Macroeconomia Usa-Europa la crescita della massa monetaria è in fase di accelerazione

[risparmier]

L'accelerazione della crescita della massa monetaria e la liquidità in eccesso prefigurano una ripresa economica più avanti nel corso di quest'anno.
La ripresa del credito, sarà successiva all' inizio della ripresa economica.​

February 06, 2009

By Joachim Fels & Manoj Pradham | London


We recently argued that the pick-up in money supply growth and the related nascent turnaround in our favorite excess liquidity measure should help to support asset markets, end the recession later this year and prevent lasting deflation (“A New Global Liquidity Cycle” The Global Monetary Analyst, January 14, 2009). This view has met with much interest among our readers, but also with much disbelief.
Many Think Credit Matters More
A frequent response has been that a pick-up in economic activity and asset prices not only requires rising money supply but also accelerating credit growth. But credit growth is unlikely to accelerate as banks are deleveraging, and hence the economy and asset markets are unlikely to recover, or so the story goes. This sounds intuitive, and it is unsurprising that after the bursting of the mother-of-all-credit bubbles, everybody is focused on the importance of credit.
The Evidence Suggests Otherwise
However, in our view, the story still gets the sequencing and the causality the wrong way round. Banks, in their lending activities, have rarely ever been leaders in economic or market cycles, but are usually followers. Credit growth can be a powerful accelerator in economic expansions and usually kicks in strongly in later phases of the upswing, but it rarely leads markets or the real economy on the way up. Put simply, the statement that there can be no recovery or pick-up in asset prices without a prior or coinciding pick-up in bank lending flies in the face of the available evidence.
Credit Crunches Last Longer Than Recessions
One way to underscore our point that credit growth lags in recoveries is to look (again) at the impressive work done by Stijn Claessens, M. Ayhan Kose and Marco E. Terrones on “What Happens During Recessions, Crunches, and Busts” (IMF Working Paper 08/274, December 2008). The paper distills the empirical regularities of no less than 122 recessions, 112 credit contractions, 114 episodes of house price declines and 234 episodes of equity declines in their various overlaps for 21 OECD countries over the period 1960-2007. The most relevant finding in our context is that the episodes of contracting credit usually last longer than the recessions that accompany them. If a recession is associated with a credit crunch, it typically starts 4-5 quarters after the onset of a credit crunch. Thus, credit crunches lead economic recessions. However, recessions in the OECD countries typically end two quarters before their corresponding credit crunch. As the IMF paper notes, this phenomenon of a “creditless recovery” is also evident from “sudden stop” episodes observed in emerging market economies.
The same conclusion emerges from our illustration, which shows US credit growth since 1947 and the recession period. Credit growth usually peaks before the onset of recessions, but – at least since the mid-1970s – it troughs only after recessions have ended.
Money Leads Recovery, Recovery Leads Credit
We have also employed the statistical-econometric tool of impulse-response functions to shed more light on the empirical relationships between US money supply, credit and the real economy, where we use the ISM manufacturing purchasing managers survey. Constructing an impulse response function is a two-step process. First, an estimate of how past values of money supply growth, credit growth and the state of the economy affect each other is generated (within a ‘vector autoregression’, in technical terms). Then, using the estimates, the model is able to show how a shock to any of the variables affects the others, i.e., how other variables in the system respond to an impulse/shock to one of the variables in the system.
In a nutshell, we find that while the ISM does not respond significantly to shocks to real credit growth, the latter does respond to shocks to the ISM. So, again, we find that credit lags rather than leads the economic cycle. Conversely, we find some evidence that real M1 growth leads rather than lags the ISM. And, logically against this backdrop, we also find that money supply growth leads credit growth.
Look at Money, Not Credit
Taken together, the empirical evidence is clear: if one is looking for a leading indicator of economic recovery, look at money, not credit. Credit crunches tend to lead recessions, but they lag recoveries. Right now, money supply growth is accelerating while credit is slowing. We continue to believe that the acceleration in money supply growth and excess liquidity foreshadows an economic recovery later this year. Eventually, the recovery in economic activity and asset prices, along with on-going balance sheet repair in the banking system would then end the credit crunch and lead to a pick-up in bank lending, in line with the typical sequencing.
To conclude, if one is waiting until credit growth resumes, one will miss both the pick-up in economic activity and the recovery of asset markets.

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[risparmier]

Dallo stesso link allegato sopra oggi si può leggere,
dell' economista Richard Berner​

http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/index.html#anchor7490​

19-2-2009​

Politica di trazione: la chiave per il recupero
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I rischi sono a due facce. La chiave o meno di tali politiche ottenere la trazione si trova nello spezzare il circolo vizioso tra la crisi del credito e l'economia, con il necessario sequenziamento derivanti dal finanziamento di mercati del credito. La stabilità finanziaria delineata dal Piano Geithner Segretario del Tesoro la settimana scorsa si rivolge a questi obiettivi, ma mancano i dettagli critica (vedi sotto). Fino a quel piano è chiarito e attuate con successo, vi è il rischio che anche la politica aggressiva avranno poco prima di trazione e l'economia americana si languono. Allo stesso tempo, tuttavia, l'impatto macroeconomico delle politiche di stimolo o ci può sorprendere con la sua forza se il piano di stabilità finanziaria è rapidamente rafforzato e eseguito. Di conseguenza, gli investitori non deve escludere la possibilità che le iniziative politiche rapidamente insieme e promuovere uno tradizionale, vigoroso rimbalzo. In quanto segue, si cerca di delineare gli elementi coinvolti nella valutazione di tali rischi.
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prosegue

(traduzione approssimativa di un traduttore internet automatico allegato sopra)​

(Richard Berner is a member of the Economic Advisory Panel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a member of the Panel of Economic Advisers of the Congressional Budget Office, and a member of the Executive Committee and a Director at large of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He is the 2007 winner of the William F. Butler Award for excellence in business economics.
Dick received his bachelor's degree from Harvard College, and his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He researched his dissertation under SSRC-Ford Foundation grants at both the University of Louvain, Belgium, and at the University of Bologna, Italy. He speaks French and a little Italian. )