Interessante analisi degli effetti di una dollarizzazione "selvaggia" nella sezione commenti di questo articolo:
New Banco Central de Venezuela Website: Trust at Your Own Risk | Caracas Chronicles
Dollarisation is not a dumb idea. It is just not the panacea you seem to think it is. To gain a handle on the economy, several things need to happen. Among the top priorities are (a) elimination of the fiscal deficit and (b) bringing the money supply under control. Dollarisation on its own does neither, but several people here mistakenly think that it automatically solves the second problem. IT DOES NOT. And, if badly managed it could produce total armageddon. It requires FIRST a restoration of BCV autonomy and adherence to constitutionally delegated authorities. Do you trust the new government to do this well?
If the present bunch of criminal defectives were to dollarise, for example, it is easy to imagine a continuation of massive fiscal deficit which the government would have to support via the “borrowing” of non-existent dollars from the BCV, just as today it borrows non-existent bolivares. These non-existent dollars are then transferred to government debtors in Venezuela in electronic payments made by the government. (This is by far the largest source of the current increase in M1 money supply). Very soon, the banks are full of non-existent dollars, backed only by a government promise that they will find the money at some time in the future. People would try to protect themselves by withdrawing cash from the bank if they could. The government would have to restrict such withdrawals (since the recipient bank doesn’t actually have these dollars other than as a promise from the government) to avoid a total banking collapse, so there is no relief from cash shortage. Confidence in “bank dollars” starts to fall at day one when people find they cannot withdraw the dollars they have in the bank. Electronic dollars in the bank start losing their value against the sparse number of cash dollars available on the street. Electronic transfer of dollars from outside Venezuela would dry up completely for obvious reasons – each time you transferred a real dollar from a US bank, it would end up in a Venezuelan bank at a fraction of its former purchasing power. Venezuelan businesses could not afford to export anything unless they received payment in dollars outside Venezuela. Clever buyers of Venezuelan oil would try to “buy” dollars in Venezuelan banks at discount to make payments in dollars to the government. The government would itself have to legislate to discriminate between dollars in Venezuelan banks and dollars outside to prevent it receiving discounted Venezuelan bank dollars in payment. [The exception would be any foreign banks foolish enough to have a retail banking business in Venezuela. They would enforcably become a source of government financing until their reserves were depleted.] Retailers would be forced to differentiate between a cash dollar and a rapidly devaluing “bank dollar”. Result is massive inflation in goods in Venezuela denoted in dollars with corresponding massive discounts for cash payment. Pure chaos. A non-solution, but a rich stew of opportunities for the well-connected.
Dollarisation without restoration of separation of powers, rigorous adherence to delegated constitutional authorities and elimination of the government fiscal deficit solves very little or nothing at all. It certainly is not the magic bullet that some here seem to think it is.