tommy271
Forumer storico
Forse il 27 è stato emesso prima ... mentre il 31 recepiva la nuova normativa.
Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 1 (2 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione troppidebiti
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
Forse il 27 è stato emesso prima ... mentre il 31 recepiva la nuova normativa.
gualberto
Charlie don't Surf
sicuramente è così il 27 è stato emesso nel 1997 prima dell'approvazione delle cac
tommy271
Forumer storico
Comunque se le CAC sono all'85% ... è difficilissimo modificarle... con una barriera del solo 15%.
E, sotto questo aspetto, meglio un titolo regolato da norme ferree o meglio non averle?
Ribalto la questione
.
gualberto
Charlie don't Surf
Comunque se le CAC sono all'85% ... è difficilissimo modificarle... con una barriera del solo 15%.
E, sotto questo aspetto, meglio un titolo regolato da norme ferree o meglio non averle?
Ribalto la questione
io per non sbagliare ho sia il 27 che il 31
Cat XL
Shizuka Minamoto
Venezuela The perfect storm
Venezuela
The perfect storm
Read the full report »
The decrease in oil prices is costing Venezuela approximately USD728mn in revenues for every dollar of price decline. This has raised the pressure on Venezuela’s hard currency cash flow, increasing the probability of a default; however, we still think it is lower than what the market is pricing.
Under our commodities team’s revised scenario of Brent averaging USD/b104 in 2014 and USD/b96 in 2015, without adjustments, Venezuela would have a deficit in its hard currency cash flow of USD27.8bn in 2015.
In a scenario of oil prices staying closer to current levels with an average of USD/b80, without adjustments, the deficit in the hard currency cash flow would be USD38.2bn. This would be a situation of high stress for Venezuela.
This oil shock puts Venezuela in a very vulnerable position, with reduced liquidity that limits the capacity to cushion against it, while eroded political capital and a busy electoral agenda add some constraints to the government’s ability to adjust.
Under this new oil price scenario, we think an adjustment is unavoidable. Beyond a decline in revenues, the government would have much more difficulty accessing financial markets to finance its deficit.
Among the policy alternatives that we think the government has are cutting Petrocaribe, selling CITGO, devaluation through a reduction in FX sales at the strongest exchange rates and allowing oil companies to sell FX in SICAD II, cutting imports, renegotiating the terms of the Chinese loans, liability management, and delaying infrastructure projects.
We still expect PDVSA to pay the bond maturing this month. With a combination of the previously mentioned measures, we still think the government could pay the bonds maturing in 2015.
So far, the government has been avoiding the political cost of adjusting, and that it has yet not shown a sense of urgency is a concern. Nonetheless, given the high costs that a default could have, we still believe it has the incentive to try to adjust and avoid a default. The main risk that we still see is an increase in social unrest due to the deterioration in the economic situation.
Even in a scenario of a (proactive) restructuring of Venezuela’s debt, we believe the recovery value for Venezuela/PDVSA bonds could be as high as 45%, limiting the downside potential from current market prices, especially for the long end of the PDVSA curve.
For analyst certifications and important disclosures, please refer to the full document(s) attached or included by hyperlink in this email.
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Alejandro Arreaza
1.212.412.3021
[email protected]
Alejandro Grisanti
1.212.412.5982
[email protected]
Donato Guarino
1.212.412.5564
[email protected]
==============================
DISCLAIMER:
This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient and any file transmitted with it may contain material that is confidential and privileged. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, please do not read this e-mail and delete this message and any file attached from your system and then notify us immediately by reply e-mail or by telephone. You should not copy or use this message and any file attached for any purpose, disclose the contents of the same to any other person or forward them without express permission by us. Considering the means of transmission, we do not undertake any liability with respect to the secrecy and confidentiality of the information contained in this e-mail and in its attachments.
Il presente messaggio di posta elettronica e' ad esclusivo utilizzo del destinatario indicato in indirizzo e gli eventuali documenti allegati potrebbero avere carattere riservato. Qualora non foste il destinatario del presente messaggio Vi preghiamo non leggerlo, di cancellarlo dal Vostro sistema assieme ad ogni documento ad esso allegato e di volerci avvertire immediatamente tramite posta elettronica o telefonicamente. E' vietata la duplicazione o l'utilizzo per qualunque fine del presente messaggio e di ogni documento ad esso allegato cosi' come la relativa divulgazione, distribuzione o inoltro a terzi senza l'espressa autorizzazione del mittente. Il mittente, in ragione del mezzo di trasmissione utilizzato, non assume alcuna responsabilita' in merito alla segretezza e riservatezza delle informazioni contenute nel presente messaggio e nei relativi allegati.
==============================
Emerging Markets Research
22 October 2014
The perfect storm
Read the full report »
The decrease in oil prices is costing Venezuela approximately USD728mn in revenues for every dollar of price decline. This has raised the pressure on Venezuela’s hard currency cash flow, increasing the probability of a default; however, we still think it is lower than what the market is pricing.
Under our commodities team’s revised scenario of Brent averaging USD/b104 in 2014 and USD/b96 in 2015, without adjustments, Venezuela would have a deficit in its hard currency cash flow of USD27.8bn in 2015.
In a scenario of oil prices staying closer to current levels with an average of USD/b80, without adjustments, the deficit in the hard currency cash flow would be USD38.2bn. This would be a situation of high stress for Venezuela.
This oil shock puts Venezuela in a very vulnerable position, with reduced liquidity that limits the capacity to cushion against it, while eroded political capital and a busy electoral agenda add some constraints to the government’s ability to adjust.
Under this new oil price scenario, we think an adjustment is unavoidable. Beyond a decline in revenues, the government would have much more difficulty accessing financial markets to finance its deficit.
Among the policy alternatives that we think the government has are cutting Petrocaribe, selling CITGO, devaluation through a reduction in FX sales at the strongest exchange rates and allowing oil companies to sell FX in SICAD II, cutting imports, renegotiating the terms of the Chinese loans, liability management, and delaying infrastructure projects.
We still expect PDVSA to pay the bond maturing this month. With a combination of the previously mentioned measures, we still think the government could pay the bonds maturing in 2015.
So far, the government has been avoiding the political cost of adjusting, and that it has yet not shown a sense of urgency is a concern. Nonetheless, given the high costs that a default could have, we still believe it has the incentive to try to adjust and avoid a default. The main risk that we still see is an increase in social unrest due to the deterioration in the economic situation.
Even in a scenario of a (proactive) restructuring of Venezuela’s debt, we believe the recovery value for Venezuela/PDVSA bonds could be as high as 45%, limiting the downside potential from current market prices, especially for the long end of the PDVSA curve.
For analyst certifications and important disclosures, please refer to the full document(s) attached or included by hyperlink in this email.
Edit my subscriptions profile | Unsubscribe me from this email
Alejandro Arreaza
1.212.412.3021
[email protected]
Alejandro Grisanti
1.212.412.5982
[email protected]
Donato Guarino
1.212.412.5564
[email protected]
==============================
DISCLAIMER:
This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient and any file transmitted with it may contain material that is confidential and privileged. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, please do not read this e-mail and delete this message and any file attached from your system and then notify us immediately by reply e-mail or by telephone. You should not copy or use this message and any file attached for any purpose, disclose the contents of the same to any other person or forward them without express permission by us. Considering the means of transmission, we do not undertake any liability with respect to the secrecy and confidentiality of the information contained in this e-mail and in its attachments.
Il presente messaggio di posta elettronica e' ad esclusivo utilizzo del destinatario indicato in indirizzo e gli eventuali documenti allegati potrebbero avere carattere riservato. Qualora non foste il destinatario del presente messaggio Vi preghiamo non leggerlo, di cancellarlo dal Vostro sistema assieme ad ogni documento ad esso allegato e di volerci avvertire immediatamente tramite posta elettronica o telefonicamente. E' vietata la duplicazione o l'utilizzo per qualunque fine del presente messaggio e di ogni documento ad esso allegato cosi' come la relativa divulgazione, distribuzione o inoltro a terzi senza l'espressa autorizzazione del mittente. Il mittente, in ragione del mezzo di trasmissione utilizzato, non assume alcuna responsabilita' in merito alla segretezza e riservatezza delle informazioni contenute nel presente messaggio e nei relativi allegati.
==============================
fabriziof
Forumer storico
Penso che opterò per usp7807hap03
tommy271
Forumer storico
Analisi Tecnica USOIL - 23.10
Konstantinos Oikonomou, Junior Analyst
Giovedi, October 23, 2014 - 14:02
USOIL: Dopo il forte aumento delle scorte di petrolio negli Stati Uniti ieri, il petrolio è sceso testando i supporti di 80,00 $ / barile.
Una mossa al di sotto del livello critico di $ 80,00 è prevista di invitare acquirenti a $ 78.00 e a $ 77,30 (bassa 28/06/2012).
La resistenza principale si trova a $ 83,30 e 84,40-50 prima 85.20.
Konstantinos Oikonomou, Junior Analyst
Giovedi, October 23, 2014 - 14:02
USOIL: Dopo il forte aumento delle scorte di petrolio negli Stati Uniti ieri, il petrolio è sceso testando i supporti di 80,00 $ / barile.
Una mossa al di sotto del livello critico di $ 80,00 è prevista di invitare acquirenti a $ 78.00 e a $ 77,30 (bassa 28/06/2012).
La resistenza principale si trova a $ 83,30 e 84,40-50 prima 85.20.
arkymede74
Forumer storico
si sta parlando sempr epiu' spesso di default qui... mi devo preoccupare??? 
camaleonte
Forumer storico
La Cina volta le spalle ad Arabia Saudita e si rivolge a Russia e Colombia per il petrolio - World Affairs - L'Antidiplomatico
"La Cina volta le spalle ad Arabia Saudita e si rivolge a Russia e Colombia per il petrolio"
"La Cina volta le spalle ad Arabia Saudita e si rivolge a Russia e Colombia per il petrolio"
- Stato