Imark
Forumer storico
Intanto il bond tracolla, con bid compresi fra 51 e 55,75 ed ask fra 55 e 57,5 ... si vende disordinatamente, parrebbe...
Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti Dubai, le entità "government-related" ed il supporto che potrebbe non arrivare... (1 Viewer)
- Creatore Discussione Imark
- Data di Inizio
Intanto il bond tracolla, con bid compresi fra 51 e 55,75 ed ask fra 55 e 57,5 ... si vende disordinatamente, parrebbe...
stockuccio
Guest
Imark
Forumer storico
mi pare che questo pezzo si possa tranquillamente generalizzare al globo intero
Sui bond sovereign o quasi - sovereign purtroppo è così...
In Dubai, per una serie di fattori enfatizzati dall'articolo, il recovery sarà "cortesia dell'emiro", nel senso che è altamente opinabile che questo consenta la rivalsa su determinati beni, a prescindere dalle decisioni delle corti UK la cui competenza a pronunciarsi è prevista dai prospetti dei bond...
paologorgo
Chapter 11
The Lehman Bros. of the Persian GulfDubai assumes it's too big to fail. We'll see about that.
By Daniel GrossPosted Monday, Nov. 30, 2009, at 3:10 PM ET
Dubai was supposed to be a new model for economic development in the Persian Gulf, and in the world. And like so many recent "new models," Dubai is proving to be a lemon.
The theory was that Dubai would be a competitive, free oasis in a region generally hostile to the open market. Lacking oil resources of its own, it set itself up as a sponge to sop up resources-generated cash. Dubai would be the playground, shopping mall, financial center, cultural zone, beach resort, and second-home mecca of the global oil patch—New York, Las Vegas, and Miami wrapped up in one. In a part of the world where politics were generally poisonous, Dubai was a comparatively free space, open to all investors. The world's financial elite embraced Dubai's new image as a blue-chip. In this year's World Economic Forum's ranking of the most competitive economies, Dubai came in 23rd, up from 31st the year before. It was the highest-ranking country not in Europe, developed Asia, or North America. Conservatives embraced Dubai as a small-government, capitalist heaven. "Think Dubai. Free and rich," as Donna Wiesner Keene wrote in a letter to the New York Times.
Of course, Dubai was never particularly free. Now it's not quite so rich. And, shorn of access to easy money and weighed down by enormous amounts of debt, it's becoming less competitive. Like so many other blue-chips that garnered headlines during the boom years, it was held aloft by loans and a global bubble heavily concentrated in commercial real estate. Now that it has stopped paying debts owned by government-controlled companies, Dubai looks less like Singapore and more like an institution whose epic fail in 2008 helped paralyze the global financial system: Lehman Bros.
Like Lehman, Dubai made the mistake of borrowing short-term to buy long-term illiquid assets. The holding companies Dubai World and Nakheel borrowed tens of billions of dollars from global capital markets and used the funds to buy stakes in Cirque du Soleil and Barney's, yacht businesses, financial-services companies, and, above all, real estate. In much the same way, Lehman plowed its hundreds of billions of borrowings into illiquid investments such as commercial office buildings and apartment complexes. (When it went bust, Lehman had more than $40 billion in commercial real estate on its books.)
Lehman exploited all the new tools of financial engineering—the commercial paper market, CDOs, etc. Dubai did the same with all the new tools of civil engineering: a palm-tree-shaped complex of islands, an indoor ski resort, the tallest building in the world.
In theory, Lehman was a model of modern corporate governance. Public shareholders were represented by an august board, which was supposed to supervise an experienced leader. In practice, it was an autocratic regime run largely for the benefit of insiders and disdainful of outside stakeholders. The same holds for Dubai, where the key companies are essentially arms of the state and are controlled by the royal family and its associates. When challenged about emerging financial problems, Lehman Bros. leader Dick Fuld adopted a tough-guy approach. "I will hurt the shorts, and that is my goal," he said in the summer of 2008. When questions arose about Dubai's financial management, its leader, Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum lashed out: "So to the people of you who nag over Dubai and Abu Dhabi, shut up!" Ultimately, neither leader was worthy of the praise and presumption of competence that the markets had given them.
Lehman Bros. never believed the government and other members of the investment-banking fraternity would let it go under. Just so, there's been a presumption in the market—and perhaps in Dubai's palaces—that the United Arab Emirates, the oil-rich political federation of which it is a part, would stand behind Dubai's many debts. So far, however, there's no sign of a full-on bailout for Dubai.
And that may be the final comparison between Lehman and Dubai. Both may have shared the illusion that they were too big to fail.
Like Lehman Bros., Dubai assumes it's too big to fail. We'll see about that. - By Daniel Gross - Slate Magazine
By Daniel GrossPosted Monday, Nov. 30, 2009, at 3:10 PM ET
Dubai was supposed to be a new model for economic development in the Persian Gulf, and in the world. And like so many recent "new models," Dubai is proving to be a lemon.
The theory was that Dubai would be a competitive, free oasis in a region generally hostile to the open market. Lacking oil resources of its own, it set itself up as a sponge to sop up resources-generated cash. Dubai would be the playground, shopping mall, financial center, cultural zone, beach resort, and second-home mecca of the global oil patch—New York, Las Vegas, and Miami wrapped up in one. In a part of the world where politics were generally poisonous, Dubai was a comparatively free space, open to all investors. The world's financial elite embraced Dubai's new image as a blue-chip. In this year's World Economic Forum's ranking of the most competitive economies, Dubai came in 23rd, up from 31st the year before. It was the highest-ranking country not in Europe, developed Asia, or North America. Conservatives embraced Dubai as a small-government, capitalist heaven. "Think Dubai. Free and rich," as Donna Wiesner Keene wrote in a letter to the New York Times.
Of course, Dubai was never particularly free. Now it's not quite so rich. And, shorn of access to easy money and weighed down by enormous amounts of debt, it's becoming less competitive. Like so many other blue-chips that garnered headlines during the boom years, it was held aloft by loans and a global bubble heavily concentrated in commercial real estate. Now that it has stopped paying debts owned by government-controlled companies, Dubai looks less like Singapore and more like an institution whose epic fail in 2008 helped paralyze the global financial system: Lehman Bros.
Like Lehman, Dubai made the mistake of borrowing short-term to buy long-term illiquid assets. The holding companies Dubai World and Nakheel borrowed tens of billions of dollars from global capital markets and used the funds to buy stakes in Cirque du Soleil and Barney's, yacht businesses, financial-services companies, and, above all, real estate. In much the same way, Lehman plowed its hundreds of billions of borrowings into illiquid investments such as commercial office buildings and apartment complexes. (When it went bust, Lehman had more than $40 billion in commercial real estate on its books.)
Lehman exploited all the new tools of financial engineering—the commercial paper market, CDOs, etc. Dubai did the same with all the new tools of civil engineering: a palm-tree-shaped complex of islands, an indoor ski resort, the tallest building in the world.
In theory, Lehman was a model of modern corporate governance. Public shareholders were represented by an august board, which was supposed to supervise an experienced leader. In practice, it was an autocratic regime run largely for the benefit of insiders and disdainful of outside stakeholders. The same holds for Dubai, where the key companies are essentially arms of the state and are controlled by the royal family and its associates. When challenged about emerging financial problems, Lehman Bros. leader Dick Fuld adopted a tough-guy approach. "I will hurt the shorts, and that is my goal," he said in the summer of 2008. When questions arose about Dubai's financial management, its leader, Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum lashed out: "So to the people of you who nag over Dubai and Abu Dhabi, shut up!" Ultimately, neither leader was worthy of the praise and presumption of competence that the markets had given them.
Lehman Bros. never believed the government and other members of the investment-banking fraternity would let it go under. Just so, there's been a presumption in the market—and perhaps in Dubai's palaces—that the United Arab Emirates, the oil-rich political federation of which it is a part, would stand behind Dubai's many debts. So far, however, there's no sign of a full-on bailout for Dubai.
And that may be the final comparison between Lehman and Dubai. Both may have shared the illusion that they were too big to fail.
Like Lehman Bros., Dubai assumes it's too big to fail. We'll see about that. - By Daniel Gross - Slate Magazine
Gaudente
Forumer storico
Tempi duri per la finanza islamica
Non bastava il default del sukuk di Dubai, ora ci si e' aggiunto anche il crollo del Ponzi scheme dei tunnel a Gaza
Al Jazeera English - Middle East - Gazans fleeced in investment scam
Non bastava il default del sukuk di Dubai, ora ci si e' aggiunto anche il crollo del Ponzi scheme dei tunnel a Gaza
Al Jazeera English - Middle East - Gazans fleeced in investment scam
Imark
Forumer storico
Chi è il proprietario della Dubai Holding Commercial Operations ? E' scritto in fondo al report...
Fitch Downgrades Dubai Holding Commercial Operations Group to 'BB'; Remains on Watch Negative
02 Dec 2009 12:19 PM (EST)
Fitch Ratings-London/Dubai-02 December 2009: Fitch Ratings has today downgraded Dubai Holding Commercial Operations Group LLC's (DHCOG) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured rating to 'BB' from 'BBB-', respectively. Both the IDR and senior unsecured ratings remain on Rating Watch Negative (RWN). The Short-term IDR has been downgraded to 'B' from 'F3' and simultaneously removed from RWN.
Today's rating action reflects a further review of the level of government support for financial obligations of DHCOG. This follows significant changes in the policy environment for support of Dubai-based entities witnessed over the past week. Fitch's action today reflects a continuing lack of substantive information to support continued equalisation of ratings with Fitch's view of Dubai's sovereign creditworthiness.
Looking forward, based on the weak policy response of the authorities, it is also Fitch's expectation that the future support environment for Dubai-based entities such as DHCOG would be unlikely to sustain a return to an equalisation of their ratings with Fitch's view on the sovereign.
Fitch's previous working assumption was that the strength of linkage between DHCOG and the Dubai government was very strong and hence warranted an IDR for DHCOG which was consistent with the agency's assessment of the creditworthiness of Dubai. Today's rating action moves DHCOG's IDR down two notches from the agency's assessment of the creditworthiness of Dubai. On a purely standalone basis, DHCOG's business and financial profile would likely warrant lower ratings than those currently assigned.
Fitch notes that DHCOG does not have the same pressing refinancing needs as the government-related property developer, Nakheel, which has a USD3.5bn Sukuk bond maturing mid-December 2009. However, Fitch's assessment of government support for DHCOG, in case of need, tries to gauge whether it would likely be provided given the prevailing circumstances in Dubai.
Fitch is maintaining the RWN as it continues to seek clarity on the level of financial support that could be expected from the Dubai government in case of need. Fitch will attempt to resolve the RWN within the next few weeks. The resolution of the RWN could result in a downgrade of DHCOG's ratings by more than one notch.
DHCOG is effectively 97.4%-owned by His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE and ruler of Dubai. The group has played a highly strategic role in the development of Dubai.
TheLondoner
Forumer storico
The Times
December 5, 2009
Confidence will never return in Dubai
ciao amici, al link postato c'è un'interessante analisi censurata in Dubai perchè molto critica nei confronti delle figure di spicco della famiglia reale... ...e soprattutto perchè si insinua il sospetto che i debiti a rischio di Dubai vadano ben oltre quelli della sola Dubai Wolrd ...gli analisti parlano di 150 billion $:
Experienced analysts no longer trust the Government’s statistics, claiming they do not fully reflect the amount Dubai owes its foreign creditors. EFG Hermes, a regional investment bank, thinks Dubai could owe as much as $150 billion (£91 billion), twice the size of the economy and two and half times its officially declared debt. Dubai World alone owes British banks $5 billion. The extent of Sheikh Mohammed’s personal holdings in the big state-owned companies is often unclear. “We are probably talking many many years before we see a resolution,” said Fahd Iqbal, Gulf strategist at EFG.
Inoltre - altra cosa interessante - si accenna ai legami finanziari e commerciali con l'Iran....
Che sia questo il vero bersaglio ? e che Dubai sia il mezzo per fare danni ?
December 5, 2009
Confidence will never return in Dubai
ciao amici, al link postato c'è un'interessante analisi censurata in Dubai perchè molto critica nei confronti delle figure di spicco della famiglia reale...
...e soprattutto perchè si insinua il sospetto che i debiti a rischio di Dubai vadano ben oltre quelli della sola Dubai Wolrd ...gli analisti parlano di 150 billion $:Experienced analysts no longer trust the Government’s statistics, claiming they do not fully reflect the amount Dubai owes its foreign creditors. EFG Hermes, a regional investment bank, thinks Dubai could owe as much as $150 billion (£91 billion), twice the size of the economy and two and half times its officially declared debt. Dubai World alone owes British banks $5 billion. The extent of Sheikh Mohammed’s personal holdings in the big state-owned companies is often unclear. “We are probably talking many many years before we see a resolution,” said Fahd Iqbal, Gulf strategist at EFG.
Inoltre - altra cosa interessante - si accenna ai legami finanziari e commerciali con l'Iran....
Che sia questo il vero bersaglio ? e che Dubai sia il mezzo per fare danni ?
Gaudente
Forumer storico
Nakheel Creditors Could Seize Dubai Waterfront Land in Default - Bloomberg.com
I portatori del sukuk della Nakheel possono aspirare al pignoramento di un terreno frontemare a Dubai, peccato che il progetto di edificazione previsto non sia mai partito ne' si prevede possa ripartire in un prossimo futuro
The waterfront project was among Dubai World’s most ambitious. Dubai Waterfront posters had lined a wall of billboards about 10 meters (30 feet) high and stretching for at least a kilometer (1.6 miles) along Sheikh Zayed Road, which surrounds part of the land. The posters were removed in the last month. Smaller billboards with Nakheel’s corporate logo remain.
Now the area is bare except for a cluster of partly finished low-rise buildings and idle cranes for hundreds of meters. Yesterday, camels roamed part of the land.
Da top location a pascolo per cammelli
I portatori del sukuk della Nakheel possono aspirare al pignoramento di un terreno frontemare a Dubai, peccato che il progetto di edificazione previsto non sia mai partito ne' si prevede possa ripartire in un prossimo futuro
The waterfront project was among Dubai World’s most ambitious. Dubai Waterfront posters had lined a wall of billboards about 10 meters (30 feet) high and stretching for at least a kilometer (1.6 miles) along Sheikh Zayed Road, which surrounds part of the land. The posters were removed in the last month. Smaller billboards with Nakheel’s corporate logo remain.
Now the area is bare except for a cluster of partly finished low-rise buildings and idle cranes for hundreds of meters. Yesterday, camels roamed part of the land.
Da top location a pascolo per cammelli
Imark
Forumer storico
Davvero lo spaccato che emerge dalle dichiarazioni rilasciate dal "management" di Dubai World fa cadere le braccia, per quanto è sconfortante... prima il "tornate a passare fra 6 mesi" detto ai creditori, adesso il "visto che non abbiamo soldi, stiamo pensando di vendere qualche asset..."
Dubai World looks to sell assets in quest for cash - Yahoo! Finance
Dubai World looks to sell assets in quest for cash
Dubai's finance chief says indebted Dubai World may sell domestic, overseas assets for cash
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) -- Dubai World, the indebted conglomerate at the heart of this sheikdom's credit problems, may sell off domestic and overseas assets acquired during a multiyear buying spree as it struggles to raise cash, according to a senior government official.
Dubai Finance Department Director-General Abdul Rahman al-Saleh did not say which pieces of the company are for sale. However, he emphasized that the assets in question would be Dubai World's alone -- underscoring the government's position that it is not responsible for debts racked up by a company it created and backed during the city-state's boom years.
"Like any company that has commitments, part of getting liquidity is selling some assets. Of course local or foreign assets," he said in an interview aired by al-Jazeera Monday.
...
Dubai World looks to sell assets in quest for cash - Yahoo! Finance
Dubai World looks to sell assets in quest for cash
Dubai's finance chief says indebted Dubai World may sell domestic, overseas assets for cash
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) -- Dubai World, the indebted conglomerate at the heart of this sheikdom's credit problems, may sell off domestic and overseas assets acquired during a multiyear buying spree as it struggles to raise cash, according to a senior government official.
Dubai Finance Department Director-General Abdul Rahman al-Saleh did not say which pieces of the company are for sale. However, he emphasized that the assets in question would be Dubai World's alone -- underscoring the government's position that it is not responsible for debts racked up by a company it created and backed during the city-state's boom years.
"Like any company that has commitments, part of getting liquidity is selling some assets. Of course local or foreign assets," he said in an interview aired by al-Jazeera Monday.
...
ilfolignate
Forumer storico
Della serie: tutte le cattive notizie si accodano!!!
Dubai, Moody's taglia ancora rating 6 società legate a governo
martedì 8 dicembre 2009 11:58
MILANO, 8 dicembre (Reuters) - Moody's Investors Service ha tagliato i rating di tutte le sei società che emettono debito collegate al governo di Dubai. Lo annuncia l'agenzia statunitense in una nota spiegando che "questa decisione segue commenti e dichiarazioni di esponenti del governo che ci portano a credere che non è possibile ipotizzare un sostegno sostanziale del governo per società che non siano direttamente parte o formalmente garantite dall'esecutivo".
Di conseguenza, Moody's ha ridotto le ipotesi di sostegno governativo per tutti i sei emittenti. Ora il merito di credito delle società riflette un profilo di Credito 'stand-alone' con l'eccezione di Dubai Electricity & Water Authority rivisti includono un notch in più dovuto al sostegno del governo, riconoscendo il loro più stretto collegamento strategico con le politiche economiche di Dubai.
Ecco l'elenco delle decisioni sui rating:
DP World: issuer e debt rating tagliati a Ba1 da Baa2;
Dubai Electricity & Water Authority (DEWA) issuer e debt rating tagliati a Ba2 da Baa2;
Jebel Ali Free Zone (JAFZ) issuer e debt rating a B1 da Ba1;
Dubai Holding Commercial Operations Group (DHCOG) issuer e debt rating a B1 da Ba2;
Emaar Properties issuer rating tagliato a B1 da Ba2;
DIFC Investments (DIFCI) issuer e debt rating a B2 da Ba1.
Tutti i rating rimangono, comunque, sotto analisi per un possibile ulteriore downgrade.
Dubai, Moody's taglia ancora rating 6 società legate a governo
martedì 8 dicembre 2009 11:58
MILANO, 8 dicembre (Reuters) - Moody's Investors Service ha tagliato i rating di tutte le sei società che emettono debito collegate al governo di Dubai. Lo annuncia l'agenzia statunitense in una nota spiegando che "questa decisione segue commenti e dichiarazioni di esponenti del governo che ci portano a credere che non è possibile ipotizzare un sostegno sostanziale del governo per società che non siano direttamente parte o formalmente garantite dall'esecutivo".
Di conseguenza, Moody's ha ridotto le ipotesi di sostegno governativo per tutti i sei emittenti. Ora il merito di credito delle società riflette un profilo di Credito 'stand-alone' con l'eccezione di Dubai Electricity & Water Authority rivisti includono un notch in più dovuto al sostegno del governo, riconoscendo il loro più stretto collegamento strategico con le politiche economiche di Dubai.
Ecco l'elenco delle decisioni sui rating:
DP World: issuer e debt rating tagliati a Ba1 da Baa2;
Dubai Electricity & Water Authority (DEWA) issuer e debt rating tagliati a Ba2 da Baa2;
Jebel Ali Free Zone (JAFZ) issuer e debt rating a B1 da Ba1;
Dubai Holding Commercial Operations Group (DHCOG) issuer e debt rating a B1 da Ba2;
Emaar Properties issuer rating tagliato a B1 da Ba2;
DIFC Investments (DIFCI) issuer e debt rating a B2 da Ba1.
Tutti i rating rimangono, comunque, sotto analisi per un possibile ulteriore downgrade.