As for oil output, PDVSA has little ability to revert what has become precipitous decline. OPEC’s reporting showed Venezuela lost a staggering 464kb/d of output in 4Q17, 649kb/d down over the last year (29% down), and almost a million barrels over a two-year horizon. As of April, production stood at 1.5mbd. The acceleration of output decline is due to a combination of factors including: the aforementioned sharply deteriorating macro backdrop and related departure of workers; the indirect impact of US sanctions on PDVSA’s financial relationships with services providers and JV partners; operational paralysis that followed a recent top management purge; and the subsequent steep learning curve of the new military leadership at the companies helm. Since April, Operational woes have been compounded by Conoco’s pursuit of a US$2bn arbitration award, leading to attachments in key facilities in the Dutch Caribbean. A judgment in the US may not be far behind. The difference between Conoco’s claim and other (stalled) awards is that the former is against PDVSA, not the Republic (which has alterego and sovereign immunity defenses). All told, we estimate PDVSA could easily lose another 500kb/d of output this year. Bond default (mostly) continues. The Republic owes considerably more bonded debt service in 2018 ($5.4bn) than PDVSA ($2.9bn). With this in mind, the default on Republic bonds seems definitive, but PDVSA’s commercial activities abroad are exposed to Conoco-style litigation. Thus, PDVSA’s bonds may selectively be kept current depending on litigation risks. As of now, only the $107mn payment of Citgo-collateralized PDVSA 2020s has been made on time this year (clearing agencies also released a delayed coupon payment on PDVSA ’22Ns).