Bund e TBond: trichechi sulla Maginot VM 180 anni

[Fleursdumal]

stava andando , dovevo barbonare cribbio

 

[masgui]

stava andando , dovevo barbonare cribbio

merdina de merdis...pensare che mi sono ciucciato al ribasso tutta la prima gamba sul dax con un contrattone future da 25 euros a sticks...(la gambona oggi è stata discretamente prevedibile) poi anticipando la seconda mi sono mangiato la metà del gain in microstop da 5 tick.
vedere il book del dax in quei momenti ti fa capire perchè tanta gente si rovina con il trading.
........... poi la seconda è arrivata quando incazziato ho spento il pc.

 

[Fleursdumal]

partita l'ultima mezz'ora una W sul 15 accennata con sbocco 1348 pivot centrale e chiusura ieri

 

[Fleursdumal]

merdina de merdis...pensare che mi sono ciucciato al ribasso tutta la prima gamba sul dax con un contrattone future da 25 euros a sticks...(la gambona oggi è stata discretamente prevedibile) poi anticipando la seconda mi sono mangiato la metà del gain in microstop da 5 tick.
vedere il book del dax in quei momenti ti fa capire perchè tanta gente si rovina con il trading.

già, selezione naturale

 

[f4f]

Thank God it's Friday.
I tassi 2-5 sono tornati su dopo la prcsazione del Tricheco, scontano molto meno un tagli dei tassi....
F4f e anklejoint in vantaggio per ora.

Buon week a tutti.

in vantaggio ????

magari

 

[f4f]

già, selezione naturale

cinically correct

 

[f4f]

La lex column del FT minimizza oggi

SocGen and tumbling markets

Published: January 25 2008 09:30 | Last updated: January 25 2008 15:59

There are two central questions to the case of Jérôme Kerviel and Société Générale. What was the precise nature of his position? And was it responsible for the sharp decline in European equities between January 21 and 23?

The best assessment is as follows. Mr Kerviel’s supposed job was to arbitrage small discrepancies between equity derivatives and cash equity prices. However, starting on January 7 Mr Kerviel made a series of bets that Germany’s Dax index, the French Cac40, and the Euro Stoxx 50 would rise. He bought futures contracts, as normal, but did not hedge against market falls. (Hedging would usually involve selling the underlying shares, or over-the-counter derivative contracts with clients.)

Eleven days later, on Friday January 18, internal controls finally spotted suspicious activity. By then the Euro Stoxx 50 had fallen by 7 per cent, and the position had generated, SocGen says, a loss of between €1.5bn and €2bn. This implies Mr Kerviel had taken a notional long exposure of €21-€29bn. The margin payments this position generated might have been over €1bn. This may sound too big to avoid detection, but may have appeared normal given the desk’s legitimate activity of very high volume and low risk trades.

On Monday, a shaken SocGen began to liquidate the position over three days. Did it move the market? Over the period the total value of trading in index futures and the cash market for the Euro Stoxx 50, was €514bn. That suggests the unwinding of Mr Kerviel’s rogue position accounted for 5 per cent or less of activity. Clearly a a determined seller does not go unnoticed by traders in a jittery market. But it seems likely that the main explanation for the market rout in Europe was earlier sharp declines in Asia, general concerns over the US economy and specific worries about the monoline insurance crisis. One man severely damaged SocGen, but it seems unlikely that he significantly moved global equity markets.


però in un'altra sezione c'è qualcosa di più pittoresco

The Great Kerviel Conspiracy

Welcome to the premier resource on the world wide internet for all stuff relating to Societe General’s dodgy alleged €5bn rogue trader fraud.

We want to keep it up to date as much as possible, so you can help us!

Bienvenue à la principale ressource sur l’Internet du monde entier pour toutes les choses relatives à la Société générale de la prétendue dodgy 5 Md € voyous commerçant fraude.

Nous voulons le garder à jour autant que possible, de sorte que vous pouvez nous aider!

STUFF TO BE SUSPICIOUS ABOUT

Why was it first a “two year cover up” and later, according to the FT, simply a case that Jerome Kerviel built up his losses over a short period?

And what about margin calls?? Answer that!

Why did SocGen people first say a compliance official had first discovered a fake trade after calling a supposed counterparty - and then later the bank said the discovery followed a tip-off?

Wasn’t George Soros in some sort of insider dealing scandal involving SocGen?

Didn’t SocGen bankroll Saddam Hussein through the “Super Gun” affair?

Didn’t something similar to this happen last summer? From Reuters:

The U.S. Federal Reserve cut its discount rate, or the rate at which it lends directly to banks, in August, soon after BNP Paribas, another French bank, spooked investors worldwide by freezing 1.6 billion euros worth of funds due to problems in the U.S. subprime mortgage sector.

Traders speculated that this time round, the travails at SocGen had played a similar catalytic role in the Fed’s move.

POSSIBLE ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS WE POSE

American Goy blogger on that Reuters theory:

This whole article is all bullshit of course, but it’s nice to see Reuters joining the nutty conspiracy freaks community. A measly couple billion euroes triggered the American and worldwide stock market run and US recession?

Please…
I guess the war in Iraq costing $195 million per day had nothing to do with it all…

Greg Newton and a friend from Goldman may well have cracked it:

It confirms my theory about how this was possible. I was talking about it this evening with a friend who works in equity derivatives at Goldman Sachs and all lines of inquiry ended with the conclusion that there are a lot of morons working at SocGen. (Not exactly breaking news that bit).

Conspiracy Planet, a top source for conspiracy theorists, has the FACTS on the Iraqi link:

(Gerald) Bull’s deal with Iraq had been bankrolled by Societe Generale, the banking arm of the Societe Generale de Belgique, a holding company of the Belgian royal family which owns 40% of the country’s industry.

Shadowparty has a relevant timeline on the Soros connection.

OTHER GOOD STUFF AND RUBBISH

Paul Kedrosky, has some excellent information about how an article in the International Herald Tribune was mysteriously changed between last Friday and then on Sunday. Bank of France Governor Christian Noyer had been quoted saying the French central bank was closely scrutinizing the balance sheets of banks like SocGen - but then SocGen’s name mysteriously disappeared.

Bets on what really happened here? A conspiracy theorist might argue that Noyer actually knew Friday about SocGen’s troubles, and let slip the SocGen info by accident to the IHT. It wouldn’t be the first time that regulators had market-moving information, only to handle it clumsily.

From the Abovetopsecret forum, which isn’t top secret:

Good God. How does one even let this happen??? And a major bankat that. Makes me question the safety of banks right now…what with the general recession atmosphere around the U.S. and all. Anyways, here is the article. Discuss. Speculate as to how you can NOT KNOW that you’ve been had out of 7 Billion Dollars. I mean, come on..this didn’t happen overnight I’m sure. How could someone not have noticed this over time?

molto interessante
grazie

 

[Fleursdumal]

Good week a tout les bondaroles

cari vi raggiungo lunedì ocio che starò fuori una settimana il bernakka taglierà di 2 punti

sciaoooo

 

[gipa69]

Good week a tout les bondaroles

cari vi raggiungo lunedì ocio che starò fuori una settimana il bernakka taglierà di 2 punti

sciaoooo

azzzz....... volatilità pazzesca e forse i peggiori timori di Dario in azione...

Bks Need $143B If Insur Ratings Fall
If bond insurers are downgraded a lot, banks will need as
much as $143 billion in fresh capital to absorb the impact,
Barclays Capital estimated.
Citigroup Inc., Merrill Lynch, Bank of America and
Wachovia are among U.S. banks most exposed to bond insur-ers,
or “monolines” as they’re also known, Barclays Capital
said in a note to investors.
In Europe, Credit Agricole , Dexia and Societe Generale are
among the most exposed, the firm added.
The consequences of bond insurer weakness are so severe
that regulators and banks in the U.S. have strong incentives to
pump more capital into the sector to avoid downgrades,
Barclays Capital analyst Paul Fenner-Leitao wrote in the note.
“Meetings between regulators and U.S. banks are at an
early stage; few concrete details about the structure of a bank-led
re-capitalisation are known,” the analyst said.

 

[gipa69]

su molti siti finanziari e da parti di molti analisti il fine settimana è stato dedicato a studiare se il bottom e reverse realizzato questa settimana può essere il segnale della fine della discesa o se questo è solo un bottom intermedio sulla strada del bear market.

Per le condizioni di estremo raggiunto sia come sentiment che come internal le condizioni sono per un bottom muktiweek di una certa importanza.
Le similirità tecniche sembrerebbero confermarlo.. più difficile dire se questo bottom sarà seguito da un nuovo pesante affondo ribassista oppure no anche se la maggior parte dei bottom si è spesso sviluppato con la realizzazione di un secondo minimo anche più profondo in termini di prezzo ma meno in termini di internals e spesso anche volumi, la mancanza di questo wecondo affondo nell'arco di 4/12 settimane rende il rimabzl omagari più lungo in termini di tempo ma con minori probabilità di successo nel lungo periodo.