marcob77
Moderator
Il punto è..quanto bisognerà attendere??
Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 2 (5 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione tommy271
- Data di Inizio
sandrino
Forumer storico
Per Elecar credo proprio non ci siano margini. Certo è che tra 10 e 0 non vedo grosse differenze, magari succede il miracolo.
Keller Zabel
Il denaro non è la realtà, sembra ma non lo è.
Supponiamo che mercoledì i Soberanos vanno in default, a quel punto vanno tutti in default o si continuerà a pagare pdvsa20?
alderan74
Forumer attivo
prova a fare una telefonata a maduro e glielo chiedi?ehi amico quando paghi?quest'anno o aspettiamo ?
Ventodivino
מגן ולא יראה
http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/...en-bogota-nombrar-un-presidente-en-el-exilio/
Junior,
cosa ne pensi ?
Ovviamente i toni usati sono quelli del correo del orinoco (la artilleria del piensamento) , giornale fondato da Chavez...
Junior,
cosa ne pensi ?
Ovviamente i toni usati sono quelli del correo del orinoco (la artilleria del piensamento) , giornale fondato da Chavez...
vitoandolini
Forumer attivo
Vabbè, ma in sto forum nessuno ha una cugina a Caracas a cui chiederlo?
carib
rerum cognoscere causas
Barclays:
Given the negative outlook for oil production, the government’s focus on reforms has shifted toward remittances as a source of hard currency; however, they are clearly insufficient to compensate for the oil production decline. Remittances have increased rapidly and could amount to c.USD2bn this year, but this represents about USD0.18 per inhabitant per day, far below the poverty line of USD2 per day. They would have to multiply by more than 10 to reach levels similar to those in economies such as El Salvador, where remittances help sustain consumption to a great extent. There would at least be a timing mismatch. Venezuela’s oil production could fall from the current 1.4mn b/d to as low as 500k b/d within the next year, and reaching the nearly USD20bn in remittances that would be necessary to compensate for that decline would take years, if it happened at all. That amount would approach what Mexico receives from more than 12 million migrants (equivalent to 40% of Venezuela’s population) located in a high income country such as the US. Venezuela’s new migrant flow is going mainly to South American countries with much lower income per capita and increasingly precarious conditions, which limits the ability to send money back home, at least in the short term.
The acceleration of the economic crisis deepens the erosion of the support base of the government and increases the risk of a fracture. Maduro is aware of this risk and focused his reelection campaign on asking for a vote of confidence and promising to address the economic crisis. However, he seems unable to deliver on his promise and recently accepted responsibility for the crisis.[1] Therefore, although the absence of institutional rules creates a high level of uncertainty and there are no precise milestones in the transition that Venezuela is experiencing, three main factors could provide a catalyst for change: the declining effectiveness of containment mechanisms, the deterioration of the relationship with allies, and the increase in internal frictions . The shape that the transition might take and who might lead the process will depend on the different stakeholders’ ability to coordinate over the coming months. Given the difficulty that the different actors, in both the opposition and the government, have had in organizing, the transition could turn more disorderly, driven more by economic and social dynamics than by political leadership, but a consolidation of the Maduro government still appears challenging.
Given the negative outlook for oil production, the government’s focus on reforms has shifted toward remittances as a source of hard currency; however, they are clearly insufficient to compensate for the oil production decline. Remittances have increased rapidly and could amount to c.USD2bn this year, but this represents about USD0.18 per inhabitant per day, far below the poverty line of USD2 per day. They would have to multiply by more than 10 to reach levels similar to those in economies such as El Salvador, where remittances help sustain consumption to a great extent. There would at least be a timing mismatch. Venezuela’s oil production could fall from the current 1.4mn b/d to as low as 500k b/d within the next year, and reaching the nearly USD20bn in remittances that would be necessary to compensate for that decline would take years, if it happened at all. That amount would approach what Mexico receives from more than 12 million migrants (equivalent to 40% of Venezuela’s population) located in a high income country such as the US. Venezuela’s new migrant flow is going mainly to South American countries with much lower income per capita and increasingly precarious conditions, which limits the ability to send money back home, at least in the short term.
The acceleration of the economic crisis deepens the erosion of the support base of the government and increases the risk of a fracture. Maduro is aware of this risk and focused his reelection campaign on asking for a vote of confidence and promising to address the economic crisis. However, he seems unable to deliver on his promise and recently accepted responsibility for the crisis.[1] Therefore, although the absence of institutional rules creates a high level of uncertainty and there are no precise milestones in the transition that Venezuela is experiencing, three main factors could provide a catalyst for change: the declining effectiveness of containment mechanisms, the deterioration of the relationship with allies, and the increase in internal frictions . The shape that the transition might take and who might lead the process will depend on the different stakeholders’ ability to coordinate over the coming months. Given the difficulty that the different actors, in both the opposition and the government, have had in organizing, the transition could turn more disorderly, driven more by economic and social dynamics than by political leadership, but a consolidation of the Maduro government still appears challenging.
Jsvmax79
Forumer storico
Economista descartó que prospere demanda contra Venezuela por default
Ricardo Serrano
hace 1 min
Ante la inquietud del mercado financiero internacional si los acreedores toman acciones legales contra el Gobierno y PDVSA por su declarado “default parcial” por parte de la Asociación Internacional de Swaps y Derivados, cabe la posibilidad de que, en realidad, Venezuela no sea demandada y se no activen los seguros por impagos. Esto se da en el marco del escenario de una demanda contra Venezuela por default de su deuda externa.
Y es que en opinión del economista Ramiro Molina, “los cupones soberanos están rezagados en la gestión de pago y es posible que se encuentren en tránsito”, argumentó en una entrevista televisiva.
Explica que la deuda externa de Venezuela “no tiene las características de un default debido a que los pagos están en curso, es decir, en proceso para que los fondos se hagan efectivos en las cuentas corrientes de los más de 400 acreedores que han financiado al Gobierno de Nicolás Maduro en los últimos años.
Asimismo, asevera que los tenedores de bonos tendrían que demostrar que el Gobierno y PDVSA no han cancelado y que el pago no existe en sus cuentas. Asegura que eso “les daría oportunidad de maniobra”. Hasta ahora, los acreedores no han confirmado más pagos por parte del gobierno venezolano.
hace 1 min
Ante la inquietud del mercado financiero internacional si los acreedores toman acciones legales contra el Gobierno y PDVSA por su declarado “default parcial” por parte de la Asociación Internacional de Swaps y Derivados, cabe la posibilidad de que, en realidad, Venezuela no sea demandada y se no activen los seguros por impagos. Esto se da en el marco del escenario de una demanda contra Venezuela por default de su deuda externa.
Y es que en opinión del economista Ramiro Molina, “los cupones soberanos están rezagados en la gestión de pago y es posible que se encuentren en tránsito”, argumentó en una entrevista televisiva.
Explica que la deuda externa de Venezuela “no tiene las características de un default debido a que los pagos están en curso, es decir, en proceso para que los fondos se hagan efectivos en las cuentas corrientes de los más de 400 acreedores que han financiado al Gobierno de Nicolás Maduro en los últimos años.
Asimismo, asevera que los tenedores de bonos tendrían que demostrar que el Gobierno y PDVSA no han cancelado y que el pago no existe en sus cuentas. Asegura que eso “les daría oportunidad de maniobra”. Hasta ahora, los acreedores no han confirmado más pagos por parte del gobierno venezolano.