Obbligazioni bancarie Banche irlandesi: newsflow, ratings, bonds. Il fronte irlandese dell'Euro. (1 Viewer)

[Imark]

Era un po' che ci pensavo al fronte occidentale dell'Euro, quello delle banche irlandesi. Il 3d vuole monitorare trasversalmente la situazione delle banche, gli interventi del governo irlandese nel comparto bancario e dei mortgage lenders, i corsi dei bond bancari che alcuni di voi detengono, con un occhio a quanto va accadendo dopo la nazionalizzazione di Anglo Irish Bank e la presenza dello Stato al 25% del capitale delle altre 2 principali banche del paese.

L'altro fronte dell'Euro da monitorare sarebbe quello sudorientale, delle banche greche... Chissà che a qualcuno non venga voglia di farlo.

parto con questo report di Fitch che downgrada 5 banche irlandesi sul presupposto di un 2009 che per l'isola del quadrifoglio sarà molto duro.


Fitch Downgrades 5 Irish Banks; Upgrades Support Ratings; Affirms Covered Bonds

15 Jan 2009 9:29 AM (EST)

Fitch Ratings-London-15 January 2009: Fitch Ratings-London-15 January 2009: Fitch Ratings has today downgraded the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and Individual Ratings of Allied Irish Banks (AIB), Anglo Irish Bank Corporation (Anglo), Bank of Ireland (BoI) and Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS) and the Individual rating of Irish Life & Permanent (ILP). The agency has placed EBS Building Society's (EBS) Long-term IDR of 'A-' (A minus) and Individual rating of 'B/C' on Rating Watch Negative.

Fitch has also upgraded the Support ratings and revised upwards the Support Rating Floors for a number of Irish credit institutions. A full list of rating actions, including those for covered bonds, appears at the end of this release.


The downgrades reflect the deteriorating economic environment, an abrupt contraction in forecasts for Irish economic growth in 2009, rising unemployment and a worsening outlook for commercial property. Fitch considers that these changes are likely to lead to weaker revenue generation, sharp rises in impaired loans and steep falls in operating profitability for the Irish banks.

"These rating actions incorporate our expectation of significantly weaker earnings by the banks and poorer asset quality," said Matthew Taylor, Senior Director in Fitch's Financial Institutions group. On a positive note, these institutions all have strong customer franchises and attentively manage expenses, which may offer some protection against declining revenues and larger loan impairment charges. In recent years, these institutions have reported notable asset growth and rising profitability as they benefited from robust economic growth. In addition, the Irish government has guaranteed all retail, commercial, institutional and interbank deposits until end-September 2010.

In upgrading the Support Ratings and revising upwards the Support Rating Floors, Fitch has taken note of the commitment of the Irish government to guarantee the covered liabilities of seven Irish credit institutions. It also notes the commitment by the Irish government to subscribe to preference shares in AIB, Anglo and BoI and its indication of the availability of additional capital to support further capital issuance by these institutions.

In view of these elements, and the government's acquisition of 75% voting rights in Anglo, Fitch has upgraded Anglo's Support Rating to '1' from '3' and revised upwards its Support Rating Floor to 'A-' (A minus) from 'BB+'. The Support Rating Floors at AIB and BoI have been revised upwards to 'A' from 'A-' and the Support Ratings of '1' have been affirmed. The agency has also upgraded the Support Ratings of EBS, ILP and INBS to '2' from '3'. The Support Rating Floors have been revised upwards to 'BBB-' (BBB minus) at EBS and INBS from 'BB+' and 'BB' respectively. Having seen the extent of the commitment from the Irish government to support its banks, Fitch considers that this support should continue to be available for the period covered by the Long-term IDR.

AIB is active in Ireland, the UK and Poland and holds a non-controlling stake in the American M&T Bank Corporation, which diversifies earnings and risks. However, the bank has sizeable investment and development commercial mortgage portfolios and Fitch is concerned that the development book in particular represents a significant risk.

Combined with Fitch's expectations of a tough operating environment leading to falling revenues and weighty loan impairment charges, the agency considers that the 'C' Individual Rating definition of 'an adequate bank' appropriately characterises the bank. More positively, AIB has large market shares in Ireland in retail funding, business loans and residential mortgages, which should continue positively to underpin the bank's performance and its receipt of EUR2bn government subscribed preference shares help to strengthen the bank.

Fitch considers that Anglo's specialisation in lending supported by commercial real estate is especially vulnerable to the weakening economy and commercial property markets. In addition to its investment portfolio, the bank has significant exposure to riskier development loans.

In this context of increasing company defaults and falling commercial property values, Fitch expects the bank to report weaker revenues and large loan impairment charges and considers that the scale of the impaired loan charges could intensify the vulnerability of the bank to economic developments. In addition, the agency considers that the sustainability of the bank's business model may be in question and that the bank may need to review its positioning to improve its otherwise weak prospects. The presence of EUR1.5bn government preference shares strengthens the bank's capital position.

Low risk residential mortgages make up about half of BoI's loan book and should help protect the bank from some of the difficulties presented by the economic downturn. However, the bank is also exposed to commercial real estate in its investment and development property lending and Fitch considers that these portfolios are still sufficiently large to generate loan impairment charges that may severely dent operating profit. The bank has a strong franchise also in retail funding and business loans in Ireland and is active in the UK market. The bank's capital position is strengthened by EUR2bn of preference shares subscribed by the government.

In the light of these rating actions taken on Irish credit institutions, Fitch is evaluating the Long-term IDR and Individual ratings of EBS.

The downgrade of ILP's Individual Rating to 'B/C' from 'B' reflects Fitch's expectations of smaller revenues and weaker asset quality in the bank as a result of the contraction in economic growth and rising unemployment in Ireland. The bank's buy-to-let mortgage portfolio in the UK may also be susceptible to losses. On the other hand, ILP benefits from the diversification provided by its insurance operations. Fitch expects a decline in insurance revenues, but considers that the performance of the overall organisation may be less influenced by the economic downturn than its Irish peers. For insurance operations, please see the separate Rating Action Comment "Fitch Downgrades Irish Life to IFS 'A+'; Outlook Negative" dated 15 January 2009 on www.fitchratings.com.

INBS has developed a specialisation in commercial property mortgages, which make up most of its loan book. Within this specialisation, there are some loan concentrations and a portion of loans with high loan to value ratios, which Fitch considers to represent a greater risk. With declining property values and an expected increase in company defaults, Fitch expects INBS to record smaller revenues and large loan impairment charges. The agency considers that the scale of the impaired loan charges could intensify the vulnerability of the society to economic developments. The society is taking action to reduce its loan exposures and Fitch views positively the appointment of additional Board Directors.

Fitch has affirmed at 'F1+' the Short-term IDR rating of AIB, Anglo Irish, BoI, EBS, and INBS in view of the existence of an Irish government guarantee for senior and lower Tier II subordinated debt which matures before end-September 2010. The agency has also affirmed at 'AAA' the senior and lower Tier II debt issues with original terms longer than one year which mature before 29 September 2010 and which are included in the Irish government's credit institutions financial support scheme.

The ratings of AIB, Anglo, BoI, EBS, ILP and INBS are as below:
Allied Irish Banks
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'A' from 'AA-' ('AA minus), off RWN; Stable Outlook assigned
Senior debt downgraded to 'A' from 'AA-' ('AA minus), off RWN
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1+'
Individual rating downgraded to 'C' from 'B', off RWN
Support rating affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor revised upwards to 'A' from A- (A minus)
Subordinated debt downgraded to 'A-' (A minus) from 'A+'; off RWN
Preference shares downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A+'; remain on RWN
AIB Bank (CI) Limited
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'A' from 'AA-' (AA minus), off RWN; Stable Outlook assigned
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1+'
Individual rating downgraded to 'C' from 'B'; off RWN
Support rating affirmed at '1'
AIB Group (UK) plc
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'A' from 'AA-' (AA minus); off RWN; Stable Outlook assigned
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1+'
Individual rating downgraded to 'C' from 'B'; off RWN
Support rating affirmed at '1'

Anglo Irish Bank Corporation
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'A-' (A minus), from 'A+'; off RWN; Stable Outlook assigned
Senior debt downgraded to 'A-' from 'A+'; off RWN
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1+'
Individual rating downgraded to 'D/E' from 'B'; off RWN
Support rating upgraded to '1' from '3'
Support Rating Floor revised upwards to 'A-' (A minus) from 'BB+'
Subordinated debt downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A'; off RWN
Preference shares downgraded to 'BBB-' (BBB minus) from 'A'; remain on RWN

Bank of Ireland
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'A' from 'AA-' (AA minus); off RWN; Stable Outlook assigned
Senior debt downgraded to 'A' from 'AA-' ('AA minus), off RWN
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1+'
Individual rating downgraded to 'C' from 'B'; off RWN
Support rating affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor revised upwards to 'A' from 'A-' (A minus)
Subordinated debt downgraded to 'A-' (A minus) from 'A+'; off RWN
Preference shares downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A+'; remain on RWN

EBS Building Society
Long-term IDR of 'A-' (A minus) placed on RWN
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1+'
Individual rating of 'B/C' placed on RWN
Support Rating upgraded to '2' from '3'
Support Rating Floor revised upwards to 'BBB-' (BBB minus) from 'BB+'
Senior debt of EBS at 'A' placed on RWN
Subordinated debt and permanent interest-bearing shares at 'BBB+' placed on RWN


EBS Mortgage Finance
Long-term IDR of 'A-' (A minus) placed on RWN
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1+'
Support rating affirmed at '1' Irish Life & Permanent
Individual rating downgraded to 'B/C', from 'B'; off RWN
Support rating upgraded to '2' from '3'

Irish Nationwide Building Society
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BBB-' (BBB minus) from 'BBB+'; off RWN; Stable
Outlook assigned
Senior debt downgraded to 'BBB-' (BBB minus) from 'BBB+'; off RWN
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1+'
Individual rating downgraded to 'D/E' from 'C'; off RWN
Support rating upgraded to '2' from '3'
Support Rating Floor revised upwards to 'BBB-' (BBB minus) from 'BB'
Subordinated debt downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB' RWN; off RWN


In the light of the above rating actions, Fitch has reviewed the credit institutions' covered bond programmes. Following the downgrade or placing on RWN of the Long-term IDRs of the related covered bond issuers or their parent bank, Fitch affirms the 'AAA' ratings for the following covered bonds:
The residential mortgage covered securities (MCS) issued by AIB Mortgage Bank. The ratings continue to be based on probability of default.

The UK commercial mortgage contractual covered bonds issued by Anglo, which were formerly based solely on probability of default and are now assigned based on a 'AA+' probability of default rating with one notch credit for high recoveries leading to the final 'AAA' rating. Anglo is the swap counterparty for the programme. Its rating is now below the 'A' rating referred to in the programme documentation, which provides for remedial action to be taken within 30 days of such a downgrade.
The UK residential mortgage contractual covered bonds issued by BoI, which were formerly assigned based solely on probability of default and are now assigned based on a 'AA+' probability of default rating with one notch credit for high recoveries leading to the final 'AAA' rating on the covered bonds. The residential MCS issued by EBS Mortgage Finance, which continue to be rated 'AA+' based on probability of default with one notch credit for high recoveries leading to the final 'AAA' rating.

 

[Imark]

Interessante anche quest'altro report, nel quale Fitch conferma la linea già adottata per la Spagna di guardare prevalentemente al dato dei parametri di stabilità finanziaria di ciascun paese piuttosto che (anche) a fattori quali le dimensioni o la forza sui mercati dell'apparato industriale e produttivo in genere.

Ciò porta Fitch a concludere che l'Irlanda, per la quale stima possa raggiungere un debito\PIL al 70% alla fine del salvataggio-consolidamento del proprio sistema bancario (contro l'attuale 41%), si troverebbe a quel punto in una situazione analoga a quella di altri paesi a rating AAA come la Francia o la Germania.

La circostanza per cui questi paesi esprimano, anche nelle dimensioni, dei sistemi economici di ben altro spessore rispetto a quello irlandese non vale a generare conseguenze relative ai rating.

Importanti le info riguardanti le banche, che ho evidenziato in grassetto. il Governo irlandese garantisce debito bancario equivalente al 230% del PIL, un dato che francamente impressiona.

Ha stanziato per il salvataggio del sistema bancario 10 mld euro avendone adoperati ad oggi 5, ma la stessa agenzie ammette che potrebbero volercene molti più di 10.

Interessanti anche i dati macro che mostrano una forte crescita del deficit pubblico, che è passato dall'1% del PIL del 2007 al 7% del 2008, e salirebbe all'11% quest'anno, attestandosi poi al 12-13% per i prossimi 4 anni se non vi fossero interventi di politica fiscale e di contenimento della spesa pubblica idonei a contenerlo.

Interventi varati dal Governo con la legge di bilancio 2009, e tali nelle dimensioni da generare un periodo di rallentamento economico che si prospetta piuttosto prolungato.

Vedremo come andrà ...


Fitch Affirms Ireland at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable

20 Jan 2009 11:22 AM (EST)


Fitch Ratings-London-20 January 2009: Fitch Ratings has today affirmed the Republic of Ireland's Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'AAA' and 'F1+', respectively. At the same time, the agency has affirmed Ireland's Long-term local currency IDR and Country Ceiling at 'AAA', respectively. The Outlooks on the Long-term IDRs are Stable.


"Ireland is in the midst of a deep recession as the economy adjusts to the unwinding of a residential construction boom and the consequent banking crisis and a sharp fall in government tax revenue. Nonetheless, the strong initial starting point of public finances, net government debt is just 29% of GDP, substantially below most 'AAA'-ranked peers such as the UK, and economic fundamentals provide Ireland with the ability to withstand this stress and maintain its 'AAA' status. However, this is also dependent on the government remaining committed to fiscal consolidation over the medium-term and the fiscal costs of financial sector support not exceeding current expectations," said Chris Pryce, Director in Fitch's Sovereigns Group.

Ireland's GDP grew by 6% in 2007, but declined by over 1% in 2008 and Fitch now expects growth to fall by 4% this year, not recovering until late 2010 or 2011. The decline in residential output and house prices began in 2007, but the severity of the fall did not become apparent until 2008 when the number of new houses built fell from almost 90,000 to 50,000 in just two years and will fall to or below 30,000 this year. House prices have been falling consistently since the spring of 2007. The twin falls in both transactions and asset values have had a significant impact on tax revenue, which fell by 14% (over EUR6bn, equivalent to 3.4% of GDP ) and is projected to decline by a further 9% (EUR4bn) this year.

The central government's deficit widened from under 1% of GDP in 2007 to almost 7% in 2008 and the government projects that without policy changes, the budget deficit will rise to 11% this year and oscillate in the 12-13% range every year for the following four years. The government has announced in its January 2009 'Addendum to the 2008 Stability Programme Update' fiscal 'adjustments' to reduce the projected deficit by EUR2bn in 2009 and between EUR3bn and EUR4bn in each of the next four years, amounting in total to EUR16.5bn. Each annual adjustment will consist of a yet unannounced combination of tax measures, including base broadening and rate increases, and expenditure cuts.

"The government's public commitment to these targets, its willingness to be clear regarding the potential economic pain its plans will cause and its acceptance of the consequent electoral unpopularity are essential to its credibility," said Chris Pryce. The government is expected to announce by the end of February the composition of the first EUR1bn in adjustments and further specify the next EUR1bn shortly thereafter, while the 2010 Budget in the autumn will detail a further EUR4bn of deficit-reducing measures.

The impact of these measures will not prevent, according to government forecasts, general government debt rising above a 60% of GDP limit by the end of 2010, but it will probably keep it below 70% of GDP which Fitch expects to be the level reached or just exceeded by a number of European 'AAA'-rated sovereigns.

Fitch takes note of the considerable 'cash or liquid' assets in government hands (about 12% of GDP) which reduces the government's indebtedness in net terms at end 2008 from 41% of GDP gross to 29%. No other 'AAA'-rated sovereign has such comparably large cash balances.

The accumulation of these assets, mostly in 2008, means that the rise in gross debt also overstates the deterioration in underlying fiscal health in that year. Ireland's National Pension Reserve Fund, currently valued at some 9% of GDP, which is subject to government control could also be used to reduce government debt on a net basis (to potentially 20% at end 2008). However, the government has already announced that part of these assets will be used to fund the recapitalisation of the Irish banks.

The banks pose another major challenge to the government. As a result of the property boom for which they provided much of the finance, the banks are now facing a steady rise in non-performing loans. The government has attempted to deal with one aspect of the problem by issuing a sovereign guarantee for deposits and most other bank liabilities. The government has also accepted that it will have to contribute to bank recapitalisation either by buying preference shares or by underwriting share issues. The government has also announced in recent days that it will nationalise the third largest lender, Anglo Irish Bank Corporation plc, for an as yet to be established amount, but certainly less than the sum it would have spent recapitalising it.

The government has said it will put up to EUR10bn into recapitalising banks. It has so far committed about half this amount, and the ultimate fiscal cost of support for the banking sector could be much greater.

Though bank debt and deposits guaranteed by the Irish government exceed 230% of GDP, the guarantee has reassured investors and depositors that no individual financial institution will be allowed to fail, while the risk of a simultaneous system-wide collapse is very remote.

Consequently, Irish banks continue to have access to market funding as well as to the European Central Bank's liquidity facilities. The ultimate fiscal costs of restoring Ireland's banks to financial health will prove substantial, but current estimates do not suggest that they will be great enough to imperil Ireland's 'AAA' status.

Another uncertainty has been the funding challenges faced by a number of EU governments. Fitch notes that the Irish government secured five year funding of EUR6bn last week, albeit at elevated pricing levels.

It also accumulated as a matter of policy over the past year cash balances of more than EUR20bn and in Fitch's opinion the risk of a 'fiscal funding' crisis is very low. Ireland continues to enjoy many of the benefits which brought it economic success in the past. These include a high income per head, a flexible and skilled labour force assisted by strong immigration and rising female participation, a business friendly and open economy including an advantageous corporate taxation regime, and a tradition of encouraging foreign investment.

It has also established a strong political consensus on the importance of encouraging business at home and abroad and the need for fiscal consolidation.

 

[ricpast]

pure queste vuoi far fallire?!


eppure lo sai che il tuo tocco è più potente di harry potter....

 

[lupin70]

Facciamo qualche esempio: sul mercato EuroTLX troviamo il titolo XS0186652557 in lettera da qualche giorno a ~78.
Si tratta di un bond subordinato con opzione CALL: è TF fino al 2014 con cedola al 4,625% e poi, se non rimborsato, diventa TV fino al 2019 con cedole variabili trimestrali Eur3M+1,42. E' un po' lunghetto ma il rendimento sembra interessante.
Il punto è che Bank of Ireland, come del resto tutto il sistema bancario in UK, e come si evince anche dal downgrade operato da Fitch (vedi post precedenti di Mark), non è messa benissimo... ad inizio settimana l'azione a seguito del crollo di RBS ha perso oltre il 50%... e l'Irlanda, tra l'altro, possiede un deficit >10% ...
Che ne pensate? Un pensierino su questo bond lo si può fare comunque?

 

[METHOS]

Facciamo qualche esempio: sul mercato EuroTLX troviamo il titolo XS0186652557 in lettera da qualche giorno a ~78.
Si tratta di un bond subordinato con opzione CALL: è TF fino al 2014 con cedola al 4,625% e poi, se non rimborsato, diventa TV fino al 2019 con cedole variabili trimestrali Eur3M+1,42. E' un po' lunghetto ma il rendimento sembra interessante.
Il punto è che Bank of Ireland, come del resto tutto il sistema bancario in UK, e come si evince anche dal downgrade operato da Fitch (vedi post precedenti di Mark), non è messa benissimo... ad inizio settimana l'azione a seguito del crollo di RBS ha perso oltre il 50%... e l'Irlanda, tra l'altro, possiede un deficit >10% ...
Che ne pensate? Un pensierino su questo bond lo si può fare comunque?

Che tipo di subordinazione ha? Può cancellare o posticipare le cedole?

 

[lupin70]

Ciao Methos,
dal regolamento del bond la clausola di subordinazione riporta quanto segue: "in caso di insolvenza di Bank of Ireland, l’obbligazione sarà rimborsata solo dopo che saranno stati soddisfatti tutti gli altri crediti per i quali non è prevista la clausola di subordinazione". Sul discorso pagamento cedole credo proprio non ci siano problemi... perlomeno in condizioni normali.

 

[Imark]

Facciamo qualche esempio: sul mercato EuroTLX troviamo il titolo XS0186652557 in lettera da qualche giorno a ~78.
Si tratta di un bond subordinato con opzione CALL: è TF fino al 2014 con cedola al 4,625% e poi, se non rimborsato, diventa TV fino al 2019 con cedole variabili trimestrali Eur3M+1,42. E' un po' lunghetto ma il rendimento sembra interessante.
Il punto è che Bank of Ireland, come del resto tutto il sistema bancario in UK, e come si evince anche dal downgrade operato da Fitch (vedi post precedenti di Mark), non è messa benissimo... ad inizio settimana l'azione a seguito del crollo di RBS ha perso oltre il 50%... e l'Irlanda, tra l'altro, possiede un deficit >10% ...
Che ne pensate? Un pensierino su questo bond lo si può fare comunque?

Mah... forse sono troppo fifone io, o lo sto diventando con questo scenario fatto di asset bancari di qualità incerta, di perdite occultate fuori bilancio, di nazionalizzazioni nel week end e salvataggi in zona cesarini ... sinceramente qui lascerei perdere tutto ciò che non è senior ed anche garantito dallo Stato irlandese ... anzi, dirò che forse, a voler davvero fare una puntata sulla tenuta dell'Euro, sono i titoli sovrani irlandesi quelli sui quali si potrebbe scommettere...

E non solo irlandesi... dal Sole 24 ore di oggi, pagina 11, traggo la notizia che la Grecia intende portare la raccolta obbligazionaria a 43 mld euro quest'anno, con la Spagna che salirà fino ad 86,5 mld di raccolta netta, in aggiunta ai 51 mld euro dello scorso anno...

 

[Imark]

Ed arrivano notizie circa l'attuazione della nazionalizzazione di Anglo Irish Bank da parte dello Stato irlandese rispetto alle preferred shares della banca da 300 mln GBP, che sono state assimilate nella legge di nazionalizzazione alle azioni ordinarie della banca, con la conseguenza che i suoi detentori sono azzerati nel capitale ed acquistano il diritto ad una compensazione che tuttavia S&P reputa sarà modesta.

Queste preferred shares passano a rating D, essendo dunque defaultate. Diversamente dagli altri perpetuals, esse prevedevano diritti di voto per i loro detentori alla stregua degli azionisti in determinate situazioni.

Gli altri perpetuals che non prevedevano analoghe prerogative per i loro detentori, restano a rating B in quanto S&P reputa molto probabile il differimento del pagamento della cedola.

Quindi alla fine il loss absorption nello strumento è stato realizzato per via legislativa, non facendo leva su clausole presenti nell'Offering Circular, ma solo per uno strumento di capitale Tier 1 ad elevata assimilazione rispetto all'equity, e non anche per gli altri perpetuals.

Anglo Irish Bank's Preference Share Ratings Lowered To 'D' Following Nationalization Bill

LONDON (Standard & Poor's) Jan. 21, 2008--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered its ratings on £300 million 6.25% Tier 1 preference shares issued by Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd. (previously a public limited company; A-/Watch Neg/A-1) to 'D' from 'B'. At the same time, the 'B' issue ratings on these preference shares were removed from CreditWatch, where they had been placed with negative implications on Sept. 30, 2008.

The 'B' issue ratings on Anglo's other undated perpetual instruments are unchanged.

The lowering of the ratings on the £300 million 6.25% Tier 1 preference shares to 'D' reflects their nationalization by the government of Ireland, along with all the common equity in Anglo.

The preference shares, unlike Anglo's other undated subordinated debt, carry voting rights in some circumstances and are included in the nationalization legislation approved by the Irish parliament. Nationalization of the preference shares means that the investors in the instruments suffer a loss of principal and all future coupons. They will receive compensation, but we expect this to be limited.

The 'B' issue ratings on Anglo's other undated perpetual instruments reflect our view of the increased probability of payment deferral on these instruments following Anglo's nationalization.

We note that the government in its statement announcing the nationalization of Anglo stated that Anglo would "continue to service its obligations and will repay its debts at maturity", and that this included obligations to bondholders.

Nevertheless, we consider that there is heightened payment deferral risk following the government's seizure of control of Anglo's stock. We consider it possible that the European Commission, in the course of approval of a potential state-aid package for Anglo at a future date, may prohibit Anglo from servicing its hybrid debt obligations.

 

[troppidebiti]

Allarme ALLIED IRISH BANKS

Book deserto con 200000 euri in vendita

XS0218949310


chi è davvero temerario potrebbe puntare una fisces

 

[Imark]

E anche Moody's mette in outlook negativo la AAA irlandese e dice anche con chiarezza che è probabile che in futuro la crisi in essere inciderà negativamente sul contesto dell'economia irlandese per qualche anno, e così pure sulla forza finanziaria del governo nazionale...

Peraltro, giacché il Governo è stato costretto a rialzare le tasse per poter gestire il costo del salvataggio bancario senza affossare debito e deficit pubblico, in un momento in cui l'edilizia e l'immobiliare - settori trainanti negli anni scorsi - generano introiti fiscali ridotti rispetto al passato ed i costi del rescue del sistema bancario, esposto anche alla bolla immobiliare in UK oltre che a quella domestica, rischiano di salire, questi sono gli ingredienti di un possibile downgrade del rating sovrano in avvenire.

Un domani un ulteriore aggiustamento fiscale potrebbe non essere più proponibile onde non aggravare la recessione economica, ed il sostegno al settore bancario inciderebbe inevitabilmente sulla metrica finanziaria dello Stato irlandese.

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Moody's changes outlook to negative on Ireland's Aaa ratings[/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Frankfurt, January 30, 2009 -- Moody's Investors Service has today changed the outlook to negative from stable on Ireland's Aaa debt ratings. Today's change in outlook reflects Moody's view that the current economic crisis is likely to significantly affect Ireland's economic strength and government financial strength for the years to come -- both in absolute terms and relative to the country's rating peers. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]"That said, Ireland's Aaa ratings remain appropriate at this point, as the country entered the current financial crisis in a relatively favourable fiscal position and as it is too early to conclude that most of the factors that contributed to its economic vitality have been structurally eroded" says Dietmar Hornung, a Vice President-Senior Analyst in Moody's Sovereign Risk Group. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Thanks to the budget surpluses of recent years, Ireland has indeed some room to manoeuvre, even under the current circumstances. Moody's assessment of "very high" government financial strength reflects the country's still relatively low level of government debt. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]At the same time, Moody's observes that Ireland's pronounced weakness in economic activity is translating into a distinct reversal of public finance dynamics. Furthermore, Ireland's fiscal adjustment capacity seems constrained, as the government can only modestly raise taxes without risking further damage to its economic model. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Moody's recognises that Ireland's economic activity is contracting on the back of a severe correction in the housing market, as well as faltering consumption in connection with increased job uncertainty and a steep decline in investment. Export growth has also been trending downwards. "Moreover, the sizeable indebtedness of households points to a particularly painful de-leveraging process," says Mr. Hornung. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Furthermore, Moody's regards the government liabilities that could possibly arise from the troubled banking system as considerable. At the end of September 2008, the Irish government announced a two-year guarantee to stabilise its banking system -- an 'intervention' which represents an off-balance sheet liability for the government. In December 2008, the government announced a EUR5.5 billion recapitalisation of three banks. In January this year, Anglo Irish Bank was nationalised. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Moody's notes that a downgrade would follow if Ireland, in the coming year, were to exhibit: (i) an economic downturn suggesting a structural erosion of what underpins the Irish "economic model"; (ii) a further significant deterioration of government financial strength, aggravated by liabilities arising from the troubled banking system; and/or (iii) a fiscal adjustment capacity that would fall short of being able to stabilise -- in the foreseeable future -- debt coverage ratios (debt/GDP, debt/general government revenue) and debt affordability indicators (interest payment/revenue) at levels compatible with a Aaa rating. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Moody's last rating action with respect to the Government of Ireland occurred in May 1998 when the foreign currency government bond rating was raised to Aaa from Aa1.[/FONT]