iguanito
Forumer storico
Leader mondiale del settore. Credo che il nome in questi casi dica tutto. la volkswagen dell'acciaio........
Obbligazioni societarie HIGH YIELD e oltre, verso frontiere inesplorate - Vol. 1
- Creatore Discussione TRADING_IDEAS
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
Per me è solido.
Appena ho un pò di liquidità prendo quella che ti ho segnalato.
Cat XL
Shizuka Minamoto
Si anche lei - 40% YTD...
angy2008
Forumer storico
grazie per la segnalazione, io purtroppo ho già mediato troppo presto e ormai ho raggiunto l'esposizione massima tollerabile. Le notizie dalla Cina portano a scrolloni per tutto il settore visto che i prezzi continuano a scendere a causa della diminuita domanda e incremento delle esportazioni dalla Cina sottocosto.
iguanito
Forumer storico
Anche io sono pieno come un uovo.
NoWay
It's time to play the game
In effetti l'azione scende senza interruzioni e sembra non trovare supporti...
zoro-aster
Forumer storico
se ci riferiamo per esempio alla 39. In data 21/8 quotava 93,635 ora stà viaggiando a 88/90 su Frankfurt non mi pare che sia scesa molto, almeno se la confrontiamo con altre quotazioni disastrose che si vedono in giro. Circa un mese fa avevo dato ordine di acquisto ma il mio giannizzero (LUX) mi disse che non era cosa per via del settore incasinato e con prevedibile futuro burrascoso,
restai liquido però ora francamente ci stò rifacendo un pensierino
arkymede74
Forumer storico
di quale isin stiamo parlando?
NoWay
It's time to play the game
Il post che hai quotato è riferito all'azione ArcelorMittal.
Poi io guardavo il bond US03938LAU89, mentre Gion mi diceva che preferisce il US03938LAP94.
Fabrib
Forumer storico
Frontier: Failing On All Cylinders - Frontier Communications Corporation (NASDAQ:FTR) | Seeking Alpha
rontier: Failing On All Cylinders
Must Read | Sep. 22, 20F15 10:00 AM ET | 28 comments | About: Frontier Communications Corporation (FTR), Includes: T, VZ
Disclosure: I am/we are short FTR. (More...)
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Summary
Cost of funding for Verizon acquisition is far greater than initially anticipated.
Risks of the acquisition outweigh potential rewards significantly.
Revenue and cash flow continue to shrink as Frontier loses more customers.
AT&T Connecticut acquisition continues to disappoint.
We remain more bearish on Frontier than ever.
In years of investing, I rarely come across companies which repeatedly make the same mistakes in a predictable fashion. Management mostly learns from their mistakes or are booted out. Unfortunately, Frontier Communications (NASDAQ:FTR) does not belong to that category. After two large failed acquisitions, the third might be the most disastrous yet.
Earlier in the year when the Frontier-Verizon (NYSE
Z) mega deal was first announced, we highlighted the likelihood for disaster given Frontier's dire financial state, falling earnings and cash flows, and the history of value-destroying acquisitions. Since then, the share price has fallen over 37% from nearly $8/share to hovering around $5/share. However, we believe there is more downside potential - as more details emerged on funding, acquisition expenses and the results of ongoing operations, the numbers are even worse than we initially anticipated, which calls for a re-evaluation going forward.
Cost Of Capital Far Greater Than Anticipated
Back in February, we showed how the deal would likely lead to significant financial strain and that projections given by management were far too optimistic. Some accused us of making overly pessimistic assumptions regarding the effect of the debt load. However, the figures now show it is even worse than we anticipated.
We initially assumed a weighted cost of debt of 8.66%, which was in line with its debt profile at the time. New funding for the deal has come at a much greater cost at 10.53%. Funding details are outlined below.
(Note: Interest rate for term loan is variable. The figure above is an estimate based on the loan agreement given that Frontier will have a leverage ratio of 3:1. The actual ratio is likely to be higher.)
The deal will cost Frontier almost $923M in fixed interest charges annually, an extremely high cost to pay for purchasing what we could characterize as unattractive, no-growth assets. Furthermore, this figure is significantly higher than our earlier estimate of $858M in annual interest expenses. Also, we have not included the one-time commitment fee and interest rate for the bridge financing loan, which amounts to $132M and $73M, a significant sum considering its already enormous debt load.
In the long term as interest rates normalize, the risk to Frontier's balance sheet is even greater as it would probably need to refinance its debt at much higher rates, leading to greater financial strain.
This results in a far greater financial strain for the company, and the Return On Invested Capital on the acquisition of Verizon assets would have to be greater than 9-10% just for Frontier to break even on the deal due to the massive debt load.
Risks Outweighs Benefit For Purchase of Verizon Assets
Tucked away in the thick prospectus for Frontier's offering of preferred stock is the pro forma results for the assets it is acquiring from Verizon. Abbreviated as VSTO, the assets are making losses when evaluated using GAAP accounting, having made a net loss of $32M last year, despite generating $5.8B in revenue. Whilst it is no surprise that decaying telco assets are making a net loss on a GAAP basis, EBITDA figures themselves are not robust, generating only $1B in 2014 EBITDA. It is no wonder that Verizon was willing to get rid of these wireline assets at short notice.
We delineate our cost-benefit analysis by looking at the best-case scenario and worst-case scenario.
Best-Case Scenario
Given that the Verizon assets are barely breaking even, it seems like management's rationale for the acquisition is to target cost savings, as they've mentioned in the first press release summarizing the deal.
Specifically, the company aims to achieve $525M in cost-savings for the first year after close and reach $700M by year three. Even assuming it manages to achieve these cost savings, the deal is still not accretive for shareholders on an EPS basis as the annual recurring liabilities from funding the deal amounts to nearly $923M, which means VSTO would still experience a net income loss. Furthermore, we have to take into account that Frontier expects to incur $450M in acquisition and integration-related expenses in addition to the interest expenses.
If we evaluate the deal on an EBITDA basis (which would be a closer representation of free cash flow), the acquisition still seems unprofitable. In 2014, VSTO generated an EBITDA of $1B. Assuming cost savings bring EBITDA to approximately $1.5B in 2016, the $450M in non-recurring integration expenses and $923M in recurring interest expenses would almost wipe out this figure in the first year after closing. Thereafter, interest expenses would continue to weigh on FCF, with the high likelihood that Frontier would have to refinance in the future at even higher rates as interest rates normalize. We have yet to include other miscellaneous charges associated with the acquisition.
Therefore, even under the best-case scenario, the deal is unlikely to result in a meaningfully beneficial outcome due to the large interest expenses, costs associated with the acquisition and the simple fact that VSTO is not an attractive group of assets.
Worst-Case Scenario
If management fails to achieve the cost synergies they outlined, it will be worse than a repeat of their 2010 acquisition of Verizon's copper wireline assets, as the debt load has swelled significantly since then. We can expect a large dividend cut due to dropping free cash flows resulting from the billions in interest expenses and fixed charges.
Simply put, unless management delivers wholly on their promise of high-cost synergies, Frontier's finances will become unsustainable without further equity or debt issuance.
Core Business Shrinking
All these concerns are compounded by the fact that Frontier's core assets continue to perform poorly as the loss of voice customers continue to outweigh the gains made in internet subscribers.
As mentioned in our earlier research, Frontier's revenue and cash flows have been decreasing due to the continued loss of voice customers, who still account for over 45% of total revenues. Q2 2015 was no different, with Frontier's legacy operations losing 10% of their legacy voice customers, whilst continuing to shed both residential and business customers at a rate of 3-4% a year.
In essence, problems with the company's core business continue to persist as the loss of revenue from declining voice customers continue to outpace the gains made from new Internet and Data subscribers. Instead of trying to improve and grow the core business, management has seemingly given up on organic growth and is looking to grow through expensive acquisitions instead.
AT&T Connecticut Acquisition Disappointing
What is perhaps more disconcerting is that the newly-acquired AT&T (NYSE:T) assets are not showing any signs of growth, as revenue, profit and the customer base have remained flat over the past few quarters.
Moreover, recall that Frontier paid over $2B to acquire these properties. Thus far, that investment has not yielded any positive returns.
(Note: Pro forma Results Obtained From Senior Notes Prospectus)
The interest expenses are based on the Senior Notes and Term Loan used to fund the acquisition. Tax expenses are calculated based on a 28% tax rate with reference to previous years. As seen above, there was a significant drop in revenue when Frontier took over, suggesting many AT&T customers left immediately following the handover. As seen above, revenue for the first two quarters of 2015 was only $528M, a significant drop from the $680M in the same period in 2014. This is unsurprising considering the barrage of customer complaints during the transition, which involved formal complaints to the Department of Consumer Protection.
Keep in mind that the deal was announced on 17 December 2014, which means management had made the decision based on 2013 pro forma results. They obviously failed to anticipate the slew of customers that would leave and the corresponding drop in revenue and earnings. Hence, what must have seemed like a good deal at the time turned out to be horrendously expensive in the end.
Taking the 2013 pro forma results, Frontier's payment of $2B would have amounted to 5.3x EBIT, a fair deal for wireline assets with no growth. However, if we take results for the current year and stretch it out to a full 12 months, the 'price' would be around 21x 2015 EBIT due to the significant decline in earnings. We have excluded non-recurring expenses from the EBIT calculations as only the main line items are considered. Even if we were to be generous and assume that EBIT for the first quarter was lower due to miscellaneous hiccups, the picture isn't much brighter. Furthermore, the high-interest expenses from the deal make it far less attractive on a bottom-line basis.
Looking at the evidence, the fact is that Frontier managed the transition terribly, losing a large number of Connecticut customers and failing to achieve the cost synergies initially intended. Despite citing its "solid acquisitions record" and $200M in cost synergies" numerous times in its filings, there is almost no evidence to support both claims as operating margins for the 6 months ended June 2015 have remained largely in line with the 2013 pro forma and 2014 results.
Moreover, even if we accept the company's claim that cost synergies had been achieved, the additional integration expenses totalling $172M since 2014 would almost completely offset the benefit thus far. Although one can argue these are non-recurring expenses, they tend to add up over the first few years of Frontier's acquisitions, resulting in a massive strain on cash flow even as they accumulate record amounts of debt.
Broken Promises To Shareholders
In essence, not only did Frontier overpay for the acquisition, it failed to manage the transition as evidenced by the loss of customers and revenue. Furthermore, the asset's growth is flat-lining a year after the acquisition, with little signs of the initially promised cost synergies being achieved.
After promising that the acquisition would be "accretive to free cash flow per share in the first year", free cash flow per share has actually decreased from $0.716/share in Q3 2014 to $0.406/share in the latest quarter on a trailing twelve-month basis. Of course, management is no stranger to unkept promises, as we saw in the disastrous acquisition of Verizon wireline assets in 2010.
Conclusion
With higher-than-anticipated interest expenses, a shrinking core business and the underperformance of recently acquired AT&T assets, we remain more bearish on Frontier than ever. Simply put, its debt load relative to cash flow is unsustainable given that it continues to pay out large dividends every quarter. Management repeatedly makes aggressive assumptions on the profitability of acquisitions, which have not materialized. We anticipate the acquisition of VSTO will follow the same trajectory, with a massive drop in revenue and earnings following the close of the transaction. Overall, buying decaying assets for a seemingly low price is a poor long-term strategy. As such, we remain bearish on Frontier.
About this article Expand
More articles by John Zhang »
Cogent: Premium Valuation Without Premium Profits • PRO • Wed, Sep 23 Outerwall: More Bad News For EcoATM Wed, Sep 23 Outerwall: Undervalued Despite EcoATM Headwinds And Secular Decline Fri, Sep 18 Alliance Resources: Profitable In The Most Dire Conditions • PRO • Thu, Aug 13 How Accounting Rules Helped US Cellular Beat Earnings Expectations • PRO • Tue, Aug 4
FTR articles from SA PRO
Frontier Communications: Bull Case Is Deeply Flawed • PRO • Thu, Jun 11 Frontier's Acquisition Spells Trouble • PRO • Sun, Feb 8 Frontier Communications: Pessimism Is Overdone, Dividend Is Safe, Stock Is Undervalued • PRO • Fri, Sep 20
Latest on FTR
Frontier Communications: Now Is The TimeWed, Sep 16 Frontier up 1.7% as analysts boost price targetsTue, Sep 15 Frontier Communications -3.5% after filing estimating tax impactMon, Sep 14 Frontier prices $6.6B debt offering for Verizon wireline dealFri, Sep 11 Frontier pursuing $6.6B in junk bonds for Verizon wireline dealWed, Sep 9 Frontier Scores Big Time With Smart InvestmentsFri, Sep 4 Frontier Communications +5.6% as Macquarie tags it top telecomThu, Sep 3 FCC approves Frontier's $10.5B purchase of Verizon wirelinesWed, Sep 2 Frontier up 0.9% premarket; Stephens launches at OverweightWed, Aug 19
Comments (28)
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delta man
Comments (45)| + Follow | Send Message
Check out this web site
http://bit.ly/1KxQQ2l
It helps one have an understanding of the reason the debt is almost untenable. The new frontier debt was rated bb3. It's a hair away from single b!
Single b is in the 6.5 percent default rate within a few years.
It's hard to imagine paying 10 percent interest on a new 6.5 billion and a dividend as well. At best the dividend is zeroed.
At worst the bone holders are left owning the new Frontier common and the current one FTR would be delisted.
22 Sep, 10:22 AMReply! Report AbuseLike1
.
rontier: Failing On All Cylinders
Must Read | Sep. 22, 20F15 10:00 AM ET | 28 comments | About: Frontier Communications Corporation (FTR), Includes: T, VZ
Disclosure: I am/we are short FTR. (More...)
COMPLIMENTARY ACCESS
We hope you enjoy this complimentary access to a Seeking Alpha PRO article.
Every market day, we select up to 20 of our authors’ top long and short ideas, exclusively for PRO subscribers.
A subscription to Seeking Alpha PRO includes:
Top Ideas: Daily exclusive access to our best long and short ideas.
Research: In-depth coverage of more than 5200 stocks, many of which have little or no coverage elsewhere.
PRO Idea Filter: Powerful search tools help you find articles based on market cap, sector, and investment style.
Learn more »
Summary
Cost of funding for Verizon acquisition is far greater than initially anticipated.
Risks of the acquisition outweigh potential rewards significantly.
Revenue and cash flow continue to shrink as Frontier loses more customers.
AT&T Connecticut acquisition continues to disappoint.
We remain more bearish on Frontier than ever.
In years of investing, I rarely come across companies which repeatedly make the same mistakes in a predictable fashion. Management mostly learns from their mistakes or are booted out. Unfortunately, Frontier Communications (NASDAQ:FTR) does not belong to that category. After two large failed acquisitions, the third might be the most disastrous yet.
Earlier in the year when the Frontier-Verizon (NYSE
Z) mega deal was first announced, we highlighted the likelihood for disaster given Frontier's dire financial state, falling earnings and cash flows, and the history of value-destroying acquisitions. Since then, the share price has fallen over 37% from nearly $8/share to hovering around $5/share. However, we believe there is more downside potential - as more details emerged on funding, acquisition expenses and the results of ongoing operations, the numbers are even worse than we initially anticipated, which calls for a re-evaluation going forward.Cost Of Capital Far Greater Than Anticipated
Back in February, we showed how the deal would likely lead to significant financial strain and that projections given by management were far too optimistic. Some accused us of making overly pessimistic assumptions regarding the effect of the debt load. However, the figures now show it is even worse than we anticipated.
We initially assumed a weighted cost of debt of 8.66%, which was in line with its debt profile at the time. New funding for the deal has come at a much greater cost at 10.53%. Funding details are outlined below.
(Note: Interest rate for term loan is variable. The figure above is an estimate based on the loan agreement given that Frontier will have a leverage ratio of 3:1. The actual ratio is likely to be higher.)
The deal will cost Frontier almost $923M in fixed interest charges annually, an extremely high cost to pay for purchasing what we could characterize as unattractive, no-growth assets. Furthermore, this figure is significantly higher than our earlier estimate of $858M in annual interest expenses. Also, we have not included the one-time commitment fee and interest rate for the bridge financing loan, which amounts to $132M and $73M, a significant sum considering its already enormous debt load.
In the long term as interest rates normalize, the risk to Frontier's balance sheet is even greater as it would probably need to refinance its debt at much higher rates, leading to greater financial strain.
This results in a far greater financial strain for the company, and the Return On Invested Capital on the acquisition of Verizon assets would have to be greater than 9-10% just for Frontier to break even on the deal due to the massive debt load.
Risks Outweighs Benefit For Purchase of Verizon Assets
Tucked away in the thick prospectus for Frontier's offering of preferred stock is the pro forma results for the assets it is acquiring from Verizon. Abbreviated as VSTO, the assets are making losses when evaluated using GAAP accounting, having made a net loss of $32M last year, despite generating $5.8B in revenue. Whilst it is no surprise that decaying telco assets are making a net loss on a GAAP basis, EBITDA figures themselves are not robust, generating only $1B in 2014 EBITDA. It is no wonder that Verizon was willing to get rid of these wireline assets at short notice.
We delineate our cost-benefit analysis by looking at the best-case scenario and worst-case scenario.
Best-Case Scenario
Given that the Verizon assets are barely breaking even, it seems like management's rationale for the acquisition is to target cost savings, as they've mentioned in the first press release summarizing the deal.
Specifically, the company aims to achieve $525M in cost-savings for the first year after close and reach $700M by year three. Even assuming it manages to achieve these cost savings, the deal is still not accretive for shareholders on an EPS basis as the annual recurring liabilities from funding the deal amounts to nearly $923M, which means VSTO would still experience a net income loss. Furthermore, we have to take into account that Frontier expects to incur $450M in acquisition and integration-related expenses in addition to the interest expenses.
If we evaluate the deal on an EBITDA basis (which would be a closer representation of free cash flow), the acquisition still seems unprofitable. In 2014, VSTO generated an EBITDA of $1B. Assuming cost savings bring EBITDA to approximately $1.5B in 2016, the $450M in non-recurring integration expenses and $923M in recurring interest expenses would almost wipe out this figure in the first year after closing. Thereafter, interest expenses would continue to weigh on FCF, with the high likelihood that Frontier would have to refinance in the future at even higher rates as interest rates normalize. We have yet to include other miscellaneous charges associated with the acquisition.
Therefore, even under the best-case scenario, the deal is unlikely to result in a meaningfully beneficial outcome due to the large interest expenses, costs associated with the acquisition and the simple fact that VSTO is not an attractive group of assets.
Worst-Case Scenario
If management fails to achieve the cost synergies they outlined, it will be worse than a repeat of their 2010 acquisition of Verizon's copper wireline assets, as the debt load has swelled significantly since then. We can expect a large dividend cut due to dropping free cash flows resulting from the billions in interest expenses and fixed charges.
Simply put, unless management delivers wholly on their promise of high-cost synergies, Frontier's finances will become unsustainable without further equity or debt issuance.
Core Business Shrinking
All these concerns are compounded by the fact that Frontier's core assets continue to perform poorly as the loss of voice customers continue to outweigh the gains made in internet subscribers.
As mentioned in our earlier research, Frontier's revenue and cash flows have been decreasing due to the continued loss of voice customers, who still account for over 45% of total revenues. Q2 2015 was no different, with Frontier's legacy operations losing 10% of their legacy voice customers, whilst continuing to shed both residential and business customers at a rate of 3-4% a year.
In essence, problems with the company's core business continue to persist as the loss of revenue from declining voice customers continue to outpace the gains made from new Internet and Data subscribers. Instead of trying to improve and grow the core business, management has seemingly given up on organic growth and is looking to grow through expensive acquisitions instead.
AT&T Connecticut Acquisition Disappointing
What is perhaps more disconcerting is that the newly-acquired AT&T (NYSE:T) assets are not showing any signs of growth, as revenue, profit and the customer base have remained flat over the past few quarters.
Moreover, recall that Frontier paid over $2B to acquire these properties. Thus far, that investment has not yielded any positive returns.
(Note: Pro forma Results Obtained From Senior Notes Prospectus)
The interest expenses are based on the Senior Notes and Term Loan used to fund the acquisition. Tax expenses are calculated based on a 28% tax rate with reference to previous years. As seen above, there was a significant drop in revenue when Frontier took over, suggesting many AT&T customers left immediately following the handover. As seen above, revenue for the first two quarters of 2015 was only $528M, a significant drop from the $680M in the same period in 2014. This is unsurprising considering the barrage of customer complaints during the transition, which involved formal complaints to the Department of Consumer Protection.
Keep in mind that the deal was announced on 17 December 2014, which means management had made the decision based on 2013 pro forma results. They obviously failed to anticipate the slew of customers that would leave and the corresponding drop in revenue and earnings. Hence, what must have seemed like a good deal at the time turned out to be horrendously expensive in the end.
Taking the 2013 pro forma results, Frontier's payment of $2B would have amounted to 5.3x EBIT, a fair deal for wireline assets with no growth. However, if we take results for the current year and stretch it out to a full 12 months, the 'price' would be around 21x 2015 EBIT due to the significant decline in earnings. We have excluded non-recurring expenses from the EBIT calculations as only the main line items are considered. Even if we were to be generous and assume that EBIT for the first quarter was lower due to miscellaneous hiccups, the picture isn't much brighter. Furthermore, the high-interest expenses from the deal make it far less attractive on a bottom-line basis.
Looking at the evidence, the fact is that Frontier managed the transition terribly, losing a large number of Connecticut customers and failing to achieve the cost synergies initially intended. Despite citing its "solid acquisitions record" and $200M in cost synergies" numerous times in its filings, there is almost no evidence to support both claims as operating margins for the 6 months ended June 2015 have remained largely in line with the 2013 pro forma and 2014 results.
Moreover, even if we accept the company's claim that cost synergies had been achieved, the additional integration expenses totalling $172M since 2014 would almost completely offset the benefit thus far. Although one can argue these are non-recurring expenses, they tend to add up over the first few years of Frontier's acquisitions, resulting in a massive strain on cash flow even as they accumulate record amounts of debt.
Broken Promises To Shareholders
In essence, not only did Frontier overpay for the acquisition, it failed to manage the transition as evidenced by the loss of customers and revenue. Furthermore, the asset's growth is flat-lining a year after the acquisition, with little signs of the initially promised cost synergies being achieved.
After promising that the acquisition would be "accretive to free cash flow per share in the first year", free cash flow per share has actually decreased from $0.716/share in Q3 2014 to $0.406/share in the latest quarter on a trailing twelve-month basis. Of course, management is no stranger to unkept promises, as we saw in the disastrous acquisition of Verizon wireline assets in 2010.
Conclusion
With higher-than-anticipated interest expenses, a shrinking core business and the underperformance of recently acquired AT&T assets, we remain more bearish on Frontier than ever. Simply put, its debt load relative to cash flow is unsustainable given that it continues to pay out large dividends every quarter. Management repeatedly makes aggressive assumptions on the profitability of acquisitions, which have not materialized. We anticipate the acquisition of VSTO will follow the same trajectory, with a massive drop in revenue and earnings following the close of the transaction. Overall, buying decaying assets for a seemingly low price is a poor long-term strategy. As such, we remain bearish on Frontier.
About this article Expand
More articles by John Zhang »
Cogent: Premium Valuation Without Premium Profits • PRO • Wed, Sep 23 Outerwall: More Bad News For EcoATM Wed, Sep 23 Outerwall: Undervalued Despite EcoATM Headwinds And Secular Decline Fri, Sep 18 Alliance Resources: Profitable In The Most Dire Conditions • PRO • Thu, Aug 13 How Accounting Rules Helped US Cellular Beat Earnings Expectations • PRO • Tue, Aug 4
FTR articles from SA PRO
Frontier Communications: Bull Case Is Deeply Flawed • PRO • Thu, Jun 11 Frontier's Acquisition Spells Trouble • PRO • Sun, Feb 8 Frontier Communications: Pessimism Is Overdone, Dividend Is Safe, Stock Is Undervalued • PRO • Fri, Sep 20
Latest on FTR
Frontier Communications: Now Is The TimeWed, Sep 16 Frontier up 1.7% as analysts boost price targetsTue, Sep 15 Frontier Communications -3.5% after filing estimating tax impactMon, Sep 14 Frontier prices $6.6B debt offering for Verizon wireline dealFri, Sep 11 Frontier pursuing $6.6B in junk bonds for Verizon wireline dealWed, Sep 9 Frontier Scores Big Time With Smart InvestmentsFri, Sep 4 Frontier Communications +5.6% as Macquarie tags it top telecomThu, Sep 3 FCC approves Frontier's $10.5B purchase of Verizon wirelinesWed, Sep 2 Frontier up 0.9% premarket; Stephens launches at OverweightWed, Aug 19
Comments (28)
Track new comments
delta man
Comments (45)| + Follow | Send Message
Check out this web site
http://bit.ly/1KxQQ2l
It helps one have an understanding of the reason the debt is almost untenable. The new frontier debt was rated bb3. It's a hair away from single b!
Single b is in the 6.5 percent default rate within a few years.
It's hard to imagine paying 10 percent interest on a new 6.5 billion and a dividend as well. At best the dividend is zeroed.
At worst the bone holders are left owning the new Frontier common and the current one FTR would be delisted.
22 Sep, 10:22 AMReply! Report AbuseLike1
.
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Obbligazioni societarie
HIGH YIELD e oltre, verso frontiere inesplorate, vol.3
