Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 2

Putin y Maduro podrían tener reunión en Rusia

Reuters



Rusia y Venezuela están trabajando en una posible reunión entre los presidentes Vladimir Putin y Nicolás Maduro en Rusia, dijo el lunes el portavoz del Kremlin, Dmitry Peskov.

“La posibilidad de una visita (de Maduro) se está trabajando, así como la posibilidad de contactos entre ambos presidentes”, dijo Peskov durante una conferencia.
 
Arreaza intervendrá este lunes en Asamblea General de la ONU

EFE

Este lunes será intervendrá el ministro para Relaciones Exteriores, Jorge Arreaza, ante la Asamblea General de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) en su 72 período de sesiones, que se realiza en Nueva York, Estados Unidos (EEUU).

El Canciller venezolano ha denunciado durante su estancia en Nueva York la aplicación de medidas coercitivas unilaterales por parte de las potencias y de otros Estados contra los países soberanos, situación que quebranta el derecho internacional, informó la Agencia Venezolana de Noticias.

En la intervención ante el organismo mundial, Arreaza tendrá la oportunidad de mostrar al mundo la ilegalidad de las sanciones económicas del gobierno de Estados Unidos contra Venezuela, calificadas por el diplomático como violatorias de los principios establecidos en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.
 
A tan solo 38 días de su vencimiento, el precio del bono PDVSA 17N ha seguido subiendo. El mercado parece cada vez más seguro de su pago

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Aunque el bono sigue relativamente bajo considerando el tiempo que le queda para madurar, ya se ubica en niveles más normales que antes

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THE RESTRUCTURING RACE

As legal scholars debate the finer points of a potential Venezuelan restructuring, we take a step back and consider the broader economic debates underlying this discussion




In recent weeks, two prominent sets of attorneys have published research papers outlining their suggested approaches for dealing with Venezuela’s debt. Both of them lay out legal strategies for restructuring Venezuela and PDVSA’s bond obligations while protecting the country’s revenue-generating activities from bondholder actions in case of a default. Lee Buchheit and Mitu Gulati (henceforth BG), respectively from Cleary Gottlieb and Duke University, center on a novel interpretation of the indentures on PDVSA’s bonds, while Mark Walker and Richard Cooper (henceforth WC), respectively from Millstein & Co. and Cleary Gottlieb, suggest reforming Venezuelan bankruptcy law and invoking Chapter 15 of the US bankruptcy code1. Perhaps the most interesting take-away from reading both of these papers is that both sets of authors recognize that a Venezuelan debt restructuring will be very difficult, and that the country will face challenges that are essentially unprecedented in the world of sovereign debt restructuring. WC assert that “no other patient in the sovereign restructuring ward has presented an array of symptoms as challenging as Venezuela,” while BG quip that restructuring Venezuela’s public-sector debt would be a larger undertaking than Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812. Both sets of authors start out from the premise that a debt restructuring is inevitable. Walker and Cooper rely heavily on ongoing (and not publicly available) work by Ricardo Hausmann and co-authors at Harvard’s Center for International Development to argue that the debt stock is unsustainable2. Buchheit and Gulati go into less details yet posit that by the time that the country tries to address its economic problems, its liquidity position and market access will be so limited that a restructuring will be inevitable3.


1 “How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt”, Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, July 27, 2017. “Venezuela's Restructuring: A Realistic Framework”, Mark A. Walker & Richard J. Cooper, September 19, 2017.



2 Venezuela . The fiscal policy paper of this project is not currently publicly available.



3 This argument is laid out at the outset of their paper, particularly in pp. 1-3.
 
THE DEVIL IN THE ECONOMIC DETAILS

Much of the assessment of the sustainability of Venezuela’s debt stock hinges on estimating sustainability metrics that are at the very least subject to a large degree of uncertainty, especially given the high level of opacity in government figures. In our estimate (see Venezuela Red Book, 3Q2017), the country’s external public sector debt external debt will reach $143bn as of the end of 2017. In contrast, WC cite a much larger number of $196bn, taken from Hausmann and co-authors.

At least some of the difference between these figures appears to refer to the treatment of domestic liabilities. We follow the IMF External Debt definition in classifying local bond holdings as internal rather than external debt, whereas Hausmann and co-authors appear to treat all foreign-currency denominated bonds – even those in the hands of the public sector – as external debt. Similarly, they appear to include authorizations to purchase foreign exchange under the currency controls system as external debt, despite the fact that the legal status of these as liabilities is unclear according to Venezuelan jurisprudence (and that they should in any case be classified as internal debt).4

But perhaps a more fundamental issue refers to the level of GDP that should be used for the purposes of debt sustainability analysis. Current GDP – which we estimate at $121bn, similar to the figure given by Hausmann – could be very far from even from the short-run equilibrium under a different policy regime. This is because the lack of international financial market access forces Venezuela to run a current accounts surplus, bringing down imports and thus dollar GDP.5 This phenomenon should be quickly reverted if the economy enacts policy reforms, reestablishes market access and begins running a current account deficit. In fact, it is difficult to imagine a regime change with enactment of policy reforms that would not be followed by a rapid appreciation of the average real exchange rate across all transactions (including parallel market) – if anything because the demand for dollars in the parallel market should decline immediately, which should lead to an immediate increase in GDP measured in US dollars. The bottom line is that a debt-to-GDP ratio calculated at the current level of GDP may be a good measure of the economy’s sustainability under the Maduro administration but a very poor guide to debt sustainability under a new administration committed to undertaking economic reforms.
 
STOCKS, FLOWS, AND THE VENEZUELAN PARADOX

But there is a deeper issue in using comparative metrics to evaluate the weight of Venezuela’s debt, which is the need to define whether we want to take a balance-sheet perspective or a flows perspective. Venezuela’s ratio of debt service to exports is definitively among the highest in the world, which indicates that the country cannot produce enough revenue flow to continue servicing its debt and at the same time maintain essential levels of imports (Table 1). On the other hand, if we look at the ratio of PDVSA’s financial debt to oil reserves, we find that it is among the lowest of major oil companies (Table 2). In other words, the data appears to be telling us that the country does not have enough revenues to service its debt, but that the value of its assets far exceeds its liabilities.

Our interpretation of this apparent paradox is that it essentially tells us that Venezuela is a poorly run country rather than an insolvent one. The country faces difficulties servicing its debts mainly as a result of the fact that it is unable to use its assets in order to generate enough revenue so as to pay for its debts. One can therefore make the argument that the energies of a new administration should be focused on increasing the productivity of its assets rather than reducing the country’s expenditures (debt service). Of course, it would be great to be able to both increase productivity and reduce expenditures at once, and if it were possible to do the latter costlessly, then the decision would be obvious. This is where the assessment of the relative costs and benefits of a decision to restructure the country’s bonds is needed.



4 Since the source of these figures is an unpublished paper, our aim is not to provide a comprehensive comparison or critique, but rather to point out that methodological differences can have a significant effect on the conclusion one reaches regarding the magnitude and sustainability of the debt stock.



5 There is evidence of a very strong correlation between imports and GDP in the Venezuelan economy, reflective of its nature as an economy that is specialized in natural resources and where real exchange rate variations bring little response in terms of increased production of tradables.






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