Obbligazioni bancarie Banche irlandesi: newsflow, ratings, bonds. Il fronte irlandese dell'Euro.

Non ricordo di averla vista già postata.

From The Sunday Times
February 1, 2009
€7bn to be pumped into Irish banks
AIB and Bank of Ireland will also be insured by the state against €24bn in bad loans

Frank Fitzgibbon and Iain Dey

THE Irish government is to invest €7 billion (£6 billion) in Ireland’s two biggest banks and insure them against more than €24 billion in bad loans as part of a recapitalisation scheme to be put in place this week.

Allied Irish Banks (AIB) and Bank of Ireland will each receive €3.5 billion in new state investment in the form of preference shares. In addition, a scheme will be put in place that will transfer the risk attaching to 80% of the value of property-related loans on the banks’ books to the taxpayers.

The Irish bailout comes just two weeks after Gordon Brown unveiled Britain’s revised bank-support deal, which led to British taxpayers increasing their stake in Royal Bank of Scotland to 70% alongside hundreds of billions of pounds of additional support for the banking sector.

The Irish banking bailout is expected to offer better terms to the banks than the UK scheme.

The Irish preference shares will carry an interest rate of 8%, representing an annual payment to the state of €560m.

The scheme has been radically overhauled since it was unveiled late last year.

Under the original deal, the Irish government intended to invest €2 billion each into AIB and Bank of Ireland. It also promised to underwrite a €1 billion share issue by each of the banks.

The collapse in share prices since then has made it impossible for the banks to raise money from investors. The state is not only picking up the shortfall but is also increasing its initial commitment to the two banks from €6 billion to €7 billion.

By investing in the banks in the form of preference shares the shareholdings of existing investors will be preserved.

The insurance scheme will cover outstanding loans on development land and on part-completed construction projects that are now considered to have an uncertain future.

AIB and Bank of Ireland, which sells financial products through the Post Office, are believed to have more than €37 billion in speculative property loans on their books. International risk consultants have identified the portion of those loans that are considered “most distressed” and these will be written off by the banks themselves in the first instance.

The risk on the balance of the speculative loans, approximately 80% of the total, will then be transferred to taxpayers, with the state in effect providing insurance on loans that subsequently have to be written off as bad. The banks will pay an upfront insurance premium to the government representing 2.5% of the value of the assets transferred.

This will give the government an immediate cash injection of more than €750m.

The scheme is to last until 2014, which will give the banks five years to “work out” their most problematic loans.

In Britain, details of the loan-insurance scheme being extended to UK banks are still being hammered out. RBS is expected to place up to £100 billion of loans into the scheme, which is designed to protect the bank from further losses.

RBS is also poised to receive a further £1.2 billion of taxpayers’ money when it unveils losses of up to £28 billion this month. The bank is in line for a rebate of all the corporation tax it paid last year. The rebate comes amid mounting concerns over the true cost of the bank bailout. The Institute for Fiscal Studies has warned that the credit crunch would cost the Exchequer £50 billion in lost tax revenues – about 3.5% of national income.

The institute said the government would need to find an extra £20 billion a year in tax increases and spending cuts by the end of the next parliament to repair the holes in the public finances.

Financial-sector profits accounted for 27% of the £50 billion in corporation tax the government received last year.

Analysts estimate RBS will be able to avoid paying tax in its UK business until 2013.
 
Il governo è pronto ad iniettare ben 7 bilioni di € nelle due principali banche del paese Bank of Ireland e Allied Irish Banks.

DUBLIN, Feb 11 (Reuters) - The Irish government said on Wednesday it would invest 7 billion euros ($9.05 billion) into the country's two main lenders and in return Allied Irish Banks (ALBK.I) and Bank of Ireland (BKIR.I) will increase lending and cut executive pay.
"The bank does not intend to take control of these banks," Finance Minister Brian Lenihan said in a news conference.
Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland will each receive 3.5 billion euros in Core Tier 1 capital via preference shares with a fixed dividend of 8 percent.
Lenihan did not unveil any insurance scheme or "bad bank" plan for the banks' bad debts but said the government would examine proposals for the reduction of risks associated with property loans. (Reporting by Andras Gergely; Editing by Carmel Crimmins, Phil Berlowitz) .
 
Ultima modifica:
Posto anche alcuni dati recenti riguardo lo stato della più grande banca del paese, cioè Bank of Ireland (la fonte è sempre Reuters).... inquietante il valore dell'azione: si è passati da un max di 18 € (2007) ad un minimo di 27 centesimi lo scorso mese di gennaio.

Here are some facts about Bank of Ireland, the country's largest bank by assets and second largest bank by market value.
* Bank of Ireland, former official bankers for the Irish government, traces its roots to 1783, with the current banking group established through a merger in 1969.
* Last year, Bank of Ireland became the first of Ireland's leading banks to hint that profits could fall, responding to the worsening economic crisis at home and around the world.
* In November, it posted a 35 percent fall in first-half earnings and scrapped its dividend to shore up capital. It forecast its impairment charge would rise to 90-110 basis points in the year to March 2010 from the lower end of a 60-75 basis point range in the year to March 2009.
* As of the end of September, residential mortgages made up 44 percent of its loan book, property lending accounted for 26 percent, non-property related business lending accounted for 25 percent and unsecured loans to consumers accounted for 4 percent.
* Just over half the group's profit is generated in Ireland, and almost another third in the United Kingdom. It also has operations in the United States, Australia, Germany and France.
* Shares in Bank of Ireland fell from a high above 18 euros in early 2007 to a low of 27 euro cents in January.
 
Irish bank bail-out

(fonte: FT.COM February 12 2009 09:53)


If at first you do not succeed, try harder. A month after it was forced to take Anglo Irish Bank under state control, the Irish government has cast aside its first bank bail-out plan and gone big. It is pumping €7bn into Allied Irish Banks (market capitalisation €1.2bn) and Bank of Ireland (€790m) in exchange for preference shares and, via equity warrants, a possible 25 per cent stake in each. The hope is this will quell concerns that the pair will otherwise be burnt to a cinder by loans they made into the country’s collapsing property sector. The quantum looks right. But Dublin is using the wrong type of fire extinguisher.
Days before Christmas, the government set out to inject €4bn of preference share capital into the banks and told them to raise €1bn apiece in a state-underwritten share issue. Anyone who doubted this plan would work was right. There was no investor appetite for Irish bank equity. Cue Irish Bail-out 2.0, though, because of the delays, the government must put up more cash.

Furthermore, it is doing it the wrong way. Preference shares are Teflon-coated hybrid capital against which write-offs cannot be made and, therefore, no good at absorbing the hefty impairments that loom. Bank of Ireland alone foresees €6bn of bad loan charges over the next three years. Even after injecting this money, the two banks’ average core tier one ratios, at 5.7 per cent, will be a percentage point below the UK average, Collins Stewart estimates.

One message of this bail-out is that the Irish bank executive self-preservation society has scored another success – jobs have been kept and state control avoided. The best way to end the banks’ misery would be to nationalise the pair. Once more with feeling please, Dublin.
 
BoI toxic loan contagion has spread and could reach €6bn


Friday February 13 2009

Bank of Ireland indicated that contagion in its development property loan book has spread to corporate and high street customers as it warned yesterday it could face up to €6bn of loan losses within the next three years.
The new figure comes from a stress-test. However, BoI's current working assumption is that it will write off €4.5bn of loans over three years, compared to the €3.8bn forecast it made in early November.
The Government became aware of the extreme-case figure last month when BoI presented a report, carried out by risk management consultancy firm Oliver Wyman, to the National Treasury Management Agency. The NTMA had led the State's negotiations with the two main banks on their recapitalisation, unveiled on Wednesday.
But the group is confident it will be able to soak up most of the losses through operating profits before they hit its capital base, which is set to be bolstered by a €3.5bn state injection.
The bank hiked its impairment charge guidance for the year to the end of March from €850m to €1.4bn, but all of this will be absorbed as it expects to remain profitable. Analysts now believe BoI will barely break even for the full year, having forecast an underlying loss for the final six months.
"Most of next year's losses will be absorbed by profitability," John O'Donovan, group chief financial officer, told the Irish Independent yesterday.
About 45pc of the increase to the loan loss charge for the second half comes the group's already problematic €13bn property and construction portfolio. The remainder is split equally between small to medium-sized enterprise (SME), and corporate and consumer and mortgage portfolios.
Mr O'Donovan said the growing signs of weakness in these loan books was down to the slowdown in economic growth, increasing unemployment and poor sentiment among SMEs and retail customers.
In acquiring up to €3.5bn worth of preference shares in both AIB and BoI, the State will also hold warrants entitling it to purchase up to a 25pc stake in each after five years. The banks would be able to reduce this to 15pc if they managed to raise equity from investors and redeem €1.5bn of the preference stock by the end of this year.
BoI expects to hold an extraordinary general meeting for shareholders to vote on the proposed recapitalisation by the end of March.
When asked if the group plans to tap the existing shareholders, Mr O'Donovan said: "Is there a reasonable scenario we could raise equity by the end of December in the current market? That's likely to be less, rather than more, likely."
Analysts
A number of analysts have raised questions about how effective preference shares are as a form of core capital.
As they must be bought back after five years, they could only be used to soak up shock losses in the unlikely situation of a bank being liquidated.
Denis Donovan, chief executive of the group's Capital Markets division, said the group is comfortable these shares are a good buffer.
Earlier yesterday, outgoing chief executive Brian Goggin, who will retire a year early in June, conceded that the bank had made mistakes on "lending decisions in the past that are now coming home to roost".
"And I suppose if I have a regret, my regret is that I didn't see this coming.
"And perhaps the lessons of economics were forgotten," he said.
"Economics ultimately are cyclical. And while we enjoyed, you know, fantastic growth and fantastic expansion, if I was, kind of, looking back and doing it again, that is a regret that I do have that I didn't perhaps question in a more challenging way, the ultimate growth that Ireland was enjoying and the fact that it was unsustainable."
 
E arriva il consueto calo dei rating come portato del nuovo intervento governativo per Bank of ireland. Particolarmente severo quello sui perpetuals, che passano a BBB e per i quali si prospetta la perdita dell'IG (circostanza che, con le quotazioni che esprimono questi bond, pare assolutamente irrilevante).

Più interessante la parte in cui S&P fa presente la possibilità, allo studio da parte del Governo irlandese, di estendere al durata dalla garanzia statale alle emissioni obbligazionarie senior delle banche nazionali oltre la scadenza attuale del settembre 2010.

Ancor di più, per gli amici che hanno i perpetuals, la circostanza per cui questi restano in creditwatch negative sull'assunto di una pronuncia certa da parte di autorità competenti (inclusa la Commissione Europea) circa la possibilità che BOI, pur godendo di aiuti di stato, possa continuare a pagare la cedola anche su questi strumenti.

Bank of Ireland Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'A' From 'A+'; Outlook Stable; Hybrids Cut To 'BBB'

LONDON (Standard & Poor's) Feb. 12, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it lowered its long-term counterparty credit rating on Bank of Ireland (the trading name of the Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland; BOI) to 'A' from 'A+'. In addition, the long-term ratings on BOI were removed from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they had been placed on Nov. 14, 2008. At the same time, the 'A-1' short-term counterparty credit rating on BOI was affirmed. The outlook is stable.

We have also lowered the ratings on BOI's hybrid capital instruments to 'BBB' from 'A-'. In addition, the ratings on the instruments remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

"The rating action reflects our consideration of BOI's strategy and
prospects for the bank's asset quality, earnings, and capitalization, as well as the Irish government's announcement yesterday of an expanded support package for BOI and its close peer, Allied Irish Banks PLC," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Giles Edwards.

The rating action reflects our view that, notwithstanding its strong
market position, BOI faces a very weak outlook for asset quality and therefore profitability over the rating horizon. In our opinion, the significant support that BOI has received from the Irish government demonstrates its high systemic importance to the Irish banking system.

We view this as a stabilizing factor to the ratings on BOI and we now include one notch of support above BOI's stand-alone credit strength.

The Irish government announced yesterday its intention to inject €3.5
billion in deeply subordinated 8% preference shares into BOI. It also plans to enable Irish domestic banks to issue longer-dated government-guaranteed bonds beyond the current September 2010 deadline, as well as to investigate ways to reduce the domestic banks' land and real estate development exposures.

Although details of this scheme have not yet been announced, we consider that it may reduce downside risk to BOI's stand-alone credit profile.

"We expect that the support being provided by the Irish government will allow BOI to maintain adequate capitalization despite, in our opinion, the weak and deteriorating outlook for BOI's asset quality and earnings," said Mr. Edwards. We consider that the outlook is also underpinned by our view that further state support would be forthcoming if required. An upgrade is considered remote within the rating horizon, due to the very weak outlook for the Irish economy and the challenges faced by BOI. Negative rating action could occur if we consider the government to be less willing to support BOI, or if the bank's business or financial profile weakens further than expected.

In this event, external support may not, in our view, be sufficient to
continue to justify the current ratings.

The CreditWatch placement of the undated capital instruments reflects our view that, while BOI may continue to be willing to service the coupons on these instruments, uncertainty exists on whether it will be allowed to by the authorities, particularly the European Commission, if the bank makes material losses in the coming years. We will resolve the CreditWatch placement of these instruments when the authorities' position becomes clearer. Should there be no impediment to BOI servicing its hybrid obligations the ratings on these instruments may be affirmed.

Should the instruments be downgraded as a result of our view of increased deferral risk arising from potential authorities' intervention, at this stage and again all other things being equal, they are likely to be downgraded to subinvestment grade
 
The CreditWatch placement of the undated capital instruments reflects our view that, while BOI may continue to be willing to service the coupons on these instruments, uncertainty exists on whether it will be allowed to by the authorities, particularly the European Commission, if the bank makes material losses in the coming years. We will resolve the CreditWatch placement of these instruments when the authorities' position becomes clearer. Should there be no impediment to BOI servicing its hybrid obligations the ratings on these instruments may be affirmed.

Ciao Mark,
grazie delle sempre preziose info.
Non ho capito una cosa : per quale motivo la commissione europea dovrebbe impedire alla BoI di pagare le cedole mentre ci sono ING e tanti altri che pur avendo preso piu' soldi dai relativi stati ed accumulato perdite superiori per il momento continuano a pagare tranquillamente?
Sai se questo e' un discorso riferito solo alla BoI o piu' in generale a tutti gli emittenti per cui si e' reso necessario un intervento di sostegno statale?
 
The CreditWatch placement of the undated capital instruments reflects our view that, while BOI may continue to be willing to service the coupons on these instruments, uncertainty exists on whether it will be allowed to by the authorities, particularly the European Commission, if the bank makes material losses in the coming years. We will resolve the CreditWatch placement of these instruments when the authorities' position becomes clearer. Should there be no impediment to BOI servicing its hybrid obligations the ratings on these instruments may be affirmed.

Ciao Mark,
grazie delle sempre preziose info.
Non ho capito una cosa : per quale motivo la commissione europea dovrebbe impedire alla BoI di pagare le cedole mentre ci sono ING e tanti altri che pur avendo preso piu' soldi dai relativi stati ed accumulato perdite superiori per il momento continuano a pagare tranquillamente?
Sai se questo e' un discorso riferito solo alla BoI o piu' in generale a tutti gli emittenti per cui si e' reso necessario un intervento di sostegno statale?

La logica è quella per cui i soldi messi nelle banche dal Governo sono un aiuto di stato che distorce la concorrenza, e si assume che questi aiuti, considerato oramai il loro carattere non occasionale, possano un domani essere soggetti a regole comuni, fra le quali quella per cui non possa fruirne chi ha scientemente assunto un rischio che - senza l'intervento statale - si sarebbe materializzato.

Le agenzie fanno riferimento a possibili interventi che assumano carattere generale, quindi non solo BoI o solo le banche irlandesi, ma tutte le banche UE... ;)
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back
Alto