Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 2 (64 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione tommy271
- Data di Inizio
Llukas
Frangar non Flectar
se ne parla di là:
Senadores de EE. UU. piden acotar criptomoneda de Maduro | El Mundo | DW | 19.01.2018
Rubio y Menéndez expresan preocupación por que el petro pueda proveer a Maduro de un mecanismo para hacer pagos a prestadores extranjeros y tenedores de bonos en Estados Unidos, "acciones que claramente frustrarían el objetivo de las sanciones impuestas" por la administración norteamericana.
Senadores de EE. UU. piden acotar criptomoneda de Maduro | El Mundo | DW | 19.01.2018
Rubio y Menéndez expresan preocupación por que el petro pueda proveer a Maduro de un mecanismo para hacer pagos a prestadores extranjeros y tenedores de bonos en Estados Unidos, "acciones que claramente frustrarían el objetivo de las sanciones impuestas" por la administración norteamericana.
sandrino
Forumer storico
Ciao Luca
Vorrei un tuo parere al riguardo
Sono serio niente coglionelle
Ti ringrazio
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
Il testo della lettera di Rubio & Menendez, se può essere utile:
Dear Secretary Mnuchin:
We write to express our concerns regarding Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s purported development of a cryptocurrency for the explicit purpose of evading sanctions levied by the United States.[1] On December 3, 2017, during his weekly radio and TV broadcast, Maduro announced the launch of a cryptocurrency, the “petro,” to be backed by Venezuela’s oil reserves.[2] According to Maduro, the petro “will help defeat the financial blockade.”[3] We have serious doubts about whether Venezuela has the capacity to launch a cryptocurrency, but regardless, it is imperative that the U.S. Treasury Department is equipped with tools and enforcement mechanisms to combat the use of cryptocurrency to evade U.S. sanctions in general, and in this case in particular.
As Venezuela’s people continue to suffer through a years-long economic crisis that has put food, medicine, and basic services out of reach, and thousands continue to protest the failed and brutal policies of the regime, Maduro has shored up financial support for external actors, ignored the humanitarian and political demands of his citizens, and become more belligerent than ever. The United States has responded appropriately, imposing a wide array of targeted sanctions against Venezuelan officials in Maduro’s inner circle. Maduro has proven that he will use every tool at his disposal to perpetuate his authoritarian objectives, including financial lifelines from Russia and China. As such, we are concerned that a cryptocurrency could provide Maduro a mechanism by which to make payments to foreign lenders and bondholders in the United States, actions that would clearly thwart the intent of U.S.-imposed sanctions. Furthermore, Maduro’s actions and any corresponding response from the Department will be closely watched by foreign sovereign states like Russia and North Korea that have expressed interest in either developing their own sovereign-backed cryptocurrencies or exploiting other cryptocurrencies for nefarious purposes. As such, we urge you to closely monitor any developments and to provide information on the Department’s efforts to ensure Venezuela does not utilize a cryptocurrency or other mechanisms to circumvent sanctions. Please provide responses to the following questions no later than January 31, 2018:
(1) Is the Department monitoring Venezuela’s efforts to develop of a cryptocurrency?
(2) Under current authorities, does the Department have the ability to modify existing sanctions to limit the Venezuelan government’s ability to circumvent sanctions using a new sovereign-backed or an existing cryptocurrency?
(3) What tools can the Department use to intercede in the event that Venezuela attempts to utilize a new sovereign-backed or an existing cryptocurrency to make payments to foreign lenders and bondholders in contravention of U.S.-imposed sanctions?
(4) Does the Department have effective enforcement mechanisms to follow and counter the use of cryptocurrencies?
(5) To what extent is the Department monitoring the development of sovereign-backed cryptocurrencies in other countries, including Russia and North Korea?
(6) To what extent is the Department monitoring possible nefarious uses of other cryptocurrencies by Venezuela, Russia, and North Korea?
Sincerely,
Dear Secretary Mnuchin:
We write to express our concerns regarding Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s purported development of a cryptocurrency for the explicit purpose of evading sanctions levied by the United States.[1] On December 3, 2017, during his weekly radio and TV broadcast, Maduro announced the launch of a cryptocurrency, the “petro,” to be backed by Venezuela’s oil reserves.[2] According to Maduro, the petro “will help defeat the financial blockade.”[3] We have serious doubts about whether Venezuela has the capacity to launch a cryptocurrency, but regardless, it is imperative that the U.S. Treasury Department is equipped with tools and enforcement mechanisms to combat the use of cryptocurrency to evade U.S. sanctions in general, and in this case in particular.
As Venezuela’s people continue to suffer through a years-long economic crisis that has put food, medicine, and basic services out of reach, and thousands continue to protest the failed and brutal policies of the regime, Maduro has shored up financial support for external actors, ignored the humanitarian and political demands of his citizens, and become more belligerent than ever. The United States has responded appropriately, imposing a wide array of targeted sanctions against Venezuelan officials in Maduro’s inner circle. Maduro has proven that he will use every tool at his disposal to perpetuate his authoritarian objectives, including financial lifelines from Russia and China. As such, we are concerned that a cryptocurrency could provide Maduro a mechanism by which to make payments to foreign lenders and bondholders in the United States, actions that would clearly thwart the intent of U.S.-imposed sanctions. Furthermore, Maduro’s actions and any corresponding response from the Department will be closely watched by foreign sovereign states like Russia and North Korea that have expressed interest in either developing their own sovereign-backed cryptocurrencies or exploiting other cryptocurrencies for nefarious purposes. As such, we urge you to closely monitor any developments and to provide information on the Department’s efforts to ensure Venezuela does not utilize a cryptocurrency or other mechanisms to circumvent sanctions. Please provide responses to the following questions no later than January 31, 2018:
(1) Is the Department monitoring Venezuela’s efforts to develop of a cryptocurrency?
(2) Under current authorities, does the Department have the ability to modify existing sanctions to limit the Venezuelan government’s ability to circumvent sanctions using a new sovereign-backed or an existing cryptocurrency?
(3) What tools can the Department use to intercede in the event that Venezuela attempts to utilize a new sovereign-backed or an existing cryptocurrency to make payments to foreign lenders and bondholders in contravention of U.S.-imposed sanctions?
(4) Does the Department have effective enforcement mechanisms to follow and counter the use of cryptocurrencies?
(5) To what extent is the Department monitoring the development of sovereign-backed cryptocurrencies in other countries, including Russia and North Korea?
(6) To what extent is the Department monitoring possible nefarious uses of other cryptocurrencies by Venezuela, Russia, and North Korea?
Sincerely,
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
Da notare che i due sono i proponenti delle sanzioni, quindi dovrebbero sapere di cosa stanno parlando...
(a tutta prima pensavo si trattasse di un faux pas, quando dichiarano che l'intento delle sanzioni sarebbe di impedire il pagamento ai bondholder)
(a tutta prima pensavo si trattasse di un faux pas, quando dichiarano che l'intento delle sanzioni sarebbe di impedire il pagamento ai bondholder)
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
leggendo sul sito dell' Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC, OFAC FAQs: Other Sanctions Programs ), a me pare che il pagamento ai bondholder non sia un target delle sanzioni, p.e.:
511. What does OFAC interpret to be debt and equity? Can U.S. financial institutions continue to maintain correspondent accounts and process U.S. dollar-clearing transactions for the entities subject to these sanctions?
The term debt includes bonds, loans, extensions of credit, loan guarantees, letters of credit, drafts, bankers acceptances, discount notes or bills, or commercial paper. The term equity includes stocks, share issuances, depositary receipts, or any other evidence of title or ownership.
The prohibitions in Subsections 1(a)(i) of E.O. 13808 apply to all transactions involving new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days; all financing in support of such new debt; and any dealing in, including provision of services in support of, such new debt.
The prohibitions in Subsections 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13808 apply to all transactions involving new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days or new equity; all financing in support of such new debt or new equity; and any dealing in, including provision of services in support of, such new debt or new equity.
These prohibitions extend to rollover of existing debt, if such rollover results in the creation of new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days (with respect to PdVSA) or longer than 30 days (with respect to the rest of the Government of Venezuela).
Engaging in transactions related to, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in any equity issued by, on behalf of, or for the Government of Venezuela is permissible, if the equity was issued prior to the effective date of E.O. 13808.
Engaging in transactions related to, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in any debt issued by, on behalf of, or for the Government of Venezuela is permissible, if the debt was issued prior to the effective date of E.O. 13808, and, in the case of bonds, either (1) the bonds are included on the List of Authorized Venezuela-Related Bonds referenced in General License 3, or (2) the bonds were issued by U.S. person entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Government of Venezuela (such as CITGO Holding, Inc.). The List of Authorized Venezuela-Related Bonds is available as an appendix to General License 3, and is also available as a stand-alone document on the Venezuela-related Sanctions page of OFAC's website. The list will also be published in the Federal Register, as will any changes to the list.
Despite the above allowances, E.O. 13808 prohibits U.S. persons from purchasing securities of any kind - including debt and equity securities - from the Government of Venezuela. The exception to this prohibition is purchasing securities that qualify as (a) new debt of PdVSA with a maturity of less than or equal to 90 days, or (b) new debt of any other part of the Government of Venezuela with a maturity of less than or equal to 30 days. U.S. persons are authorized to deal with the Government of Venezuela as counterparty to transactions involving securities that fall into either of these two categories. U.S. persons are not authorized to purchase, directly or indirectly, bonds on the List of Authorized Venezuela-Related Bonds from the Government of Venezuela.
U.S. financial institutions may continue to maintain correspondent accounts and process U.S. dollar-clearing transactions for the Government of Venezuela, so long as those activities do not involve engaging in transactions related to, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in transaction types prohibited by E.O. of August 24, 2017. [08-25-2017]
511. What does OFAC interpret to be debt and equity? Can U.S. financial institutions continue to maintain correspondent accounts and process U.S. dollar-clearing transactions for the entities subject to these sanctions?
The term debt includes bonds, loans, extensions of credit, loan guarantees, letters of credit, drafts, bankers acceptances, discount notes or bills, or commercial paper. The term equity includes stocks, share issuances, depositary receipts, or any other evidence of title or ownership.
The prohibitions in Subsections 1(a)(i) of E.O. 13808 apply to all transactions involving new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days; all financing in support of such new debt; and any dealing in, including provision of services in support of, such new debt.
The prohibitions in Subsections 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 13808 apply to all transactions involving new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days or new equity; all financing in support of such new debt or new equity; and any dealing in, including provision of services in support of, such new debt or new equity.
These prohibitions extend to rollover of existing debt, if such rollover results in the creation of new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days (with respect to PdVSA) or longer than 30 days (with respect to the rest of the Government of Venezuela).
Engaging in transactions related to, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in any equity issued by, on behalf of, or for the Government of Venezuela is permissible, if the equity was issued prior to the effective date of E.O. 13808.
Engaging in transactions related to, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in any debt issued by, on behalf of, or for the Government of Venezuela is permissible, if the debt was issued prior to the effective date of E.O. 13808, and, in the case of bonds, either (1) the bonds are included on the List of Authorized Venezuela-Related Bonds referenced in General License 3, or (2) the bonds were issued by U.S. person entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Government of Venezuela (such as CITGO Holding, Inc.). The List of Authorized Venezuela-Related Bonds is available as an appendix to General License 3, and is also available as a stand-alone document on the Venezuela-related Sanctions page of OFAC's website. The list will also be published in the Federal Register, as will any changes to the list.
Despite the above allowances, E.O. 13808 prohibits U.S. persons from purchasing securities of any kind - including debt and equity securities - from the Government of Venezuela. The exception to this prohibition is purchasing securities that qualify as (a) new debt of PdVSA with a maturity of less than or equal to 90 days, or (b) new debt of any other part of the Government of Venezuela with a maturity of less than or equal to 30 days. U.S. persons are authorized to deal with the Government of Venezuela as counterparty to transactions involving securities that fall into either of these two categories. U.S. persons are not authorized to purchase, directly or indirectly, bonds on the List of Authorized Venezuela-Related Bonds from the Government of Venezuela.
U.S. financial institutions may continue to maintain correspondent accounts and process U.S. dollar-clearing transactions for the Government of Venezuela, so long as those activities do not involve engaging in transactions related to, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in transaction types prohibited by E.O. of August 24, 2017. [08-25-2017]
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
512. Why is OFAC imposing sanctions and issuing general licenses specific to bonds and other securities?
The Government of Venezuela is selling assets for much less than they are worth at the expense of the Venezuelan people and using proceeds from these sales to enrich supporters of the regime. Bonds and other securities are among the assets being sold. The prohibitions and related general licenses are meant to prevent U.S. persons from contributing to the Government of Venezuela's corrupt and shortsighted financing schemes while mitigating market disruptions and harm to investors. [08-25-2017]
Quanto abbiamo affermato spesso anche qui.
The Government of Venezuela is selling assets for much less than they are worth at the expense of the Venezuelan people and using proceeds from these sales to enrich supporters of the regime. Bonds and other securities are among the assets being sold. The prohibitions and related general licenses are meant to prevent U.S. persons from contributing to the Government of Venezuela's corrupt and shortsighted financing schemes while mitigating market disruptions and harm to investors. [08-25-2017]
Quanto abbiamo affermato spesso anche qui.
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
Altra conferma:
522. Other than through the existing general licenses, under what circumstances might U.S. persons be authorized to deal in new debt of greater than 30 or 90 days issued by the Government of Venezuela?
In the Lima Declaration of August 8, 2017, twelve countries across the Americas refused to recognize the Constituent Assembly or the laws it adopts because of its illegitimate nature, while at the same time fully backing the democratically elected National Assembly. We stand in solidarity with our friends and allies in the region. If the democratically elected Venezuelan National Assembly approved a new debt issuance by the Government of Venezuela that E.O. 13808 would prohibit U.S. persons from dealing in, the United States would consider using licensing authority to allow U.S. persons to deal in the issuance. [08-25-2017]
522. Other than through the existing general licenses, under what circumstances might U.S. persons be authorized to deal in new debt of greater than 30 or 90 days issued by the Government of Venezuela?
In the Lima Declaration of August 8, 2017, twelve countries across the Americas refused to recognize the Constituent Assembly or the laws it adopts because of its illegitimate nature, while at the same time fully backing the democratically elected National Assembly. We stand in solidarity with our friends and allies in the region. If the democratically elected Venezuelan National Assembly approved a new debt issuance by the Government of Venezuela that E.O. 13808 would prohibit U.S. persons from dealing in, the United States would consider using licensing authority to allow U.S. persons to deal in the issuance. [08-25-2017]
Llukas
Frangar non Flectar
la mia posizione è chiara da tempo, a torto o a ragione: pagamenti fatti e bloccati almeno fino un certo punto. non so se poi hanno continuato a farli visto che glieli bloccavano. ormai le fonti sul blocco sono molteplici: banchiere usa by carib, ceo greylock, lettera rubio e menendez, tutto il governo venezuelano, la banca russa che aveva ricevuto la cedola della 2027 pdvsa, sono quelle che ricordo, di sicuro non le uniche. oltre a questo l'aggravante che nessuno ha accelerato e che Maduro, se volesse defaultare davvero, l'avrebbe già dichiarato. non ha senso aspettare: si accumulano solo interessi per il claim e ormai sono 3 mesi. inoltre: i problemi sono cominciati con la 2027, pagata 15 giorni dopo a settembre, prodromo al caos che ne è seguito. per pagare i rimborsi, i quali sarebbero stati più difficilmente gestibili in ottica di evitare il default, si parlava già a suo tempo di pdvsa che aveva aperto un ufficio in svizzera e che il pagamento fosse passato da gazprom bank addirittura. e poi gli accordi con Crystallex(e 15 giorni dopo non riescono a pagarla, poi il buio informativo), il pagamento al governo brasiliano via FMI... troppi indizi, qualcosa di poco chiaro c'è, inutile negarlo e dire che i chavisti sono tutti coglioni.