Derivati USA: CME-CBOT-NYMEX-ICE BUND, TBOND and the middle of the guado (VM 69)
- Creatore Discussione masgui
- Data di Inizio
shabib
Forumer storico
naturalemte
se fossi furbo e avessi letto il GipaZ prima di scrivere quando sopra,
sarei stato meno braggart
ma idea non la cambio
amico mio , tu dici bene che il re $ e' nudo , e da quello che ho postato e scritto in passato puoi vedere che sono d'accordo con te , ma adesso il $ ha delle chances mooolto piu' grandi e sopratutto sa bluffare bene...
f4f
翠鸟科
amico mio , tu dici bene che il re $ e' nudo , e da quello che ho postato e scritto in passato puoi vedere che sono d'accordo con te , ma adesso il $ ha delle chances mooolto piu' grandi e sopratutto sa bluffare bene...
ma la BCE non si è ancora messa a stampare ....
se cominciamo noi a far QE, ....
shabib
Forumer storico
se non fosse per la germania che vuole proteggere il valore del suo euro-marco , il QE penso che gia' lo attuavamo in europa.....del resto il marco-euro si adatta perfettamente alle necessita' della germania ,i problemi sono per gli altri...non credo che all'interno deli USA , fra l'altro , ci siano discrepanze del 10% tra l'inflazione interna dei vari stati o il valore di bonds statali...poi sai , qui tutti stanno facendo i conti senza leggere i libri di storia....tu forse intendi che voglio dire...
f4f
翠鸟科
se non fosse per la germania che vuole proteggere il valore del suo euro-marco , il QE penso che gia' lo attuavamo in europa.....del resto il marco-euro si adatta perfettamente alle necessita' della germania ,i problemi sono per gli altri...non credo che all'interno deli USA , fra l'altro , ci siano discrepanze del 10% tra l'inflazione interna dei vari stati o il valore di bonds statali...poi sai , qui tutti stanno facendo i conti senza leggere i libri di storia....tu forse intendi che voglio dire...
actually non capisco, ma oggi è giorno di fuoco, troppi hasini ( mercato a parte)
in USA le banche falliscono come nocciole e alcuni stati sono già falliti o quasi, california in primis
il QE non lo facciamo solo perchè, per adesso, ne possiamo fare a meno
se comincia la spagna a dar segni di scricchiolio, son le banche tedesche a rischiare di svalutare gli asset.... altro che Italia
Fleursdumal
फूल की बुराई
beh dopo lo sprofondo iniziale di stamattina i btp si son ripresi, vediamo se è stato raggiunto il climax
shabib purtroppo i crukki sono al centro dell'europa e quindi volente e nolente un progetto di costruzione di europa unita non può prescindere da loro
perchè se ci mettiamo a leggere i libri alura li eviteremmo come la peste
cmq anche io sempre stato un convinto euroentusiasta sto compiendo un percorso di ripensamento , sarà anche l'influenza albionica
il nostro posto è nel mediterraneo
e da qui ripartiremo, prima o poi 
quando ci libereremo dalle catene
shabib purtroppo i crukki sono al centro dell'europa e quindi volente e nolente un progetto di costruzione di europa unita non può prescindere da loro
perchè se ci mettiamo a leggere i libri alura li eviteremmo come la peste
cmq anche io sempre stato un convinto euroentusiasta sto compiendo un percorso di ripensamento , sarà anche l'influenza albionica
il nostro posto è nel mediterraneo
e da qui ripartiremo, prima o poi quando ci libereremo dalle catene
Fleursdumal
फूल की बुराई
lo stanno chiamando il Merkel's crash li mortè
BNP Paribas agrees, it’s the Merkel crash
Posted by Izabella Kaminska on Nov 30 11:15. It was first highlighted by economist Paul de Grauwe.
But, dare we say, the so-called ‘Merkel crash’ is quickly becoming analyst consensus for what really triggered this latest European debt rout.
As BNP Paribas points out on Tuesday:
Vorsprung durch mechanismen.
li mortèBNP Paribas agrees, it’s the Merkel crash
Posted by Izabella Kaminska on Nov 30 11:15. It was first highlighted by economist Paul de Grauwe.
But, dare we say, the so-called ‘Merkel crash’ is quickly becoming analyst consensus for what really triggered this latest European debt rout.
As BNP Paribas points out on Tuesday:
Yesterday did see EMU spreads widening further despite the release of a credible Irish rescue package. The reason for continued peripheral selling pressure may be related to the funding needs of banks as highlighted in the stability report of the BoP. It was last Tuesday when Germany showed a blueprint for the further regulation of the private bond market. Germany aims introducing this law in 2011 and would like to harmonise this law EU wide. The blue print suggested that next to creditors and debtors it would be the regulator to decide if and when there would be hair cuts or maturity lengthening on outstanding bonds announced. Hence, last Tuesday set the starting point for bank CDS’s moving sharply up as markets assumed that bonds which such kind of clause (regulator deciding) would be difficult to sell. Spanish banks will have come to the capital market in the first half of 2011 and will have to issue more bonds than the Spanish sovereign. The stability report of the BoP highlighting this problematic will keep investors concerned and the EUR offered.
And thus the European Stability Mechanism is transforms ever more officially into the European Instability Mechanism (EIM), alternatively to be known as Merkel’s Crash Mechanism (MCM).
Vorsprung durch mechanismen.
FreeWind69
...armonia
beh dopo lo sprofondo iniziale di stamattina i btp si son ripresi, vediamo se è stato raggiunto il climax
shabib purtroppo i crukki sono al centro dell'europa e quindi volente e nolente un progetto di costruzione di europa unita non può prescindere da loro
perchè se ci mettiamo a leggere i libri alura li eviteremmo come la peste
cmq anche io sempre stato un convinto euroentusiasta sto compiendo un percorso di ripensamento , sarà anche l'influenza albionica
il nostro posto è nel mediterraneo
quando ci libereremo dalle catene
...concordo in pieno
...curioso che chi venga definito come "non politico" per eccellenza da opposizioni ed alleati ...si sia dimostrato in questi anni per lungimiranza come uno dei migliori che abbiamo mai avuto al governo ...è innegabile che si sia speso molto in quella direzione conseguendo diversi successi
...immagino in pochi saranno in accordo con le mie parole ...è semplice pragmatismo ...l'ideologia è un male tremendo e porta a convincimenti assai errati
feliceanima
Forumer attivo
LISBONA
Fleursdumal
फूल की बुराई
l'epitaffio di ambrosio per l'irlanda
Ireland's Debt Servitude
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard Economics Last updated: November 30th, 2010
36 Comments Comment on this article
Irish anger over the bailout and austerity package building
Stripped to its essentials, the €85bn package imposed on Ireland by the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank is a bail-out for improvident British, German, Dutch, and Belgian bankers and creditors.
The Irish taxpayers carry the full burden, and deplete what remains of their reserve pension fund to cover a quarter of the cost.
This arrangement – I am not going to grace it with the term deal – was announced in Brussels before the elected Taoiseach of Ireland had been able to tell his own people what their fate would be.
The Taoiseach said afterwards that Brussels had squelched any idea of haircuts for senior bondholders: a lack of “political and institutional” support in his polite words: or “they hit the roof”, according to leaks.
One can see why the EU authorities reacted so vehemently. Such a move at this delicate juncture would have set off an even more dramatic chain reaction in the EMU debt markets than the one we are already seeing.
It is harder to justify why the Irish should pay the entire price for upholding the European banking system, and why they should accept ruinous terms.
I might add that if it is really true that a haircut on the senior debt of Anglo Irish, et al, would bring down the entire financial edifice of Europe, then how did any of these European banks pass their stress tests this summer, and how did the EU authorities ever let the matter reach this point? Brussels cannot have it both ways.
Ireland did not run large fiscal deficits or violate the Maastricht Treaty in the boom years. It ran a fiscal surplus, (as did Spain) and reduced its public debt to near zero. German finance minister Wolfgang Schauble keeps missing this basic point, but then we don’t want to disturb a comfortable – and convenient – German prejudice.
Patrick Honohan, the World Bank veteran brought in to clean house at the Irish Central Bank, wrote the definitive paper on the causes of this disaster from his perch at Trinity College Dublin in early 2009.
Entitled “What Went Wrong In Ireland?”, it recounts how the genuine tiger economy lost its way after the launch of the euro, and because of the euro.
“Real interest rates from 1998 to 2007 averaged -1pc [compared with plus 7pc in the early 1990s],” he said.
A (positive) interest shock of this magnitude in a vibrant fast-growing economy was bound to stoke a massive credit and property bubble.
“Eurozone membership certainly contributed to the property boom, and to the deteriorating drift in wage competitiveness. To be sure, all of these imbalances and misalignments could have happened outside EMU, but the policy antennae had not been retuned in Ireland. Warning signs were muted. Lacking these prompts, Irish policy-makers neglected the basics of public finance.”
“Lengthy success lulled policy makers into a false sense of security. Captured by hubris, they neglected to ensure the basics, allowing a rogue bank’s reckless expansionism,” he wrote.
Let me add that the ECB ran a monetary policy that was too loose even for the eurozone as a whole, holding rates at 2pc until well into the credit boom and allowing the M3 money supply to expand at 11pc (against a 4.5pc target). The ECB breached its own inflation ceiling every month for a decade. It did this to help Germany through its mini-slump, and in doing so poured petrol on the bonfire of the PIGS. So please, NO MORE HYPOCRISY FROM BERLIN.
The truth is that the EMU venture is one of shared culpability. Yes, the Irish should have regulated their banks properly and restricted mortgages to a loan-to-value ratio of 80pc, 70pc, or 60pc, forcing it down as low as needed – as Hong Kong and Singapore do – to stop idiotic bubbles.
But almost nobody understood the implications of monetary union: in Dublin, in Berlin, in Brussels, and Frankfurt. They were almost all beguiled, (though I doubt that the ECB’s Axel Weber and Jurgen Stark ever were).
Given this, why should the Irish people accept the current terms? As Citigroup said in a note today, the EU part of the package will come at around 7pc — higher than the fee paid by Greece. This is pena
By 2014, interest payments on Ireland’s public debt (then 120pc of GDP) will be €10bn, while tax revenues will be €36bn. This ratio is well above the average default trigger of 22pc, as calculated in a Moody’s study.
Nominal Irish GNP has contracted by 26pc since the peak. It is nominal, not real, that matters for debt dynamics.
Ireland is in a classic debt-deflation trap , as described by Irving Fisher in his 1933 Economica paper.
Yes, it has a very vibrant export sector, and can perhaps claw its way out of the trap – which Greece and Portugal cannot hope to do in time, in my view. In a way that makes the choice even harder.
The question is, should the Dail vote against the austerity budget on December 7, Pearl Harbour Day. And should the next government – with Sinn Fein in the coalition? – tell the EU to go to Hell, do an Iceland, wash its hands of the banks, and carry out a unilateral default on senior debt by refusing to extend the guarantee?
The risks are huge, but then the provocations are also huge. And there is a score to settle. Did the EU not disregard the Irish `No’ to Lisbon, just as it disregarded the first Irish `No’ to Nice? Did it not trample all over Irish democracy?
It is not for a British newspaper to suggest which course to take. Both outcomes are ghastly, but as one Irish reader wrote to me: if Eamon De Valera could defy world opinion in 1945 by sending condolences to Germany for the death of the Fuhrer, today’s leaders need not worry too much about scandalizing those who made them swallow Lisbon.
Compliance is traumatic. Default is traumatic. What the Irish have before them is a political choice about what they wish to be as a people, and a nation.
Let me finish with a few words by Dan O’Brien, the Economics Editor of the Irish Times, that caught my eye.
“Nothing quite symbolised this State’s loss of sovereignty than the press conference at which the ECB man spoke along with two IMF men and a European Commission official. It was held in the Government press centre beneath the Taoiseach’s office. I am a xenophile and cosmopolitan by nature, but to see foreign technocrats take over the very heart of the apparatus of this State to tell the media how the State will be run into the foreseeable future caused a sickening feeling in the pit of my stomach.”
My sympathies.
Ireland's Debt Servitude
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard Economics Last updated: November 30th, 2010
36 Comments Comment on this article
Stripped to its essentials, the €85bn package imposed on Ireland by the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank is a bail-out for improvident British, German, Dutch, and Belgian bankers and creditors.
The Irish taxpayers carry the full burden, and deplete what remains of their reserve pension fund to cover a quarter of the cost.
This arrangement – I am not going to grace it with the term deal – was announced in Brussels before the elected Taoiseach of Ireland had been able to tell his own people what their fate would be.
The Taoiseach said afterwards that Brussels had squelched any idea of haircuts for senior bondholders: a lack of “political and institutional” support in his polite words: or “they hit the roof”, according to leaks.
One can see why the EU authorities reacted so vehemently. Such a move at this delicate juncture would have set off an even more dramatic chain reaction in the EMU debt markets than the one we are already seeing.
It is harder to justify why the Irish should pay the entire price for upholding the European banking system, and why they should accept ruinous terms.
I might add that if it is really true that a haircut on the senior debt of Anglo Irish, et al, would bring down the entire financial edifice of Europe, then how did any of these European banks pass their stress tests this summer, and how did the EU authorities ever let the matter reach this point? Brussels cannot have it both ways.
Ireland did not run large fiscal deficits or violate the Maastricht Treaty in the boom years. It ran a fiscal surplus, (as did Spain) and reduced its public debt to near zero. German finance minister Wolfgang Schauble keeps missing this basic point, but then we don’t want to disturb a comfortable – and convenient – German prejudice.
Patrick Honohan, the World Bank veteran brought in to clean house at the Irish Central Bank, wrote the definitive paper on the causes of this disaster from his perch at Trinity College Dublin in early 2009.
Entitled “What Went Wrong In Ireland?”, it recounts how the genuine tiger economy lost its way after the launch of the euro, and because of the euro.
“Real interest rates from 1998 to 2007 averaged -1pc [compared with plus 7pc in the early 1990s],” he said.
A (positive) interest shock of this magnitude in a vibrant fast-growing economy was bound to stoke a massive credit and property bubble.
“Eurozone membership certainly contributed to the property boom, and to the deteriorating drift in wage competitiveness. To be sure, all of these imbalances and misalignments could have happened outside EMU, but the policy antennae had not been retuned in Ireland. Warning signs were muted. Lacking these prompts, Irish policy-makers neglected the basics of public finance.”
“Lengthy success lulled policy makers into a false sense of security. Captured by hubris, they neglected to ensure the basics, allowing a rogue bank’s reckless expansionism,” he wrote.
Let me add that the ECB ran a monetary policy that was too loose even for the eurozone as a whole, holding rates at 2pc until well into the credit boom and allowing the M3 money supply to expand at 11pc (against a 4.5pc target). The ECB breached its own inflation ceiling every month for a decade. It did this to help Germany through its mini-slump, and in doing so poured petrol on the bonfire of the PIGS. So please, NO MORE HYPOCRISY FROM BERLIN.
The truth is that the EMU venture is one of shared culpability. Yes, the Irish should have regulated their banks properly and restricted mortgages to a loan-to-value ratio of 80pc, 70pc, or 60pc, forcing it down as low as needed – as Hong Kong and Singapore do – to stop idiotic bubbles.
But almost nobody understood the implications of monetary union: in Dublin, in Berlin, in Brussels, and Frankfurt. They were almost all beguiled, (though I doubt that the ECB’s Axel Weber and Jurgen Stark ever were).
Given this, why should the Irish people accept the current terms? As Citigroup said in a note today, the EU part of the package will come at around 7pc — higher than the fee paid by Greece. This is pena
By 2014, interest payments on Ireland’s public debt (then 120pc of GDP) will be €10bn, while tax revenues will be €36bn. This ratio is well above the average default trigger of 22pc, as calculated in a Moody’s study.
Nominal Irish GNP has contracted by 26pc since the peak. It is nominal, not real, that matters for debt dynamics.
Ireland is in a classic debt-deflation trap , as described by Irving Fisher in his 1933 Economica paper.
Yes, it has a very vibrant export sector, and can perhaps claw its way out of the trap – which Greece and Portugal cannot hope to do in time, in my view. In a way that makes the choice even harder.
The question is, should the Dail vote against the austerity budget on December 7, Pearl Harbour Day. And should the next government – with Sinn Fein in the coalition? – tell the EU to go to Hell, do an Iceland, wash its hands of the banks, and carry out a unilateral default on senior debt by refusing to extend the guarantee?
The risks are huge, but then the provocations are also huge. And there is a score to settle. Did the EU not disregard the Irish `No’ to Lisbon, just as it disregarded the first Irish `No’ to Nice? Did it not trample all over Irish democracy?
It is not for a British newspaper to suggest which course to take. Both outcomes are ghastly, but as one Irish reader wrote to me: if Eamon De Valera could defy world opinion in 1945 by sending condolences to Germany for the death of the Fuhrer, today’s leaders need not worry too much about scandalizing those who made them swallow Lisbon.
Compliance is traumatic. Default is traumatic. What the Irish have before them is a political choice about what they wish to be as a people, and a nation.
Let me finish with a few words by Dan O’Brien, the Economics Editor of the Irish Times, that caught my eye.
“Nothing quite symbolised this State’s loss of sovereignty than the press conference at which the ECB man spoke along with two IMF men and a European Commission official. It was held in the Government press centre beneath the Taoiseach’s office. I am a xenophile and cosmopolitan by nature, but to see foreign technocrats take over the very heart of the apparatus of this State to tell the media how the State will be run into the foreseeable future caused a sickening feeling in the pit of my stomach.”
My sympathies.
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