The topic of confiscation of Russian frozen assets is back in the mainstream. This time due to reports of the Joe Biden administration's support for confiscation bills. What exactly is the topic and what should we expect?
1. The most recent confiscation bills are bills introduced simultaneously in the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives. In the Senate, the bill is S. 3359, introduced by Democrat Sheldon Whitehouse. In the House, it is H.R. 6491, proposed by Republican Joe Wilson. Both have cosponsors from Republicans and Democrats, respectively. That is, both bills can be considered to be of interest to both parties. This is important because the bipartisan nature increases the chances of passage. Not by much, but it does.
2. Both bills are virtually identical. They authorize the President and the Administration to extrajudicially seize the assets of individuals whose property is blocked under the President's authority under the IEEPA Act of 1977. That is pretty much any blocking sanction. Interestingly, assets of those who have violated or attempted to violate U.S. export control regulations could also be confiscated. Confiscated property could be transferred to Ukraine.
3. The likelihood of these particular bills becoming law is still ambiguous. Our research suggests that only about 5% of bills become law. Moreover, the vast majority of sanctions after the start of the SWO have not yet been enshrined in federal laws (with the exception of disruption of normal trade relations, ban on Russian fuel supplies and sanctions against buyers of Russian gold). They are enshrined in the executive decrees of the president and in legal acts to implement these decrees. Decrees can also remain unchanged for decades. But they are more reversible compared to laws. Apparently, the Administration has avoided a situation in which it is constrained by legislation in the matter of sanctions against Russia.
4. However, that a legal mechanism for confiscation will emerge sooner rather than later seems much more likely. Something may emerge by February 2024. Politically, strong sanctions moves will be needed by the next anniversary. And there are already few of them in store. Beyond the anniversary, confiscation could partially solve Ukraine's funding problem if Congress continues to block aid. This is a good way for Congressmen to build political capital: we are helping Ukraine with Russia's money, not U.S. money.
5. The new mechanism may well take the form of a federal law, but remain flexible. For example, not to obligate the president to conduct confiscation, but to give him such authority (not shall, but may).
6. Will such a mechanism lead to an exodus of investors from the U.S.? Everything will depend on the scale of application. If we are talking about isolated confiscations, no. If we are talking about mass seizures, it will make us think more seriously. Especially investors from China, with which the U.S. is gradually complicating relations. The experience of Canada is illustrative. There is a legal mechanism of confiscation there, but it has not yet had much effect on investors. Cases of application in the direct sense are isolated.
7. In sum, the emergence in the United States of a legal mechanism for confiscation of frozen assets of Russian persons or persons involved in circumventing export controls should be expected. There are arguments that this could happen as early as February. But there are many buts. The existing bills look crude. There is little time to pass them before February. If anything is going to be passed, it will likely be in a flexible form. Much will depend on it's application. The dollar will not collapse and investors will not chase away. Although there will be another good reason to think about it.
t.me
