tommy271
Forumer storico
La Polonia ha lo zloty.
Comunque è uno scenario che non esiste, l'Euro è irreversibile ...
Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 1 (7 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione Imark
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
La Polonia ha lo zloty.
Comunque è uno scenario che non esiste, l'Euro è irreversibile ...
tommy271
Forumer storico
ECB FOCUS-Isolated in Greece debate, Trichet may U-turn again
Fri Jun 10, 2011 8:29am EDT
* ECB opposing almost any form of Greek debt restructuring
* Trichet may want to shape fiscal reform of euro zone
* But ECB made U-turn over bond buying last year
* Carrying out threat would be politically difficult
* Compromise might be found short of Schaeuble's proposal
By Paul Carrel
FRANKFURT, June 10 (Reuters) - Just over a year ago, European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet was asked whether the bank would consider buying euro zone governments' bonds in the open market to help tackle the bloc's debt crisis.
"I would say we did not discuss this option," he told a news conference after an ECB Governing Council meeting in Lisbon. Other ECB officials had publicly denounced the idea as violating the principles of strict monetary management.
Four days later, the ECB said it would start buying bonds, making a U-turn as part of an emergency package put together with euro zone leaders. The controversial step ultimately led to German central bank chief Axel Weber quitting his post.
Fast-forward to the present day, and the ECB is again under pressure to compromise on its principles and steadfastly refusing to do so. It opposes any scenario that would force private sector bond investors to share the burden of bailing out Greece by restructuring its debt.
The ECB has even threatened to use its so-called "nuclear option": refusing to accept restructured Greek bonds as collateral in its lending operations, a scenario that would cut off funding to much of Greece's financial sector.
But past form and the weight of pressure which the ECB faces from euro zone governments suggest it may yet make another U-turn, or at least soften its position to permit some form of debt restructuring to go ahead.
SCHAEUBLE
Though he denies any quarrel, Trichet is clearly at odds with German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, who has demanded a "quantified and substantial" contribution from bond holders as part of any new aid package for Greece.
Schaeuble, facing domestic pressure to involve the private sector in the package, has suggested a bond swap that would effectively extend the maturities of Greek debt by seven years.
The major credit rating agencies have said they would probably classify any debt rollover as a default because even if it were presented as voluntary, there would be an element of coercion: investors would be taking part because they feared the consequences of not doing so. [ID:nLDE7560AX]
Trichet took a hard line on the issue of default on Thursday, telling a news conference after the ECB's latest policy meeting: "We would say it is an enormous mistake to embark in decisions that would trigger a credit event."
He added, "We exclude all concepts which would not be purely voluntary. We call for avoiding any credit event and selective default. And of course default."
OPPOSITION
The ECB argues that any form of default could spook financial markets and trigger another Lehman-type crisis in the euro zone, pushing up bond yields for countries such as Spain.
Also, the ECB has bought about 45 billion euros of Greek government bonds; if a default forced it to take losses on that debt, it might have to ask governments for fresh capital and a dangerous precedent would have beem set for central bank involvement in debt crises.
David Marsh, author of 'The Euro: The Politics of the New Global Currency', believes Trichet -- whose term as ECB president will expire at the end of October -- is focused on the fate of the broader euro zone.
"I'm convinced the ECB and the central banks behind it are not just talking their own book because they are worried about their balance sheet. There is a systemic issue here that a voluntary restructuring is very difficult to achieve without driving not just Greece but other countries into a wider default," he said.
David Mackie, analyst at JPMorgan, said he believed Trichet wanted to avoid the use of debt restructurings to resolve euro zone crises because he hoped the bloc would instead assert control over the fiscal policies of crisis-hit states.
In a speech last week, Trichet delivered his vision of a euro zone run along those lines, suggesting the bloc might eventually establish a central finance ministry.[ID:nLDE751194]
"If the ECB is successful in its attempt to prevent any kind of debt restructuring in the near term, the region will indeed move down the path towards the destination that Trichet wants it to go to," Mackie said.
COMPROMISE
But many euro zone governments, led by Germany, have different priorities. They face popular discontent with the mounting cost of the euro zone crisis, and Berlin feels it must involve the private sector in sharing the burden -- primarily the banks which many people blame for starting the global credit crisis that fuelled the euro zone's debt problems.
Clemens Fuest, a professor at Oxford University and a member of the academic advisory board of the German Federal Ministry of Finance, said the ECB must be ready to compromise on its insistence that any sovereign debt restructuring be voluntary and non-binding on private sector creditors.
"The compromise cannot be that there is a shifting of all the burden of the debt to the taxpayer," Fuest told Reuters Insider television in an interview. [ID:nLDE7590OV]
"The language is stark at the moment, but if we look back the ECB has bought government bonds during this crisis to fight the crisis, so it is already a party in the crisis and it has deviated from the very strict and clear rules for normal situations," Fuest said.
"I think these rules are fine for normal situations but in the crisis we have to find something, to find solutions so I think in the end the ECB will be ready to compromise."
Such a compromise, some European officials suggest, might take the form of a less dramatic debt rollover than the bond swap envisaged by Schaeuble -- perhaps a commitment by private investors to buy new Greek bonds when existing ones mature.
The rating agencies would probably still declare a default, but it might be a limited or "selective" default that was brief in duration, had a modest impact on markets and did not force the ECB to take losses on its holdings. [ID:nLDE7570KR]
Rejecting this option and carrying out its threat to cut Greek banks off from funding, throwing the euro zone's banking system into chaos, might be politically impossible for the ECB.
"I do feel they've got a very strong position but it would not be the last time that they would be having to compromise," Marsh said of the ECB's opposition to debt restructuring.
Fri Jun 10, 2011 8:29am EDT
* ECB opposing almost any form of Greek debt restructuring
* Trichet may want to shape fiscal reform of euro zone
* But ECB made U-turn over bond buying last year
* Carrying out threat would be politically difficult
* Compromise might be found short of Schaeuble's proposal
By Paul Carrel
FRANKFURT, June 10 (Reuters) - Just over a year ago, European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet was asked whether the bank would consider buying euro zone governments' bonds in the open market to help tackle the bloc's debt crisis.
"I would say we did not discuss this option," he told a news conference after an ECB Governing Council meeting in Lisbon. Other ECB officials had publicly denounced the idea as violating the principles of strict monetary management.
Four days later, the ECB said it would start buying bonds, making a U-turn as part of an emergency package put together with euro zone leaders. The controversial step ultimately led to German central bank chief Axel Weber quitting his post.
Fast-forward to the present day, and the ECB is again under pressure to compromise on its principles and steadfastly refusing to do so. It opposes any scenario that would force private sector bond investors to share the burden of bailing out Greece by restructuring its debt.
The ECB has even threatened to use its so-called "nuclear option": refusing to accept restructured Greek bonds as collateral in its lending operations, a scenario that would cut off funding to much of Greece's financial sector.
But past form and the weight of pressure which the ECB faces from euro zone governments suggest it may yet make another U-turn, or at least soften its position to permit some form of debt restructuring to go ahead.
SCHAEUBLE
Though he denies any quarrel, Trichet is clearly at odds with German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, who has demanded a "quantified and substantial" contribution from bond holders as part of any new aid package for Greece.
Schaeuble, facing domestic pressure to involve the private sector in the package, has suggested a bond swap that would effectively extend the maturities of Greek debt by seven years.
The major credit rating agencies have said they would probably classify any debt rollover as a default because even if it were presented as voluntary, there would be an element of coercion: investors would be taking part because they feared the consequences of not doing so. [ID:nLDE7560AX]
Trichet took a hard line on the issue of default on Thursday, telling a news conference after the ECB's latest policy meeting: "We would say it is an enormous mistake to embark in decisions that would trigger a credit event."
He added, "We exclude all concepts which would not be purely voluntary. We call for avoiding any credit event and selective default. And of course default."
OPPOSITION
The ECB argues that any form of default could spook financial markets and trigger another Lehman-type crisis in the euro zone, pushing up bond yields for countries such as Spain.
Also, the ECB has bought about 45 billion euros of Greek government bonds; if a default forced it to take losses on that debt, it might have to ask governments for fresh capital and a dangerous precedent would have beem set for central bank involvement in debt crises.
David Marsh, author of 'The Euro: The Politics of the New Global Currency', believes Trichet -- whose term as ECB president will expire at the end of October -- is focused on the fate of the broader euro zone.
"I'm convinced the ECB and the central banks behind it are not just talking their own book because they are worried about their balance sheet. There is a systemic issue here that a voluntary restructuring is very difficult to achieve without driving not just Greece but other countries into a wider default," he said.
David Mackie, analyst at JPMorgan, said he believed Trichet wanted to avoid the use of debt restructurings to resolve euro zone crises because he hoped the bloc would instead assert control over the fiscal policies of crisis-hit states.
In a speech last week, Trichet delivered his vision of a euro zone run along those lines, suggesting the bloc might eventually establish a central finance ministry.[ID:nLDE751194]
"If the ECB is successful in its attempt to prevent any kind of debt restructuring in the near term, the region will indeed move down the path towards the destination that Trichet wants it to go to," Mackie said.
COMPROMISE
But many euro zone governments, led by Germany, have different priorities. They face popular discontent with the mounting cost of the euro zone crisis, and Berlin feels it must involve the private sector in sharing the burden -- primarily the banks which many people blame for starting the global credit crisis that fuelled the euro zone's debt problems.
Clemens Fuest, a professor at Oxford University and a member of the academic advisory board of the German Federal Ministry of Finance, said the ECB must be ready to compromise on its insistence that any sovereign debt restructuring be voluntary and non-binding on private sector creditors.
"The compromise cannot be that there is a shifting of all the burden of the debt to the taxpayer," Fuest told Reuters Insider television in an interview. [ID:nLDE7590OV]
"The language is stark at the moment, but if we look back the ECB has bought government bonds during this crisis to fight the crisis, so it is already a party in the crisis and it has deviated from the very strict and clear rules for normal situations," Fuest said.
"I think these rules are fine for normal situations but in the crisis we have to find something, to find solutions so I think in the end the ECB will be ready to compromise."
Such a compromise, some European officials suggest, might take the form of a less dramatic debt rollover than the bond swap envisaged by Schaeuble -- perhaps a commitment by private investors to buy new Greek bonds when existing ones mature.
The rating agencies would probably still declare a default, but it might be a limited or "selective" default that was brief in duration, had a modest impact on markets and did not force the ECB to take losses on its holdings. [ID:nLDE7570KR]
Rejecting this option and carrying out its threat to cut Greek banks off from funding, throwing the euro zone's banking system into chaos, might be politically impossible for the ECB.
"I do feel they've got a very strong position but it would not be the last time that they would be having to compromise," Marsh said of the ECB's opposition to debt restructuring.
tomcat
Forumer attivo
non è detto che la polonia - la cui economia si sta integrando sempre di più con quella tedesca - non entri, anche se gli altri escono
per quanto riguarda le uscite:
in politica non c'è nulla di irreversibile (vedi tutti i precedenti sistemi di cambi fissi)
e le leggi della fisica (a cui quelle dell'economia assomigliano molto) escludono la possibilità che un sistema le cui singole parti (fra l'altro completamente diverse fra di loro, per caratteristiche e resistenza) siano sottoposte a continue sollecitazioni da forze aventi direzione e intensità diversissima possa rimanere intatto, salvo aggiungere energia dall'esterno in quantità illimitata
cosa ne pensi?
Ultima modifica:
forzaroma
Forumer attivo
Mica tanto scontato Tommy dopo le frizioni degli ultimi tempi tra il partito del cancelliere e quello liberale, a questo punto la strada per un nuovo finanziamento mi sembra in discesa visto che si diva che l'ostacolo maggiore era rappresentato dall'ostracismo teutonico (che cozzava con la posizione favorevole francese)...mah!!! Quante cose poco chiare.
tommy271
Forumer storico
ECB’s Stark Says It’s Time to Stop ‘Fruitless’ Greek Discussion
By Simone Meier - Jun 10, 2011 2:30 PM GMT+0200 Fri Jun 10 12:30:00 GMT 2011
European Central Bank Executive Board member Juergen Stark comments on Greek bailout proposals, borrowing costs and liquidity provision.
He spoke to reporters at a conference in Frankfurt today.
On ECB liquidity measures:
“We have now also to take into account the so-called funding plans which are part of the adjustment programs in all three countries, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The objective is to reduce the dependency on ECB or Eurosystem refinancing operations. This is the objective. This is now under discussion with regulators. I can assure you that we’ll come up over the next couple of months” with a plan.
“We’re in the process of phasing out. The recourse to our refinancing operations has significantly declined. There’s a normalization. At the same time we have to deal with some banks which have not yet access to the interbank market. On the phasing out, you know what we decided yesterday but at the same time I’d like to stress the fact that we continue with the full allotment doesn’t prevent us to do what’s necessary to ensure price stability over the medium term.”
On private-sector involvement in a Greek bailout:
“One should think twice about the idea of private-sector involvement. With a strong commitment from Greek authorities, I think there’s no need for private-sector involvement.”
“The ECB is not against involvement of the private sector but conditions have to be clear. The involvement of the private sector has to be purely voluntary and not create a default. It’s time to stop this fruitless discussion. The real issue is the program for Greece and to implement it in full.
“What’s key for us is to protect our independence and our integrity and that the no-bailout clause is respected. We will apply our rules so the system requires adequate collateral and lending to only sound banks. The program as it stands now delivers sustainability.
“Each and every analysis about the need to involve the private sector has to be involved on the debt-sustainability analysis. If Greece runs a primary surplus and the privations plan is implemented the debt-to-GDP ratio will decline significantly. All this discussion about private-sector involvement distracts so many resources from implementing the program that it’s no surprise in the view of the academics and also of the Greek authorities that it seems to be an easy way out.”
On Greek bailout proposals:
“It’s not our task to make concrete proposals. I’m very happy that this institution’s mandate is on its core task. It’s not our task to give advice” on “initiatives that were launched by others.”
On criticism of the ECB:
“There is this ongoing criticism about the risks that we have taken too much risk on our balance sheet, that it’s not manageable, the bad bank, should I now provide with additional information that you can continue writing these things? It’s always taxpayer money but it’s also about the credibility of this institution.”
On a Greek solution:
“We have our rules. Those rules have been applied and all the options that are under discussion implicitly consider to some extent the involvement of the ECB. That means whatever the option which in the end might be chosen, the underlying assumption is that the ECB will continue to accept the Greek paper as eligible collateral. This remains to be seen.
“We know today more than we knew two weeks ago. It’s not very likely that a substantial involvement of the private sector will happen,” and any involvement would have to be “totally voluntary. As we have to stick to the rules, first that the collateral has to be appropriate, the banks have to be financially sound, financially healthy. We have to make an assessment.
“It’s pretty clear in the case of a credit event first and in the case of a selective default, a rating event, this prevents us from continuing to accept Greek bonds as eligible bonds. For this reason policy makers should know what they’re talking about.”
On ECB interest rates:
“The projections are staff projections. We said that we see the risks to price stability to the upside over the medium term. The underlying assumption is higher short-term interest rates.”
On the ECB’s balance sheet:
“It’s obvious that the ECB has taken additional risks on its balance sheet. This reflects the dimension of the crisis. We’re still living through the crisis and like other central banks, we have taken risks on our balance sheet. We have a well functioning risk-controlling regime. We’re neither naïve nor ignorant on what’s going on in the markets and what risks we have on our balance sheet.”
On central bank measures:
“Eurosystem credit is provided against eligible collateral only. We have a prudentially designed rule base and a transparent collateral framework. The level of transparency of the collateral framework allows for a high level of market scrutiny.”
“The Eurosystem has continuously adjusted its collateral framework to react to financial market” developments. “We have widened the collateral” setup. “Most of these broadening measures have been discontinued at the end of 2010.”
“We have also intensified monitoring and surveillance and have increased haircuts. The statement made in public that huge amounts of low-quality ABS have been” pledged to the ECB “is simply wrong. Only 44 billion euros has been originated in Ireland and currently no ABS has been originated in Greece.”
“The Target2 claim on the NCB’s balance sheet doesn’t per se mean a financial risk exposure. The risk exposure relates to the underlying monetary-policy operations. We have to be very prudent not to blur the facts here. What is key are the underlying monetary policy operations.”
On liquidity provisions to banks:
“In particular German banks actually use the ECB’s deposit facility. There are no liquidity constraints.”
On cross-border flows:
“We have to deal with cross-border flows and we have to analyze why they occur.”
(Bloomberg)
By Simone Meier - Jun 10, 2011 2:30 PM GMT+0200 Fri Jun 10 12:30:00 GMT 2011
European Central Bank Executive Board member Juergen Stark comments on Greek bailout proposals, borrowing costs and liquidity provision.
He spoke to reporters at a conference in Frankfurt today.
On ECB liquidity measures:
“We have now also to take into account the so-called funding plans which are part of the adjustment programs in all three countries, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The objective is to reduce the dependency on ECB or Eurosystem refinancing operations. This is the objective. This is now under discussion with regulators. I can assure you that we’ll come up over the next couple of months” with a plan.
“We’re in the process of phasing out. The recourse to our refinancing operations has significantly declined. There’s a normalization. At the same time we have to deal with some banks which have not yet access to the interbank market. On the phasing out, you know what we decided yesterday but at the same time I’d like to stress the fact that we continue with the full allotment doesn’t prevent us to do what’s necessary to ensure price stability over the medium term.”
On private-sector involvement in a Greek bailout:
“One should think twice about the idea of private-sector involvement. With a strong commitment from Greek authorities, I think there’s no need for private-sector involvement.”
“The ECB is not against involvement of the private sector but conditions have to be clear. The involvement of the private sector has to be purely voluntary and not create a default. It’s time to stop this fruitless discussion. The real issue is the program for Greece and to implement it in full.
“What’s key for us is to protect our independence and our integrity and that the no-bailout clause is respected. We will apply our rules so the system requires adequate collateral and lending to only sound banks. The program as it stands now delivers sustainability.
“Each and every analysis about the need to involve the private sector has to be involved on the debt-sustainability analysis. If Greece runs a primary surplus and the privations plan is implemented the debt-to-GDP ratio will decline significantly. All this discussion about private-sector involvement distracts so many resources from implementing the program that it’s no surprise in the view of the academics and also of the Greek authorities that it seems to be an easy way out.”
On Greek bailout proposals:
“It’s not our task to make concrete proposals. I’m very happy that this institution’s mandate is on its core task. It’s not our task to give advice” on “initiatives that were launched by others.”
On criticism of the ECB:
“There is this ongoing criticism about the risks that we have taken too much risk on our balance sheet, that it’s not manageable, the bad bank, should I now provide with additional information that you can continue writing these things? It’s always taxpayer money but it’s also about the credibility of this institution.”
On a Greek solution:
“We have our rules. Those rules have been applied and all the options that are under discussion implicitly consider to some extent the involvement of the ECB. That means whatever the option which in the end might be chosen, the underlying assumption is that the ECB will continue to accept the Greek paper as eligible collateral. This remains to be seen.
“We know today more than we knew two weeks ago. It’s not very likely that a substantial involvement of the private sector will happen,” and any involvement would have to be “totally voluntary. As we have to stick to the rules, first that the collateral has to be appropriate, the banks have to be financially sound, financially healthy. We have to make an assessment.
“It’s pretty clear in the case of a credit event first and in the case of a selective default, a rating event, this prevents us from continuing to accept Greek bonds as eligible bonds. For this reason policy makers should know what they’re talking about.”
On ECB interest rates:
“The projections are staff projections. We said that we see the risks to price stability to the upside over the medium term. The underlying assumption is higher short-term interest rates.”
On the ECB’s balance sheet:
“It’s obvious that the ECB has taken additional risks on its balance sheet. This reflects the dimension of the crisis. We’re still living through the crisis and like other central banks, we have taken risks on our balance sheet. We have a well functioning risk-controlling regime. We’re neither naïve nor ignorant on what’s going on in the markets and what risks we have on our balance sheet.”
On central bank measures:
“Eurosystem credit is provided against eligible collateral only. We have a prudentially designed rule base and a transparent collateral framework. The level of transparency of the collateral framework allows for a high level of market scrutiny.”
“The Eurosystem has continuously adjusted its collateral framework to react to financial market” developments. “We have widened the collateral” setup. “Most of these broadening measures have been discontinued at the end of 2010.”
“We have also intensified monitoring and surveillance and have increased haircuts. The statement made in public that huge amounts of low-quality ABS have been” pledged to the ECB “is simply wrong. Only 44 billion euros has been originated in Ireland and currently no ABS has been originated in Greece.”
“The Target2 claim on the NCB’s balance sheet doesn’t per se mean a financial risk exposure. The risk exposure relates to the underlying monetary-policy operations. We have to be very prudent not to blur the facts here. What is key are the underlying monetary policy operations.”
On liquidity provisions to banks:
“In particular German banks actually use the ECB’s deposit facility. There are no liquidity constraints.”
On cross-border flows:
“We have to deal with cross-border flows and we have to analyze why they occur.”
(Bloomberg)
tommy271
Forumer storico
Mica tanto scontato Tommy dopo le frizioni degli ultimi tempi tra il partito del cancelliere e quello liberale, a questo punto la strada per un nuovo finanziamento mi sembra in discesa visto che si diva che l'ostacolo maggiore era rappresentato dall'ostracismo teutonico (che cozzava con la posizione favorevole francese)...mah!!! Quante cose poco chiare.
Già da un paio di giorni era stato raggiunto un accordo di massima all'interno della compagine governativa.
La realtà è che la questione è terribilmente complessa, con troppi attori sul palcoscenico che vogliono dire la loro.
Ogni decisione è sofferta e le istanze che devono assumere le responsabilità sono tante.
Comunque seguiremo passo a passo tutto l'iter ... con ogni probabilità prima dell'Eurogruppo del 20, i ministri delle finanze terranno la prossima settimana un prevertice per definire il tutto.
Quindi, in questi giorni si deciderà sulla questione della "partecipazione" volontaria. Che è il tema più spinoso.
Quando tutto sarà approvato, dovrà passare sotto l'esame del Parlamento Greco.
Se tutto andrà per il verso giusto, verso gli inizi di luglio la faccenda dovrebbe chiudersi.
Ultima modifica:
tommy271
Forumer storico
Non sono uno scienziato, quindi mi limito ad un quadro probabilistico.
Quindi escludo una qualsiasi uscita della Grecia dall'Euro, aggiungendo che la moneta unica è irreversibile.
Sinora abbiamo visto paesi chiedere l'ingresso nella moneta unica.
Al momento non è prevista nessuna modalità di espulsione o di uscita volontaria.
Certo, tutto può accadere: domani mattina potrei uscire di casa ed essere falciato da una macchina, oppure stasera mi si può incendiare la casa...
tomcat
Forumer attivo
sia chiaro , non voglio assolutamente polemizzare
e concordo con te che allo stato tutti stiano cercando di tenere unito il sistema e che anche la crisi attuale sarà superata nei tempi stretti da te prefigurati
quello che penso io, per tempi medio-lunghi è che quello attuale è un sistema intrinsecamente instabile e che può pertanto riservare esiti anche imprevedibili
tommy271
Forumer storico
Personalmente credo che, se usciremo positivamente da questa vicenda, la moneta unica avrà ulteriori strumenti per preservare la stabilità all'interno dell'area Euro.
Quindi, sulla scia di una soluzione in Grecia, rimango ottimista sul medio/lungo periodo.
A quel punto, altre aree valutarie avranno problemi ...
Certo che se inizia a crollare la Grecia, poi sarà la volta dell'Irlanda e del Portogallo con prevedibili sconquassi su tutta l'area.
Perchè i lusitani o gli irlandesi non dovrebbero a loro volta tagliare il debito?
E gli spagnoli?
E noi italiani?
Ultima modifica:
Comandante Gerard
Forumer storico
Mah...di irreversibile su questa terra c'è una cosa sola...
A parte le battute più o meno serie (avevo aperto pure una discussione sulla fine dell'euro un anno fa) sinceramente mi trovo d'accordo con gaudente:
l' euro potrà tranquillamente continuare ad esistere in caso di default incontrollato greco. Personalmente su questo ho pochi dubbi.
Finirebbe solo l'euro per come lo conosciamo ora.
Con annessa probabilmente la fine di una certa idea di Europa , idea che è rimasta lì senza crescere... invecchiata da sola nella trappola delle paure e delle burocrazie.
Ma non è affato detto che sarebbe un male per l' euro in sé.
Forse nemmeno per l' Europa.
Un cataclisma per noi? Forse sì, ma non lo vedo così scontato; per qualcun'altro sicuramente sì, certamente non per tutti.
L' euro potrebbe diventare per contrappasso ancor più solido e forte di prima , ripulito di un pò di spazzatura "periferica"...
Somiglierebbe, stranamente, sempre di più al DM...
- Stato