Source: Stifel
1. We hold our view that a regime change in 2018 appears unlikely. An involuntary regime change may happen if the US imposes oil import and/export bans on Venezuela because that could dramatically reduce the rent-seeking capabilities of the Maduro administration and the military. However, given that Donald Trump has already complained about high oil prices, he seems unlikely to launch oil sector sanctions on Venezuela because that could cause a sudden reduction in global oil supply and thus further raise oil prices. True, PdVSA's crude production likely will continue to decline, but it could be in a slow speed. PdVSA's crude production did drop rapidly in the two months of February and March from 1.71mbd to 1.51mbd, but in April-May it has only decreased 70kbd to 1.44mbd. If such a slow speed can be maintained or even slowed down further, it will be unlikely to see a cashflow stress-induced regime change, at least in 2018. In this case, the bonds likely will have a further downside this year.
2. That said, we think the declining trajectory of VENZ and PdVSA bonds may take a pause for a short period of time, especially for the low-coupon PdVSA bonds as their prices are approaching 20 points. The mid-price of PdVSA 24s, for example, is 20.78 currently. Although PdVSA 24s touched such price level in January and early February, during those days the price was quoted clean. Recall that on February 12th, when PdVSA bonds started trading flat, the price of PdVSA 24s immediately jump c2 points to close at 22.88 on that day to reflect the accrued interest. Therefore, the current price of PdVSA 24s is actually this year's new low. We envision that 20 could serve as a technical and psychological support for these low-coupon PdVSA bonds (except for the hunger bonds PdVSA 6% 22s). However, VENZ bonds and higher-coupon PdVSA bonds may drift towards the levels of low-coupon PdVSA bonds. On June 25th, a group of investors holding more than $8bn of VENZ and PdVSA bonds, advised by Mark Walker of Millsten & Co, issued a statement saying that VENZ and PdVSA bondholders should be treated equally and that any restructuring should provide "comparable recoveries for all similarly situated creditors". This shows that many bondholders are losing patience in regards to Maduro's prioritizing resources to keep PdVSA 20s afloat. It is hard to predict how these bondholders can make Maduro treat all the creditors equally, but we would rather be cautious on PdVSA 20s.
3. We believe Venezuela almost surely will default on the principal payments of VENZ 13.625% 18s and 7% 18s. We recommend switching out of VENZ 7% 18s into PdVSA 12.75% 22s.
4. We continue to favor PdVSA 12.75% 22s over VENZ 26s. We also favor PdVSA 35s over VENZ 38s and 25s.