Portafogli e Strategie (investimento) Investment Grade, entro le frontiere conosciute.
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waltermasoni
Caribbean Trader
waltermasoni
Caribbean Trader
Fitch Affirms France at 'AA'; Outlook Stable
20 JUL 2018 4:03 PM ET
Fitch Ratings-London-20 July 2018: Fitch Ratings has affirmed France's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'AA' with a Stable Outlook.
A full list of rating actions is at the end of this rating action commentary.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
France's ratings are underpinned by a large, wealthy and diversified economy, strong and effective civil and social institutions and a track record of macro-financial stability. Nevertheless public finances, although gradually improving, remain a rating weakness relative to the 'AA' category. The ratings also benefit from strong financial flexibility, helped by the ultra-loose financing conditions prevailing in the eurozone, and the access to deep and liquid capital markets as a core eurozone member.
The cyclical improvement of public finances has continued since the last rating review in January 2018, predominantly driven by higher than expected tax revenues. The budget deficit declined to 2.6% of GDP in 2017, the lowest since 2007, and Fitch forecasts a 2.3% deficit this year. France exited the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the corrective arm of the EU's fiscal rule, in June 2018, based on the European Commission's assessment that the budget deficit will remain below 3% of GDP over the medium term.
In the latest Stability Programme the government presented a path of continued structural adjustments that would lead to a balanced headline budget by 2022. The latest fiscal plan (Report prior to the public finance policy debate, published on 29 June), contains 3pp of GDP expenditure cuts by 2022, while revenues would fall by 1.0pp. However, the government has not yet published its Public Action 2022 document, which as part of the structural reform agenda should detail the fiscal measures on the expenditure side.
General government gross debt (GGGD) remains very high at 97% of GDP at the end of 2017, compared with the 'AA' current median of 38%. GGGD likely peaked in 2017, but the decline will be slow over the medium term, partly due to the SNCF debt transfer, expected to reach EUR35 billion (1.6% of GDP) by 2022. According to Fitch's baseline debt dynamics scenario, GGGD will remain above 90% of GDP over the next decade, thus risks stemming from high debt will prevail for a longer period.
GDP growth slowed in 1Q18 to 0.2% qoq after buoyant quarterly growth, on average 0.7% during 2017, according to revised national accounts. High frequency data indicates only a modest pick-up in 2Q18 after the impact of adverse temporary factors fade.
The labour market improvement also stalled in 1Q18 after strong job creation in 2017. 300,000 new jobs were created in 2017 and the employment growth rate reached 1.3% in 4Q17. The temporary increase in the unemployment rate in 1Q18 to 8.9% is mainly due to changing labour regulations and the expiry of tax incentives for hiring at the end of 2017. Beyond the short-term volatility, Fitch forecast the declining trend of the unemployment rate to continue and fall to 8% by 2020. Nevertheless the unemployment rate is persistently higher than the 'AA' and 'AAA' current medians of 5.2 and 5.5%, respectively.
Fitch forecast GDP growth to slow gradually from 2% in 2018 to 1.8% in 2019 and 1.6% in 2020. The assumption of the medium-term growth potential of the French economy is around 1.2%, unchanged since the last rating review. Implementation of President Macron's ambitious structural reform agenda that was launched shortly after the 2017 presidential and general elections could significantly boost growth potential. However, at the early stage of the reform implementation the quantification of the impact is highly uncertain.
The High Council for Financial Stability, the French macroprudential authority, raised the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB) from 0% to 0.25% in June 2018 in light of the continued acceleration of the financial cycle, as a positive output gap is opening up. This was a preventive measure, banks have 12 months from 1 July 2018 to comply with the new requirement, and the first increase of the CCyB among larger eurozone members. It follows the Council's May 2018 decision to limit systemic banks' exposures to the most indebted corporates to 5% of eligible capital.
The French financial sector is sound, Fitch's banking system indicator is 'a', the same as in Germany and the Netherlands (both AAA) and the UK (AA). The well-capitalised banking sector is able to meet the increasing household and corporate credit demand, while lending rates are among the lowest in the eurozone. Credit growth is approaching 6%, among the highest rates in the eurozone, and capital market activity is strong, also contributing to the smooth transmission of the loose financing conditions to the French real economy.
France's prudent debt management helps mitigate risks from high public debt. The average maturity of the central government debt is 7.8 years. The average issuing yield of medium- to long-term debt in 1H18 was 0.6%, practically unchanged from 2017. Due to the prolonged period of very benign financing conditions, the implicit interest rate on the debt portfolio fell to below 2% in 2018 from 4.8% in 2008.
France has run moderate current account deficits, which have averaged less than 1% of GDP over the last 10 years. Fitch forecasts modest, albeit growing, current account deficits to prevail in 2018 and 2019 in light of recent oil price increases and euro appreciation. Net external debt is estimated at 31% of GDP in 2017, compared with the creditor 'AA' current median position of 18%
20 JUL 2018 4:03 PM ET
Fitch Ratings-London-20 July 2018: Fitch Ratings has affirmed France's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'AA' with a Stable Outlook.
A full list of rating actions is at the end of this rating action commentary.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
France's ratings are underpinned by a large, wealthy and diversified economy, strong and effective civil and social institutions and a track record of macro-financial stability. Nevertheless public finances, although gradually improving, remain a rating weakness relative to the 'AA' category. The ratings also benefit from strong financial flexibility, helped by the ultra-loose financing conditions prevailing in the eurozone, and the access to deep and liquid capital markets as a core eurozone member.
The cyclical improvement of public finances has continued since the last rating review in January 2018, predominantly driven by higher than expected tax revenues. The budget deficit declined to 2.6% of GDP in 2017, the lowest since 2007, and Fitch forecasts a 2.3% deficit this year. France exited the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the corrective arm of the EU's fiscal rule, in June 2018, based on the European Commission's assessment that the budget deficit will remain below 3% of GDP over the medium term.
In the latest Stability Programme the government presented a path of continued structural adjustments that would lead to a balanced headline budget by 2022. The latest fiscal plan (Report prior to the public finance policy debate, published on 29 June), contains 3pp of GDP expenditure cuts by 2022, while revenues would fall by 1.0pp. However, the government has not yet published its Public Action 2022 document, which as part of the structural reform agenda should detail the fiscal measures on the expenditure side.
General government gross debt (GGGD) remains very high at 97% of GDP at the end of 2017, compared with the 'AA' current median of 38%. GGGD likely peaked in 2017, but the decline will be slow over the medium term, partly due to the SNCF debt transfer, expected to reach EUR35 billion (1.6% of GDP) by 2022. According to Fitch's baseline debt dynamics scenario, GGGD will remain above 90% of GDP over the next decade, thus risks stemming from high debt will prevail for a longer period.
GDP growth slowed in 1Q18 to 0.2% qoq after buoyant quarterly growth, on average 0.7% during 2017, according to revised national accounts. High frequency data indicates only a modest pick-up in 2Q18 after the impact of adverse temporary factors fade.
The labour market improvement also stalled in 1Q18 after strong job creation in 2017. 300,000 new jobs were created in 2017 and the employment growth rate reached 1.3% in 4Q17. The temporary increase in the unemployment rate in 1Q18 to 8.9% is mainly due to changing labour regulations and the expiry of tax incentives for hiring at the end of 2017. Beyond the short-term volatility, Fitch forecast the declining trend of the unemployment rate to continue and fall to 8% by 2020. Nevertheless the unemployment rate is persistently higher than the 'AA' and 'AAA' current medians of 5.2 and 5.5%, respectively.
Fitch forecast GDP growth to slow gradually from 2% in 2018 to 1.8% in 2019 and 1.6% in 2020. The assumption of the medium-term growth potential of the French economy is around 1.2%, unchanged since the last rating review. Implementation of President Macron's ambitious structural reform agenda that was launched shortly after the 2017 presidential and general elections could significantly boost growth potential. However, at the early stage of the reform implementation the quantification of the impact is highly uncertain.
The High Council for Financial Stability, the French macroprudential authority, raised the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB) from 0% to 0.25% in June 2018 in light of the continued acceleration of the financial cycle, as a positive output gap is opening up. This was a preventive measure, banks have 12 months from 1 July 2018 to comply with the new requirement, and the first increase of the CCyB among larger eurozone members. It follows the Council's May 2018 decision to limit systemic banks' exposures to the most indebted corporates to 5% of eligible capital.
The French financial sector is sound, Fitch's banking system indicator is 'a', the same as in Germany and the Netherlands (both AAA) and the UK (AA). The well-capitalised banking sector is able to meet the increasing household and corporate credit demand, while lending rates are among the lowest in the eurozone. Credit growth is approaching 6%, among the highest rates in the eurozone, and capital market activity is strong, also contributing to the smooth transmission of the loose financing conditions to the French real economy.
France's prudent debt management helps mitigate risks from high public debt. The average maturity of the central government debt is 7.8 years. The average issuing yield of medium- to long-term debt in 1H18 was 0.6%, practically unchanged from 2017. Due to the prolonged period of very benign financing conditions, the implicit interest rate on the debt portfolio fell to below 2% in 2018 from 4.8% in 2008.
France has run moderate current account deficits, which have averaged less than 1% of GDP over the last 10 years. Fitch forecasts modest, albeit growing, current account deficits to prevail in 2018 and 2019 in light of recent oil price increases and euro appreciation. Net external debt is estimated at 31% of GDP in 2017, compared with the creditor 'AA' current median position of 18%
waltermasoni
Caribbean Trader
Russia 'BBB-/A-3' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable
OVERVIEW
On July 20, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BBB-/A-3' foreign currency
long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on Russia, as well as its
'BBB/A-2' local currency long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings. The
outlook is stable.
OUTLOOK
The stable outlook balances the risks emanating from the renewed escalation of
geopolitical tensions against the potential for further strengthening of
Russia's public and external finances.
We may take a positive rating action on Russia in the next 24 months if its
economic recovery gathers momentum and GDP per capita trend growth reaches
rates comparable with countries at similar levels of development.
Faster-than-expected fiscal consolidation, as a result of sustained commitment
to fiscal discipline, could also support a positive rating action. Effective
measures to address long-term fiscal pressures from an aging population could
also put upward pressure on the ratings.
We could take a negative rating action should geopolitical events result in
foreign governments introducing materially tighter sanctions on Russia, for
example, on large state-owned energy companies. We could also take a negative
action if we considered there was a risk of a material deterioration in
Russia's budgetary trajectory, either due to spending pressures or the
crystallization of contingent liabilities in the banking sector or state-owned
enterprises (SOEs).
RATIONALE
The ratings are supported by Russia's commitment to conservative macroeconomic
management, its formidable net external asset position, low government debt,
and considerable monetary flexibility. The ratings are constrained by the
structural weaknesses of the Russian economy, which remains dependent on
revenues from oil and gas exports, as well as by wider institutional and
governance bottlenecks. While Russia's oil and gas sectors only make up around
8% of GDP, they still account for some 45% of total exports. Further rating
constraints include geopolitical tensions and their resulting international
sanctions that could drag on Russia's long-term economic growth prospects.
Institutional and Economic Profile: Sanctions and weak institutions constrain
growth prospects
followed by a modest 1.8% on average over 2019-2021. Russia's economic growth
will likely be supported by an ongoing global economic upswing and a moderate
recovery of domestic demand helped by improving bank lending and the
government's proposed boost to public investments. At the same time, negative
demographic trends and low productivity continue to weigh on Russia's
long-term growth potential. Structural impediments to productivity-driven
growth include the state's dominant and increasing role in the economy, the
challenging business and regulatory environment, and relatively low levels of
competition and innovation. We expect these factors will continue to constrain
Russia's pace of per capita growth, which is currently only one-half of the
average pace of growth for the sample of over 30 rated sovereigns with similar
income levels (measured by $ GDP per capita).
At the same time, Russia's macroeconomic policy framework remains, in our
view, prudent. This has allowed the economy to absorb a severe terms-of-trade
shock in 2014-2015 and to withstand the April round of U.S. sanctions, which
targeted a number of large corporates, including one of the world's largest
aluminum exporters UC Rusal. Despite the initial market reaction, the ultimate
impact of the April sanctions on macroeconomic stability has been limited. The
overall policy framework showcased the economy's resilience to renewed
external shocks given the flexible exchange rate regime, adequate capital
buffers in the banking system, and a very modest, if any, retaliatory response
from the Russian government to sanctions. In contrast to Russia's actions in
2014, when it introduced a number of trade restrictions, this time the
government focused on containing risks, and shielding the financial system and
strategically important companies from the imposition of secondary sanctions.
At the same time, the risk premium on Russian assets has increased somewhat
while sanction-related risks have prompted the Russian central bank to put its
easing cycle on hold, which will weigh on growth in the short term.
That said, we believe that the shape and timing of additional sanctions will
likely stem from Russia's foreign policy actions as well as the U.S. domestic
political debate, both of which are difficult to predict. The U.S.
administration has so far refrained from imposing harsher sanctions, including
on the oil and gas sector, and sovereign debt. Although not our baseline
scenario, we consider sanctions on either possible under the 2017 Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. We believe that such sanctions
would likely have a detrimental effect on Russia's sovereign credit quality.
At the same time, we continue to think that existing international sanctions
will remain in place through our forecast horizon. These sanctions will likely
limit Russia's trend growth and economic diversification efforts, due to high
investor uncertainty and constraints on technology transfer. Were sanctions to
be imposed on sovereign debt (which we consider to be highly unlikely), we
expect these would pertain to the flow (new issuance) rather than the stock
(outstanding holdings).
The recent re-election of President Putin has enabled the government to make a
number of ambitious policy proposals focused on boosting infrastructure and
human capital investment, productivity, and growth. Framed under the new
presidential decree, these proposals involve a number of fiscal and structural
measures and come on top of recent progress in business regulatory reforms,
which is reflected, for example, by Russia's advances in the World Bank's
"Doing Business" ranking. The new policy agenda includes challenging and
unpopular reforms--such as raising the retirement age, reducing the share of
the informal economy, tackling vested interests, and levelling the playing
field for SOEs— all of which could be instrumental in stimulating higher
growth. At the same time, we remain guarded about the prospects of a
substantial strengthening of Russia's investment climate, including
improvements in the judicial system and law enforcement, given our view of a
limited effectiveness of past reform initiatives. Also, while authorities have
regularly discussed privatization and demonopolization in the past,
implemented policies and measures point in the opposite direction, leading us
not to expect any notable reduction in the government's role in the economy.
In our view, Russia suffers from weak checks and balances between institutions
and high centralization of power. We have observed this in recent restrictive
actions toward independent mass media and elevated constraints on genuine
political participation. Although we expect macroeconomic policy continuity in
the next few years, in the longer term, the limited track record and
uncertainty surrounding the succession of power in 2024 could undermine
predictability of policy priorities.
- 20-Jul-2018 16:14 EDT
OVERVIEW
- We consider that Russia's solid external and public balance sheets,
coupled with a flexible exchange rate and prudent fiscal framework,
should enable its economy to absorb shocks from possible new
international sanctions. - We are therefore affirming our 'BBB-/A-3' foreign currency and 'BBB/A-2'
local currency sovereign credit ratings on Russia. - The outlook is stable.
On July 20, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BBB-/A-3' foreign currency
long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on Russia, as well as its
'BBB/A-2' local currency long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings. The
outlook is stable.
OUTLOOK
The stable outlook balances the risks emanating from the renewed escalation of
geopolitical tensions against the potential for further strengthening of
Russia's public and external finances.
We may take a positive rating action on Russia in the next 24 months if its
economic recovery gathers momentum and GDP per capita trend growth reaches
rates comparable with countries at similar levels of development.
Faster-than-expected fiscal consolidation, as a result of sustained commitment
to fiscal discipline, could also support a positive rating action. Effective
measures to address long-term fiscal pressures from an aging population could
also put upward pressure on the ratings.
We could take a negative rating action should geopolitical events result in
foreign governments introducing materially tighter sanctions on Russia, for
example, on large state-owned energy companies. We could also take a negative
action if we considered there was a risk of a material deterioration in
Russia's budgetary trajectory, either due to spending pressures or the
crystallization of contingent liabilities in the banking sector or state-owned
enterprises (SOEs).
RATIONALE
The ratings are supported by Russia's commitment to conservative macroeconomic
management, its formidable net external asset position, low government debt,
and considerable monetary flexibility. The ratings are constrained by the
structural weaknesses of the Russian economy, which remains dependent on
revenues from oil and gas exports, as well as by wider institutional and
governance bottlenecks. While Russia's oil and gas sectors only make up around
8% of GDP, they still account for some 45% of total exports. Further rating
constraints include geopolitical tensions and their resulting international
sanctions that could drag on Russia's long-term economic growth prospects.
Institutional and Economic Profile: Sanctions and weak institutions constrain
growth prospects
- Growth is likely to remain below that of peers, not least due to
uncertainty created by international sanctions. - Russia's macroeconomic policy framework is strong. At the same time, we
believe that implementing structural reform proposals following the
presidential election will be challenging. - A limited track record of power transfer through competitive elections
result in low visibility over power succession scenario in 2024.
followed by a modest 1.8% on average over 2019-2021. Russia's economic growth
will likely be supported by an ongoing global economic upswing and a moderate
recovery of domestic demand helped by improving bank lending and the
government's proposed boost to public investments. At the same time, negative
demographic trends and low productivity continue to weigh on Russia's
long-term growth potential. Structural impediments to productivity-driven
growth include the state's dominant and increasing role in the economy, the
challenging business and regulatory environment, and relatively low levels of
competition and innovation. We expect these factors will continue to constrain
Russia's pace of per capita growth, which is currently only one-half of the
average pace of growth for the sample of over 30 rated sovereigns with similar
income levels (measured by $ GDP per capita).
At the same time, Russia's macroeconomic policy framework remains, in our
view, prudent. This has allowed the economy to absorb a severe terms-of-trade
shock in 2014-2015 and to withstand the April round of U.S. sanctions, which
targeted a number of large corporates, including one of the world's largest
aluminum exporters UC Rusal. Despite the initial market reaction, the ultimate
impact of the April sanctions on macroeconomic stability has been limited. The
overall policy framework showcased the economy's resilience to renewed
external shocks given the flexible exchange rate regime, adequate capital
buffers in the banking system, and a very modest, if any, retaliatory response
from the Russian government to sanctions. In contrast to Russia's actions in
2014, when it introduced a number of trade restrictions, this time the
government focused on containing risks, and shielding the financial system and
strategically important companies from the imposition of secondary sanctions.
At the same time, the risk premium on Russian assets has increased somewhat
while sanction-related risks have prompted the Russian central bank to put its
easing cycle on hold, which will weigh on growth in the short term.
That said, we believe that the shape and timing of additional sanctions will
likely stem from Russia's foreign policy actions as well as the U.S. domestic
political debate, both of which are difficult to predict. The U.S.
administration has so far refrained from imposing harsher sanctions, including
on the oil and gas sector, and sovereign debt. Although not our baseline
scenario, we consider sanctions on either possible under the 2017 Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. We believe that such sanctions
would likely have a detrimental effect on Russia's sovereign credit quality.
At the same time, we continue to think that existing international sanctions
will remain in place through our forecast horizon. These sanctions will likely
limit Russia's trend growth and economic diversification efforts, due to high
investor uncertainty and constraints on technology transfer. Were sanctions to
be imposed on sovereign debt (which we consider to be highly unlikely), we
expect these would pertain to the flow (new issuance) rather than the stock
(outstanding holdings).
The recent re-election of President Putin has enabled the government to make a
number of ambitious policy proposals focused on boosting infrastructure and
human capital investment, productivity, and growth. Framed under the new
presidential decree, these proposals involve a number of fiscal and structural
measures and come on top of recent progress in business regulatory reforms,
which is reflected, for example, by Russia's advances in the World Bank's
"Doing Business" ranking. The new policy agenda includes challenging and
unpopular reforms--such as raising the retirement age, reducing the share of
the informal economy, tackling vested interests, and levelling the playing
field for SOEs— all of which could be instrumental in stimulating higher
growth. At the same time, we remain guarded about the prospects of a
substantial strengthening of Russia's investment climate, including
improvements in the judicial system and law enforcement, given our view of a
limited effectiveness of past reform initiatives. Also, while authorities have
regularly discussed privatization and demonopolization in the past,
implemented policies and measures point in the opposite direction, leading us
not to expect any notable reduction in the government's role in the economy.
In our view, Russia suffers from weak checks and balances between institutions
and high centralization of power. We have observed this in recent restrictive
actions toward independent mass media and elevated constraints on genuine
political participation. Although we expect macroeconomic policy continuity in
the next few years, in the longer term, the limited track record and
uncertainty surrounding the succession of power in 2024 could undermine
predictability of policy priorities.
waltermasoni
Caribbean Trader
Czech Republic 'AA-/A-1+' Foreign Currency And 'AA/A-1+' Local Currency Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable
OVERVIEW
- 20-Jul-2018 16:11 EDT
OVERVIEW
- We expect the Czech economy to maintain an average growth rate of 2.4%
over the next four years, while net general government debt will remain
low. - We are affirming our 'AA-/A-1+' foreign currency and 'AA/A-1+' local
currency sovereign credit ratings on the Czech Republic. - At the same time, we are converting the issuer credit ratings on the
Czech Republic and the issue ratings on Czech Republic sovereign debt to
"unsolicited." On Aug. 20, 2018, we intend to withdraw all of our issue
ratings on Czech Republic's debt. S&P Global Ratings will maintain its
ratings on Czech Republic on an unsolicited basis. - The outlook on the ratings is stable.
waltermasoni
Caribbean Trader
Kuwait Ratings Affirmed At 'AA/A-1+'; Outlook Stable
OVERVIEW
- 20-Jul-2018 16:08 EDT
OVERVIEW
- We expect Kuwait to continue to hold extremely large government and
external net asset positions, allowing the authorities space to gradually
implement reforms. - We are therefore affirming our 'AA/A-1+' long- and short-term foreign and
local currency sovereign credit ratings on Kuwait. - The outlook is stable.
C’è anche il bond a tasso variabile
Emittente M&T Bank
Azione (Gruppo) NYSE:MTB
Tipo Obbligazione Societaria
Categoria Senior, Richiamabile
Registrata SEC Si
Scadenza 26 luglio 2023
Durata Residua 5 anni, 4 giorni
Valuta USD (Dollaro Statunitense)
Tipo Cedola Tasso Fisso
Cedola (Annuale) 3,550%
Frequenza Cedola Semestrale
Lotto Minimo 2.000 USD
Lotti Addizionali 1.000 USD
Data Emissione 26 luglio 2018
Totale Emesso 500.000.000 USD
Prezzo Emissione 99,923%
Prezzo Scadenza 100,000%
Rating Obbligazione A- (S&P), A3 (Moody's), A (Fitch)
Borsa Origine TRACE
Isin US55261FAJ30
Cusip 55261FAJ3
Industria Bancario
Settore Finanziario
Paese Stati Uniti
Regione America sviluppati
Emittente M&T Bank
Azione (Gruppo) NYSE:MTB
Tipo Obbligazione Societaria
Categoria Senior, Richiamabile
Registrata SEC Si
Scadenza 26 luglio 2023
Durata Residua 5 anni, 4 giorni
Valuta USD (Dollaro Statunitense)
Tipo Cedola Tasso Fisso
Cedola (Annuale) 3,550%
Frequenza Cedola Semestrale
Lotto Minimo 2.000 USD
Lotti Addizionali 1.000 USD
Data Emissione 26 luglio 2018
Totale Emesso 500.000.000 USD
Prezzo Emissione 99,923%
Prezzo Scadenza 100,000%
Rating Obbligazione A- (S&P), A3 (Moody's), A (Fitch)
Borsa Origine TRACE
Isin US55261FAJ30
Cusip 55261FAJ3
Industria Bancario
Settore Finanziario
Paese Stati Uniti
Regione America sviluppati
