Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 2 (11 lettori)

carib

rerum cognoscere causas
Concordo che tra le sovrane la 34 sembra la migliore, in caso le CAC e le indentures avranno un peso.
Non lo dico io, ma Anna Gelpern..

(Professor of Law
A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Harvard; M.Sc., London School of Economics and Political Science)
 

carib

rerum cognoscere causas
Circa il peso probabile delle CAC, nel caso in oggetto.. gli spreads indicati dal mercato offrono un metro.. anche se impreciso..
 

tommy271

Forumer storico
Henry Ramos Allup


En su mitin de ayer en cadena nacional Maduro ignoró adrede la masacre de El Junquito y asesinato de Oscar Pérez y acompañantes por parte de colectivos paramilitares del 23 de enero con complicidad BAE, CICPC y otros.
 

Esad

Forumer attivo
Concordo che tra le sovrane la 34 sembra la migliore, in caso le CAC e le indentures avranno un peso.
Non lo dico io, ma Anna Gelpern..

(Professor of Law
A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Harvard; M.Sc., London School of Economics and Political Science)

Migliore anche della 27?
 

GiveMeLeverage

& I will remove the world
dato che sono stato abbastanza impegnato su altri books e continuo ad esserlo, qualcuno può cortesemente linkarmi il paper di cui state disquisendo.

Grazie
Non mi ricordo se già postato, il documento ha qualche mese ma lo ritengo molto interessante perché indica una strada semplice per ristrutturare il debito venezuelano (sovereign + PDVSA) evitando il problema hold out.

"We propose that Venezuela restructure both PDVSA debt
and its own external debt via Exchange Offers. To maximize the number of participating
bondholders and receive sufficient debt relief, we suggest that Venezuela primarily utilize the
pari passu clauses in the vast majority of PDVSA and Venezuelan bonds, which have been
modified compared to a typical pari passu clause and can be read to allow the subordination of the bonds according to Venezuelan law. To minimize the number of holdout creditors,
therefore, Venezuela can introduce a law that subordinates non-exchanged debt to exchanged debt, making timely or full payment of holdout debt unlikely."


PPC per bond PDVSA:

“The Notes and the Guaranty will be the unsecured, senior obligations of the Issuer
and the Guarantor and will rank pari passu with all other senior unsecured
obligations of the Issuer and the Guarantor, in each case other than obligations
granted preferential treatment pursuant to the laws of Venezuela
.”


PPC per bond sovereign:

“The Notes constitute Public External Indebtedness of the Republic and (subject
to “Negative Pledge” below) are direct, unconditional, unsecured and general
obligations of the Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu and without any
preference among themselves. The payment obligations of the Republic under
the Notes shall, save for such exceptions as may be provided by applicable
legislation
and subject to “Negative Pledge,” at all times rank at least equally
with all its other payment obligations relating to External Public Debt…


This provision exists in all CAC bonds (the post-2003 bonds). However, non-CAC (pre-2003)
bonds do not contain the exact provision and make no reference to applicable law. Non-CAC
debt stock is comprised of (1) a 1991-issued bond of $1.6 billion;58 (2) a 1997-issued bond of $4 billion and (3) a 1998 issue of $750 million. These bonds contain the following provision that makes no reference to “applicable legislation”:

“The Global Bonds will be direct, unsecured, general and unconditional obligations
of Venezuela. The Global Bonds will rank pari passu, without any preference
among themselves. The payment obligations of Venezuela under the Global Bonds
will at all times rank at least equally with all other payment obligations of
Venezuela relating to External Public Debt.”
 

Allegati

  • SSRN-id3021369.pdf
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