Derivati USA: CME-CBOT-NYMEX-ICE BUND, TBOND and the middle of the guado (VM 69)

cmq a vedere come stanno trattando i plenipotenziari zinesi gli europei e oggi gli italici altro che guerre commerciali con loro da questa parte dell'ovest
 
uno sguardo al passato con un simpatico grafo

Deflationary periods in US history

Posted by Cardiff Garcia on Oct 06 20:06. A chart from the St Louis Fed:

And what it shows:
The vertical lines on the chart mark the approximate dates of the 1890, 1893, 1907, and early-1930s financial crises. These crises led to bank failures and a reduced money supply as depositors withdrew money, preferring to hold cash. The severe contractions and deflationary episodes that followed these crises have shaped the U.S. perception of deflation. Inflation, output, and (as noted) the money supply fell during or shortly after each crisis. The international experience has been similar; deflation is often associated with poor output growth and high unemployment.
We suspect that Japan in the 1990s also has a little something to do with the US perception of deflation.
As we’ve already covered, research from the IMF has shown that in the last forty years, the experiences of developed economies have been somewhat different: it’s been more common for large and persistent output gaps to produce disinflation without quite falling into deflation. But Japan was a rather glaring exception, and not all of the downturns in the study came after financial crises.
The St Louis Fed warns that even disinflation that threatens to become deflation can have similar effects as unexpected deflationary shocks:
In particular, unexpected deflation can cause the same sort of effects as lower-than-expected inflation, which causes businesses to pay higher real wages for workers and borrowers to repay more (in inflation-adjusted terms) than they intended. As a result, businesses may economize on workers and borrow less, which tends to depress output and employment.
Expected deflation, however, can affect the economy too—through the real interest rate (defined roughly as the nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate). Nominal interest rates cannot be negative because people would rather hold cash than lend at negative rates. The real cost of borrowing, however, can be positive even if the nominal interest rate is zero. For example, if prices fall by 2 percent per year, loans must be paid in dollars that have appreciated 2 percent in value. A floor on the real cost of borrowing can make consumers and businesses reluctant to invest and, consequently, reduce economic activity.
It probably shouldn’t surprise, then, to learn that one Fed president has publicly come out in favour of price level targeting while another has floated the idea.
Thus far, Fed chair Ben Bernanke has resisted such calls, most recently in his speech at Jackson Hole, where he said that this would be more appropriate for outright deflationary periods. But he also said: “I see no support for this option on the FOMC.”
He may want to look again.
 
Questo fa il paio con il P&F, c'è anche un conteggio elliottiano abbastanza preciso (omesso al chart)
sarà la febbre ?:barella::barella:
 

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