johnny1982
Forumer storico
comunque IW sono davvero imbarazzanti ...
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate SNS Reeal in diretta: storia di un esproprio - Notizie, informazioni e commenti
cumulate
Forumer storico
risposto
Ilandro
Forumer attivo
Buongiorno forse non tutti sanno del curriculum vitae del Ministro delle Finanze Jeroen, andate sul sito : WWW.MIGLIOVERDE.EU/JEROEN-DIJSSELBLOEM -FALSO-MASTER-ECONOMIA/ leggete e nessuno fà niente per rimouovere questo cancro dalla Società !!!!!!!!!!
angy2008
Forumer storico
da quando hanno scoperto che aveva taroccato il curriculum ha fatto un sacco di carriera perchè non avevano di meglio e nella mafia dei politici questi personaggi fanno sempre comodo
Dandst
Forumer storico
mi sembra che si difese parlando di un errore di traduzione nel CV...
rivoglio i miei soldi!!!!
simoneimola
Forumer attivo
E' arrivato un piccolo aggiornamento dallo studio.
Ormai sono passati anni da quel maledetto giorno, che mi sta ancora in parte condizionando la vita.
Comunque sono lievemente ottimista, ma auguro tutto il male del mondo sia al Ministro delle Finanze Jeroen Dijsselbloem e allo stato Ladro Olandese.
Ormai sono passati anni da quel maledetto giorno, che mi sta ancora in parte condizionando la vita.
Comunque sono lievemente ottimista, ma auguro tutto il male del mondo sia al Ministro delle Finanze Jeroen Dijsselbloem e allo stato Ladro Olandese.
Cosa ti rende ottimista? Se si può sapere
simoneimola
Forumer attivo
Quello che mi rende "lievemente ottimista" è che non pensavo di avere qualche speranza nel procedimento in Olanda, dal momento che i giudici sono olandesi.
Comunque in teoria finito il procedimento in olanda abbiamo anche qualche possibilità alla corte dei diritti europei, ma penso che possa partire solo 4 anni dopo la fine di quello in olanda.
Comunque in teoria finito il procedimento in olanda abbiamo anche qualche possibilità alla corte dei diritti europei, ma penso che possa partire solo 4 anni dopo la fine di quello in olanda.
maxinblack
Forumer storico
Da Forbes In Europe, 2016 Will Be The Year Of Lawsuits
In Europe, 2016 Will Be The Year Of Lawsuits
Frances Coppola ,
CONTRIBUTOR
I write about banking, finance and economics.
Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.
2016 is fast approaching, and with it another phase in the EU’s attempts to make creditors pay for failed banks. The European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (EBRRD) has been law in all EU countries since January 2015, but up till now the bail-in rules have not been fully implemented.
The EBRRD provides bank regulators with four main tools for resolving a failed bank:
During the financial crisis, creditors – and sometimes even shareholders – were made good at taxpayer expense. But these expensive bailouts have left a very sour taste, and no-one has any appetite for them anymore. These days, creditors are expected to pay. Well, some of them, anyway.
In all recent bank failures (apart from Duesseldorfer Hypothekenbank), subordinated debt holders have been bailed in, leaving senior creditors untouched. This sounds straightforward: subordinated debt holders rank junior to senior unsecured bondholders and all depositors, so should expect to lose their investments first in the event of bank insolvency.
However, bailing in subordinated debt holders has proved to be anything but simple. A roll-call of recent bail-ins shows just how difficult it can be:
Police officers and demonstrators face off during a protest called by victims of toxic investments made by former Banco Espirito Santo (BES) now Novo Banco (New Bank) in front of the Novo Bank headquarters in Lisbon on September 9, 2015. (Photo credit: FRANCISCO LEONG/AFP/Getty Images)
But why should a few problems with bail-in of subordinated debt holders spoil a good directive? Undeterred, the EU is pressing ahead with the next phase. From January 2016, senior as well as subordinated creditors will be bailed in in the event of bank insolvency. Bail-in of 8% of total liabilities (plus complete wiping of equity, of course) will be required before state aid can be granted.
The prospect of bailing in senior creditors has filled bank regulators, and even the ECB, with horror. The only country so far to bail in senior creditors was Cyprus in 2013, which imposed a 47.5% haircut on uninsured depositors in Bank of Cyprus. The money lost included the working capital of businesses, the funds of educational institutions and the life savings of Cypriot citizens. The Cypriot economy nosedivedand is only just now beginning to recover.
But that was mild compared to what would happen if deposits in Greek banks were bailed in. The Greek economy is deeply depressed, and large amounts of money have left the country. There isn’t much in the way of senior unsecured debt and uninsured deposits to bail in, and just about all of it is the working capital of Greek businesses. The consequences for the Greek economy of wiping out the working capital of Greek businesses overnight don’t bear thinking about. Understandably, the ECB ruled out depositor bail-in for Greece.
Continued from page 1
This caused a huge problem. To avoid depositor bail-in, the four large Greek banks had to build up their capital buffers – fast. So they did some of the silliest rights issues ever seen, issuing large amounts of shares at deep discounts and causing their stock prices to collapse. The share price of the National Bank of Greece fell so low the NASDAQ suspended trading in its shares. However, all four banks did manage to raise a reasonable amount of capital, though they also needed to tap the 10bn EUR set aside for bank recapitalization in the first phase of the current Greek bailout deal. But they desperately need the asset side of their balance sheets to improve if they are to avoid future bail-ins. Greece had better recover quickly.
Then there are the Italian banks. Italy has a number of small and medium-size banks which are technically insolvent due to desperately high levels of non-performing loans. It has hitherto taken a somewhat relaxed line on their resolution. But now that depositor bail-in is on the horizon, the Bank of Italy has woken up. It has broken up four distressed Italian banks, creating four “bridge banks” and four “bad banks”, and bailed in subordinated debt holders. But true to form, bailing in the subordinated claims has proved anything but simple. In fact – since this is Italy – it is politically toxic. Like the Co-Op and BES, these banks have sold subordinated debt to small retail customers as a higher-yielding alternative to a deposit account. And those customers are hopping mad about it. They were told these were safe investments. Now they are losing their life savings. One man even committed suicide after losing 100k EUR.
Last to declare was the Portuguese bank BANIF. BANIF has been in trouble for years. In 2013/14 it was planning a recapitalization deal with the sovereign wealth fund of Equatorial Guinea, which foundered when the Portuguese MEP, Ana Gomes, pointed out that this is the personal slush fund of one of the most corrupt dictators in the world and the money properly belonged to the people of Equatorial Guinea, most of whom live on less than a dollar a day despite the country’s enormous oil wealth. BANIF never found an alternative source of capital and has been in steady decline ever since. On December 14th it robustly denied media reports that it was about to be forced into resolution. But those reports were in reality well founded. BANIF has been split in two, its good assets have been sold to Banco Santander and – guess what – subordinated creditors have been bailed in. Not that this is anywhere near enough. The Portuguese government has also had to stump up 2.26bn EUR, which for some bizarre reason the EU agreed was acceptable under state aid rules. But the consequences for the fragile ruling Left coalition could be serious: the Communist Party says it will vote against the revision to the 2015 fiscal budget caused by this new bailout.
Today is New Year’s Eve, and the new era is about to dawn. We haven’t yet managed to work out how to bail in subordinated creditors without forests of lawsuits and accusations of stealing from the poor. But already the first senior creditor bail-in has been announced. Earlier this month Novo Banco, which despite being the “good bank” remnant of BES is actually insolvent due to the Bank of Portugal’s abject failure to separate good and toxic assets cleanly in 2014, was given 6 months by European bank regulators to find some more capital. Yesterday, the Bank of Portugal announced thatthe capital would be raised by means of a haircut on senior bondholders.
Let the lawsuits begin.
In Europe, 2016 Will Be The Year Of Lawsuits
Frances Coppola ,
CONTRIBUTOR
I write about banking, finance and economics.
Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.
2016 is fast approaching, and with it another phase in the EU’s attempts to make creditors pay for failed banks. The European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (EBRRD) has been law in all EU countries since January 2015, but up till now the bail-in rules have not been fully implemented.
The EBRRD provides bank regulators with four main tools for resolving a failed bank:
- Sale of the failed bank partly or entirely to another entity
- Creation of a “bridge bank” containing the good assets, which would be sold to another entity or floated as an independent business
- Creation of a “bad bank”, or asset management vehicle, which would be gradually wound down over time (to prevent state aid rules being breached, this tool must be used in conjunction with at least one of the other tools)
- Write-down of creditor claims (or conversion to equity) in order of rank.
During the financial crisis, creditors – and sometimes even shareholders – were made good at taxpayer expense. But these expensive bailouts have left a very sour taste, and no-one has any appetite for them anymore. These days, creditors are expected to pay. Well, some of them, anyway.
In all recent bank failures (apart from Duesseldorfer Hypothekenbank), subordinated debt holders have been bailed in, leaving senior creditors untouched. This sounds straightforward: subordinated debt holders rank junior to senior unsecured bondholders and all depositors, so should expect to lose their investments first in the event of bank insolvency.
However, bailing in subordinated debt holders has proved to be anything but simple. A roll-call of recent bail-ins shows just how difficult it can be:
- In 2013, the UK’s Co-Op Bank attempted to bail in its subordinated debt holders; but the deal failed and the subordinated debt holders took over the bank, to the considerable annoyance of the Co-Op Group (the bank’s owner), which lost the majority of its stake.
- In 2014, Portugal’s Banco Espirito Santo was split in two: subordinated debt holders were left in the residual “bad bank” along with the bank’s impaired assets, while senior and official creditors sailed off into a new entity, the aptly named Novo Banco, along with all the good assets. But the Bank of Portugal now faces lawsuits from disgruntled subordinated debt holders who claim they were never given a chance to provide more capital and rescue the bank themselves, Co-Op Bank style.
- In Austria – and increasingly in Germany too – the tangled web of claims and counterclaims in the Heta mess becomes ever more complex. These days it is not even clear exactly how the claims are ranked. The settlement agreement between Heta and the State of Bavaria in October effectively converted 60% of BayernLB’s subordinated claim into a senior claim, diluting the other senior creditors – many of whom are themselves only “senior” because of deficiency guarantees from the Province of Carinthia, which the Austrian federal government has repeatedly tried (but so far failed) to repudiate.
- In the Netherlands, the government was forced to offer compensation to SNS Reaal subordinated debt holders for its expropriation of their claims.
Police officers and demonstrators face off during a protest called by victims of toxic investments made by former Banco Espirito Santo (BES) now Novo Banco (New Bank) in front of the Novo Bank headquarters in Lisbon on September 9, 2015. (Photo credit: FRANCISCO LEONG/AFP/Getty Images)
But why should a few problems with bail-in of subordinated debt holders spoil a good directive? Undeterred, the EU is pressing ahead with the next phase. From January 2016, senior as well as subordinated creditors will be bailed in in the event of bank insolvency. Bail-in of 8% of total liabilities (plus complete wiping of equity, of course) will be required before state aid can be granted.
The prospect of bailing in senior creditors has filled bank regulators, and even the ECB, with horror. The only country so far to bail in senior creditors was Cyprus in 2013, which imposed a 47.5% haircut on uninsured depositors in Bank of Cyprus. The money lost included the working capital of businesses, the funds of educational institutions and the life savings of Cypriot citizens. The Cypriot economy nosedivedand is only just now beginning to recover.
But that was mild compared to what would happen if deposits in Greek banks were bailed in. The Greek economy is deeply depressed, and large amounts of money have left the country. There isn’t much in the way of senior unsecured debt and uninsured deposits to bail in, and just about all of it is the working capital of Greek businesses. The consequences for the Greek economy of wiping out the working capital of Greek businesses overnight don’t bear thinking about. Understandably, the ECB ruled out depositor bail-in for Greece.
Continued from page 1
This caused a huge problem. To avoid depositor bail-in, the four large Greek banks had to build up their capital buffers – fast. So they did some of the silliest rights issues ever seen, issuing large amounts of shares at deep discounts and causing their stock prices to collapse. The share price of the National Bank of Greece fell so low the NASDAQ suspended trading in its shares. However, all four banks did manage to raise a reasonable amount of capital, though they also needed to tap the 10bn EUR set aside for bank recapitalization in the first phase of the current Greek bailout deal. But they desperately need the asset side of their balance sheets to improve if they are to avoid future bail-ins. Greece had better recover quickly.
Then there are the Italian banks. Italy has a number of small and medium-size banks which are technically insolvent due to desperately high levels of non-performing loans. It has hitherto taken a somewhat relaxed line on their resolution. But now that depositor bail-in is on the horizon, the Bank of Italy has woken up. It has broken up four distressed Italian banks, creating four “bridge banks” and four “bad banks”, and bailed in subordinated debt holders. But true to form, bailing in the subordinated claims has proved anything but simple. In fact – since this is Italy – it is politically toxic. Like the Co-Op and BES, these banks have sold subordinated debt to small retail customers as a higher-yielding alternative to a deposit account. And those customers are hopping mad about it. They were told these were safe investments. Now they are losing their life savings. One man even committed suicide after losing 100k EUR.
Last to declare was the Portuguese bank BANIF. BANIF has been in trouble for years. In 2013/14 it was planning a recapitalization deal with the sovereign wealth fund of Equatorial Guinea, which foundered when the Portuguese MEP, Ana Gomes, pointed out that this is the personal slush fund of one of the most corrupt dictators in the world and the money properly belonged to the people of Equatorial Guinea, most of whom live on less than a dollar a day despite the country’s enormous oil wealth. BANIF never found an alternative source of capital and has been in steady decline ever since. On December 14th it robustly denied media reports that it was about to be forced into resolution. But those reports were in reality well founded. BANIF has been split in two, its good assets have been sold to Banco Santander and – guess what – subordinated creditors have been bailed in. Not that this is anywhere near enough. The Portuguese government has also had to stump up 2.26bn EUR, which for some bizarre reason the EU agreed was acceptable under state aid rules. But the consequences for the fragile ruling Left coalition could be serious: the Communist Party says it will vote against the revision to the 2015 fiscal budget caused by this new bailout.
Today is New Year’s Eve, and the new era is about to dawn. We haven’t yet managed to work out how to bail in subordinated creditors without forests of lawsuits and accusations of stealing from the poor. But already the first senior creditor bail-in has been announced. Earlier this month Novo Banco, which despite being the “good bank” remnant of BES is actually insolvent due to the Bank of Portugal’s abject failure to separate good and toxic assets cleanly in 2014, was given 6 months by European bank regulators to find some more capital. Yesterday, the Bank of Portugal announced thatthe capital would be raised by means of a haircut on senior bondholders.
Let the lawsuits begin.
Ultima modifica:
maxinblack
Forumer storico
Studio legale sulle ipotesi di compensazione di SNS
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstr … sequence=1
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstr … sequence=1