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PASTELLETTO
Guest
Sicuramente lo swap andrà bene e questo farà rimbalzare anche il MIB.
Poi però....
Morto 'npapa se ne fa nartro!
Nobody's
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1773,9
Nobody's
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Buy back...sicuro al 90%
Nobody's
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German Bundesbank chief opposes joint euro zone debt
Reuters - 06/09/2011 19:27:32
BERLIN, Sept 6 (Reuters) -
Bundesbank chief Jens Weidmann on Tuesday said he opposed joint euro zone debt issuance, telling a German newspaper it would undermine incentives for states in the currency bloc to keep finances solid.
"Common liability without limiting national sovereignty would mean that the institutional framework of the currency union would lose its consistency," he said in an interview to be published in Boersen Zeitung on Wednesday.
Germany, which enjoys lower costs for issuing debt than its single currency partners, has led resistance to joint euro-denominated bonds.
Turning to highly indebted euro zone member Greece, Weidmann said Athens must implement the reform program it had agreed with international lenders.
"A consistent fulfillment of the agreed program is also a precondition for continuing international aid. The Greek government must show it is ready and in the position to do its part toward the crisis' resolution."
(Reporting by Brian Rohan; editing by Ron Askew) Messaging: [email protected]))
Keywords: GERMANY BUNDESBANK/EUROBONDS
Bundesbank chief Jens Weidmann on Tuesday said he opposed joint euro zone debt issuance, telling a German newspaper it would undermine incentives for states in the currency bloc to keep finances solid.
"Common liability without limiting national sovereignty would mean that the institutional framework of the currency union would lose its consistency," he said in an interview to be published in Boersen Zeitung on Wednesday.
Germany, which enjoys lower costs for issuing debt than its single currency partners, has led resistance to joint euro-denominated bonds.
Turning to highly indebted euro zone member Greece, Weidmann said Athens must implement the reform program it had agreed with international lenders.
"A consistent fulfillment of the agreed program is also a precondition for continuing international aid. The Greek government must show it is ready and in the position to do its part toward the crisis' resolution."
(Reporting by Brian Rohan; editing by Ron Askew) Messaging: [email protected]))
Keywords: GERMANY BUNDESBANK/EUROBONDS
PASTELLETTO
Guest
German Bundesbank chief opposes joint euro zone debtReuters - 06/09/2011 19:27:32BERLIN, Sept 6 (Reuters) -
Bundesbank chief Jens Weidmann on Tuesday said he opposed joint euro zone debt issuance, telling a German newspaper it would undermine incentives for states in the currency bloc to keep finances solid.
"Common liability without limiting national sovereignty would mean that the institutional framework of the currency union would lose its consistency," he said in an interview to be published in Boersen Zeitung on Wednesday.
Germany, which enjoys lower costs for issuing debt than its single currency partners, has led resistance to joint euro-denominated bonds.
Turning to highly indebted euro zone member Greece, Weidmann said Athens must implement the reform program it had agreed with international lenders.
"A consistent fulfillment of the agreed program is also a precondition for continuing international aid. The Greek government must show it is ready and in the position to do its part toward the crisis' resolution."
(Reporting by Brian Rohan; editing by Ron Askew) Messaging: [email protected]))
Keywords: GERMANY BUNDESBANK/EUROBONDS
Ormai sono un disco rotto.
Nobody's
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Qualche GG per il DAx come in questi GG....poi vediamo
Magari i PIIGS........la G non stava per Greece
Nobody's
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Europe’s lethal uncertainty
Felix Salmon
Sep 6, 2011 11:54 EDT
euro | greece
As markets plunge again today, ostensibly on existential worries about the eurozone, you might want a plain-English explanation of what the root of the problem is. And John Lanchester is a great place to turn for such things:
On 16 August, Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel had an emergency meeting to decide what to do about the Eurozone crisis. After it, they gave a press conference at which they spoke in platitudes about the need for Europe to improve its ‘economic governance’, avoiding all specifics. They precisely and explicitly ruled out the only two things which would have helped: the creation of ‘eurobonds’, i.e. debts backed by the full economic weight of all the countries inside the eurozone; and the extension of the €440 billion European Financial Stability Facility. It’s easy to see why they did this, and their reasons are entirely to do with the domestic unpopularity of giving more aid to the indebted and severely struggling ‘Club Med’ countries of Southern Europe. Unfortunately, Merkel and Sarkozy’s inaction is a recipe for certain disaster. Everybody and his cat knows that the eurobond is the only way out of the crisis for the eurozone in the medium term; as for the necessary size of the short-term bailout facility, Gordon Brown’s guesstimate was €2 trillion. That ‘could have convinced the markets that Europe meant business’. Huge, sustained and manifestly undeflectable government intervention on that scale is the only thing which will cause the speculators and hedge-funders and ‘hot money’ types to back off. Instead, nothing.
Lanchester’s full essay is well worth reading, and helps to put today’s news in perspective. When Mario Draghi says that Europe needs to “make a quantum step up in economic and political integration,” he’s basically agreeing with Christine Lagarde that Europe’s nations need to stand together. And when elected leaders signally fail to say the same thing, markets fall.
Meanwhile, amazingly, the Greek bond exchange is still far from a done deal, and Landon Thomas does his best to try to explain how Europe’s banks are being pushed to accept it:
This week, bankers representing the Greek government — Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas and HSBC — have been explaining to investors why it is in their interest to trade in their decimated Greek bonds, take a 21 percent loss and accept a new package of longer-dated securities with AAA backing…
With the price of Greek debt trading in some cases at 50 cents on the dollar — even lower than when the bailout deal was announced in July — the 21 percent haircut seems to be quite a bargain.
As a bonus, the new bonds would be governed by international law, rather than Greek law. That is a significant alteration of lending terms that would strengthen the negotiating hand of the bondholders if Greece eventually concluded it had no alternative but to default — even after this latest bailout.
The math isn’t quite as simply as Thomas implies — if you take a 21% haircut on a bond, the new instrument is not automagically going to be worth 79 cents, even if it does have “AAA backing”. That backing will be in the form of long-dated zero-coupon collateral which is hard for bondholders to extract, and the new debt will still have a low credit rating and a large amount of default risk baked in.
But the governing-law part of the deal is important. Thomas cites (but doesn’t link to) Lee Buchheit’s important paper on that topic. Basically, current Greek debt is in many ways worthless to bondholders: if and when Greece defaults, they have no legal recourse. But if the exchange goes through, then the new Greek debt will give bondholders real teeth in the event of default.
There’s still a lot of weirdness going on in Greece’s debt, especially at the short end of the yield curve. Consider this, for instance: the Greek bond maturing on January 11 is trading at par — the market expects it to be paid in full, and the yield on the bond is in single digits. But the Greek bond maturing on March 20 is trading at about 63 cents on the dollar, for a yield well into triple digits. Meanwhile, the bond maturing on May 15 is trading in the low 80s, for a yield of around 30%.
There might be a good explanation for why short-dated Greek debt is trading so oddly, or it might just be an artifact of illiquidity. But the general chaos and uncertainty that’s reining in Europe right now is very reminiscent of the height of the financial crisis. Crises of confidence are always self-fulfilling, and the longer governments take to react to them, the worse they get. Europe, by its nature, moves slowly. And that’s bad news for global markets.
Felix Salmon
Sep 6, 2011 11:54 EDT
euro | greece
As markets plunge again today, ostensibly on existential worries about the eurozone, you might want a plain-English explanation of what the root of the problem is. And John Lanchester is a great place to turn for such things:
On 16 August, Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel had an emergency meeting to decide what to do about the Eurozone crisis. After it, they gave a press conference at which they spoke in platitudes about the need for Europe to improve its ‘economic governance’, avoiding all specifics. They precisely and explicitly ruled out the only two things which would have helped: the creation of ‘eurobonds’, i.e. debts backed by the full economic weight of all the countries inside the eurozone; and the extension of the €440 billion European Financial Stability Facility. It’s easy to see why they did this, and their reasons are entirely to do with the domestic unpopularity of giving more aid to the indebted and severely struggling ‘Club Med’ countries of Southern Europe. Unfortunately, Merkel and Sarkozy’s inaction is a recipe for certain disaster. Everybody and his cat knows that the eurobond is the only way out of the crisis for the eurozone in the medium term; as for the necessary size of the short-term bailout facility, Gordon Brown’s guesstimate was €2 trillion. That ‘could have convinced the markets that Europe meant business’. Huge, sustained and manifestly undeflectable government intervention on that scale is the only thing which will cause the speculators and hedge-funders and ‘hot money’ types to back off. Instead, nothing.
Lanchester’s full essay is well worth reading, and helps to put today’s news in perspective. When Mario Draghi says that Europe needs to “make a quantum step up in economic and political integration,” he’s basically agreeing with Christine Lagarde that Europe’s nations need to stand together. And when elected leaders signally fail to say the same thing, markets fall.
Meanwhile, amazingly, the Greek bond exchange is still far from a done deal, and Landon Thomas does his best to try to explain how Europe’s banks are being pushed to accept it:
This week, bankers representing the Greek government — Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas and HSBC — have been explaining to investors why it is in their interest to trade in their decimated Greek bonds, take a 21 percent loss and accept a new package of longer-dated securities with AAA backing…
With the price of Greek debt trading in some cases at 50 cents on the dollar — even lower than when the bailout deal was announced in July — the 21 percent haircut seems to be quite a bargain.
As a bonus, the new bonds would be governed by international law, rather than Greek law. That is a significant alteration of lending terms that would strengthen the negotiating hand of the bondholders if Greece eventually concluded it had no alternative but to default — even after this latest bailout.
The math isn’t quite as simply as Thomas implies — if you take a 21% haircut on a bond, the new instrument is not automagically going to be worth 79 cents, even if it does have “AAA backing”. That backing will be in the form of long-dated zero-coupon collateral which is hard for bondholders to extract, and the new debt will still have a low credit rating and a large amount of default risk baked in.
But the governing-law part of the deal is important. Thomas cites (but doesn’t link to) Lee Buchheit’s important paper on that topic. Basically, current Greek debt is in many ways worthless to bondholders: if and when Greece defaults, they have no legal recourse. But if the exchange goes through, then the new Greek debt will give bondholders real teeth in the event of default.
There’s still a lot of weirdness going on in Greece’s debt, especially at the short end of the yield curve. Consider this, for instance: the Greek bond maturing on January 11 is trading at par — the market expects it to be paid in full, and the yield on the bond is in single digits. But the Greek bond maturing on March 20 is trading at about 63 cents on the dollar, for a yield well into triple digits. Meanwhile, the bond maturing on May 15 is trading in the low 80s, for a yield of around 30%.
There might be a good explanation for why short-dated Greek debt is trading so oddly, or it might just be an artifact of illiquidity. But the general chaos and uncertainty that’s reining in Europe right now is very reminiscent of the height of the financial crisis. Crises of confidence are always self-fulfilling, and the longer governments take to react to them, the worse they get. Europe, by its nature, moves slowly. And that’s bad news for global markets.
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Italia meno a rischio di Grecia, ma fiducia mercati debole - S&P
Reuters - 06/09/2011 19:32:04
MILANO, 6 settembre (Reuters) -
Italia e Spagna corrono meno rischi di Grecia, Portogallo e Irlanda, ma devono affrontare la minore fiducia dei mercati e le maggiori difficoltà per accedere al mercato del debito.
Inoltre la situazione di incertezza che affrontano i due paesi, con il conseguente aumento del costo del debito, fa sì che crescano i costi per le banche italiane e spagnole.
E' quanto emerge dal rapporto di S&P intitolato "Il rimbalzo delle banche europee vacilla tra rallentamento economico e turbolenze sui mercati".
"Nonostante il deterioramento della capacità di credito nei paesi periferici, i nostri rating sui paesi dell'Unione europea sono tipicamente di alto grado di investimento. Il Portogallo e l'Irlanda sono chiaramente sotto pressione, ma non nelle gravi difficoltà della Grecia. Secondo noi, Spagna e Italia sono meno a rischio, ma restano fortemente esposte al dissolversi della fiducia dei mercati e a periodi di stretto accesso sul mercato del debito", si legge nel documento.
Il rapporto sottolinea che l'ampio spread tra i rendimenti dei titoli italiani e spagnoli rispetto a quelli tedeschi riflette i timori degli investitori che i due paesi "potrebbero seguire la strada dei loro fratelli minori. Queste preoccupazioni stanno contagiando anche la Francia e altri paesi in precedenza considerati come rifugi sicuri".
Questa situazione ha un impatto diretto sul settore bancario.
"Il maggior costo del debito sovrano di Italia e Spagna sta facendo crescere i costi che le banche italiane e spagnole devono sostenere per finanziarsi all'ingrosso", spiega S&P.
L'agenzia di rating mette inoltre in evidenza il rapporto tra redditività degli istituti di credito e crescita economica del paese.
"I grandi gruppi bancari europei con la redditività più bassa appartengono a paesi con economie ancora in recessione o che stanno crescendo molto lentamente: Grecia, Portogallo, Irlanda e Italia"
Sul sito Reuters.com le altre notizie Reuters in italiano. Le top news anche su Reuters Italia (@reuters_italia) su Twitter
Italia e Spagna corrono meno rischi di Grecia, Portogallo e Irlanda, ma devono affrontare la minore fiducia dei mercati e le maggiori difficoltà per accedere al mercato del debito.
Inoltre la situazione di incertezza che affrontano i due paesi, con il conseguente aumento del costo del debito, fa sì che crescano i costi per le banche italiane e spagnole.
E' quanto emerge dal rapporto di S&P intitolato "Il rimbalzo delle banche europee vacilla tra rallentamento economico e turbolenze sui mercati".
"Nonostante il deterioramento della capacità di credito nei paesi periferici, i nostri rating sui paesi dell'Unione europea sono tipicamente di alto grado di investimento. Il Portogallo e l'Irlanda sono chiaramente sotto pressione, ma non nelle gravi difficoltà della Grecia. Secondo noi, Spagna e Italia sono meno a rischio, ma restano fortemente esposte al dissolversi della fiducia dei mercati e a periodi di stretto accesso sul mercato del debito", si legge nel documento.
Il rapporto sottolinea che l'ampio spread tra i rendimenti dei titoli italiani e spagnoli rispetto a quelli tedeschi riflette i timori degli investitori che i due paesi "potrebbero seguire la strada dei loro fratelli minori. Queste preoccupazioni stanno contagiando anche la Francia e altri paesi in precedenza considerati come rifugi sicuri".
Questa situazione ha un impatto diretto sul settore bancario.
"Il maggior costo del debito sovrano di Italia e Spagna sta facendo crescere i costi che le banche italiane e spagnole devono sostenere per finanziarsi all'ingrosso", spiega S&P.
L'agenzia di rating mette inoltre in evidenza il rapporto tra redditività degli istituti di credito e crescita economica del paese.
"I grandi gruppi bancari europei con la redditività più bassa appartengono a paesi con economie ancora in recessione o che stanno crescendo molto lentamente: Grecia, Portogallo, Irlanda e Italia"
Sul sito Reuters.com le altre notizie Reuters in italiano. Le top news anche su Reuters Italia (@reuters_italia) su Twitter
PASTELLETTO
Guest
I prossimi siamo noi, Moody's è già sul piede di guerra e dubito che possiamo fornire domani il risultato di un'ottima manovra finanziaria.
Questo mi fa aprire scenari inquietanti in testa, visto l'andamento delle banche (Unicredit in testa).
Quanto durerà?
Che vuole il mercato in Italia?
Forse solo il crollo del governo attuale e un cambio di rotta.
Oppure l'approvazione della finanziaria, ammesso che ci creda, il mercato, alla finanziaria.
Anche solo un segnale, tanto il buco resta quello, non è che Bersani possa staccare un assegno da 1000 miliardi e rotti di €.
Ma quale segnale?
Per ora i rimbalzi del MIB sono guidati dall'eco di buone notizie che arrivano da altri mercati.
Questo mi fa aprire scenari inquietanti in testa, visto l'andamento delle banche (Unicredit in testa).
Quanto durerà?
Che vuole il mercato in Italia?
Forse solo il crollo del governo attuale e un cambio di rotta.
Oppure l'approvazione della finanziaria, ammesso che ci creda, il mercato, alla finanziaria.
Anche solo un segnale, tanto il buco resta quello, non è che Bersani possa staccare un assegno da 1000 miliardi e rotti di €.
Ma quale segnale?
Per ora i rimbalzi del MIB sono guidati dall'eco di buone notizie che arrivano da altri mercati.
- Stato