tommy271
Forumer storico
Hoy, #21deMarzo, los #BonosdeVenezuela están mayoritariamente positivos. Excepto VENZ18 cupón 13%, VENZ19. En promedio suben 0,46%
Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 2
- Creatore Discussione tommy271
- Data di Inizio
cristian2008
Forumer attivo
Contento?
cristian2008
Forumer attivo
Io non mi sento carne da macello. Se tu ti senti ti auguro che non lo diventerai
sandrino
Forumer storico
Ti rispondo per l'ennesima volta dicendoti che non sono contento di come stiano andando le cose.
E che spero sempre nella venezuelanata last minute.
Poi comunque mi dirai se AD OGGI sono più pericolosi i miei post o di quelli su twitter che una settimana fa scrivevano "ELECAR A 50 CE L'HANNO IN MANO LORO VEDRETE CHE RIMBORSA"
Vedi in me il nemico ma non sono io.
Esad
Forumer attivo
Quando leggo i tuoi post su Elecar mi viene in mente una nota scena del film "Non ci resta che piangere"..... "mo me lo segno".
tommy271
Forumer storico
C'è molta gente speranzosa su Elecar.
Meglio così: il mercato è fatto di belle e grandi attese.
carib
rerum cognoscere causas
Nomura:
The stealth rally on Venezuela/PdVSA bonds has gained momentum over the past few weeks and reasserts itself as an idiosyncratic credit that trades on its own fundamentals while de-coupling from the broader risk aversion. You could explain part of the gains to the expectations of a coupon payment after the unexpected headline on Euroclear’s receipt of funds for the much delayed coupon of the 6% PdVSA’22 (now 114 days late). However, the failure to communicate payment on the now defaulted 12.75% PdVSA’22 this week does not show a priority of honoring PdVSA coupon payments. We assume the more dominant influence for the latest gains has been the increasing expectations of a potential regime change through the election headlines and recent military arrests. The event risks are converging through May elections with cashflow constraints the ultimate trigger for a political transition. It will be increasingly difficult for President Maduro to survive the cashflow stress while the US ultimately holds the leverage via trade sector sanctions and/or litigation.
The stealth rally on Venezuela/PdVSA bonds has gained momentum over the past few weeks and reasserts itself as an idiosyncratic credit that trades on its own fundamentals while de-coupling from the broader risk aversion. You could explain part of the gains to the expectations of a coupon payment after the unexpected headline on Euroclear’s receipt of funds for the much delayed coupon of the 6% PdVSA’22 (now 114 days late). However, the failure to communicate payment on the now defaulted 12.75% PdVSA’22 this week does not show a priority of honoring PdVSA coupon payments. We assume the more dominant influence for the latest gains has been the increasing expectations of a potential regime change through the election headlines and recent military arrests. The event risks are converging through May elections with cashflow constraints the ultimate trigger for a political transition. It will be increasingly difficult for President Maduro to survive the cashflow stress while the US ultimately holds the leverage via trade sector sanctions and/or litigation.
carib
rerum cognoscere causas
2.
The non-communication on the latest defaulted PdVSA bond (12.775% PdVSA’22) suggests non-payment of PdVSA bonds. There has been no official announcement on the intentions to pay the 12.75% PdVSA’22 contrary to the previous PdVSA coupon payments with notification after the expiration of the 30 day grace period. There could be late payments on the PdVSA’21, 35, 24 and 26 after months of delay through the intermediaries that were initiated in November-December 2017. However, cashflow stress suggests difficulty on honoring any future coupon payments ahead of the next bulk of coupons in April. This could then heighten the litigation threat. It’s obvious that bondholders should be taking preliminary steps to organize; however it may be premature to accelerate until high conviction of permanent default and/or less conviction of regime change. The litigation recourse is typically only a last resort strategy for the complexity, cost and lengthy process while most investors would prefer negotiation/restructuring under new management. We assume that the litigation threats delay until after the April coupon payments and after May presidential elections to better assess the prospects of permanent default and regime change.
The non-communication on the latest defaulted PdVSA bond (12.775% PdVSA’22) suggests non-payment of PdVSA bonds. There has been no official announcement on the intentions to pay the 12.75% PdVSA’22 contrary to the previous PdVSA coupon payments with notification after the expiration of the 30 day grace period. There could be late payments on the PdVSA’21, 35, 24 and 26 after months of delay through the intermediaries that were initiated in November-December 2017. However, cashflow stress suggests difficulty on honoring any future coupon payments ahead of the next bulk of coupons in April. This could then heighten the litigation threat. It’s obvious that bondholders should be taking preliminary steps to organize; however it may be premature to accelerate until high conviction of permanent default and/or less conviction of regime change. The litigation recourse is typically only a last resort strategy for the complexity, cost and lengthy process while most investors would prefer negotiation/restructuring under new management. We assume that the litigation threats delay until after the April coupon payments and after May presidential elections to better assess the prospects of permanent default and regime change.
Ottoecinquanta
Forumer attivo
Sandrì, magari hai ragione e non rimborseranno ma non mi sembra molto equilibrato continuare a ribadirlo annunciando il total default sia qui sia su Twitter, senza offesa ovviamente
carib
rerum cognoscere causas
3.
We assume that the markets would interpret bad news (sanctions/litigation) as good news with extreme measures necessary to force a political transition while defaulted and distressed bond prices have already discounted low recovery value. There has already been a significant bounce off the lows and outside of the 25-30 trading range for the higher coupon bonds. This would suggest some caution for near-term retracement; however the latent positive event risks through May and dominant underweight positioning suggests resiliency of recent gains and potential to overshoot to the upside. The technicals are quite supportive with the recent strength potentially attracting crossover investors that were waiting for higher conviction (higher prices) of regime change as the catalyst for participation. We would expect knee-jerk gains even with an intra-Chavismo transition on the prospects that political transition = economic transition. We remain constructive even after the latest gains with a preference for the lower cash price bonds versus the expensive bonds (VENZ’18 and VENZ’34) but the entire complex benefiting on the prospects of a political transition.
We assume that the markets would interpret bad news (sanctions/litigation) as good news with extreme measures necessary to force a political transition while defaulted and distressed bond prices have already discounted low recovery value. There has already been a significant bounce off the lows and outside of the 25-30 trading range for the higher coupon bonds. This would suggest some caution for near-term retracement; however the latent positive event risks through May and dominant underweight positioning suggests resiliency of recent gains and potential to overshoot to the upside. The technicals are quite supportive with the recent strength potentially attracting crossover investors that were waiting for higher conviction (higher prices) of regime change as the catalyst for participation. We would expect knee-jerk gains even with an intra-Chavismo transition on the prospects that political transition = economic transition. We remain constructive even after the latest gains with a preference for the lower cash price bonds versus the expensive bonds (VENZ’18 and VENZ’34) but the entire complex benefiting on the prospects of a political transition.