Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 2 (3 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione tommy271
- Data di Inizio
Ventodivino
מגן ולא יראה
Venezuela C/SD/RD
A costly power play
The economy continues to plunge, as hyperinflation
takes hold and oil production falls fast
Venezuela, PDVSA and their bondholders are
paralyzed in a staring contest
May 20 elections are a challenge to Maduro’s hold on
power, but one he has designed to be manageable
Venezuela’s macroeconomic plunge still has no end in
sight. Hyperinflation has been fully unleashed on the
economy, with inflation estimated at over 2,000% by end-
2017 and on track to head toward 10,000% by mid-2018.
Meanwhile, real GDP is estimated to have contracted by a
cumulative 30% in 2013-2017, with another 10% decline
expected this year. Social indicators have plummeted, and
large-scale emigration has ensued.
As for oil output, PDVSA has little ability to reverse what
has become a more precipitous decline of late. OPEC’s
reporting showed a record monthly decline in December for
Venezuela’s crude oil production, which dropped by 216kb/d
(11.8%) m/m to 1,621 kb/d according to Venezuela’s direct
reporting. According to the direct series, Venezuela lost a
staggering 464kb/d of output in 4Q, 649kb/d over the last year
(29% down), and almost a million barrels over a two-year
horizon. As of February, production stood at 1,586 kb/d. We
think the acceleration of output decline since the end of last
year is due to a combination of factors including: the
aforementioned sharply deteriorating macro backdrop and
related departure of workers; the indirect impact of US
sanctions on PDVSA’s financial relationships with services
providers and JV partners; and operational paralysis that
followed a recent top management purge, and the subsequent
steep learning curve of the new military leadership at the
company’s helm. Amid possible new international actions, we
estimate PDVSA could easily lose another 500kb/d of output
this year.
No moratorium, but little-to-no payments. Since last
November 2, when President Maduro went on live TV and
announced that PDVSA would pay, but henceforth “refinance
and a restructure the external debt”, Venezuela/PDVSA and
their respective creditors have been in a state of paralysis.
PDVSA belatedly serviced coupons and amortizations on
bonds falling due (inclusive of grace periods) before last
December, totaling US$2.37bn, but the company is late on
US$730mn of coupons in the four months since. Meanwhile
the Republic is currently past due on US$1.445bn of bond
coupons, having serviced nothing at all since the November
announcement. Even so, bondholders have thus far failed to
accelerate any bonds, in part amid hopes that future coupons
may arrive (clearing agencies have eventually allowed
coupons to flow, and Venezuela has not declared moratorium)
and in part as there is no attractive end game for a
restructuring as long as financial sanctions prevail. In the
meantime, Venezuela has attempted to raise funds in the face
of sanctions by issuing up to US$6bn face value of the
sovereign crypto currency the “Petro”, though there is thus far
little tangible confirmation of any significant sales. End
demand for the “Petro” depends on the ability to convert it
into hard currency, an operation made difficult by explicit US
sanctions—not to mention little contractual evidence that the
oil field “backing” the asset can actually be monetized.
Hopes of a change in direction are tenuously pinned on a
May 20 election that has already been formally rejected by
the opposition MUD. The government effectively kicked
over the negotiation table related to fair electoral conditions
back in January when it insisted on an early voting date
(originally “before April” and now set for May 20; see our
note from January 26 for more background). The MUD united
in its decision not to participate in the vote, with the exception
of former Governor Henri Falcon, an ex-Chavista who was
Capriles’s campaign manager in 2012, but who has always
stood to the left of the core-four MUD parties. Falcon’s
defection was seen by the MUD as a gift to Maduro, as his
presence could lend some semblance of legitimacy to a
process that has already been ex-ante rejected by the
international community, which in the meantime has
continued to apply more sanctions.
Falcon leads, but advantage Maduro. While Falcon is
leading a very unpopular Maduro by around 10%pts in most
opinion polls, many analysts are skeptical of his chances to
actually claim victory, given the lack of organized support
from the MUD, including their infrastructure needed to audit
results and “prove” expected manipulation. Moreover, the
government is perceived to have strong levers of social
control to compel its own base to go out and vote (lest they
risk access to subsidized basic goods or employment).
Falcon’s team has championed a dollarization program that is
attractive to a population that has seen savings and incomes
decimated, and there still may be some actors in the MUD
willing to lend critical support. At the same time, unrest in the
military and a subsequent crackdown by Maduro raises the
prospects for some regime destabilization amid a controversial
electoral event. Nonetheless, for now it seems Maduro has the
situation controlled, and seems willing to accept that strong
international isolation is the price to pay for the consolidation
of his power (and the avoidance of a prohibitive exit costs).
A costly power play
The economy continues to plunge, as hyperinflation
takes hold and oil production falls fast
Venezuela, PDVSA and their bondholders are
paralyzed in a staring contest
May 20 elections are a challenge to Maduro’s hold on
power, but one he has designed to be manageable
Venezuela’s macroeconomic plunge still has no end in
sight. Hyperinflation has been fully unleashed on the
economy, with inflation estimated at over 2,000% by end-
2017 and on track to head toward 10,000% by mid-2018.
Meanwhile, real GDP is estimated to have contracted by a
cumulative 30% in 2013-2017, with another 10% decline
expected this year. Social indicators have plummeted, and
large-scale emigration has ensued.
As for oil output, PDVSA has little ability to reverse what
has become a more precipitous decline of late. OPEC’s
reporting showed a record monthly decline in December for
Venezuela’s crude oil production, which dropped by 216kb/d
(11.8%) m/m to 1,621 kb/d according to Venezuela’s direct
reporting. According to the direct series, Venezuela lost a
staggering 464kb/d of output in 4Q, 649kb/d over the last year
(29% down), and almost a million barrels over a two-year
horizon. As of February, production stood at 1,586 kb/d. We
think the acceleration of output decline since the end of last
year is due to a combination of factors including: the
aforementioned sharply deteriorating macro backdrop and
related departure of workers; the indirect impact of US
sanctions on PDVSA’s financial relationships with services
providers and JV partners; and operational paralysis that
followed a recent top management purge, and the subsequent
steep learning curve of the new military leadership at the
company’s helm. Amid possible new international actions, we
estimate PDVSA could easily lose another 500kb/d of output
this year.
No moratorium, but little-to-no payments. Since last
November 2, when President Maduro went on live TV and
announced that PDVSA would pay, but henceforth “refinance
and a restructure the external debt”, Venezuela/PDVSA and
their respective creditors have been in a state of paralysis.
PDVSA belatedly serviced coupons and amortizations on
bonds falling due (inclusive of grace periods) before last
December, totaling US$2.37bn, but the company is late on
US$730mn of coupons in the four months since. Meanwhile
the Republic is currently past due on US$1.445bn of bond
coupons, having serviced nothing at all since the November
announcement. Even so, bondholders have thus far failed to
accelerate any bonds, in part amid hopes that future coupons
may arrive (clearing agencies have eventually allowed
coupons to flow, and Venezuela has not declared moratorium)
and in part as there is no attractive end game for a
restructuring as long as financial sanctions prevail. In the
meantime, Venezuela has attempted to raise funds in the face
of sanctions by issuing up to US$6bn face value of the
sovereign crypto currency the “Petro”, though there is thus far
little tangible confirmation of any significant sales. End
demand for the “Petro” depends on the ability to convert it
into hard currency, an operation made difficult by explicit US
sanctions—not to mention little contractual evidence that the
oil field “backing” the asset can actually be monetized.
Hopes of a change in direction are tenuously pinned on a
May 20 election that has already been formally rejected by
the opposition MUD. The government effectively kicked
over the negotiation table related to fair electoral conditions
back in January when it insisted on an early voting date
(originally “before April” and now set for May 20; see our
note from January 26 for more background). The MUD united
in its decision not to participate in the vote, with the exception
of former Governor Henri Falcon, an ex-Chavista who was
Capriles’s campaign manager in 2012, but who has always
stood to the left of the core-four MUD parties. Falcon’s
defection was seen by the MUD as a gift to Maduro, as his
presence could lend some semblance of legitimacy to a
process that has already been ex-ante rejected by the
international community, which in the meantime has
continued to apply more sanctions.
Falcon leads, but advantage Maduro. While Falcon is
leading a very unpopular Maduro by around 10%pts in most
opinion polls, many analysts are skeptical of his chances to
actually claim victory, given the lack of organized support
from the MUD, including their infrastructure needed to audit
results and “prove” expected manipulation. Moreover, the
government is perceived to have strong levers of social
control to compel its own base to go out and vote (lest they
risk access to subsidized basic goods or employment).
Falcon’s team has championed a dollarization program that is
attractive to a population that has seen savings and incomes
decimated, and there still may be some actors in the MUD
willing to lend critical support. At the same time, unrest in the
military and a subsequent crackdown by Maduro raises the
prospects for some regime destabilization amid a controversial
electoral event. Nonetheless, for now it seems Maduro has the
situation controlled, and seems willing to accept that strong
international isolation is the price to pay for the consolidation
of his power (and the avoidance of a prohibitive exit costs).
carib
rerum cognoscere causas
Victor Fu | Stifel Nicolaus & Co Inc
Director | EM Sovereign Desk Strategy
* VENZ and PdVSA bonds have retreated over the past weeks on lower expectations for a Falcón victory though his economic plan appears convincing
* We see an immediate upside of 10-15 points if Falcón wins (<30% chance) and downside of 5-8 points if he loses (>70%) and thus an expected value of around -1 point
* We favor VENZ 31s over 34s, VENZ 23s over 25s, VENZ 23s/28s over 38s, PdVSA 35s over 21s, and PdVSA 24s/26s over 37s
Director | EM Sovereign Desk Strategy
* VENZ and PdVSA bonds have retreated over the past weeks on lower expectations for a Falcón victory though his economic plan appears convincing
* We see an immediate upside of 10-15 points if Falcón wins (<30% chance) and downside of 5-8 points if he loses (>70%) and thus an expected value of around -1 point
* We favor VENZ 31s over 34s, VENZ 23s over 25s, VENZ 23s/28s over 38s, PdVSA 35s over 21s, and PdVSA 24s/26s over 37s
Miqui
Forumer attivo
mi sembra più sensato
sandrino
Forumer storico
sandrino
Forumer storico
Ma proprio perché non si capisce, sarei curioso -e non sono ironico- di ascoltare le tue idee al riguardo.
alderan74
Forumer attivo
sto meditando..cosa farebbe maduro se vincesse?non si puo' insabbiare in venezuela..dovrebbe trovare un modo per pagare una volta ripresa la sedia..pero' come scrive l'articolo postato da carib sono cosi i prezzi perche' ci si aspetta vinca falcon..non mi convincono le percentuali..i detentori di bond si fidano di una elezione venezuelana per tutelare i loro diritti?magari tu pensi che non ci pagherebbe piu'..e' una delle tante brutte possibilita'..speriamo che non sia cosi..bisognerebbe trovare elementi in piu' al riguardo..
Ultima modifica:
carib
rerum cognoscere causas
il mercato non "si aspetta" affatto che vinca Falcon, ma non esclude questo scenario, in caso i militari cambino posizione.
Maduro che resta al potere= piu' inflazione e meno petrolio. Problema irrisolto.