Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti Obbligazioni Brasile e Petrobras

Nuove nubi si addensano sul Brasile, mettendo nuovamente a dura prova la Rousseff.
Per il momento nessun segnale di inversione della crisi economica. Il tutto resta piuttosto scontato.

In questo clima, favorito dalla chiusura di NY, il Brasil 37 accentua la debolezza chiudendo oltreoceano a 97,15 da 97,75.
Siamo intorno ai minimi delle ultime sedute, comunque all'interno di un ampio trading range che va tra 95/100.
 
El Producto Interno Bruto en la mayor economía de América Latina habría caído un 1,2 por ciento en el tercer trimestre frente al período inmediatamente anterior en base desestacionalizada, tras la contracción de 1,9 por ciento de abril-junio, según la mediana de las estimaciones de 33 economistas consultados en el sondeo.


En una base anual, el PIB brasileño habría descendido un 4,1 por ciento en el tercer trimestre, el declive más profundo desde que se comenzaron a registrar los datos en 1996.




Es difícil ver una mejoría, incluso con poderosos lentes binoculares", escribieron en una nota economistas de la consultora MCM . "Es un círculo peligroso, vicioso", agregó. Según los economistas, la producción se habría contraído en todos los sectores de la economía en el tercer trimestre.




Economía brasileña se habría contraído a ritmo récord interanual en tercer trimestre | América Latina | Reuters
 
Petrobras
Federal Government Considering Hybrid Securities

According to Agencia Estado, Federal Government is considering capitalizing
PBR with Hybrid securities aiming to reduce the company's leverage and debt
obligations going forward. According to our preliminary assessment, the hybrid
structure would reduce the company’s future cash requirements as principal would not
be amortized. However, at this point, the lack of details as hybrid size in USD, interest
rates, equity conversion possibilities impair us from saying that this initiative is
negative for the company or even for the shareholders. We consider the adoption of
this solution might mitigate the short-term urgency of implementing other measures
such as fuel price adjustment, asset sale, but in the long run PBR will still need to
work with positive Refining EBITDA margins, reduce its costs and adjust its capex.
Our ballpark estimate indicates that PBR distress situation would require at least
USD40bn taking into consideration the company has to amortize ~USD73bn from
2016-19, of which USD24bn are bonds and USD49bn other debt. The amount will be
booked as “equity”, but won’t be dilutive to shareholders.
 What’s new? Agência Estado is reporting that Fed. Government is Studying
Hybrid Securities to “capitalize” Petrobras. In our view, Federal Government is
aware of PBR’s leverage situation and is working to find a solution to reduce the
company’s debt levels while allowing the company to cope with its future capex
obligations. The news mentions the government is studying the issuance of a hybrid
security (equity and debt), that would be similar to contingent convertibles (Cocos),
which allows the government to capitalize the company without having to issue
shares. Moreover, with the issuance of this “new” hybrid instrument, the state aims
to achieve the same effect of a capitalization by bond issuance reducing the
company’s Net Debt/EBITDA ratios currently at 5.2x. The intention is to adapt the
company to a mechanism that has already been used at other different state-owned
companies like Banco do Brasil and Caixa Economica Federal.
 What are hybrid securities? According to our understanding, a hybrid security
is an instrument that combines the characteristics of debt and equity. The
contingent convertibles are bonds that combine those characteristics and are
convertible to equity given a strike price. In the street there are many types of hybrid
and Coco bonds, but the news does not mention which mechanism the government
would be willing to use in PBR.
 We estimate PBR would need at least USD40bn as “new money”. In our recent
report (here) we had estimated that PBR’s cash needs at ~USD79bn between 2016
and 2019, of which USD6bn and USD16bn in 2016-17 as debt new issuance.
Moreover, bearing in mind the ongoing constraints to access the debt market after
the downgrade to junk status, we believe the USD40bn could not be sufficient for
PBR to cope with its investment program and debt obligations over next years, we
consider that PBR will have to announce additional measures to curb its cash needs
in 2016-19. We once again reiterate that the government seems to be between a rock
and a hard place and a positive pricing policy is likely a quicker way out for the
company
 
Era già uscita qualche gg fa questa news poi smentita, o sbaglio?

E' del 20, se già postata cancello.

Metto questo commento alla trimestrale.


Weak 3Q15; Remain cautious due to execution risks
and macro/political uncertainties



Petrobras reported results on Thursday night and held a conference call on
Friday. Results were weak, as reported EBITDA was down 32%qoq (in
USD terms), impacted by legal contingencies, tax expenses, write-offs and
allowances for impairment of receivables from the electricity sector.
Although unleveraged FCF was positive as the company was able to
monetize WC, we estimate FCF after interest was negative $500 million.
Net debt ended the quarter at $102 billion and net leverage remained high
at 3.9x; in BRL terms, net leverage reached 5.2x. Given the continued cash
burn and no expectations of a meaningful improvement in EBITDA, we
believe leverage is unlikely to decline in the near term absent significant
proceeds from asset sales, combined with an import parity pricing policy.
Management has signaled that asset sales should be the main driver for
deleveraging in the coming year; however, it did not provide many details
on the topic during the conference call. Importantly, the company noted it
may engage in new sale-leaseback transactions and raise secured debt in
order to avoid paying higher interest rates. During the press call,
management also mentioned the possibility of doing liability management
to improve its maturity profile.
We remain cautious on the name given
challenging fundamentals and significant FX exposure, as well as the
difficult macro and political situation in Brazil. While the ~400bp spread to
the sovereign seems high given the strong linkage between the two and the
importance of Petrobras to the government, we believe that there are too
many uncertainties at this point and that direct government support (as
capital injection or guarantees on existing and/or future issuances) appears
unlikely in the near-term given fiscal constraints and political instability.
We have a Neutral recommendation on the Issuer. We are UW the 2024s
and the long-end (as we believe the curve is too flat) and N most of the rest
of the curve. We only have select OWs on the 3% 2019s, FRN 2019s,
5.75% 2020s and 4.875% 2020s, as we believe that they look cheap on a
relative basis to the rest of the curve.
 
El Gobierno federal y las administraciones estatales planean demandar a los dueños del yacimiento de mineral de hierro Samarco por 20.000 millones de reales (unos 5.240 millones de dólares) en daños causados por la rotura de una represa, dijo el viernes la ministra del Ambiente, Izabella Teixeira.


Samarco es un emprendimiento conjunto de las gigantes BHP Billiton Ltd y Vale SA, cuyas acciones cayeron un 5,78 por ciento en la Bolsa de Sao Paulo.




Brasil demandará a BHP y Vale por 5.000 mln dlr ante daños por desastre en represa | América Latina | Reuters
 

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