Madiba
Forumer storico
The Operational Goad.
Over the last several months of this war, since early September but really since the period immediately following the fall of Lisichansk in early July, we have seen the Russians suffer a series of operational reverses that have all somehow resulted in the Ukrainians taking extremely heavy losses. Anyone who knows anything about war knows that this is generally the opposite of how the ledger looks after a successful offensive. To lay out the timeline:
Early July - Russia seizes Lisichansk, pushes to the border of Lugansk Oblast south of the Seversky Donets and then ceases serious offensive action with regular troops.
Late July - Ukraine's OC-South begins a counteroffensive in Kherson. They are defeated with heavy losses and cease serious attacks by the end of August.
Early September - Ukraine launches an offensive east of Kharkov, breaking through an extremely thin Russian line and forcing Russian troops to withdraw from Izyum.
Mid-September - Buoyed by their success in Kharkov, Ukrainian forces launch a general offensive across the line of contact. They are defeated with massive casualties.
Early October - The Kharkov Counteroffensive bogs down due to heavy losses just east of Krasny Liman. Desultory attacks continue, achieving nothing.
Mid-October - A Ukrainian attack from Krivoy Rog achieves unexpected success and Russian troops fall back to Dudchany from northeast Kherson Oblast.
Late October - Smelling blood, Ukrainian troops ramp up attacks in Kherson. They make no gains and are defeated with heavy losses.
Early November - Russia withdraws troops from their bridgehead in Kherson north of the Dniper. Ukraine's OC-South is too battered to even attempt pursuit.
Now - Buoyed again by the Russian withdrawal from Kherson, Ukraine launches a new wave of attacks across the line. They are noticeably weak and achieve nothing.
There's a saying: "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." A pattern emerges from the last four months of fighting. As soon as one Ukrainian offensive culminated, the Russians gave up ground elsewhere - often quite significant ground, but always without any serious losses on their side. This led to Ukrainian morale skyrocketing and renewed offensive efforts in the belief that the Russians were on the verge of operational collapse. These renewed offensives would then fail with massive losses, and the cycle would repeat.
I believe this may be intentional on the part of the Russians. Between mobilization efforts and Western aid, by the summer Ukraine had amassed a huge and fairly well-equipped army that would have been difficult for the Russians to overcome offensively without enormous, and extremely costly, mobilization efforts of their own. This pool of manpower and equipment, however, is finite - and the Russians know this very well. Ukraine has no significant military industry left intact and Western difficulties with military production need no discussion at this point. Similarly, the Ukrainian leadership is eager to attack and take back lost territory. The Russian decision was thus quite straightforward: they would go on the defensive and let the enemy come to them. The Ukrainians obliged. And any time it looked like Ukraine had had enough, the Russians would throw them a bone to get them to keep attacking.
Others have noted that the Russian General Staff prizes efficiency - this is, simply put, the most efficient way to defeat Ukraine. Goad them into dissipating their army - which, if the Ukrainians were acting rationally, would be treated as the priceless and irreplaceable asset that it is - in a series of disastrous counteroffensives. Then mop up what's left at a considerably lower cost and effort than would otherwise be required. As for the last bit, the winter campaign season approaches just as Russia's mobilized troops finish their training.
To make a boxing analogy, this is rope-a-dope over months and a thousand kilometers of front line. And Drago's getting ready to come off the ropes.
Over the last several months of this war, since early September but really since the period immediately following the fall of Lisichansk in early July, we have seen the Russians suffer a series of operational reverses that have all somehow resulted in the Ukrainians taking extremely heavy losses. Anyone who knows anything about war knows that this is generally the opposite of how the ledger looks after a successful offensive. To lay out the timeline:
Early July - Russia seizes Lisichansk, pushes to the border of Lugansk Oblast south of the Seversky Donets and then ceases serious offensive action with regular troops.
Late July - Ukraine's OC-South begins a counteroffensive in Kherson. They are defeated with heavy losses and cease serious attacks by the end of August.
Early September - Ukraine launches an offensive east of Kharkov, breaking through an extremely thin Russian line and forcing Russian troops to withdraw from Izyum.
Mid-September - Buoyed by their success in Kharkov, Ukrainian forces launch a general offensive across the line of contact. They are defeated with massive casualties.
Early October - The Kharkov Counteroffensive bogs down due to heavy losses just east of Krasny Liman. Desultory attacks continue, achieving nothing.
Mid-October - A Ukrainian attack from Krivoy Rog achieves unexpected success and Russian troops fall back to Dudchany from northeast Kherson Oblast.
Late October - Smelling blood, Ukrainian troops ramp up attacks in Kherson. They make no gains and are defeated with heavy losses.
Early November - Russia withdraws troops from their bridgehead in Kherson north of the Dniper. Ukraine's OC-South is too battered to even attempt pursuit.
Now - Buoyed again by the Russian withdrawal from Kherson, Ukraine launches a new wave of attacks across the line. They are noticeably weak and achieve nothing.
There's a saying: "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." A pattern emerges from the last four months of fighting. As soon as one Ukrainian offensive culminated, the Russians gave up ground elsewhere - often quite significant ground, but always without any serious losses on their side. This led to Ukrainian morale skyrocketing and renewed offensive efforts in the belief that the Russians were on the verge of operational collapse. These renewed offensives would then fail with massive losses, and the cycle would repeat.
I believe this may be intentional on the part of the Russians. Between mobilization efforts and Western aid, by the summer Ukraine had amassed a huge and fairly well-equipped army that would have been difficult for the Russians to overcome offensively without enormous, and extremely costly, mobilization efforts of their own. This pool of manpower and equipment, however, is finite - and the Russians know this very well. Ukraine has no significant military industry left intact and Western difficulties with military production need no discussion at this point. Similarly, the Ukrainian leadership is eager to attack and take back lost territory. The Russian decision was thus quite straightforward: they would go on the defensive and let the enemy come to them. The Ukrainians obliged. And any time it looked like Ukraine had had enough, the Russians would throw them a bone to get them to keep attacking.
Others have noted that the Russian General Staff prizes efficiency - this is, simply put, the most efficient way to defeat Ukraine. Goad them into dissipating their army - which, if the Ukrainians were acting rationally, would be treated as the priceless and irreplaceable asset that it is - in a series of disastrous counteroffensives. Then mop up what's left at a considerably lower cost and effort than would otherwise be required. As for the last bit, the winter campaign season approaches just as Russia's mobilized troops finish their training.
To make a boxing analogy, this is rope-a-dope over months and a thousand kilometers of front line. And Drago's getting ready to come off the ropes.
