Obbligazioni societarie HIGH YIELD e oltre, verso frontiere inesplorate - Vol. 2

[fabriziof]

Ciao ecco, ma bastava cliccare sul link.....


Moody's downgraded Pyxus' CFR to Ca, outlook is stable

17 Apr 2020
New York, April 17, 2020 -- Moody's Investors Service, ("Moody's") downgraded Pyxus International, Inc.'s ("Pyxus ") Corporate Family Rating (CFR) to Ca from Caa2 and its Probability of Default Rating to Ca-PD from Caa2-PD. Moody's downgraded the company's ABL revolving credit Facility to B2 from Ba3.



Additionally, Moody's downgraded the company's first lien notes to Caa2 from B2 and second lien notes to C from Ca. Pyxus' Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating remains at SGL-4. The rating outlook on all ratings was changed to stable from negative.



The downgrade reflects the company's continued weakening liquidity position, delay in refinancing its maturities and with monetizing a portion of its FIGR business (cannabis), proceeds of which were expected to repay debt. Additionally, the global coronavirus outbreak and subsequent disruption to Pyxus' business to obtain and process tobacco leaf has resulted in materially weaker operating performance and significant negative free cash flows, placing additional pressure on its business. Moody's now expects liquidity to be constrained and debt/EBITDA to exceed 15 times, making it increasingly difficult for the company to support its capital structure. Moreover, the downgrade of the first and second lien notes also considers the high potential for a distressed exchange to materially lower recovery.



Moody's downgraded the following ratings:



-Corporate Family Rating to Ca from Caa2;

-Probability of Default Rating to Ca-PD from Caa2-PD;

-Senior Secured Second lien notes due 2021 to C (LGD5) from Ca (LGD5);

-Senior Secured ABL revolving credit facility due 2021 to B2 (LGD2) from Ba3 (LGD2);

-Senior Secured First lien notes due 2021 to Caa2 (LGD2) from B2 (LGD2);

The outlook was changed to stable from negative.



RATINGS RATIONALE



Pyxus' Ca CFR reflects the company's very weak liquidity, challenging operating metrics; very high financial leverage and potential for a debt restructuring. The company operates in a mature and low-margin leaf business that is challenged by the declining volume of cigarette sales. The global outbreak of coronavirus has placed additional pressure on its business. The rating is further constrained by the company's heavy reliance on uncommitted financing, access to which could be impaired as Pyxus' credit quality weakens. The company benefits from its position as one of two major leaf tobacco merchants, its established relationships with key cigarette manufacturers, its global procurement and processing network, and investment in the growing cannabis sector.



The stable outlook reflects that the ratings capture Moody's current expectations for default and recovery.



ESG considerations include high social risks associated with the negative health impact of cigarettes and expansion into cannabis. The company's financial policy reflects high governance risks given its very aggressive financial policy.



FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS



Ratings could be downgraded further if Pyxus liquidity further deteriorates, or if a restructuring provides lower recoveries than currently anticipated.



Given the company's high financial leverage and weak operating performance, an upgrade is not likely in the next year. In order to warrant an upgrade, the company needs to materially improve its operating performance, strengthen its liquidity position, refinance its debt maturities and materially reduce financial leverage.



The rapid and widening spread of the coronavirus outbreak, deteriorating global economic outlook, falling oil prices, and asset price declines are creating a severe and extensive credit shock across many sectors, regions and markets. The combined credit effects of these developments are unprecedented. The protein and agriculture sector has been somewhat affected by the shock given its sensitivity to consumer demand and sentiment. More specifically, the weaknesses in Pyxus' credit profile have left it vulnerable to shifts in market sentiment in these unprecedented operating conditions and Pyxus remains vulnerable to the outbreak continuing to spread. Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under our ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health and safety. Today's action reflects the impact on Pyxus of the breadth and severity of the shock, and the broad deterioration in credit quality it has triggered.



Pyxus, Headquartered in Morrisville, North Carolina, is a leaf tobacco merchant. Its principal products include flue-cured, burley and oriental tobaccos, which are major ingredients in cigarettes. Annual revenue totaled approximate $1.6 billion for the last twelve months ending December 2019.



The principal methodology used in these ratings was Protein and Agriculture published in May 2019 and available at Moodys.com. Alternatively, please see the Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

Grazie io sul link non ho trovato il testo

 

[fedro10]

Grazie io sul link non ho trovato il testo

no problem..

 

[bia06]

Vallourec 2023 da 60 a 44 in 2 giorni (inquiry otc in apertura, ho rinunciato, dunque non so se operativo).

 

[salice02]

è da quando uso il portatile da casa che non mi sia apre la pagina della borsa di Berlino, qualcuno che smanetta meglio di me ha qualche idea del perché.

Capita spesso anche a me... Penso sia un problema del sito...

 

[angy2008]

Vallourec 2023 da 60 a 44 in 2 giorni (inquiry otc in apertura, ho rinunciato, dunque non so se operativo).

a 44 non me le danno

 

[IL MARATONETA]

è da quando uso il portatile da casa che non mi sia apre la pagina della borsa di Berlino, qualcuno che smanetta meglio di me ha qualche idea del perché.

A me va sul computer mentre non si apre dal telefono

 

[matteotosi1985]

Su Tenneco che dite ??

salta ??

 

[frmaoro]

Ora Yahoo fa parte del gruppo Verizon Media
per chi vuole cavalcare il futuro rialzo del petrolio da seguire

 

[Fabrib]

Trump ordering plan to make funds available for oil, gas cos. (Bloomberg)

 

[bia06]

Wolfgang Muenchau on Financial Times

The spread between Italian and German bonds rose last week to around 2 percentage points. Why should that be so? Unlike in 2012, there is no looming threat of a liquidity crisis. The European Central Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme will probably ensure that the Italian government is safe to issue whatever debt it needs this year. Rather, Italy’s problems are of a different nature.

As of the end of last year, Italy’s public sector debt was 136 per cent of gross domestic product. Over the previous decade, it had increased by 30 percentage points. If you assume that what the IMF calls the Great Lockdown leaves Italian GDP 10 per cent lower than in 2019, and if outstanding debt increases by 20 per cent, then its debt-to-GDP ratio balloons to 180 per cent. When debt rises and output falls at the same time, these ratios shoot up fast.

So what should Italy do? I see three courses of action. My expectation for this week’s virtual meeting of EU leaders is a compromise on a restructuring fund. Once the applause fades and people look at the details, they will realise it will have no macroeconomic relevance. This will leave the ECB, once again, as the only EU institution that matters. Its pandemic programme will do the necessary this year.

But what about afterwards? The only available instrument left for the ECB to deploy is former president Mario Draghi’s “outright monetary transactions” — the never-launched programme that will forever be associated with his 2012 promise to “do whatever it takes” to save the eurozone. This would allow the ECB to undertake unlimited purchases of Italian debt, but only if Italy applies to the European Stability Mechanism for an enhanced conditions credit line. This is like an overdraft facility with some mild conditionalities. It is not the facility itself that matters, but its link to an ECB programme.

Yet there does not appear to be a majority in the Italian parliament for ESM support. Nor is it clear that the ECB would agree to trigger OMT. The argument is that it is not intended to address looming insolvency.

Another course is for Italy to default, or seek a debt restructuring. This may be compatible with eurozone membership, but would need ECB involvement as otherwise Italian debt would lose its status. Domestic banks are another priority. As they hold much of Italy’s sovereign debt, default could lead to bank failures. Still, as Irish economist Karl Whelan points out, Italy could “haircut” its bonds and win enough savings to nationalise and save them. Investors would be wiped out but deposits saved.

Finally, there is always the spectre of a eurozone exit. It is not a probable event. But then again, nor was Brexit. As happened in the UK, Italians are beginning to blame the EU for everything that is going wrong. I heard a story of someone blaming the Dutch for the delay in their unemployment payments. This is an absurd accusation, of course. But the Five Star Movement, the senior partner in the ruling coalition, may see an opportunity to revive its flagging political support and play to rising anti-EU sentiment. It is hard to overstate Italy’s dramatic turn to Euroscepticism. It will not go away when lockdown ends.

Emmanuel Macron is right to warn about the unravelling of the EU. I fear, however, that the French president will avoid a long-overdue confrontation with Germany, which remains sceptical about the idea of eurozone bonds. Unless he is willing to get such a bond under way with a smaller group of member states, his threat is cheap talk. If Giuseppe Conte, Italian prime minister, acts in the spirit of his predecessors, he will agree to a foul compromise and discover later that the costs outweigh the benefits. Once that realisation sets in, there will not be many good options left.

When northern Europeans discuss eurobonds or similar instruments, they frame the debate in terms of solidarity and charity or, in the Dutch case, as a gift. They do not see it as risk insurance. There is zero appreciation in Germany, and, I suppose, the Netherlands too, of a potentially catastrophic downside to their financial sectors and their economies were Italy to default.
Yet, default becomes increasingly probable if politics rules out alternatives. If or when that happens, the eurozone will not be ready.