TBOND-BUND-EUROSTOX-FIBMERD fine del capitalismo(V.M.98anni)

io preferirei shortarlo dall'high
su doppio max e iper comprato area 41000
..ma se il Low non tiene
lo shorto pure subito
(questo è l'indice, è meno volatile)

1165920258fib.gif
 
The Globalisation of Finance
by Steve Saville




Below is an extract from a commentary originally posted at www.speculative-investor.com on 10th December 2006.

The Liquidity Boom Continues

The way the financial world used to work, short-term interest rates in the US being higher than long-term interest rates in the US would preclude any possibility of Treasury Bond prices being boosted by carry trades (borrowing short-term money in order to invest in longer-term debt, thus earning the "carry", or interest rate spread, between the two types of debt). But that was then, this is now. The way things work today, if short-term rates in the US are prohibitively high then carry-traders can simply do most of their borrowing in Europe. And if short-term rates in Europe are too high it's still not a problem because they can do most of their borrowing in Japan. After all, despite some mild 'jawboning' to the contrary the Bank of Japan seems intent on keeping short-term interest rates near zero and accommodating all demand for short-term money indefinitely.

Furthermore, if the 4% spread between short-term Japanese interest rates and US T-Bond yields isn't sufficiently enticing, even after taking into account that the annualised return on the aforementioned Japan-US spread trade could be boosted to 40% using routine 10:1 leverage, no problem again; just borrow in Japan and use the proceeds to 'invest' in Brazilian or Turkish bonds, remembering, of course, to use various derivatives to hedge away any currency or credit risk. In fact, although today's ridiculously low credit spreads wouldn't appear to provide adequate compensation for the additional risk it might also make sense for a speculator to borrow at the comparatively high rate of 5% in the US in order to finance the purchase of, say, Indonesian Government bonds given that any risk could be passed on to counter-parties at the cost of a relatively small insurance premium.

The point is, the supply of 'hot money' (money that can be shifted around rapidly in response to changes in expected returns) now seems to be endless because if monetary conditions start to get tighter in one part of the world then the speculative community can always find a source of low-cost financing somewhere else. And the Bank of Japan (BOJ), with its zero or near-zero interest rates, effectively underwrites the whole process. This is why the financial markets experienced some palpitations during the first half of this year when the BOJ soaked-up a lot of liquidity and made noises about commencing a rate-hiking program, and why the speculative juices resumed their flow as soon as the BOJ backed away from its planned monetary tightening. It is also why an official US recession might not follow this year's inversion of the US yield curve. During past cycles an inverted yield curve has meant that financial market liquidity was about to contract in a big way, but that's not necessarily the case today.

What we have, right now, is the outward appearance of monetary conditions in the US and some other G7 economies that would, under normal circumstances, bring about substantial weakness in equities and/or commodities and/or bonds, and yet all of these major asset classes are doing well. It almost seems as if it doesn't matter what the US Fed or the ECB or the Bank of England or the Reserve Bank of Australia do, there will be plenty of liquidity as long as the BOJ continues to price short-term credit at bargain-basement levels and leaves its borrowing window open to all comers.

We can't confidently predict how long the liquidity boom will continue other than we are sure it won't continue beyond the point where the BOJ gets serious about tightening its monetary policy, although it could certainly end well before that point. If forced to make a guess we'd say that things will come to a head during the first quarter of next year, but there's really no need to guess because when a major liquidity turning point arrives its footprints should be evident in a) the relative performances of gold and base metals (gold will become relatively strong), b) the yield-spread (short-term interest rates will begin to trend lower relative to long-term interest rates), c) the relative performances of high-risk debt and Treasury debt (high-risk debt will become relatively weak), and d) the relative performances of emerging market equities and US equities (emerging market equities will become relatively weak).

In the mean time we'll remain skeptical about the sustainability of the latest in a long line of "new eras" while steering clear of any bearish bets.

The Yen: a casualty of the liquidity boom

We have said in the past that we are long-term bullish on the Yen, meaning that over the next 5 years we expect the Yen to lose its purchasing power at a slower rate and to fall by less, relative to gold, than most other fiat currencies (the strongest paper currency is the one that weakens at the slowest pace). This view was based on our beliefs that a secular bear market in Japanese equities ended in 2003 and that Yen inflation would remain relatively low.

Japanese monetary authorities' insistence on keeping short-term Yen interest rates pegged near zero is, however, forcing us to re-think. There are many things that central banks cannot do, but one thing they are all extremely good at is currency de-valuation. When a central bank seems determined to follow a policy that will not only cause its currency to weaken relative to gold but also cause it to weaken relative to other paper, it makes no sense to bet against it.

Thanks to Japan's "weak Yen" policy the Yen is in the bottom third of its 3-year range while the US dollar's other major competitors are in the top third of their 3-year ranges. Furthermore and with reference to the following monthly chart, it looks like Yen futures are going to test the bottom of their 3-year range (80) at some point over the coming few months. If this happens it will probably be worth going 'long' the Yen for a trade, but we are going to step away from our long-term bullish outlook on the Japanese currency until we see some evidence that the BOJ is going to allow interest rates to adjust to more normal levels.
 
Fernando'S ha scritto:
io preferirei shortarlo dall'high
su doppio max e iper comprato area 41000.......

detto fatto flattato ieri e rientrato sul marzo a 41205, così evito il
problema se ci arriva o non ci arriva :)
un saluto a tutti :)


ps per dan: questa settimana forse domanilaltro passo da codeste parti
casomai ti telefono si va a pigliare un cafe'
 
Bonjour a tout les bondaroles

attendant la FED :-o
prossima riunione bbundaroli giuro che porto il righello con i cm , mettiamo in pratica il cameratismo del c@zzo :V

1165930708anna_nava-img7716-08-1.jpg
 
Fleursdumal ha scritto:
Bonjour a tout les bondaroles

attendant la FED :-o
prossima riunione bbundaroli giuro che porto il righello con i cm , mettiamo in pratica il cameratismo del c@zzo :V

Immagine sostituita con URL per un solo Quote: http://www.investireoggi.it/phpBB2/immagini/1165930708anna_nava-img7716-08-1.jpg

Io sono tranquillo.... :-o


La domanda pressante è:
prevaleranno gli hedgers o gli speculators? cioè chi sarà costretto a riversare la posizione? e questo avverrà con qualche danno o senza alcun danno?
Noi small stiamo ad osservare.....


Higher yields and lower stock prices ahead? End of inversion?

In this week's update (shorter than usual as there wasn’t a huge change in positions for hedging accounts), I will touch on the noticeable failure of the 10-year future to break out of the multi-year trend line and the fact that hedging accounts continue to lean hard against the 10 year note and the S&P 500.

Please keep in mind that in this case I am ‘thinking aloud’ and not making a prediction. I have found that making predictions is a dangerous occupation. But the failure in 10’s could have serious implications for stocks, bonds and the shape of the yield curve.

First of all, see the chart here (thank you to Tom Peterson of Bullseye Research for pointing this out to me). It is a very simple chart of the continuous futures contract of the 10 year Treasury future. Note the rather defined ‘channel’ and the noticeable failure at the top of the trend line.

10-Year Continuous Futures Contract
1165931080bsed12111.jpg


Could it be that if we stay in this channel, we get a nasty 5-7 point decline in prices? Yikes…

Now take a look at the chart of yields in the 10-year note on a continuous basis. Note that the channel is there, but in reverse of course, as prices and yields move in opposite directions. A move to the top of the channel could mean a move into the 5.50% range. Note that my firm sold many long-term positions at the highs in prices and lows in yields at nice profits and will continue to do so if the channels remain intact. If we break out of the range below 4.40%, my firm will need to re-assess our position and I also think that would bring in a hard landing (recession) scenario. See the chart here of yields.

10-Year Treasury Yields
1165931110bsed12112.jpg


How are hedgers positioned in 10-year notes? Still short. See the chart here.

Hedgers Net Positions in 10-Year Treasury Futures
1165931145bsed12113.jpg


What about the inversion in yields? My firm tracks the Federal Funds rate (that is the true measure of rates the Fed is setting) vs. 10-year yields (the rate the market uses as a benchmark for inflation expectations. Note that the inversion is at levels that have usually brought in stiff stock market corrections. I realize that former Fed Chairman Greenspan has publicly stated that inversions no longer are meaningful, but he is the same guy (no acrimony, just fact) that publicly recommended adjustable rate mortgages when fixed rate mortgages were at 50-year lows and just before the Fed raised short-term rates 17 times! So, yes I am sorry to say that I am publicly (respectfully of course) disagreeing with him.

10-Year Treasury Yield Minus Fed Funds vs. S&P 500

1165931175bsed12114.jpg


What about the hedgers' position in the S&P 500? They continue to lean hard against the market. And they have been rather correct in the past. They are still short the Dow, NASDAQ and slightly long the Russell 2000. They haven’t been wrong in the past and I will not bet against them now. Keep in mind that my firm's calculations combine the open outcry or ‘big’ contract and electronic or e-mini contract together in ‘big contract’ terms. See that chart here.

Hedgers Position in S&P 500 vs. S&P 500

1165931206bsed12115.jpg


In sum, it now seems possible that there are a few possible outcomes:


The inversion could come to an end as 10-year yields move up.
The dollar can strengthen as it usually does at the beginning of the year and in particular in the third year of Presidential terms.
Stocks could correct as the hedgers' position suggests.
Stocks could sell off as yield increases hurt P/E ratios.
The Fed would ease as housing hurts the economy.
A Fed easing and corresponding rise in 10-year yields would make the curve steep by the middle of 2007.
The Fed eases as fiscal and monetary policies are usually friendly in the third year of Presidential terms.
Stocks start weak in 2007 and end strong as sentiment corrects and then strengthens after the second Fed ease.
Central banks' purchases are now the ‘elephant in the room.' They are making their presence known lately. This has made investors emboldened to buy as there is now a theoretical ‘Central bank put.’
What the market knows isn’t worth knowing. Now that we know that Central Banks are buying, does it no longer help the market?
Private equity deals have also put a bid underneath the market. Now that we know they are the other elephant in the room, do they become insignificant to the general markets?

I think 2007 will be more volatile and more interesting. I expect that it will be a sector driven market in equities and my firm will likely become more trading oriented in ETFs and will continue our now cautious stance on bonds unless the trend is broken.
 
Notizia che potrebbe pesare sui cross e potrebbe dare indicazioni di un rallentamento almeno della circolazione della moneta...

Record decrease on U.S. Trade Deficit
Tue, Dec 12 2006, 13:57 GMT
http://www.fxstreet.com

FXstreet.com (Barcelona) – The trade deficit of the U.S. has fallen the largest in nearly five years, thanks to the decrease in petrol prices and the increase of exports.

The deficit in goods and services with the rest of the world fell in October by the 8.4% to $58.87 Billion from $64.26 Billion in September, according to the Commerce Department, when the analysts advanced a much shorter decrease, to $63.30 Billion. This is the sharpest drop since the 11.2% fall in December 2001.

Imports decreased 2.7% in October to $182.49 Billion from $187.61 Billion in September. The volume of crude oil imports decreased to 311.76 million barrels from 316.59 million and the price of the barrel decreased by $ 7.05 to $ 55.47 the barrel. The price of other industrial materials such as oil and chemicals decreased by $ 5.20 million.
 
Ricordate ieri che accennavamo al ruolo di spinta che avranno le Olimpiadi del 2008 a Beijing? beh viene considerato persino in un report di Morgan Stanley sul caffè e il cacao - vd thread Arabica
 
gipa69 ha scritto:
Notizia che potrebbe pesare sui cross e potrebbe dare indicazioni di un rallentamento almeno della circolazione della moneta...

Record decrease on U.S. Trade Deficit
Tue, Dec 12 2006, 13:57 GMT
http://www.fxstreet.com

FXstreet.com (Barcelona) – The trade deficit of the U.S. has fallen the largest in nearly five years, thanks to the decrease in petrol prices and the increase of exports.

The deficit in goods and services with the rest of the world fell in October by the 8.4% to $58.87 Billion from $64.26 Billion in September, according to the Commerce Department, when the analysts advanced a much shorter decrease, to $63.30 Billion. This is the sharpest drop since the 11.2% fall in December 2001.

Imports decreased 2.7% in October to $182.49 Billion from $187.61 Billion in September. The volume of crude oil imports decreased to 311.76 million barrels from 316.59 million and the price of the barrel decreased by $ 7.05 to $ 55.47 the barrel. The price of other industrial materials such as oil and chemicals decreased by $ 5.20 million.

per ora reazione tiepida :rolleyes: non si vogliono sbilanciare , evidentemente venerdì sui payrolls si è ballato troppo per i loro gusti :V
 
Sulla Cina?
Eccoci....

1. China: Two for One

Two important developments out of China overnight.

One: China's central bank still sees a possibility of an upturn in inflation, central bank chief Zhou Xiaochuan said.

Two: China's high savings rate will be difficult to reverse, the central bank governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, said.

First, China's Central Bank warned at a financial seminar that "inflation is a matter of concern for the central bank."
Central bank chief Zhou Xiaochuan, however, said China will not adopt inflation targeting and instead will focus on economic growth and generating employment.
The People's Bank of China (PBoC) announced plans to absorb $20 billion from the banking system by selling 1-year bills to Chinese commercial banks, which is a policy move aimed at "tightening."
Meanwhile, Zhou also noted that the PBoC's objectives include maintaining low inflation, but warned of deflationary pressures and overcapacity in some industries as a result of China's high savings rate.
Zhou said that it is difficult to set a standard for an appropriate level of savings, due to "cultural differences."
A chief reason why China's economy remains unbalanced from a global perspective is due to low levels of domestic consumption.
China has raised minimum wages and increased welfare spending this year to prompt households to consume more and make the economy less dependent on exports.

2. U.S. Urges Faster China "Economic Reforms"

If, by "economic reforms," one means, "consumer spending."

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (with Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in tow) is visiting China this week to press for Chinese consumers to save less and spend more.
"The Chinese currently save about 50% of their GDP, which is much higher than necessary -- un-healthily high," Al Hubbard, assistant to the president for economic policy, was quoted as saying in Barron's.
the article also noted that in a preliminary discussion last week in Washington with China's deputy finance minister, Hubbard said he stressed the need for the Chinese to move toward a lower savings rate.
The current Chinese economy is driven by exports.
According to Barron's China exports $200 billion more than it buys from the U.S.
Moreover, China's central bank chief Zhou Xiaochuan noted, above, there are steep cultural barriers to shifting the Chinese economy from export-led to domestic consumption-based.
From the U.S. perspective, with a personal savings rate that has been negative for more than a year-and-a-half, spending more makes perfect sense.
From a Chinese perspective, however, the question is: Spend what?
Research published this week showed that the Chinese, one fifth of the world's population, accounted for less than one-in-100 of the world's richest 10% of adults, the Financial Times reported.

3. Mind the Gap

Closely related to Number One and Two, above, Li Bengong, executive deputy director of the China National Committee on Aging noted that consumption by China's 143 million senior citizens will reach $180 billion by 2010.

Wow, $180 billion by 2010, that's pretty good, right? Wait, it gets even better, China's seniors are projected to spend $550 billion by 2020.
Currently about 11 percent of China's population is over the age of 60, according to China Gate.
"In terms of consumption, the aging population will have a huge influence on China's future social and economic development," Li Bengong, executive deputy director of the China National Committee on Aging said.
Before we get too excited about this projected level of Chinese consumption, however, let's put it in some context.
143 million Chinese seniors are projected to spend $180 billion by 2010. How does that compare to the U.S.?
U.S. census data reports there are roughly 47 million people in the U.S. aged 60+, roughly a third of China's over 60 population.
They are estimated to spend more than $1 trillion a year on goods and services, more than five times what China's seniors spend.
That's a sizeable gap.




4. Whole Lotta Collapsin' Goin' On

According to new data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), oil producing countries have reduced their exposure to the dollar to the lowest level in two years, the Financial Times reported.

Russia and members of OPEC cut their dollar holdings from 67% of forex reserves in the first quarter to 65% in the second.
Eighteen months ago, the exposure to the dollar of oil producing countries was above 70%.
They increased their holdings of euros from 20% to 22%, the BIS said.
The last time oil-exporting countries cut their exposure to the dollar was in late 2003, the article said.
The revelation in the latest BIS quarterly review could put new pressure on the ailing US currency, the FT suggested.
But is that really true? After all, the data simply reports a shift that has already happened.
Concerns over long-running trade imbalances, fiat currency and why the dollar will collapse are not new.
These same concerns have been around for a long, long time.
How long?
Why, this long:

Gold and the Dollar Crisis, Robert Triffin, 1961

The Economics of Crisis: War, Politics, and the Dollar, Eliot Janeway, 1968

Understanding the dollar crisis, Percy Greaves, 1973

The Day the Dollar Dies, Willard Cantelon, 1973

The Conspiracy Against the Dollar: The Spirit of the New Imperialism, Peter Beter, 1973

The Federal Reserve and Our Manipulated Dollar: With Comments on the Causes of Wars, Depressions, Inflation, and Poverty, Martin Larson, 1975

Nothing can replace the U.S. dollar ... and it almost has! : How you can multiply your money during runaway inflation and depression, Martin Rom, 1975

Fate of the Dollar, Martin Mayer, Feb. 3, 1981

Getting Rich Outside the Dollar, C. Weber, L. Reiss, Aug.1, 1993

Currencies and Crises, Paul Krugman, Feb. 1995

The Dollar Crisis, Ross Perot, 1996

The Dilemmas of the Dollar: The Economics and Politics of United States International Monetary Policy, Fred Bergsten, 1996

Tug of War: Why You Should Care About the Global Currency Crisis, Paul Erdman, Oct. 15, 1997

Day of Reckoning: The Consequences of American Economic Policy, Benjamin Friedman, Sep. 12, 1998

The Sixteen-Trillion-Dollar Mistake: How the U.S. Bungled Its National Priorities from the New Deal to the Present, Bruce Jansson, Feb. 2001

The Dollar Crisis: Causes, Consequences, Cures, Richard Duncan, July 25, 2003

The Coming Collapse of the Dollar, James Turk, John Rubino, Dec. 28,. 2004

Petrodollar Warfare: Oil, Iraq and the Future of the Dollar, William Clark, May 15, 2005

The Demise of the Dollar... and Why It's Great For Your Investments, Addison Wiggin, Aug. 8, 2005



Man, that's a whole lot of crises and collapsing going on!




5. "I Am Rather Screwed."

From the Los Angeles Times this morning:

"Every day, Will Hertzberg owns a little less of his three-bedroom house in Corona.

Like hundreds of thousands of other homeowners around the state, Hertzberg has a mortgage that lets him choose how much he pays each month.

Like many of them, he always chooses to pay as little as possible.

For the moment, this allows the 56-year-old Hertzberg to continue living in his tract home despite being only marginally employed. But his debt is swelling, and his mortgage company controls his fate.

"I am rather screwed," he said."
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back
Alto