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gipa69
collegio dei patafisici
Zimbabwe: Best Performing Stock Market in 2007?
By John Paul Koning
Posted on 4/10/2007
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CNBC and other stock market tabloids are notorious for making simplistic linkages between the stock market and gross domestic product (GDP). They tell us that any event that stimulates GDP growth inevitably drives stock prices up, and any event that hurts GDP growth pushes stocks down.
Since the largest share of GDP is consumption, consumer demand becomes the all-important figure driving growth. When the consumer gets too excited, the Fed must step in to cool them down with interest-rate hikes. When the consumer isn't spending, Fed interest-rate cuts stimulate demand.
The tragedy currently occurring in Zimbabwe completely contradicts this sort of logic. Zimbabwe is in the middle of an economic disintegration, with GDP declining for the seventh consecutive year, half what it was in 2000. Ever since President Mugabe's disastrous land-reform campaign (an entire article in itself), the country's farming, tourism, and gold sectors have collapsed. Unemployment is said to be near 80%.
Yet something odd is happening.
The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (the ZSE) is the best performing stock exchange in the world, the key Zimbabwe Industrials Index up some 595% since the beginning of the year and 12,000% over twelve months. This jump in share prices is far in excess of increases in consumer prices. While the country is crumbling, the Zimbabwean share speculator is keeping up much better than the typical Zimbabwean on the street.
CNBC logic fails to explain the coincidence of a rising ZSE and collapsing GDP because it entirely ignores the monetary side of the economy. At this point Austrian economics makes its contribution to our story. According to Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT), the peak-trough-peak pattern that economies demonstrate is not their natural state, but one created by excess growth in money supply and credit. New money is not simply parachuted to everyone equally and at the same time — it is sluiced into the economy at certain initial "entry points." From these entry points, a number of initial goods are bought by recipients of new money causing a rise in price for these initial goods relative to other goods.
Because entrepreneurs react to this observed but unjustified change in the structure of prices by investing their capital, misallocation occurs. As money-supply growth continues and prices become more contorted, more and more ventures are undertaken that would not be undertaken in a regime without money-supply growth. When, for whatever the reason, money supply finally contracts, the artificial strength in prices that encouraged unprofitable ventures is removed, prices collapse, and large numbers of ventures go bankrupt. Thus we have the recession part of the business cycle, the simultaneous failure of many firms at the same time.
If, as the Austrian theory states, money enters the economy at certain points, it is likely that a nation's stock market will become a prime beneficiary of any monetary expansion. Fresh money enters the economy first through banks and other financial entities who may invest it in shares, or lend it to others who buy shares. Thus stock prices rise relative to prices of things like food and clothes and will outperform as long as this monetary process is allowed to continue.
This is what we are seeing in Zimbabwe. With the country suffering from Mugabe's catastrophic policies, increasingly the only means for the government to fund itself has been money-supply growth. This has only exacerbated the economy's problems. The flood of new money that authorities have created has caused the existing value of money in circulation to plummet, i.e., the prices of all sorts of goods to explode, some rising more than others.
As prices become more misaligned, basic decision-making abilities of normal Zimbabweans are impaired and the day-to-day functioning of the economy deteriorates. Perversely, all of this has forced the government to issue even more currency to make up for budget shortfalls and to buy support. At last measure, the country's consumer price index was rising (i.e., the purchasing power of currency declining), at a rate of 1,729% a year.
The ZSE is growing some three times faster than consumer prices. This relative outperformance versus general prices is a result of stocks being a chief entry point for the flood of newly created money. Keep Zimbabwean dollars in your pocket, and they've already lost a chunk of their value by the next day. Putting money in the bank, where rates are pithy, is not much better. Investing in government bonds is the equivalent of financial suicide. Converting wealth into foreign currency is difficult; hard currency is scarce, and strict rules limit exchangeability.
As for capital improvements, there is little incentive on the part of companies to invest in their already-losing enterprises since economic prospects look so bleak. Very few havens exist for people to hide their wealth from the evils created by Mugabe's policies. Like compressed air looking for an exit, money is pouring into shares of ZSE-listed firms like banker Old Mutual, hotel group Meikles Africa, and mobile phone firm Econet Wireless. It is the only place to go. Thus the 12,000% year over year increase in the Zimbabwe Industrials.
Our Zimbabwe example, though extreme, demonstrates how changes in stock prices can be driven by monetary conditions, and not changes in GDP. New money gets spent or invested. In Zimbabwe's case, because there are no alternatives, it is stocks that are benefiting.
This sort of thinking can be applied to the stock markets in the Western world too. Though western central banks have not been printing nearly as fast as their Zimbabwe counterpart, they do have a long history of increasing the money supply. It forces one to ask how much of the growth in Western stock markets over the preceding twenty-five years has been created by a vastly increasing money supply, and how much is due to actual wealth creation. Perhaps stock prices have increased faster than goods prices for the last twenty-five years because, as in Zimbabwe, Western stock markets have become one of the principal entry points for newly printed currency.
By John Paul Koning
Posted on 4/10/2007
[Subscribe at email services, tell others, or Digg this story.]
CNBC and other stock market tabloids are notorious for making simplistic linkages between the stock market and gross domestic product (GDP). They tell us that any event that stimulates GDP growth inevitably drives stock prices up, and any event that hurts GDP growth pushes stocks down.
Since the largest share of GDP is consumption, consumer demand becomes the all-important figure driving growth. When the consumer gets too excited, the Fed must step in to cool them down with interest-rate hikes. When the consumer isn't spending, Fed interest-rate cuts stimulate demand.
The tragedy currently occurring in Zimbabwe completely contradicts this sort of logic. Zimbabwe is in the middle of an economic disintegration, with GDP declining for the seventh consecutive year, half what it was in 2000. Ever since President Mugabe's disastrous land-reform campaign (an entire article in itself), the country's farming, tourism, and gold sectors have collapsed. Unemployment is said to be near 80%.
Yet something odd is happening.
The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (the ZSE) is the best performing stock exchange in the world, the key Zimbabwe Industrials Index up some 595% since the beginning of the year and 12,000% over twelve months. This jump in share prices is far in excess of increases in consumer prices. While the country is crumbling, the Zimbabwean share speculator is keeping up much better than the typical Zimbabwean on the street.
CNBC logic fails to explain the coincidence of a rising ZSE and collapsing GDP because it entirely ignores the monetary side of the economy. At this point Austrian economics makes its contribution to our story. According to Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT), the peak-trough-peak pattern that economies demonstrate is not their natural state, but one created by excess growth in money supply and credit. New money is not simply parachuted to everyone equally and at the same time — it is sluiced into the economy at certain initial "entry points." From these entry points, a number of initial goods are bought by recipients of new money causing a rise in price for these initial goods relative to other goods.
Because entrepreneurs react to this observed but unjustified change in the structure of prices by investing their capital, misallocation occurs. As money-supply growth continues and prices become more contorted, more and more ventures are undertaken that would not be undertaken in a regime without money-supply growth. When, for whatever the reason, money supply finally contracts, the artificial strength in prices that encouraged unprofitable ventures is removed, prices collapse, and large numbers of ventures go bankrupt. Thus we have the recession part of the business cycle, the simultaneous failure of many firms at the same time.
If, as the Austrian theory states, money enters the economy at certain points, it is likely that a nation's stock market will become a prime beneficiary of any monetary expansion. Fresh money enters the economy first through banks and other financial entities who may invest it in shares, or lend it to others who buy shares. Thus stock prices rise relative to prices of things like food and clothes and will outperform as long as this monetary process is allowed to continue.
This is what we are seeing in Zimbabwe. With the country suffering from Mugabe's catastrophic policies, increasingly the only means for the government to fund itself has been money-supply growth. This has only exacerbated the economy's problems. The flood of new money that authorities have created has caused the existing value of money in circulation to plummet, i.e., the prices of all sorts of goods to explode, some rising more than others.
As prices become more misaligned, basic decision-making abilities of normal Zimbabweans are impaired and the day-to-day functioning of the economy deteriorates. Perversely, all of this has forced the government to issue even more currency to make up for budget shortfalls and to buy support. At last measure, the country's consumer price index was rising (i.e., the purchasing power of currency declining), at a rate of 1,729% a year.
The ZSE is growing some three times faster than consumer prices. This relative outperformance versus general prices is a result of stocks being a chief entry point for the flood of newly created money. Keep Zimbabwean dollars in your pocket, and they've already lost a chunk of their value by the next day. Putting money in the bank, where rates are pithy, is not much better. Investing in government bonds is the equivalent of financial suicide. Converting wealth into foreign currency is difficult; hard currency is scarce, and strict rules limit exchangeability.
As for capital improvements, there is little incentive on the part of companies to invest in their already-losing enterprises since economic prospects look so bleak. Very few havens exist for people to hide their wealth from the evils created by Mugabe's policies. Like compressed air looking for an exit, money is pouring into shares of ZSE-listed firms like banker Old Mutual, hotel group Meikles Africa, and mobile phone firm Econet Wireless. It is the only place to go. Thus the 12,000% year over year increase in the Zimbabwe Industrials.
Our Zimbabwe example, though extreme, demonstrates how changes in stock prices can be driven by monetary conditions, and not changes in GDP. New money gets spent or invested. In Zimbabwe's case, because there are no alternatives, it is stocks that are benefiting.
This sort of thinking can be applied to the stock markets in the Western world too. Though western central banks have not been printing nearly as fast as their Zimbabwe counterpart, they do have a long history of increasing the money supply. It forces one to ask how much of the growth in Western stock markets over the preceding twenty-five years has been created by a vastly increasing money supply, and how much is due to actual wealth creation. Perhaps stock prices have increased faster than goods prices for the last twenty-five years because, as in Zimbabwe, Western stock markets have become one of the principal entry points for newly printed currency.
gipa69
collegio dei patafisici
Fleursdumal ha scritto:meglio ripeterla fino alla noia sta cosa : chi si imbarca in una posizione qualsiasi sui derivati sottocapitalizzato e senza un piano per le emergenze è destinato a soccombere sempre
Aggiungiamo qualche altra regola interessante anche se forse non tutte valgono per tutti:
Earlier this month a member sent me a copy of Trading Rules: Strategies For Success by William F. Eng. And, I have to say, I found myself enjoying the book quite a lot and I highly recommend it. Mr. Eng covers 50 rules and most of them are real gems:
1. Divide your trading capital into ten equal risk segments
2. Use a two-step order process
3. Don't overtrade
4. Never let a profit turn into a loss
5. Trade with the trend
6. If you don't know what's going on, don't do anything
7. Tips don't make you any money
8. Use the right order to get into the markets
9. Don't be whimsical about closing out your trades
10. Withdraw a portion of your profits
11. Don't buy a stock only to obtain a dividend
12. Don't average your losses
13. Take big profits and small losses
14. Go for the long pull as an outside speculator
15. Sell shorts as often as you go long
16. Don't buy something because it is low priced
17. Pyramid correctly, if at all
18. Decrease your trading after a series of successes
19. Don't formulate new opinions during market hours
20. Don't follow the crowd - they are usually wrong
21. Don't watch or trade too many markets at once
22. Buy the rumor, sell the fact
23. Take windfall profits when you get them
24. Keep charts current
25. Preserve your capital
26. Nothing new ever occurs in the markets
27. Money cannot be made every day from the markets
28. Back your opinions with cash when they are confirmed by market action
29. Markets are never wrong, opinions often are
30. A good trade is profitable right from the start
31. As long as a market is acting right, don't rush to take profits
32. Never permit speculative ventures to turn into investments
33. Don't try to predetermine your profits
34. Never buy a stock because it has a big decline from its previous high, nor sell a stock because it is high priced
35. Become a buyer as soon as a stock makes new highs after a normal reaction
36. The human side of every person is the greatest enemy to successful trading
37. Ban wishful thinking in the markets
38. Big movements take time to develop
39. Don't be too curious about the reasons behind the moves
40. Look for reasonable profits
41. If you can't make money trading the leading issues, you aren't going to make it trading the overall markets
42. Leaders of today may not be the leaders of tomorrow
43. Trade the active stocks and futures
44. Avoid discretionary accounts and partnership trading accounts
45. Bear markets have no supports and bull markets have no resistance
46. The smarter you are, the longer it takes
47. It is harder to get out of a trade than to get into one
48. Don't talk about what you're doing in the markets
49. When time is up, markets must reverse
50. Control what you can, manage what you cannot
ditropan
Forumer storico
dan24 ha scritto:buongiorno Rekkie
493K Aud/usd media 0,82663
460K euro/yen media 159,89etcetc
un eurostox 4226
l'aud/usd la sta facendo fuori dal vaso....va beeee soffriamo
giorno dan ... porka puttana ladra !!! Ad 8300 di aud glie ne ho tirati altri 3 ... che gran fetenti ! Sembra di rivedere l euro yen di qualche mese fà !
dan24
Forumer storico
Index eurostox
hammer e contro hammer....sti quazzi...
dopo lo sforamento del max di febbraio e dopo che ieri ci son tornati sotto...chiudono precisi sul max stesso...
vediamo oggi se confermano il recupero o meno...
intanto nikkey -1,10% anche stanotte....sta facendo strada a se...pur con uno yen così debole non riesce a rimbalzare....
hammer e contro hammer....sti quazzi...
dopo lo sforamento del max di febbraio e dopo che ieri ci son tornati sotto...chiudono precisi sul max stesso...
vediamo oggi se confermano il recupero o meno...
intanto nikkey -1,10% anche stanotte....sta facendo strada a se...pur con uno yen così debole non riesce a rimbalzare....
dan24
Forumer storico
Aud/usd fa impressione veramente...l'ipercomprato daily nun gli basta per girarsi...il canale superiore chiama pure 0,84...sti quazzi...per me era arrivato pips meno pips più...invece mi sta facendo patire più del dovuto sta maialaaaa di cross...mi trasferisco tra il jappone e l'australia..sto decidendo
e che quazzo ritorni a 0,8210 sono graditi
Euro/yen
pare aver trovato una resistenza in area 160,85 che ha ritestato stanotte.....ma non trova neanche la forza di scendere e tornare sotto i 160. Per me un ritracciamento in area 159 è sempre possibile nel breve....vedremo...
e che quazzo ritorni a 0,8210 sono graditi
Euro/yen
pare aver trovato una resistenza in area 160,85 che ha ritestato stanotte.....ma non trova neanche la forza di scendere e tornare sotto i 160. Per me un ritracciamento in area 159 è sempre possibile nel breve....vedremo...
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