sandrino
Forumer storico
Nada de nada
Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 2 (52 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione tommy271
- Data di Inizio
Nada de nada
policeman
Forumer storico
FAKE NEWS
Have a nice day and week end
policeman
Forumer storico
vai a leggere le sanzioni americane contro il Venezuela
carib
rerum cognoscere causas
A.Oliveros:
La clave para poder cambiar el acelerado deterioro de nuestra producción petrolera está en venderles confianza y credibilidad a los inversionistas extranjeros. Para eso haría falta acabar con el default (renegociar la deuda externa de la República y Pdvsa). Sin esa ayuda externa, no hay recuperación posible.
Para todo esto hará falta toda la ayuda posible (China, FMI, Europa, Marte, Júpiter, Saturno). Nuestra crisis es innovadora en la gravedad, pero muchos países en la región y en el mundo han sufrido de hiperinflación y nosotros mismos tenemos experiencia en revertir caídas en la producción petrolera. Para acabar con la crisis hace falta querer hacerlo y buscarse gente que sepa afrontarla, no “economistas” que vengan con bidones de gasolina a apagar el incendio. Tampoco se necesitan colegas importados, los nacionales de calidad abundan. La clave es ¿el gobierno quiere acabar con la crisis o profundizarla?
La clave para poder cambiar el acelerado deterioro de nuestra producción petrolera está en venderles confianza y credibilidad a los inversionistas extranjeros. Para eso haría falta acabar con el default (renegociar la deuda externa de la República y Pdvsa). Sin esa ayuda externa, no hay recuperación posible.
Para todo esto hará falta toda la ayuda posible (China, FMI, Europa, Marte, Júpiter, Saturno). Nuestra crisis es innovadora en la gravedad, pero muchos países en la región y en el mundo han sufrido de hiperinflación y nosotros mismos tenemos experiencia en revertir caídas en la producción petrolera. Para acabar con la crisis hace falta querer hacerlo y buscarse gente que sepa afrontarla, no “economistas” que vengan con bidones de gasolina a apagar el incendio. Tampoco se necesitan colegas importados, los nacionales de calidad abundan. La clave es ¿el gobierno quiere acabar con la crisis o profundizarla?
Ventodivino
מגן ולא יראה
JPM del 21 giugno .
Venezuela: No bottom
Venezuela’s electoral council (CNE) declared that President Maduro reelection for the 2019-2025 term. Maduro “won” on May 20 with 68% amid historically low turnout. The blowout result was not unexpected, despite polls that ranged from competitive election to a clear opposition advantage, amid the president’s ongoing low approval. Recall the opposition umbrella group MUD declined to participate in the event after dialogue talks at the turn of the year in the Dominican Republic failed to yield an agreement on basic electoral conditions. The final blow that ended those talks was the government’s unilateral decision to bring the elections forward to the first half of the year. Presidential elections traditionally happen in 4Q, and the current term ends in January 2019. Despite the MUD’s strategic decision, former Governor Henri Falcon broke ranks and decided to run anyway, buoyed by polls showing he had a strong chance to receive more votes than Maduro, and presenting a relatively orthodox economic stabilization plan, punctuated by a dollarization proposal. His decision to run was strongly criticized by most opposition leaders, and only gained the support of a minority of the traditional opposition establishment.
Very low turnout. According to the CNE, the official election result showed turnout of 46%. This compares with around 80% in both Chavez’s 2012 reelection and the 2013 snap election of Maduro. Press reports suggest even this figure could have been inflated: Reuters reported only 32% participation as of 6pm, the moment polling stations are supposed to close. Despite some expectations that he would validate the process, Falcon refused to recognize the final result.
More international isolation. The low turnout, as well as Falcon’s post-vote stance, seemed to undermine Maduro’s strategic objective, which was for the election to provide enough of a “legitimacy” argument to gradually erode the growing resolve of the international community to isolate Venezuela. In the event, the US, the EU and the Lima Group of large Latin American countries all refused to recognize the election. The Lima group stated that their governments would take further steps to financially isolate Venezuela, as well as to deal with an intensifying regional migration crisis. The OAS has begun a process that could take high ranking Maduro officials to the Hague on human rights charges, while also taking up the Venezuela case again in the context of the hemispheric body’s Democratic Charter. The US followed the May 20 vote by placing an incremental financial sanction prohibiting PDVSA’s factoring of receivables, or the sale/posting as collateral of any other state assets. These added to financial sanctions placed last year, which shut Venezuela and PDVSA out of financial markets, impeded PDVSA from collecting Citgo dividends, and restricted oil-sector counterparties from extending credit to PDVSA via arrears (in effect limiting new services from being provided to the state oil company). Despite Maduro’s post election move to release some high profile political prisoners, the White House has signaled that the overall policy stance toward Venezuela remains unchanged.
Political equilibrium? There has been some discussion that Maduro may try to move with a new “dialogue” process with some opposition actors, and Maduro in June shuffled the (sanctioned) Tareck El Aissami out of the VP position, replacing him with (unsanctioned by the US) ANC head Delcy Rodriguez. Overall, however, the political backdrop seems to be stabilizing in a negative equilibrium, with little in the way of catalyst for a better trajectory. The key caveat to this view is the crumbling economy and suffocating external liquidity situation resulting from the oil sector decline. However, it will take movement from within Chavismo / the armed forces at this point to deliver an inflection to the current political trajectory.
Oil decline, hyperinflation taking the economy to new lows
As for oil output, PDVSA has little ability to revert what has become an increasingly precipitous decline.OPEC’s reporting showed a 29% overall decline in 2017 down to 1.62mbd, with a sharp tumble in 4Q. Over a two year horizon Venezuela’s output is down over 1 million barrels, standing at 1.5mbd by May 2018 according to Venezuela’s direct communications to OPEC; third parties estimated below 1.4mbd. The accelerating decline is due to a combination of factors including: the sharply deteriorating macro backdrop and related departure of skilled workers; the indirect impact of US sanctions on PDVSA’s financial relationships, which should be complicated further by the latest action on factoring; and operational paralysis that followed the top management purge enacted by the new PDVSA leadership under National Guard General Quevedo. While Maduro issued a decree granting Quevedo near carte blanch to strike deals outside the constraints of Venezuela’s Hydrocarbons law, the overriding drivers cited above have not receded. Moreover, since April, operational woes have been compounded by Conoco’s pursuit of a $2bn arbitration award, leading to attachments in key facilities in the Dutch Caribbean. A judgment in the US may not be far behind. The difference between Conoco’s claim and other (stalled) awards is that the former is against PDVSA, not the Republic (which has alter-ego and sovereign immunity defenses). PDVSA has given some signals that it might be willing to settle with Conoco, but installments might be negotiated, and then the two sides may need a license from the US since. Even if PDVSA settles, more creditors would be waiting in the wings. All told, we estimate PDVSA could easily lose another 500kb/d of output this year.
Venezuela has not published any economic statistics since 3Q15. At that point, the economy had suffered seven straight quarters of contraction, while inflation had crossed the 100% threshold. The opposition controlled National Assembly (AN) stepped in to fill the information void. On the growth side, their GDP proxy figures annual contractions upwards of 12% in each 2016-17. The AN’s inflation index has shown prices accelerate to over 60%m/m in 4Q17, to over 80%m/m so far in 2018, including a 110%m/m print in May. This has taken inflation from 2,600% in 2017 to almost 25,000% in the last print. The parallel FX rate has moved exponentially in concert, jumping from an average rate of USD/VEF 1,365 in 2016 to over 100,000 by December 2017, to over 2 million by June 2018. These moves (Figure 3) have been driven by the monetary financing of the deficit, as observed by the expansion of the Central Bank’s balance sheet via its claims on PDVSA.
Bond default (mostly) continues. PDVSA paid $2.3bn of bonded debt maturities last November, but a trickle of coupons since then has mostly halted. As of now, only the $107mn payment of Citgo-collateralized PDVSA 2020s has been made on time this year (clearing agencies also released a delayed coupon payment on PDVSA ’22Ns). The Republic owes considerably more in 2018 ($5.4bn) than PDVSA ($2.9bn), and the default on $36bn (face value) of Republic bonds seems definitive. PDVSA’s commercial activities are exposed to Conoco-style litigation, so their bonds ($28bn face outstanding, plus several billion of promissory notes) may continue to selectively see some coupon flow depending on perceptions of litigation risks. However, so far, bondholders have remained on the sidelines, not accelerating their claims, be it to avoid a lower statutory rate on PDI, or be it because legal costs are hard to justify given the lack of end game (i.e., a restructuring is blocked by US policy).
Venezuela: No bottom
- Maduro’s May “re-election” led to more isolation, but politics feels stuck in a negative equilibrium
- The oil sector decline seems untenable and may yet spark a reaction from Chavista stakeholders
- Bond default has not been met with legal action, but arbitrations are advancing
Venezuela’s electoral council (CNE) declared that President Maduro reelection for the 2019-2025 term. Maduro “won” on May 20 with 68% amid historically low turnout. The blowout result was not unexpected, despite polls that ranged from competitive election to a clear opposition advantage, amid the president’s ongoing low approval. Recall the opposition umbrella group MUD declined to participate in the event after dialogue talks at the turn of the year in the Dominican Republic failed to yield an agreement on basic electoral conditions. The final blow that ended those talks was the government’s unilateral decision to bring the elections forward to the first half of the year. Presidential elections traditionally happen in 4Q, and the current term ends in January 2019. Despite the MUD’s strategic decision, former Governor Henri Falcon broke ranks and decided to run anyway, buoyed by polls showing he had a strong chance to receive more votes than Maduro, and presenting a relatively orthodox economic stabilization plan, punctuated by a dollarization proposal. His decision to run was strongly criticized by most opposition leaders, and only gained the support of a minority of the traditional opposition establishment.
Very low turnout. According to the CNE, the official election result showed turnout of 46%. This compares with around 80% in both Chavez’s 2012 reelection and the 2013 snap election of Maduro. Press reports suggest even this figure could have been inflated: Reuters reported only 32% participation as of 6pm, the moment polling stations are supposed to close. Despite some expectations that he would validate the process, Falcon refused to recognize the final result.
More international isolation. The low turnout, as well as Falcon’s post-vote stance, seemed to undermine Maduro’s strategic objective, which was for the election to provide enough of a “legitimacy” argument to gradually erode the growing resolve of the international community to isolate Venezuela. In the event, the US, the EU and the Lima Group of large Latin American countries all refused to recognize the election. The Lima group stated that their governments would take further steps to financially isolate Venezuela, as well as to deal with an intensifying regional migration crisis. The OAS has begun a process that could take high ranking Maduro officials to the Hague on human rights charges, while also taking up the Venezuela case again in the context of the hemispheric body’s Democratic Charter. The US followed the May 20 vote by placing an incremental financial sanction prohibiting PDVSA’s factoring of receivables, or the sale/posting as collateral of any other state assets. These added to financial sanctions placed last year, which shut Venezuela and PDVSA out of financial markets, impeded PDVSA from collecting Citgo dividends, and restricted oil-sector counterparties from extending credit to PDVSA via arrears (in effect limiting new services from being provided to the state oil company). Despite Maduro’s post election move to release some high profile political prisoners, the White House has signaled that the overall policy stance toward Venezuela remains unchanged.
Political equilibrium? There has been some discussion that Maduro may try to move with a new “dialogue” process with some opposition actors, and Maduro in June shuffled the (sanctioned) Tareck El Aissami out of the VP position, replacing him with (unsanctioned by the US) ANC head Delcy Rodriguez. Overall, however, the political backdrop seems to be stabilizing in a negative equilibrium, with little in the way of catalyst for a better trajectory. The key caveat to this view is the crumbling economy and suffocating external liquidity situation resulting from the oil sector decline. However, it will take movement from within Chavismo / the armed forces at this point to deliver an inflection to the current political trajectory.
Oil decline, hyperinflation taking the economy to new lows
As for oil output, PDVSA has little ability to revert what has become an increasingly precipitous decline.OPEC’s reporting showed a 29% overall decline in 2017 down to 1.62mbd, with a sharp tumble in 4Q. Over a two year horizon Venezuela’s output is down over 1 million barrels, standing at 1.5mbd by May 2018 according to Venezuela’s direct communications to OPEC; third parties estimated below 1.4mbd. The accelerating decline is due to a combination of factors including: the sharply deteriorating macro backdrop and related departure of skilled workers; the indirect impact of US sanctions on PDVSA’s financial relationships, which should be complicated further by the latest action on factoring; and operational paralysis that followed the top management purge enacted by the new PDVSA leadership under National Guard General Quevedo. While Maduro issued a decree granting Quevedo near carte blanch to strike deals outside the constraints of Venezuela’s Hydrocarbons law, the overriding drivers cited above have not receded. Moreover, since April, operational woes have been compounded by Conoco’s pursuit of a $2bn arbitration award, leading to attachments in key facilities in the Dutch Caribbean. A judgment in the US may not be far behind. The difference between Conoco’s claim and other (stalled) awards is that the former is against PDVSA, not the Republic (which has alter-ego and sovereign immunity defenses). PDVSA has given some signals that it might be willing to settle with Conoco, but installments might be negotiated, and then the two sides may need a license from the US since. Even if PDVSA settles, more creditors would be waiting in the wings. All told, we estimate PDVSA could easily lose another 500kb/d of output this year.
Venezuela has not published any economic statistics since 3Q15. At that point, the economy had suffered seven straight quarters of contraction, while inflation had crossed the 100% threshold. The opposition controlled National Assembly (AN) stepped in to fill the information void. On the growth side, their GDP proxy figures annual contractions upwards of 12% in each 2016-17. The AN’s inflation index has shown prices accelerate to over 60%m/m in 4Q17, to over 80%m/m so far in 2018, including a 110%m/m print in May. This has taken inflation from 2,600% in 2017 to almost 25,000% in the last print. The parallel FX rate has moved exponentially in concert, jumping from an average rate of USD/VEF 1,365 in 2016 to over 100,000 by December 2017, to over 2 million by June 2018. These moves (Figure 3) have been driven by the monetary financing of the deficit, as observed by the expansion of the Central Bank’s balance sheet via its claims on PDVSA.
Bond default (mostly) continues. PDVSA paid $2.3bn of bonded debt maturities last November, but a trickle of coupons since then has mostly halted. As of now, only the $107mn payment of Citgo-collateralized PDVSA 2020s has been made on time this year (clearing agencies also released a delayed coupon payment on PDVSA ’22Ns). The Republic owes considerably more in 2018 ($5.4bn) than PDVSA ($2.9bn), and the default on $36bn (face value) of Republic bonds seems definitive. PDVSA’s commercial activities are exposed to Conoco-style litigation, so their bonds ($28bn face outstanding, plus several billion of promissory notes) may continue to selectively see some coupon flow depending on perceptions of litigation risks. However, so far, bondholders have remained on the sidelines, not accelerating their claims, be it to avoid a lower statutory rate on PDI, or be it because legal costs are hard to justify given the lack of end game (i.e., a restructuring is blocked by US policy).
policeman
Forumer storico
Llukas,è proibito postare nunca su Rotterdam di la,cancellano tutto.
ho chiesto al spedizioniere,che è anche mio se i venezuelani pagano,mi ha detto che pagano
puntualmente con trasferimento da una banca dell Antilles.Penso che il mallopo si trova in
quella banca.naturalmente ha rifiutato di dirmi il nome della banca.
vedi è utile questo contatto di Rotterdam.
Have a nice evening
ho chiesto al spedizioniere,che è anche mio se i venezuelani pagano,mi ha detto che pagano
puntualmente con trasferimento da una banca dell Antilles.Penso che il mallopo si trova in
quella banca.naturalmente ha rifiutato di dirmi il nome della banca.
vedi è utile questo contatto di Rotterdam.
Have a nice evening
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