neosephiroth86
Forumer storico
@StockExchange
@tommy271
Cruces and Samples (forthcoming 2016) show that the
ex post haircut signifcantly differed from these early
computations when the payments on the GDP-linked
warrants are included — and they show that the returns
on these warrants were exceptionally large. They do the
following illustrative exercise: suppose that in 2005, a
holdout bondholder had a hypothetical portfolio of
what by 2010 were the seven most litigated bonds, and
exchanged in 2005 that portfolio for the same basket of
bonds that the average restructured bondholder received
in the frst swap — a basket that included GDP-linked
warrants. By 2005, the value of that basket would have
been of 37 cents on the dollar. Suppose that the holdout
bondholders reinvested all the coupons in the same
security year after year. In 2015, every holdout bondholder
would have had a claim of $1.33 — that is, every holdout
would have had 33 more cents than the original face
value, even having accepted an initial deep discount.
Interestingly, investing $1 on June 2, 2005 (the day the frst
exchange was settled) in a US Treasury bond would have
resulted in a claim of $1.27 on the same date of 2015.
Se le cose vanno come nel 2001 non sarebbe una tragedia, soprattutto per chi le ha prese a 55 cent come me. Considerando i titoli GDP linked l'haircut é stato meno grave di quanto sembrerebbe Bisognerebbe vedere anche se stanno messi peggio o meglio di allora, che mi dici ?
@tommy271
Cruces and Samples (forthcoming 2016) show that the
ex post haircut signifcantly differed from these early
computations when the payments on the GDP-linked
warrants are included — and they show that the returns
on these warrants were exceptionally large. They do the
following illustrative exercise: suppose that in 2005, a
holdout bondholder had a hypothetical portfolio of
what by 2010 were the seven most litigated bonds, and
exchanged in 2005 that portfolio for the same basket of
bonds that the average restructured bondholder received
in the frst swap — a basket that included GDP-linked
warrants. By 2005, the value of that basket would have
been of 37 cents on the dollar. Suppose that the holdout
bondholders reinvested all the coupons in the same
security year after year. In 2015, every holdout bondholder
would have had a claim of $1.33 — that is, every holdout
would have had 33 more cents than the original face
value, even having accepted an initial deep discount.
Interestingly, investing $1 on June 2, 2005 (the day the frst
exchange was settled) in a US Treasury bond would have
resulted in a claim of $1.27 on the same date of 2015.
Se le cose vanno come nel 2001 non sarebbe una tragedia, soprattutto per chi le ha prese a 55 cent come me. Considerando i titoli GDP linked l'haircut é stato meno grave di quanto sembrerebbe Bisognerebbe vedere anche se stanno messi peggio o meglio di allora, che mi dici ?
Ultima modifica:
) di 5 mld in venti giorni. 5 mld al giorno è uno sproposito che credo vada al di là del possibile. E comunque anche 5 mld in 20 giorni sono una fracca di soldi e un bel falò, più che delle vanità, vano in sé e per sé , perchè poi in ogni caso il peso va dove deve andare ossia dove lo porta la sfiducia degli stessi argentini nel loro sistema monetario e finanziario. A meno, chissà, magari di forti misure di controllo dei capitali e reintroduzione del cepo cambiario.
