JOACKIN
joakin
Affascinante intervista di institutionalrisk ad uno dei pochi esperti indipendenti tedeschi sulla mafia delle banche tedesche, LandesBanken in particolare coi loro stimati 300 miliardi di asset tossici
la cosa che colpisce è la descrizione della Germania dove le banche sia le private come Deutsche che le statali come Landesbanken e Sparkasse dominano i media e sono legate ai politici (appartengono agli stati e i politici siedono nei CDA e si fanno finanziare) per cui non c'è nessuno dibattito e meno trasparenza che in America, tanto le tv sono statali e le banche sono statali per cui in entrambe siedono i politici e di conseguenza i media criticano meno che in Italia o Inghilterra
Ancora oggi nessuno sa bene quanti siano i crediti tossici ma dato che sono banche statali e non quotate tirano avanti facendo finta di niente. Il costo stimato delle perdite sarebbe intorno al 10% del PIL della Germania...
Attenzione all'ultimo passaggio: dal 5 al 10% del PIL in America ed Europa non era reddito reale negli ultimi anni, erano flussi di credito addizionali creati da debito eccessivo e questo debito sta scomparendo e con lui questa frazione di PIL...
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...Achim Dübel
But nobody in Germany ever complains about the mismanagement of the Landesbanks because most of the media is controlled by the politicians! By law the TV channels must be independent, but the reality as with the banks is dictated by the politicians who sit not only on the boards of banks but also on the boards of the public media networks. If a journalist is too focused on investigative reporting or financial scandals in this particular area, it will definitely damage his career.
...Dübel:
Another one of the German stories that connect with the global crisis and nobody here wants to tell is de-facto collapse of local financial centers such as Düsseldorf or Munich. The entire European leg of the crisis is the story of the ambition of smaller banking centers, backed ultimately by local taxpayers. You have Reykjiavik, Dublin, Edinburg with Royal Bank of Scotland (NYSE:RBS), Dusseldorf, Leipzig, Stockholm with Swedbank, Budapest with OTP, you have Lisbon with Millennium Bank losing money in Poland, Belgium with both Fortis and KBC and so on - the axis of the insolvent is longer than most people imagine. So the smaller European banks went on a speculative spree where, the believed, they were becoming regional and even international players. The results are very serious for smaller European jurisdictions, such as Belgium which has 25% of GDP in loan exposure in Central and Eastern Europe. And there was lots of local contagion. Everybody knows the Iceland story, but few know that, for example, basically all of the banks in Düsseldorf went bankrupt in the crisis. My suspicion is that they all talked to the same investment bankers on road shows...
...
Dübel: Long story short, the total back of the envelope figure for Germany in terms of rescues so far is already safely in the 10% of GDP range. SoFFin, the federal rescue fund, has provided alone about €190 billion or roughly 7.5% of GDP; add to this the state rescue programs, which are basically SoFFin cofinancing shares, for the Landesbanken. Are some €250-300 billion in protection enough to address a problem calibrated semi-officially in the €800-€900 billion range? Probably not, especially considering the high toxic asset shares at the Landesbanken .
Dübel: My guess is that the Landesbanken alone will cause ultimate losses of 8-10% of German GDP, which is real money. Compare that sum with the 5% of GDP costs for the US S&L crisis.
The IRA: How much do you think the cost of the cleanup plus the end to the use of state guarantees is going to affect visible GDP in the EU? In the US, our assumption has been that as much as 5-10% of reported GDP was not income as much as the increased flow of funds due to debt issuance. If Germany and the other EU nations are forced to forego such borrowings, what will the reported GDP in the EU look like in 2010 and beyond?
Dübel: Yes, the flow stops and the loan demand also falls, well below what the Fed and the ECB would like it to be. And higher savings rates in the US and EU will contribute to this shrinkage in GDP as well. I think that the Fed is wrong to try and restore previous levels of consumption. There needs to be an adjustment. The further you push the bubble, the bigger the adjustment. But there is another question with serious implications for our growth prospects, which is: who bears the losses, taxpayers or debt investors in banks.So far, the rescue operations in both the US and Germany are heavily biased against taxpayers. This needs to change, if we do not want public investment and private consumption (via cutbacks in transfer programs) to heavily suffer.
la cosa che colpisce è la descrizione della Germania dove le banche sia le private come Deutsche che le statali come Landesbanken e Sparkasse dominano i media e sono legate ai politici (appartengono agli stati e i politici siedono nei CDA e si fanno finanziare) per cui non c'è nessuno dibattito e meno trasparenza che in America, tanto le tv sono statali e le banche sono statali per cui in entrambe siedono i politici e di conseguenza i media criticano meno che in Italia o Inghilterra
Ancora oggi nessuno sa bene quanti siano i crediti tossici ma dato che sono banche statali e non quotate tirano avanti facendo finta di niente. Il costo stimato delle perdite sarebbe intorno al 10% del PIL della Germania...
Attenzione all'ultimo passaggio: dal 5 al 10% del PIL in America ed Europa non era reddito reale negli ultimi anni, erano flussi di credito addizionali creati da debito eccessivo e questo debito sta scomparendo e con lui questa frazione di PIL...
------------------
...Achim Dübel
But nobody in Germany ever complains about the mismanagement of the Landesbanks because most of the media is controlled by the politicians! By law the TV channels must be independent, but the reality as with the banks is dictated by the politicians who sit not only on the boards of banks but also on the boards of the public media networks. If a journalist is too focused on investigative reporting or financial scandals in this particular area, it will definitely damage his career.
...Dübel:
Another one of the German stories that connect with the global crisis and nobody here wants to tell is de-facto collapse of local financial centers such as Düsseldorf or Munich. The entire European leg of the crisis is the story of the ambition of smaller banking centers, backed ultimately by local taxpayers. You have Reykjiavik, Dublin, Edinburg with Royal Bank of Scotland (NYSE:RBS), Dusseldorf, Leipzig, Stockholm with Swedbank, Budapest with OTP, you have Lisbon with Millennium Bank losing money in Poland, Belgium with both Fortis and KBC and so on - the axis of the insolvent is longer than most people imagine. So the smaller European banks went on a speculative spree where, the believed, they were becoming regional and even international players. The results are very serious for smaller European jurisdictions, such as Belgium which has 25% of GDP in loan exposure in Central and Eastern Europe. And there was lots of local contagion. Everybody knows the Iceland story, but few know that, for example, basically all of the banks in Düsseldorf went bankrupt in the crisis. My suspicion is that they all talked to the same investment bankers on road shows...
...
Dübel: Long story short, the total back of the envelope figure for Germany in terms of rescues so far is already safely in the 10% of GDP range. SoFFin, the federal rescue fund, has provided alone about €190 billion or roughly 7.5% of GDP; add to this the state rescue programs, which are basically SoFFin cofinancing shares, for the Landesbanken. Are some €250-300 billion in protection enough to address a problem calibrated semi-officially in the €800-€900 billion range? Probably not, especially considering the high toxic asset shares at the Landesbanken .
Dübel: My guess is that the Landesbanken alone will cause ultimate losses of 8-10% of German GDP, which is real money. Compare that sum with the 5% of GDP costs for the US S&L crisis.
The IRA: How much do you think the cost of the cleanup plus the end to the use of state guarantees is going to affect visible GDP in the EU? In the US, our assumption has been that as much as 5-10% of reported GDP was not income as much as the increased flow of funds due to debt issuance. If Germany and the other EU nations are forced to forego such borrowings, what will the reported GDP in the EU look like in 2010 and beyond?
Dübel: Yes, the flow stops and the loan demand also falls, well below what the Fed and the ECB would like it to be. And higher savings rates in the US and EU will contribute to this shrinkage in GDP as well. I think that the Fed is wrong to try and restore previous levels of consumption. There needs to be an adjustment. The further you push the bubble, the bigger the adjustment. But there is another question with serious implications for our growth prospects, which is: who bears the losses, taxpayers or debt investors in banks.So far, the rescue operations in both the US and Germany are heavily biased against taxpayers. This needs to change, if we do not want public investment and private consumption (via cutbacks in transfer programs) to heavily suffer.
