Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti Dubai, le entità "government-related" ed il supporto che potrebbe non arrivare... (3 lettori)

Imark

Forumer storico
Dubai, un'altra situazione interessante. Comincio dal recuperare il materiale lasciato sul FOL, dove una domanda di Kylix apriva spazio ad alcune valutazioni mie e di altri.

Siamo al 21 aprile 2008, 1 anno fa...

Riscontro un'improvvisa caduta dei corsi ora a 90,46. Qualcuno ne conosce i motivi?
DUBAI HOLDING
xs0285303821
30.1.2014 4,75%

Il Dubai sembra impegnato in una massiccia raccolta di liquidità attraverso l'emissione di debito ... a finanziamento di corposi progetti di realizzazione di infrastrutture e di nuova espansione edilizia ... andrebbe visto se la cosa possa avere conseguenze sui rating sovrani...

Da profano mi chiedo se sia tutto oro quello che luccica dietro questo lungo boom immobiliare... nutro una istintiva diffidenza...

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=a1SG2q_w8fkE&refer=europe
http://www.selectproperty.com/inves...rket-to-finance-infrastructure-projects-1043/
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Il 10 ottobre 2008, un altro passo avanti in questa vicenda, quando le agenzie si accorgono che il debito di Dubai è in decollo verticale...

Il Dubai sembra impegnato in una massiccia raccolta di liquidità attraverso l'emissione di debito ... a finanziamento di corposi progetti di realizzazione di infrastrutture e di nuova espansione edilizia ... andrebbe visto se la cosa possa avere conseguenze sui rating sovrani...

Da profano mi chiedo se sia tutto oro quello che luccica dietro questo lungo boom immobiliare... nutro una istintiva diffidenza...

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=a1SG2q_w8fkE&refer=europe
http://www.selectproperty.com/inves...rket-to-finance-infrastructure-projects-1043/

Oggi se ne accorge anche Moody's... ;) Il debito di entità governative facenti capo a Dubai è arrivato ad eccedere il 100% del PIL nazionale del 2006...

Moody's assesses core components and risk factors of Dubai Inc.

Dubai's potential reliance on the Federation and Abu Dhabi could be at its most significant over the coming years

DIFC, October 13, 2008 -- Dubai's corporatist business model has played a central part in the emirate's economic transformation over the past decade, says Moody's Investors Service in a new Special Comment released today. At the same time, a systemic increase in debt to finance this transformation has resulted in growing contingent liabilities to the government and the need for greater analytical emphasis on federal support when assessing creditworthiness amongst Dubai government-owned entities.

Moody's publication entitled "Demystifying Dubai Inc. -- A Guide to Dubai's Corporatist Model and Moody's Assessment of its rising Leverage" offers a comprehensive examination of the various corporate layers that make up Dubai's government-controlled system, which Moody's defines according to the function of the corporations and their relative maturity. The report also assesses the risk factors that determine credit ratings amongst Dubai's government-related issuers (GRI), as well as the role of Abu Dhabi and the federal government in Moody's criteria for identifying government support.

"In realising Dubai's growth programme, the city is run according to a corporatist model, whereby the government represented by Dubai's Ruler and a number of core Executives oversee the operations of large state-owned enterprises that dominate each economic sector", says Philipp Lotter, Dubai (DIFC) based Senior Vice President at Moody's Middle East Limited and co-author of the report. "While this system has proved successful to date, cumulative liabilities are currently rising faster than investments are able to generate returns, which increases Dubai's medium term susceptibility to execution risks and necessitates a clear understanding of wider implicit federal support when rating key government-backed corporations", Lotter adds.

Moody's report elaborates on Dubai's recent history and the acceleration of its economic transformation, supported by a model of state-run capitalism where the boundaries between government, the ruling family and private enterprise are fluid.

"In most countries there are identifiable delineations between the public and private sectors", says Tristan Cooper, Dubai (DIFC) based Vice President at Moody's Middle East Limited and co-author of the report. "In Dubai, however, the state corporatist model plus the fact that the Ruler and his closest relatives form the core of the government make it difficult to draw such distinctions", Cooper adds.

Moody's publication defines the various components of Dubai's corporatist model into seven distinct categories: In addition to the central government, which is dwarfed in both liabilities and revenues by the corporations it owns, Moody's categories include "The Holdings", "The National Champions", "The Embryonic Entities", "The Quasi-Government Authorities", "The Service Providers" and "The Financial Investors".

Moody's also examines the rise in debt at various state-owned corporations, which are considered contingent liabilities of the government, given the close relationship between the central government and the large corporations that it owns, and the resulting uplift that GRI-ratings obtain from implied government support.

"Moody's has conservatively identified in excess of USD 47 billion in liabilities at various government-related companies, which represents more than 100% of Dubai's 2006 gross domestic product", Philipp Lotter states. "We believe that leverage raised primarily through state-owned corporations will continue to grow faster than GDP for at least the next 5 years, during which the Emirate's susceptibility towards execution, financing and geopolitical risks will be at its most pronounced", Lotter adds.

Given the rise in contingent liabilities, Moody's analysis of government-related issuers in Dubai places growing emphasis on the willingness and ability of the federal government and Abu Dhabi as the largest and wealthiest of the seven emirates to support Dubai-based GRI's, in addition to Dubai's own willingness and ability to support.

"We would expect a high level of support from the federal government and/or Abu Dhabi at least for other Emirate governments and, in all likelihood, the most important publicly owned financial institutions and corporations throughout the UAE's seven Emirates, although we consider each case carefully on its own merits", explains Tristan Cooper.

Moody's Special Comment "Demystifying Dubai Inc. -- A Guide to Dubai's Corporatist Model and Moody's Assessment of its rising Leverage" is available now on Moodys.com.
 

Imark

Forumer storico
La cosa innescava qualche valutazione fra i forumisti, ed il 13 ottobre 2008, così si commentava.

Per fortuna che hanno il petrolio (anche se non molto mi sembra) se fanno la fine dell'islanda

Temo avessero puntato molto su finanza ed edilizia ... ci sta che il loro PIL vada a sgonfiarsi negli anni a venire, sia in conseguenza del fatto che questi due business, per come messi su a Dubai, andranno incontro ad una contrazione, in conseguenza del rallentamento globale, ed anche per i ridotti introiti petroliferi degli stati vicini ... il debito emesso, invece, credo si ridurrà più gradualmente.... ;)
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Lo scetticismo aleggiava abbondante in quei giorni anche fra altri forumisti, alcuni dei quali oggi molto presenti su IO :)lol: :lol:)

stessa domanda ke mi sono fatto ieri quando leggendo la stampa ho trovato un'articolo pubblicitario ke promuoveva la vendita di app a dubai....con rendimenti del 10 %
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Un'offerta inadeguata....gia' adesso i loro bond "rendono" di piu'
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http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4sAgqSD_LIA
The cost of insuring Dubai Holding's bonds has increased nearly four-fold since May, according to traders of credit default swaps. Credit-default swaps on Dubai Holding Commercial Operations traded at 679.3 basis points on Oct. 10, up from 172.99 at the beginning of May, CMA Datavision prices show.

The company's $500 million of 10-year notes due 2017 fell 2.2 percent today, raising the yield to a record 13.1 percent, Bloomberg data shows

a me parevan matti anche 5 anni fa quando stavano imiziando

se ci vai una volta non ci torni piu`nemmeno dipinto

a meno che no facciano come montecarlo,residenza esentasse
(e non controllino pero`poi i consumi acqua e corrente per veder se uno ci va davvero)


Mah:Condivido la Tua perplessità: sono stato di recente a Dubai ed ho visto selve di gru e di palazzi INVENDUTI con striscioni appesi onde invitare la gente all' acquisto o all' affitto.. sopratutto(ma non solo, anzi!) in zona Sharjah;quindi non lo so veramente se sia "tutto oro quello che luccica".
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(Quello che è certo che c'era un caldo infame
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Imark

Forumer storico
Il 25 novembre 2008, così commentavo...

Intanto la situazione prende una piega islandese, per così dire e fatti i debiti distinguo: Dubai si accinge a nazionalizzare e a fondere fra loro alcune holding finanziarie e a fare disclosure su quella che il Times Online definisca "previously secretive finances".

Viene fuori che il debito publico è ad un 148% del PIL annuo ed in termini assoluti a 40.000 $ per abitante...

Il boom immobiliare di Dubai pare avviato ad un inesorabile hard landing.

Il governo degli Emirati Arabi Uniti (che comprendono Dubai e vedono quale emirato predominante Abu Dhabi) pare intenzionato ad intervenire investendo in una banca nella quale saranno concentrate e fuse alcune delle istituzioni e dei veicoli finanziari di Dubai attivi nel prestito immobiliare.

November 25, 2008
Dubai discloses details to assuage fears

David Robertson in Dubai

The Government of Dubai has moved to protect its economy from a looming crisis of confidence by disclosing details of its previously secretive finances, merging and nationalising financial groups and putting the brakes on its property market.

Mohamed Alabbar, a member of Dubai's executive council and chairman of Emaar Properties, said yesterday that the emirate's borrowings were $10 billion (£6.6 billion) and that state-affiliated companies owed a further $70 billion. Dubai's GDP was 198 billion United Arab Emirates dirhams (£35.6billion), which means that the ratio of its debt to gross domestic product is 148 per cent, compared with 57 per cent in the United States, 40 per cent in Britain and 99 per cent in Japan. It equates to a per capita debt of about $40,000 per head if split among Dubai's two million population.

This was the first time that a member of the Government has confirmed the city-state's financial situation and it came as speculation has mounted that a heavily indebted Dubai would be forced to sell assets to Abu Dhabi, its rich neighbour, to prevent defaults.

Dubai has borrowed to finance its infrastructure and construction boom and companies such as Dubai World, which owns P&O ports, and Emirates Airline have accumulated large debts during a period of rapid growth.

Concern over the level of debt held by the Government and its affiliated companies has sent jitters throughout the Gulf region. Dubai's stock market is down 60 per cent this year and many residents believe that the property market is on the brink of collapse.

The Government of Dubai is seeking to calm nerves by publicly supporting its companies, banks and economy through measures that include opening up about the level of indebtedness.

Mr Alabbar said that Dubai's debt of $10 billion compared with sovereign assets of $90 billion while its companies owed $70 billion against assets of $270 billion. “The Government can and will meet all its obligations going forward,” he said. “Dubai's borrowing is not being used to cover expenditure or to provide subsistence, it is funding our long-term infrastructure development.”

Mr Alabbar, who was speaking at the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) conference, added that the Government would support companies that got into financial difficulty because of the credit crisis. Mr Alabbar is head of a committee that has been set up to handle Dubai's response to the global economic crisis and his comments are effectively a government guarantee. On Sunday the committee forced through the merger of several struggling banks to maintain liquidity within the Dubai market.

Tamweel and Amlak Finance, both mortgage lenders, UAE Real Estate and Emirates International have been merged into a single vehicle — the Emirates Development Bank.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates, the federation of seven states that includes Dubai, has agreed to invest in this new bank in order to stabilise its balance sheet. The intervention of the UAE Government is considered particularly significant in the Gulf as the individual emirates have traditionally been largely independent.

The UAE Government is dominated by Abu Dhabi, the richest of the emirates, and its involvement is thought to be a signal to worried banks and investors that the vast wealth of Abu Dhabi is now implicitly supporting Dubai.

Mr Alabbar also said that Dubai's largest companies would have to work together to find a way through the economic difficulties, particularly in the property sector.

Mr Alabbar's Emaar, which is building the Burj Dubai, the world's tallest building, will collaborate with Nakheel, which built the palm islands off the Dubai coast, and Dubai Holdings, the Government's property unit. The three companies control 70 per cent of Dubai's property development industry, but will be allowed to work together to limit supply and prevent the market from being flooded with new apartments.

Mr Alabbar said: “We have to recognise the reality on the ground and work differently. We have to collaborate and in time, in the future, we can be competitors again.”

There were calls at the DIFC conference for Arab nations to use their wealth to bargain for a more prominent position in global affairs. Western leaders have asked Arab nations to use their sovereign wealth funds to support the global economy and many in the Middle East believe that their countries should join an expanded G7 to reflect their greater contribution.
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Devo ammettere che non l'ho poi più seguita, fino alle notizie odierne, quando arriva una messa in osservazione del rating dei bond da parte di queste entità semigovernative, da parte di S&P, per ridurlo se il governo di Dubai non avrà affermato di voler dare supporto al debito contratto da tali soggetti.

Per come è raccontata dall'agenzia, la vicenda ha un sapore un po' levantino, ma cmq preoccupante: S&P viene a sapere dai media che una controllata operativa di una primaria agenzia governativa di proprietà del governo di Dubai (Dubai World) sta valutando con i propri creditori una ristrutturazione di un proprio sukuk (bond islamico) in scadenza a dicembre 2009.

Prova allora a chiedere in giro cosa sta succedendo: contatta Dubai World, e le dicono che tutte le opzioni sono possibili, inclusa la ristrutturazione, poi contattano il governo di Dubai, e questo si dichiara non in grado di assicurare che non ci saranno ristrutturazioni del debito da parte delle agenzie di proprietà del governo, nè che gli obblighi contratti da tali soggetti saranno adempiuti in pieno con riguardo ai creditori e nelle maniere concordate inizialmente... :-o

A questo punto, sebbene Dubai World sia un'agenzia controllata dal governo non rateata, S&P si sente in dovere di mettere sotto osservazione il rating di quelle che invece sono rateate :)lol:) visto che per esse il rating è stato accordato sull'assunto di un sostegno pieno da parte del governo in caso fosse necessario per tenere fede agli impegni verso i creditori.

S&P ci tiene a precisare che non è che se la sono inventata loro questa faccenda del supporto: gli è stata più volte affermata da alti funzionari del governo di Dubai :)D) e chiaramente ci si attende che si manifesti, questo supporto, in momenti di difficoltà (giacché, quando le cose vanno bene, non ce ne é bisogno...:-o)

E conclude: la riduzione dei rating, può riguardare una o più di queste agenzie ed essere anche di più livelli, dipendendo da cosa ci verrà detto sul supporto che si intende dare da parte del governo in ciascun caso specifico ... :cool:

Ratings On Dubai Government-Related Entities Put On Creditwatch Negative On Uncertainty Over Government Support

DUBAI (Standard & Poor's) April 30, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services today said it had placed the ratings on the following Dubai-based government-related entities (GREs) on CreditWatch with negative implications: DIFC Investments LLC, DP World Ltd., Jebel Ali Free Zone (FZE), the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre Authority (DMCC), Dubai Holding Commercial Operations Group LLC (DHCOG), and Emaar Properties PJSC (collectively, "the Rated GREs").

In addition, we placed the notes issued by Thor Asset Purchase (Cayman) Ltd. (Thor), which are securitized by cash flows from a revolving pool of existing and future receivables originated by Dubai Electricity and Water Authority (DEWA; not rated), as well as the notes issued by JAFZ Sukuk Ltd. (collectively, "The Notes"), on CreditWatch with negative implications (see Ratings List below).

"The CreditWatch placements reflect our opinion of the likelihood of
downgrades of the Rated GREs and The Notes if the potential for extraordinary government support to the Rated GREs and The Notes is not affirmed by the government of Dubai," Standard & Poor's credit analyst Farouk Soussa said.

"The need for Dubai government support is potentially increasing in the face of deteriorating fundamentals for some of the Rated GREs."

The action results from our learning that a review of debt strategy at Nakheel (not rated), a material subsidiary of government-owned Dubai World (also not rated) and a key Dubai-based GRE, may include the possibility of a debt exchange.

Recent media reports indicate that Nakheel is opening a dialogue with existing holders of its $3.5 billion sukuk coming due in December 2009, with a view to restructuring the debt.

Standard & Poor's has discussed these reports with Dubai World and has been told that "all options" in dealing with outstanding liabilities are being considered as part of an ongoing review, including a restructuring.

Standard & Poor's has also invited comment from the government of Dubai, which has declined to either refute the possibility of a debt restructuring at any of its Rated GREs or to provide clear assurances that all debt obligations of the Rated GREs will be met in a full and timely manner as per their original terms.

The primary reason the mere possibility of a debt restructuring in an unrated Dubai-based GRE has been sufficient to trigger a review of all our Rated GREs and The Notes is due to the fact that such a possibility stands at odds with our prior expectation that the government of Dubai is committed to providing extraordinary support to its key GREs, including the Rated GREs, in order to allow them to service their respective obligations in a full and timely manner.

This expectation is based in part on repeated representations to Standard & Poor's and to the public by senior government officials and other highly placed individuals, that the government of Dubai is committed to providing such extraordinary support.

In accordance with our published criteria, a GRE is rated between the inclusive bounds formed by the GRE's stand-alone credit profile and the government rating, with the placement along this rating spectrum a function of our assessment of the potential for extraordinary government support (see "Rating Government-Related Entities: A Primer," published on June 14, 2006, on RatingsDirect).

All of the Rated GREs reflect government creditworthiness more than stand-alone credit profiles, though this may shift should the government's support commitment ebbs. In our view, the consideration of a debt restructuring in any key GRE, particularly if it were deemed to be "distressed", increases the uncertainty as to Dubai's intention to provide adequate support in times of stress.

"At this stage, we have not had confirmation as to Nakheel or the government's intentions with respect to Nakheel's outstanding sukuk. The CreditWatch placement will hold for the duration of our review, which will focus on confirming these intentions, and then assessing the impact this may or may not have on our view of the likelihood of extraordinary government support with respect to The Notes, and each Rated GRE and its respective obligations," Mr. Soussa said.

"We will resolve the CreditWatch placement once the analysis is complete. There is a significant likelihood that the review may result in the downgrade of one or more Rated GREs or The Notes by one or more notches, depending on our assessment of the likelihood of support on a case-by-case basis, and on the stand-alone creditworthiness of each Rated GRE and its respective obligations."

.......
 

lorenzo63

Age quod Agis
Ieri sul Wsj

è apparso un articolo sempre su Dubai (che nn ho postato in attesa di Mark che terminasse il lavoro dii recupero da FOL)
Parlando di uno dei miei viaggi (attrono a aprile maggio 2008) che postai su Fol descrissi già una situazione quantomeno preoccupante: decine e decine di torri (palazzi) in stile moderno acciai vetri etc. che recavano striscioni enormi appesi, recanti scritte: for sale, for rent etc. Tantissimi.
Ulteriori viaggi nell' area confermarono una situazione (anche per via delle chiaccherate) in deciso peggioramento...
L' apparire qui e là (anche su Onvista) di pubblicità che promette ritorni mirabolanti sugli investimenti (IMHO) è fonte di ulteriori preoccupazioni..ovvero il mio "naso" mi dice che l'uovo è marcio...


L'articolo sotto in realtà a parte qualche dettaglio, non aggiunge poi molto, ma il fatto che se ne parli...


Green shoots in the desert? Not so fast. Hopes that Dubai's economy was recovering have been dashed by Standard & Poor's putting six government-related entities on negative watch ahead of possible downgrades to "junk." That raises fresh doubts over Dubai's ability to raise funds on international markets and the possibility it will need another bailout from Abu Dhabi.

The S&P move is a shock after recent statements from Dubai officials that the emirate's financial difficulties were under control. Earlier this year, Dubai secured a $20 billion bailout underwritten by the Abu Dhabi-based central bank. Abu Dhabi has released the first $10 billion, with international investors expected to provide the rest.

But Dubai's problems could be worse than initially thought. What prompted the S&P decision was confirmation that real-estate developer Nakheel and parent company Dubai World may have to restructure debts amid plummeting revenue. Foreign contractors also have complained of delays in payment.

Bankers say the S&P action was priced into the market for Nakheel. But this latest blow is bound to make international investors more wary of subscribing to the second half of the $20 billion emergency bond program.

That could force Dubai to return to Abu Dhabi for the rest of the money. But its larger neighbor has its own problems. Its sovereign-wealth funds are losing money. Mubadala Development Co. lost more than $3 billion last year. And with oil around $50 a barrel, Abu Dhabi will have to dip into foreign reserves to help its federal partners.

In the desert, green shoots often turn out to be mirages
 

whitesoul9

Forumer storico
Dubai Holding Commercial OperaEO-Med.-T. Notes 2007(14)

Qualcuno sa dirci qualcosa su questa obbligazione isin XS0285303821 ?
Siamo all'azzardo puro o in qualche modo si può contare sulla crescita economica di Dubai?
 

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