Obbligazioni societarie Bonds Air Berlin Eur/Chf DE000AB100B4 XS1051719786 XS1051723895
- Creatore Discussione gionmorg
- Data di Inizio
kirk01
Forumer attivo
Quando potremmo avere qualche notizia certa se noi possessori dei bond avremo un rimborso oppure no?
domanda alla quale nessuno può rispondere oggi
070162
Bond..... solo BOND
Ragà... perdonate la mia ignoranza... ma io veramente non capisco una cosa...
quando qualcuno fallisce la procedura fallimentare prevede che i beni residuali vengano venduti per soddisfare le pretese dei creditori...
ebbeno un po a questa parte sto assistendo a vicende che stanno demolendo questa mia semplice e granitica convinzione...
ma come è possibile che la parte buona venga venduta a terzi e gli obbligazionisti rimangono all'asciutto...
qualcuno può gentilmente spiegare ?
quando qualcuno fallisce la procedura fallimentare prevede che i beni residuali vengano venduti per soddisfare le pretese dei creditori...
ebbeno un po a questa parte sto assistendo a vicende che stanno demolendo questa mia semplice e granitica convinzione...
ma come è possibile che la parte buona venga venduta a terzi e gli obbligazionisti rimangono all'asciutto...
qualcuno può gentilmente spiegare ?
Magician
Forumer attivo
Ciao, la vera scommessa è purtroppo sulla scomparsa di un concorrente.
Ad inizio anno era uscito da parte di qualche Commissione Europea uno studio sulla concentrazione dei vettori in Europa, affermando che attualmente vi fossero un'abbondanza di compagnie, con una non chiara strategia industriale (low cost - regionali - lunga percorrenza) e si auspicava una razionalizzazione mediante accordi/fusioni .
AirBerlin ha sempre avuto il problema che il suo reale azionista di riferimento per legge non poteva esserlo di fatto.
Ethiad non poteva avere il controllo perchè altrimenti la compagnia non aveva la possibilità ed i vantaggi di considerarsi europea, ma per anni ha dovuto ripianare le perdite.
In aggiunta negli ultimi due anni si è assistito ad una continua battaglia con le Autorità tedesche ogni qual volta (semestrale) era da stilare un nuovo calendario voli, dal momento che venivano negati i co-sharing.
A questo punto il Mercato vede gli Arabi fuori, tutti gli altri a spartirsi i clienti di AirBerlin e un fortunato ( forse Lufthansa) a prendersi ciò che resta se "costa poco" o dopo il fallimento.)
Di AirBerlin purtroppo scarso interesse se non per i lavoratori, che avranno i loro ammortizzatori sociali.
Per parlare della Etihad, adesso ce la presione anche sulle due obbligazioni della EA Partners (dove AirBerlin ha 18.8%), che hanno perso 5% - 8%:
Earlier today Air Berlin filed for insolvency proceedings after main shareholder Etihad Airways had withdrawn its financial support.
The discount carrier and its subsidiaries submitted the filing in a local Berlin court, though it won’t seek bankruptcy protection for its Niki Luftfahrt GmbH and Leisure Cargo GmbH units, Air Berlin said in a statement. Talks with Deutsche Lufthansa AG and other parties regarding disposals are continuing, the carrier said. The German government announced to provide a EUR 150mm bridge loan to maintain flight operations for another three months.
Outstanding Air Berlin bonds are heavily under pressure and should only be considered for investors experienced in trading distressed bonds. We therefore focus our assessment on the outstanding EA Partners (EAPART) senior bonds:
Security
EAP Ref.
ISIN
EAPART 6⅞ 20$
EAP I
XS1293573397
EAPART 6¾ 21$
EAP II
XS1423779187
Both bonds are collateralized debt obligations backed by a claim on seven Etihad owned or partially owned airlines including Air Berlin as follows:
- EAPART Structure -
Use of proceeds
EAP I
EAP II
Etihad Airways
18.8%
17.8%
EAS Catering/ground/cargo
16.2%
19.8%
Alitalia
18.8%
19.9%
Air Berlin PLC
18.8%
19.9%
Jet Airway
16.2%
not included
Air Serbia
8.1%
12.6%
Air Seychelles
3.1%
10.0%
Total
100.0%
100.0%
The market is currently in price finding mode and trading is all over the place. Bonds are wrapped around 85/90 on a very indicative basis. Where exactly these should be will depend on whether Etihad continues to support the EAPART structure. In the aftermath of the Alitalia bankruptcy in March 2017, it had become apparent that Etihad had provided a guarantee in November 2016 for Alitalia portion of the principal in EAPART I & II, with the excess cash in the EAPART structure being used to largely cover the Alitalia portion of the coupon. While the market initially sold off, bonds quickly recovered once the Etihad statement hit the tapes.
The market will be hoping Etihad has done or will do the same for Air Berlin, but the continued support of Etihad for its equity partners will be tested with Air Berlin contributing around USD 231mm to the EAP I and EAP II structures. Furthermore, the liquidity reserve pool is already stretched by the coupon payments of the Allitalia portion (only the principal repayment had been assumed by Etihad). That being said, the liquidity reserve pool only covers another 2-3 coupon payments according to JP Morgan. Hence, the market expects a statement from Etihad regarding the liquidity pool and regarding the decision whether or not to guarantee the Air Berlin debt part of the EAPART structure.
There is a strong moral hazard argument in favor of continued support for the EAPART structure by Etihad even with the second airline defaulting. The additional cost of guaranteeing the Air Berlin principal comes at USD 231mm in a worst case scenario (assuming a recovery rate of zero). This cost has to be weighed against the USD 25+bn that Abu Dhabi Government Related Entities (GREs) have taken on from domestic and international bond investors primarily on the assumption of support from either the government or one of the GREs. It looks like Etihad support was factored into the relatively tight pricing of EAP I and EAP II. If Etihad decided not to assume support for the Air Berlin part of the debt, an adverse effect on other GRE related debt (with most having mediocre stand-alone credit profiles without government support) is very likely. We would further expect an impact on the future capability of refinancing for Abu Dhabi GREs which may by far offset the one-time cost of guaranteeing the Air Berlin debt part in the EAPART structure.
That being said, there is potential value in the structure at mid to high 80s but the outcome is highly binary. Potential investors should take into account the effect on the principal as well as on future coupon payments. A positive statement by Etihad will trigger an immediate buying opportunity as it will underline the ongoing support of Etihad for its equity partners. Under such a scenario bonds should trade around 200bps wide to Etihad’s UNITYL Sukuk 3.86 11/30/21s USD (XS1525419617). Those bonds are unchanged on the day, trading around 102.25/102.75 (3.30%/3.16%) at 135bps over 5yr treasury. Adding 200bps for EAP I and EAP II resulted in a theoretical target price of 105 for both bonds in a best case scenario while the downside, all else equal, should be somehow limited at low 80s, taking into account the principal and the coupon effect.
Issuer Name
Ticker
Cpn
Maturity
Ask Price
Yld to Worst(Ask)
ISIN
Curr
OAS Spread (Ask)
Min Piece
EA Partners I BV
EAPART
6.875
28.09.2020
90.42
10.52
XS1293573397
USD
913.79
200'000.00
EA Partners II BV
EAPART
6.75
01.06.2021
90.46
9.79
XS1423779187
USD
829.81
200'000.00
Sources: JP Morgan, Seaport, Bloomberg
_____________________________________________________
Earlier today Air Berlin filed for insolvency proceedings after main shareholder Etihad Airways had withdrawn its financial support.
The discount carrier and its subsidiaries submitted the filing in a local Berlin court, though it won’t seek bankruptcy protection for its Niki Luftfahrt GmbH and Leisure Cargo GmbH units, Air Berlin said in a statement. Talks with Deutsche Lufthansa AG and other parties regarding disposals are continuing, the carrier said. The German government announced to provide a EUR 150mm bridge loan to maintain flight operations for another three months.
Outstanding Air Berlin bonds are heavily under pressure and should only be considered for investors experienced in trading distressed bonds. We therefore focus our assessment on the outstanding EA Partners (EAPART) senior bonds:
Security
EAP Ref.
ISIN
EAPART 6⅞ 20$
EAP I
XS1293573397
EAPART 6¾ 21$
EAP II
XS1423779187
Both bonds are collateralized debt obligations backed by a claim on seven Etihad owned or partially owned airlines including Air Berlin as follows:
- EAPART Structure -
Use of proceeds
EAP I
EAP II
Etihad Airways
18.8%
17.8%
EAS Catering/ground/cargo
16.2%
19.8%
Alitalia
18.8%
19.9%
Air Berlin PLC
18.8%
19.9%
Jet Airway
16.2%
not included
Air Serbia
8.1%
12.6%
Air Seychelles
3.1%
10.0%
Total
100.0%
100.0%
The market is currently in price finding mode and trading is all over the place. Bonds are wrapped around 85/90 on a very indicative basis. Where exactly these should be will depend on whether Etihad continues to support the EAPART structure. In the aftermath of the Alitalia bankruptcy in March 2017, it had become apparent that Etihad had provided a guarantee in November 2016 for Alitalia portion of the principal in EAPART I & II, with the excess cash in the EAPART structure being used to largely cover the Alitalia portion of the coupon. While the market initially sold off, bonds quickly recovered once the Etihad statement hit the tapes.
The market will be hoping Etihad has done or will do the same for Air Berlin, but the continued support of Etihad for its equity partners will be tested with Air Berlin contributing around USD 231mm to the EAP I and EAP II structures. Furthermore, the liquidity reserve pool is already stretched by the coupon payments of the Allitalia portion (only the principal repayment had been assumed by Etihad). That being said, the liquidity reserve pool only covers another 2-3 coupon payments according to JP Morgan. Hence, the market expects a statement from Etihad regarding the liquidity pool and regarding the decision whether or not to guarantee the Air Berlin debt part of the EAPART structure.
There is a strong moral hazard argument in favor of continued support for the EAPART structure by Etihad even with the second airline defaulting. The additional cost of guaranteeing the Air Berlin principal comes at USD 231mm in a worst case scenario (assuming a recovery rate of zero). This cost has to be weighed against the USD 25+bn that Abu Dhabi Government Related Entities (GREs) have taken on from domestic and international bond investors primarily on the assumption of support from either the government or one of the GREs. It looks like Etihad support was factored into the relatively tight pricing of EAP I and EAP II. If Etihad decided not to assume support for the Air Berlin part of the debt, an adverse effect on other GRE related debt (with most having mediocre stand-alone credit profiles without government support) is very likely. We would further expect an impact on the future capability of refinancing for Abu Dhabi GREs which may by far offset the one-time cost of guaranteeing the Air Berlin debt part in the EAPART structure.
That being said, there is potential value in the structure at mid to high 80s but the outcome is highly binary. Potential investors should take into account the effect on the principal as well as on future coupon payments. A positive statement by Etihad will trigger an immediate buying opportunity as it will underline the ongoing support of Etihad for its equity partners. Under such a scenario bonds should trade around 200bps wide to Etihad’s UNITYL Sukuk 3.86 11/30/21s USD (XS1525419617). Those bonds are unchanged on the day, trading around 102.25/102.75 (3.30%/3.16%) at 135bps over 5yr treasury. Adding 200bps for EAP I and EAP II resulted in a theoretical target price of 105 for both bonds in a best case scenario while the downside, all else equal, should be somehow limited at low 80s, taking into account the principal and the coupon effect.
Issuer Name
Ticker
Cpn
Maturity
Ask Price
Yld to Worst(Ask)
ISIN
Curr
OAS Spread (Ask)
Min Piece
EA Partners I BV
EAPART
6.875
28.09.2020
90.42
10.52
XS1293573397
USD
913.79
200'000.00
EA Partners II BV
EAPART
6.75
01.06.2021
90.46
9.79
XS1423779187
USD
829.81
200'000.00
Sources: JP Morgan, Seaport, Bloomberg
_____________________________________________________
iguanito
Forumer storico
La procedura alla quale ti riferisci tu è la liquidazione dei beni della società conseguente al fallimento che però resta ad oggi come extrema ratio. prima di questa le normative nazionali prevedono tutta una serie di altre procedure concorsuali (non è questa la sede per illustrare il discorso in profondità, ovviamente) che sono volte all'obiettivo di tentare di risanare l'azienda proteggendone, nei limiti del possibile, dipendenti e creditori. A questo aggiungi che quando l'azienda in crisi è di particolare rilevanza vengono create leggi ad hoc.
Per farti una idea puoi leggere la cronistoria di Alitalia.
Sentenza
Forumer storico
certo non vi fate mancare niente,in pieno ferragosto avete anche airberlin seconda compagnia tedesca ,andata a gambe all"aria
comprte BFP sempre sicuri o altrimenti spendeteli per le vacanze ne giovera il pil
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