Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 1

[buttozzo]

buongiorno a tutti io finche' non vedo nero su bianco in modo definitivo non dico niente penso che il piano dovrebbe essere ancora rimodellato

 

[Rottweiler]

Juncker avrà pure ragione, ma non credo che dichiarazioni di questo tipo siano molto gradite dall'orgoglioso popolo greco:

Greek sovereignty to be massively limited: Juncker


By Erik Kirschbaum
BERLIN | Sun Jul 3, 2011 8:07am EDT
(Reuters) - Greece faces severe restrictions on its sovereignty and must privatize state assets on a scale similar to the sell off of East German firms in the 1990s after communism fell, Eurogroup chairman Jean-Claude Juncker said.

In an interview published after euro zone finance ministers in the Eurogroup approved a further 12 billion euro ($17.43 billion) installment of Greece's bailout, Juncker said he was optimistic that measures agreed with Athens would help to resolve the country's problems.

"The sovereignty of Greece will be massively limited," he told Germany's Focus magazine in the interview released on Sunday, adding that teams of experts from around the euro zone would heading to Greece.

"For the forthcoming wave of privatizations they will need, for example, a solution based on a model of Germany's 'Treuhand agency'," Juncker added, referring to the privatization agency that sold off 14,000 East German firms between 1990 and 1994.

The Greek parliament voted on Thursday to set up a privatization agency under austerity plans agreed with the European Union and IMF which have provoked violent protests on the streets of Athens.

Greeks are acutely sensitive to any infringement of their sovereignty or suggestions of foreign "commissars" getting involved in running the country.

"One cannot be allowed to insult the Greeks. But one has to help them. They have said they are ready to accept expertise from the euro zone," Juncker said.

Athens must sell off five billion euros in state assets this year alone or risk missing targets set under its EU/IMF program, which could cut off its funding needed to keep the government running and avoid a debt default.

A repeat of Germany's Treuhand experience may prove bitter for Greeks, who are already suffering soaring unemployment as a recession drags into its third year.

Once the world's biggest holding company, Treuhand was supposed to sell off state property at a profit but closed its books with a huge deficit and a legacy of bitterness among the legions of workers whose jobs it destroyed.

Four million Germans were employed by Treuhand-owned companies in 1990 but only about 1.5 million jobs were left in 1994 when the agency closed.

Instead of reaping profits to be distributed to all east Germans, as it was designed to do, it ran up debts of 270 billion marks ($172 billion) in the fire sale of assets.

"NOT FULLY FUNCTIONAL"

Juncker, also Luxembourg's Prime Minister, first floated the idea of a Treuhand-style agency for Greece in May. He said then he believed Greece could raise considerably more than the 50 billion euros in asset sales.

"The current package of measures, which Athens has agreed to, will bring a solution to the Greek question," he said in the

Focus interview. However, he added that the Greek tax collection system was "not fully functional."

On Saturday, euro zone finance ministers agreed that the fifth tranche of the 110-billion-euro bailout agreed with Greece in May 2010 would be paid by July 15, as long as the IMF's board signs off on the disbursement. The IMF is expected to meet on July 8 to approve it.

The payment will allow Greece to avoid the immediate threat of default, but the country still needs a second rescue package, which is also expected also to total around 110 billion euros and which will now probably be finalized only in September.

Juncker said the Greek crisis had been largely caused by itself. "Between 1999 and 2010 wages rose 106.6 percent even though the economy did not grow at the same pace. The wage policies were completely out of control and not based on (gains in) productivity," he said.

 

[Orwell]

buongiorno a tutti io finche' non vedo nero su bianco in modo definitivo non dico niente penso che il piano dovrebbe essere ancora rimodellato

intanto ... rimodellando l'italica manovra .... il bollo sui Dossier Titoli passerà a 120 Euro annui ... no comment! e scusate il legger OT ...

 

[IL MARATONETA]

intanto ... rimodellando l'italica manovra .... il bollo sui Dossier Titoli passerà a 120 Euro annui ... no comment! e scusate il legger OT ...

non abbiamo messsssssso le manimanimanimani nelle tascheeeeee......... degli italiani

 

[IL MARATONETA]

bollo dossier titoli

Manovra/ Bollo su dossier titoli aumenta a 120 euro

Sabato, 2 Luglio 2011 - 09:36


Aumenta da 34,2 a 120 euro il bollo sui dossier titoli. L'imposta si applica per i dossier con valori superiori a mille euro. Lo scrive il Sole 24 ore, anticipando il testo della manovra, che sarebbe giunta al Quirinale per l'emanazione del decreto legge. Il dl prevede anche un aumento dello 0,75% dell'Irap per banche ed intermediari finanziari.

 

[g.ln]

aumento bollo dossier titoli

Manovra/ Bollo su dossier titoli aumenta a 120 euro

Sabato, 2 Luglio 2011 - 09:36


Aumenta da 34,2 a 120 euro il bollo sui dossier titoli. L'imposta si applica per i dossier con valori superiori a mille euro. Lo scrive il Sole 24 ore, anticipando il testo della manovra, che sarebbe giunta al Quirinale per l'emanazione del decreto legge. Il dl prevede anche un aumento dello 0,75% dell'Irap per banche ed intermediari finanziari.

Ciao Maratoneta, che dire! pazienza? mah, spero che durante l'iter parlamentare questo bollo venga ridotto o eliminato, come sembra che possa essere fatto per la mancata indicizzazione delle pensioni medie.
Intanto parto per un paio di giorni per Genova con moglie (acquario, sommergibile Nazario Sauro, giro città, ecc.).
Ci risentiamo mercoledì, spero con una situazione greca più rilassata.
Buonanotte, Giuseppe

 

[tommy271]

Grecia, rollover potrebbe determinare "default selettivo" - S&P

lunedì 4 luglio 2011 07:25



4 luglio (Reuters) - Il rollover del debito greco potrebbe determinare un "default selettivo". È quanto sostiene l'agenzia di rating Standard & Poor's.
Dopo la dichiarazione dell'agenzia, l'euro è sceso ai minimi di seduta a 1,4518 dollari dalla precedente chiusura di 1,4540.



***
La proposta francese ...

 

[tommy271]

Juncker: Italia, Spagna e Belgio non sono a rischio contagio

http://www.corriere.it/economia/11_...1e0-980c-35d723c25df8.shtml?fr=box_primopiano

 

[tommy271]

TEXT-S&P: Debt Rollover Plan May Put Greece In Selective Default







Mon Jul 4, 2011 1:25am EDT

(The following was released from the rating agency)



July 4--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered the long-term rating on the Hellenic Republic (Greece) to 'CCC' from 'B'. In part, the downgrade reflected our view of the rising risk that an enhanced official financing package addressing the Greek government's 2011-2014 financing needs could require private sector debt restructuring in a form that we would view as an effective default of its debt obligations under our ratings criteria. In recent weeks, a number of proposals relating to this topic have surfaced, and the particulars in some cases are evidently still in flux. This credit comment looks at the most prominent of the recent proposals, put forward by the Federation Bancaire Francaise (FBF) on June 24, 2011, in the context of our criteria for evaluating distressed debt exchanges and similar debt restructurings (see Related Research below). In brief, it is our view that each of the two financing options described in the FBF proposal would likely amount to a default under our criteria.
The FBF proposal currently envisions French-regulated financial institutions agreeing to either of two options regarding their reinvestment of proceeds from Greek government debt maturing between July 2011 and June 2014. Based on recent public statements by European policy makers and bank executives, we believe the options FBF has put forward on the refinancing of Greece's maturing debt were made at the behest of Greece's eurozone official creditors. We broadly summarize these options below.
Under the first option, French financial institutions would invest at least 70% of the proceeds of their maturing Greek government bonds in newly-issued 30-year Greek government bonds (New Thirty-Year Bonds). The transferability of the New Thirty-Year Bonds would be restricted for the first 10 years of their tenor (but eligible collateral for ECB repo operations). They would bear interest at 5.5% plus a margin equal to the percentage of real annual growth of the Greek economy, capped at 2.5% and floored at 0%. The Greek government, in turn, would be required to apply a portion of the issuance proceeds to the purchase of zero-coupon 30-year 'AAA'-rated bonds issued by one or more sovereigns, supranational institutions, or European agencies, with the principal and interest from such 'AAA' debt calculated to repay in full the principal amount of the New Thirty-Year Bonds.
Under the second option, French financial institutions would invest at least 90% of the proceeds of their maturing Greek government bonds in newly-issued five-year Greek government bonds (New Five-Year Bonds). The New Five-Year Bonds would also include restrictions on their transferability, and the interest rate coupon would be the same as on the New Thirty-Year Bonds described in option one. We understand there would be no investment of any part of issuance proceeds in 'AAA' debt under the second option.
The relevant Standard & Poor's criteria pertaining to the financing options described in the FBF proposal are found in "General Criteria: Rating Implications of Exchange Offers and Similar Restructurings, Update," published on RatingsDirect on May 12, 2009. This criteria describes the principles Standard & Poor's follows when analyzing the credit effects when distressed entities attempt to restructure their obligations. Depending on the circumstances, Standard & Poor's views certain types of debt exchanges and similar restructurings as equivalent to a payment default. Under our criteria, two conditions must be met for a debt exchange or similar restructuring to qualify as an effective default: (i) the transaction is viewed by us as distressed rather than purely opportunistic, and (ii) we take the view that the "exchange or similar restructuring" will result in investors receiving less value than the promise of the original securities.
Although we do not consider either FBF financing option as strictly being an "exchange," we are of the view that each falls into the category of what our criteria terms a "similar restructuring." This is because we believe--based on recent public statements of eurozone policymakers--that the aim of the financing options is to reduce the risk of a near-term debt payment default or debt restructuring with haircuts and give the Greek government more time to undertake fiscal consolidation and policy reforms. We also believe that the proposed options respond to the desire of eurozone creditor governments to slow the growth in their own exposure to Greek government credit risk. We note, too, the public expressions of concern by many policymakers about the potentially damaging consequences of a near-term Greek default of any kind on the capital positions of some European banks and that such a default might trigger greater financial contagion in Europe and globally.
Our criteria further states: "For an exchange offer to be viewed as distressed, we must decide that, apart from the offer, there is a realistic possibility of a conventional default (i.e., the company could file for bankruptcy, become insolvent, or fall into payment default) on the instrument subject to the exchange, over the near to medium term." In our view, Greece's near-term reliance on EU/IMF official financing, the government's difficulty in reducing its sizable fiscal deficit, and the current pricing of Greek government debt in the secondary market all underscore the Hellenic Republic's weak creditworthiness and, consequently, point to a "realistic possibility" that either financing option would fit the "distressed" category. (We also note the announcement on July 1, 2011, by the Institute of International Finance--a global organization with membership drawn, among others, from large banks, insurance companies, and investment management firms--that some of its members might, under certain conditions, be willing to buy back Greek government bonds at market prices well below par.)
In addition, our criteria outline the characteristics of "distressed transactions" that, individually or collectively, we consider when forming an opinion on whether the resulting newly issued debt has "less value than the promise of the original securities," a primary condition of a distressed exchange or similar restructuring:
-- The combination of any cash amount and principal amount of new securities offered is less than the original par amount;
-- The interest rate is lower than the original interest rate;
-- The new securities' maturities extend beyond the original;
-- The timing of payments is slowed (e.g., zero-coupon from quarterly paying, or bullet from amortizing); or
-- The ranking is altered to more junior. In our view, the third and fourth characteristics can be found in one or both FBF financing options.
In both options, investors would purchase new securities with somewhat higher interest rate coupons than the maturing debt. But unlike other investments investors would have been likely to make with the proceeds of maturing Greek debt, the New Five-Year Bonds and the New Thirty-Year Bonds would have restricted transferability for extended periods--in our view because, given current market conditions, both the New Five-Year Bonds and the New Thirty-Year Bonds would likely trade at a price significantly below par. In addition, we note that the tenor of the New Thirty-Year Bonds under the first option is far longer than the original maturities of any outstanding Greek government bonds, and we take the view that the intent of such extended maturities is to slow the timing of future principal repayments quite significantly. We also note that speculative-grade rated issuers rarely, if ever, are able to access market financing with such a long tenor. Taking these considerations into account, we believe that both options represent (i) a "similar restructuring" (ii) are "distressed" and (iii) offer "less value than the promise of the original securities

 

[METHOS]

Grecia, rollover potrebbe determinare "default selettivo" - S&P

lunedì 4 luglio 2011 07:25



4 luglio (Reuters) - Il rollover del debito greco potrebbe determinare un "default selettivo". È quanto sostiene l'agenzia di rating Standard & Poor's.
Dopo la dichiarazione dell'agenzia, l'euro è sceso ai minimi di seduta a 1,4518 dollari dalla precedente chiusura di 1,4540.



***
La proposta francese ...

Ciao Tommy, onestamente non ne posso più delle 3 sorelle, l'europa dovrebbe decidersi a creare una sua agenzia di rating.