Macroeconomia Crisi finanziaria e sviluppi (6 lettori)

paologorgo

Chapter 11
In a research note released last night, Goldman Sachs raised their estimate of Q4 GDP from 4.0% to 5.8%. They cautioned that the "headline will be an eye-popper", but that this growth is mostly due to inventory changes: "More than two-thirds of our estimated increase comes from a sudden stabilization in inventories". They also noted "anything between 4½% and 7% is possible given the volatility of the inventory data".

The rest of the note cautions on 2010, and Goldman still sees sluggish growth of just under 2.0% with the unemployment rate peaking in early 2011.

This is what we've been discussing - GDP boosted by inventory changes in the 2nd half of 2009, followed by sluggish growth in 2010.

San Francisco Fed President described the impact of inventory changes back in September: The Outlook for Recovery in the U.S. Economy
I expect the biggest source of expansion in the second half of this year to come from a diminished pace of inventory liquidation by manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. Such a pattern is typical of business cycles. Inventory investment often is the catalyst for economic recoveries. True, the boost is usually fairly short-lived, but it can be quite important in getting things going. ...​
But what if this doesn't "get things going"?

When was the last time we saw 5%+ GDP growth, due mostly to inventory changes, and increasing unemployment? It was in Q1 1981.

The 1980 recession ended in Q3 1980, and inventory changes boosted Q4 GDP by 3.8%, and Q1 1981 GDP by an amazing 6.4%! However underlying demand remained weak (as defined by GDP ex-inventory changes, and PCE) as shown in the following table:

1263726466calcriskgdp.jpg


Look at the blue period, and notice the boost in GDP from inventory changes in the Q4 1980, and Q1 1981. But PCE was only 1.5% in Q1 1980, and fell to 0.0% in Q2 1980. Since there was no pickup in underlying demand, the economy slid back into recession in July 1981.

Now the causes of the current recession are very different from the early '80s, but once again we are seeing a transitory boost from inventory changes and underlying demand remains weak. With the huge overhang of existing home inventory and record rental vacancies, and the ongoing repair of household balance sheets, I expect underlying demand to remain weak in 2010.

The blip in the 2nd half from inventory changes was expected, and I expect Q4 to be the best quarter for GDP for some time.

1 Q4 2009 is estimated. GDP is from Goldman Sachs, and ex-inventory and PCE is from my own estimate.

Calculated Risk: Q4 GDP: Beware the Blip
 

troppidebiti

Forumer storico
"Il suo piano non credo sia stato concepito da tecnici o banchieri centrali", spiega Tremonti.

"L'idea che chi è stato salvato con il denaro pubblico restituisca il denaro che ha ricevuto con il sovrappiù dei benefici di sistema mi pare un'idea che si inserisce perfettamente in questa logica", sottolinea.

Secondo il ministro, per far fronte alla crisi nell'ultimo anno si sono confrontate due idee: "l'idea politica di una nuova Bretton Woods e dei legal standard contro l'idea tecnica dei Forum e dei Board".

i conti non tornano con un incremento del debito pubblico di 2000 miliardi restituirne 150 in 10 anni mi sembra una presa in giro:rolleyes:
 

Grecale

5min e na vita....Picasso
In a research note released last night, Goldman Sachs raised their estimate of Q4 GDP from 4.0% to 5.8%. They cautioned that the "headline will be an eye-popper", but that this growth is mostly due to inventory changes: "More than two-thirds of our estimated increase comes from a sudden stabilization in inventories". They also noted "anything between 4½% and 7% is possible given the volatility of the inventory data".

The rest of the note cautions on 2010, and Goldman still sees sluggish growth of just under 2.0% with the unemployment rate peaking in early 2011.

This is what we've been discussing - GDP boosted by inventory changes in the 2nd half of 2009, followed by sluggish growth in 2010.

San Francisco Fed President described the impact of inventory changes back in September: The Outlook for Recovery in the U.S. Economy
I expect the biggest source of expansion in the second half of this year to come from a diminished pace of inventory liquidation by manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. Such a pattern is typical of business cycles. Inventory investment often is the catalyst for economic recoveries. True, the boost is usually fairly short-lived, but it can be quite important in getting things going. ...​
But what if this doesn't "get things going"?

When was the last time we saw 5%+ GDP growth, due mostly to inventory changes, and increasing unemployment? It was in Q1 1981.

The 1980 recession ended in Q3 1980, and inventory changes boosted Q4 GDP by 3.8%, and Q1 1981 GDP by an amazing 6.4%! However underlying demand remained weak (as defined by GDP ex-inventory changes, and PCE) as shown in the following table:

1263726466calcriskgdp.jpg


Look at the blue period, and notice the boost in GDP from inventory changes in the Q4 1980, and Q1 1981. But PCE was only 1.5% in Q1 1980, and fell to 0.0% in Q2 1980. Since there was no pickup in underlying demand, the economy slid back into recession in July 1981.

Now the causes of the current recession are very different from the early '80s, but once again we are seeing a transitory boost from inventory changes and underlying demand remains weak. With the huge overhang of existing home inventory and record rental vacancies, and the ongoing repair of household balance sheets, I expect underlying demand to remain weak in 2010.

The blip in the 2nd half from inventory changes was expected, and I expect Q4 to be the best quarter for GDP for some time.

1 Q4 2009 is estimated. GDP is from Goldman Sachs, and ex-inventory and PCE is from my own estimate.

Calculated Risk: Q4 GDP: Beware the Blip


Ottimo articolo Paolo :up: e molto condivisibile, non avevo idea della simmetria proposta con il 1980/1 che mi sembra corretta relativamente al ripristino delle scorte, cosi come è vero che l'aumento nelle scorte faccia da catalizzatore sui ratio economici

Infatti nei dati macro c'è una ripresa seppur modesta della produzione ma se guardo le vendite al dettaglio o il mercato immobiliare la traccia di questa ripresa scompare, c'è nell'offerta ma non nella domanda e la disoccupazione aumenta incessantemente anche se in forte rallentamento

Per aggiornare quella simmetria ai tempi ns non ci si può esimere dal considerare il forte catalizzatore che il BRIC e tutta l'asia hanno rappresentato in questa "ripresa economica"

Nel 1980 l'asia che conosciamo oggi non aveva voce e la sua incidenza sulla domanda/offerta globale era modestissima se paragonata ad oggi
Oggi 2010 il tavolo economico mondiale è completamente diverso, questi paesi hanno iniziato a sviluppare una forte domanda interna che fa da traino ad una stanca Europa ed una troppo indebitata america, sarà sufficente? Non lo so ovviamente in assoluto ma credo che per le società USA ed EU attive nell'export possano rappresentare degli ottimi alleati per sconfiggere la recessione che è + che presente e vivida

Pertanto senza sconfessare il possibile ridimensionamento del Gdp nei prossimi trim ( come nel 80/1) oggi si potrebbe trarre forte giovamento dai nuovi attori mondiali

Il problema insoluto rimane il forte leverage che è esclusivamente finanziario, un deleverage sarebbe auspicabile ma se Obama è costretto a minacciare una tassa per riaffermare certi principi sacrosanti pensa cosa potrebbe accadere se un delevarage venisse imposto per legge........

Chi ha esperienza in proposito dice.......

"Richard Koo, della Nomura Research, punta il dito sulla deflazione. Secondo Koo, un'economia dove chi è troppo indebitato dedica i propri sforzi a saldare il debito ha le seguenti tre caratteristiche: l'offerta di credito e di liquidità bancaria cessa di crescere, non perché le banche non siano disposte a prestare, ma perché le aziende e le famiglie non vogliono prendere soldi in prestito; la politica monetaria convenzionale è in gran parte inefficace; e il desiderio del settore privato di migliorare la propria situazione patrimoniale fa emergere lo stato come prestatore di ultima istanza."

IDEE / Se Tokyo sbaglia Pechino impara - Il Sole 24 ORE

Un caro saluto ;)

 

Geller

Banned
una pagina carina sul debito usa

United States public debt - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

in effetti 150 miliardi sono spicciolini

Non bisogna fare confusione.
Le banche USA, da diversi mesi, stanno già restituendo i finanziamenti governativi (anche perchè vogliono al più presto gestire le proprie aziende di credito senza vincoli ... come, ad esempio, il ripristino dei famigeratissimi bonus...); si veda la vicenda Citigroup, Bank of America, etc...

Secondo logica, le nuove tasse di Obama sugli utili delle banche per i prox 10-12 anni rappresentano una forma di interessi aggiuntivi sul credito accordato.
Dico interessi aggiuntivi, in quanto le banche stanno già ripagando i debiti con i dovuti interessi (quelli pattuiti a suo tempo).

:rolleyes:
 

stockuccio

Guest
GEAB N°41 is available! The Decade 2010 – 2020: Towards a knockout victory by gold over the Dollar



- Public announcement GEAB N°41 (January 16, 2010) -




1820791-2483112.jpg

The US Federal Reserve is no longer able, in reality, to continue its multi-decade combat against the « barbarous relic » in order to guarantee the supremacy of the US currency at the centre of the international monetary system. For LEAP/E2020 the decade which has just begun will be clearly marked by a complete KO of the Dollar (and the fall of most major international currencies) by gold.

We have often reminded readers in different GEAB issues that gold constitutes both a medium/long term investment intended to protect one’s capital against the risk of a loss in value of paper currencies and financial assets, and an eventual means of payment in the event of a very serious monetary crisis. In these two cases the choice of placing a portion of one’s assets in gold is a response to anticipating events and risks in the coming years (and not the coming weeks or months). For this GEAB N°41, a special edition at the beginning of a new decade, it seems opportune to LEAP/E2020 to put forward its anticipations on gold’s progress for 2010 – 2020, completing what the team wrote in issue N°34 of the GEAB in April 2009. This view of the decade is even more legitimate since we consider our analysis constitutes an aid for both individual investors as well as for the heads of central banks and institutions in charge of maintaining the value of a large amount of assets in the medium and long term (for example, pension, sovereign and insurance funds). Indeed for the first time in almost 40 years (since the ending of Dollar convertibility to gold in 1971), the interests of the world’s central banks and individual investors, once again, converge on gold: value is no longer at all guaranteed by the Dollar as an international reserve currency and, as long as the latter has no globally recognised successor, gold remains the only asset capable of maintaining this value.

We already took a look at the paradox of the gold market in the GEAB N°34, showing that if the market for the yellow metal seemed to be well controlled by the Fed and the large central banks to prevent any significant appreciation in the gold price, nevertheless, because of the global systemic crisis, the structural collapse of United States’ influence (and thus the Fed) and the related breaking up of the international monetary system inherited from 1971, gold was a safe investment in times of great uncertainty. As a reminder, since the publication date of the GEAB N°34 gold has gained more than 30% in US Dollars and more than 23% in Euros. In addition it has gained more than 100% in US Dollars and more than 85% in Euros since our first recommendation to diversify out of other investments in favour of physical gold (up to a third of assets) given in 2006.



1820791-2483113.jpg
Decade 2000-2009: Gold’s gain against 17 currencies (in %)

But if gold has seen its price rise considerably since then, it is not the result of any market move towards greater transparency and less manipulation by the US Federal Reserve and its major supporters. The three main tools used in an attempt to prevent any return of gold to the centre of the international monetary system are still in place, that is:

. the development of a « paper gold market » swamping the physical gold market in a sea of fictitious contracts which are essentially pledges on gold which in reality doesn’t exist (or, which amounts to the same, is repeatedly used for different contracts)

. the falsifying of the levels of actual physical gold reserves, especially those of the United States, which have not been subject to independent audit for decades

. the communication tactic, via major economic and financial media, of systematically suggesting that investment in gold is out of date, reserved for old people who only swear by gold in the same way as they would tell stories of forgotten wars, or by gold bugs whom the precious metal turns mad.

As the whole world has been able to see over the course of these last forty years, and until recently, this strategy worked extremely well, even leading a number of other countries, United Kingdom in the first place (1), to divest themselves of their gold reserves at rock bottom prices. This story thus shows very clearly the necessity for decision-makers, either to have a strong personal ability to anticipate events, or to have access to such quality anticipation. In this case, the bill for not anticipating events will reach at least ten billion USD.

But if the market, organised in such a way to permit gold to be held at a distance from the international monetary system for forty years, has continued to function, what is it that has changed and made this strong rise in the gold price possible? It is the overturning of a factor essential to world order, due to the growing impact of the systemic crisis and the entry into the phase of worldwide geopolitical dislocation: the US Federal Reserve no longer has the means to battle against the old enemy of US Dollar hegemony which gold represents. This loss of ability is, of course, a complex phenomenon, consisting of many facets which we analyse in this GEAB edition.



Major world currency prices versus gold (1900-2009) (Euro = Deutsche Mark before 1999, the broken line is German inflation of 1922 and the breakdown after WW2) – Source: World Gold Council / Matterhorn, 12/07/2009

As previously indicated, the publication of this first GEAB of the year, where we usually publish our anticipations for the next twelve months, exceptionally coincides with the beginning of a new decade and, what is more, a decade which all careful observers feel will mark an upheaval in the world order. Exceptionally as well, Franck Biancheri the GEAB coordinator, in the course of writing a book which deals with the post-crisis world (publication in France expected in spring 2010), has agreed to make one of his two anticipation scenarios for the decade 2010-2020 (2) available to our team, and therefore to the GEAB readers. Our team has seized this occasion to give our subscribers the benefit of a rational geopolitical « dive » into what the coming decade holds for us. Out of the two calendars, entitled respectively « The painful dawn of the world after (3) » and « The tragic twilight of the world before (4) », our team has chosen to present the latter which is, without any doubt, the most worrying, but which also seems to us to more clearly reflect the trends at work today.



---------
Notes:

(1) In 1999, Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, was the architect of this huge economic-financial mistake which has cost, at current prices, more than 10 billion USD in lost opportunity to the British treasury. The article in The Times of the 12/28/2009, provides a rare example of an advantageous comparision for France vis-à-vis Great Britain due to its decision at the time to not follow the « economic and financial fashion » dictated by Washington. That said, British taxpayers can console themselves by bearing in mind that if there had been another ten billion in their coffers, their government would have just given it to the banks over the course of these last months. And, to raise their spirits, they ought to know that The Times forgot to state that Nicolas Sarkozy, then French Finance Minister, organised a sale of a smaller amount of French gold also on ideological grounds (Source: Boursorama, 12/30/2009). No comment!

(2) We wish to remind our readers that this sort of scenario, presented here as a yearly chronicle of the decade to come, doesn’t pretend to be a detailed description of future events. Its main purpose is to make more understandable, more lively the trends identified during the work of anticipation. These chronicles of the future are, so to speak, a pictured version of the fundamental analyses described elsewhere.

(3) « The painful dawn » because giving birth to a new world order can only be painful, like all birth, even if what follows is clearly positive.

(4) « The tragic twilight » because if this is the route which is followed, it will have all the characteristics of a tragedy, i. e. a sad ending and the awareness by all the participants in the story that it will finish very badly.



Samedi 16 Janvier 2010




magari con questa previsione catastrofica per il dollaro con conseguente trionfo dell'oro c'entra anche questa notizia http://www.thedailybell.com/743/CFTC-to-Limit-Gold-and-Silver-Trading.html





sempre sul tema 'chi è che compra i treasuries ?' ....
Who Is the 'One Big Bidder' For US Treasuries?


There are a number of possibilities for the identity of the non-primary dealer domestic source of enormous purchases at the longer end of the yield curve in recent US Treasury auctions.

It could be a misclassification, a branch of a bank representing a foreign power. The problem with this theory is that foreign Central Banks have a reluctance to buy the long end of the curve.

It also could be a legitimate domestic purchaser like a pension fund compelled to match duration of obligations, as is required by a little noted ruling of the US government a couple of years ago. They might be shifting out of other long term instruments with similar durations but more risk.

It might even be PIMCO. They certain have the money as the world's biggest bond fund, and they do offer two Treasury ETF's which, although not directly related to the products bought, might be relevant on a cross trade. And PIMCO has recently been talking down Treasuries in favor of corporates, which doesn't mean anything since traders often 'talk their book.' Still, unless it is for the ETFs it is hard to justify buying the long durations straight up in size. And while PIMCO says they do not like Treasuries, Benny and the Fed said they are buying long to keep interest rates lower. Why doubt them?

And of course, it might very well be the Federal Reserve Bank, or the Treasury via the Exchange Stabilization Fund.

It could also be the big bidder who comes in with some regularity and smashes down the price of the precious metals, with the obvious intent of manipulating the market, like clockwork just after the PM fix in London with some frequency.

It might even be the mysterious bidder who stands ready to buy the SP futures at every weakness, maintaining a floor on the market, and a steady drift higher in prices, with no change in fundamental underpinnings. Their hand in the market is apparent.

It is less probable, given the state of market manipulation by a few big proprietary trading desks riding another wave of cheap FEd money, but it might even be the party that entered the US equity market yesterday at 12:03 PM with a HUGE order (228,000 contracts) to buy the SP futures. As Larry Levin noted, "As of now I don't have a firm answer, but whether it was HFT activity, the "Helicopter," or a massive cross trade, it sure set the bottom in for the afternoon. Everyone in the Dow, Nasdaq, and S&P pits were talking about it and nobody was willing to sell into that massive bid." And so the market rallied once again into its current peak. No doubt it will be blamed on Monsieur Fat Fingers. Funny how lucky the big prop traders are with their reckless accidents, with millions gained from gaming the market, and all by accident.

As the article from the Financial Times indicates, it might never be possible to find out who this is, unless there is an audit of the market that is made public. As Edmund Burke noted, "Fraud is the Minister of Injustice" and it is my experience that opacity is the accomplice of fraud. Who has the most to hide these days?

Personally I think the Fed is buying across the yield curve to affect interest rates, and Treasury takes care of stocks and commodities through the Exchange Stabilization Fund, and friends in a few key banks, but who can say for sure, without the power of wiretap, audit, and subpoena?

If this is price manipulation, no matter the intentions or beneficiaries, it is likely that it is mispricing risk in a big way, misallocating investments, and will eventually will fail. Its failure will cause a great deal of pain in the real economy for innocent bystanders, and will end in tears. And when that time comes, expect those who created the crisis to make the public another offer that they think you cannot refuse, in excess of their last demand for 700$ billions, tout de suite.

You decide what is most likely, and what needs to be done about it, if anything.

More than a few people are wondering at the lack of response from the people in various nations, particularly in the UK and the US. Here is some old knowledge that might prove illuminating.


National Madness
Gilbert Keith Chesterton 1910

"This slow and awful self-hypnotism of error is a process that can occur not only with individuals, but also with whole societies. It is hard to pick out and prove; that is why it is hard to cure. But this mental degeneration may be brought to one test, which I truly believe to be a real test.

A nation is not going mad when it does extravagant things, so long as it does them in an extravagant spirit. But whenever we see things done wildly, but taken tamely, then the State is growing insane...

For madness is a passive as well as an active state: it is a paralysis, a refusal of the nerves to respond to the normal stimuli, as well as an unnatural stimulation. There are commonwealths, plainly to be distinguished here and there in history, which pass from prosperity to squalor or from glory to insignificance, or from freedom to slavery, not only in silence, but with serenity."​
And in this slow descent into madness, the worst is surely yet to come.

Financial Times
Direct bids for US Treasury notes lead to speculation over buyer
By Michael Mackenzie in New York
January 14 2010 02:00

Auctions of US Treasury notes this week have attracted extremely strong buying from domestic institutional investors, fuelling speculation that "one big bidder" has decided to defy the conventional wisdom on Wall Street that US government debt is due for a fall.

Yesterday, direct bids accounted for 17 per cent of the sales of $21bn in 10-year Treasury notes, far higher than the recent average of 7.4 per cent. It was the highest percentage of direct bids in a 10-year Treasury auction since May 2005.

On Tuesday, direct bids accounted for a record 23.4 per cent of the bidding for $40bn in three-year notes, up from an average direct bid of 6 per cent.

Market participants say the unusually high level of direct bidding suggests that a large investor is looking to accumulate Treasuries without alerting the primary dealers on Wall Street to its intentions.

"It appears to us that someone is trying to hide their apparent interest in owning these auctions from the rest of the market," said David Ader, strategist at CRT Capital.

Rick Klingman, managing director at BNP Paribas, said: "It is unusual to see such a spike in the direct bid and I would imagine it is one big bidder. There is no way we will find out who it is, not now, or ever."

The surge in direct bidding is particularly notable because it comes after predictions that the record levels of Treasury debt issuance would exhaust investor demand, driving yields higher.

Among the most high-profile warnings came from Pimco, manager of the largest bond fund, which raised concerns about the escalating supply of US Treasury debt.

Attention will now focus on whether there is similar direct demand for today's $13bn 30-year bond sale.

The 10-year notes were sold at a yield of 3.754 per cent yesterday, the highest rate awarded for a note sale since June, when they were issued at 3.99 per cent. At the start of the year the yield on 10-year notes briefly traded at 3.90 per cent, as many investors talked down the prospects for Treasuries. The note traded at about 3.70 per cent earlier this week and was at 3.70 per cent late yesterday.

Under the three main classifications of buyers in Treasury debt sales, direct bidders are generally domestic non-primary dealer banks and large institutional investors. Normally their presence at Treasury auctions is small, as they usually buy debt through the primary dealer network, which currently numbers 18 banks and broker/dealers.
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Il timing della strategia della BCE di riduzione della liquidità di supporto alle banche nel corso del 2010 esaminato in questo articolo del WSJ. Segnatevi le date, potrebbe essere utile rammentarle... ;) :-o


  • JANUARY 18, 2010, 5:17 A.M. ET
ECB to Stop Providing Liquidity in Swiss Francs


By GEOFFREY T. SMITH

FRANKFURT--The European Central Bank said Monday that it will stop providing liquidity in Swiss francs at the end of January, ending another of the emergency programs it used to tackle the financial crisis.

The ECB has been providing up to €25 billion of Swiss francs ($35.95 billion) to the market through foreign-exchange swaps through a one-week revolving facility over recent months. "The decision was made against the background of declining demand and improved conditions on the funding markets," the ECB said.

The ECB has said it will gradually remove the extraordinary measures it took after the collapse of U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., with ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet saying repeatedly that they won't be needed to the same extent in future.

The bank had already begun to wind down its crisis measures by stopping its longer-term provision of liquidity in dollars in September. In November, it said it would tighten the credit rating requirements it places on certain bonds that it accepts as collateral for its lending operations.

However, its most significant step back towards a neutral policy stance and away from the extraordinarily supportive stance of 2009 came in December, when the bank confirmed that it would withdraw from providing liquidity for longer than three months at a time.

The ECB carried out its last 12-month refinancing operation in the middle of December, and will hold its last six-month tender in March. After that, it will have no credit facilities that are longer than three months.

So far, financial markets have reacted calmly to the ECB's implementation of its "exit strategy," helped by the fact that the bank has continued to provide an overall level of liquidity far in excess of what the system needs to conduct its daily business.

However, many analysts expect the liquidity situation to become noticeably tighter in June, when €442 billion in funds from the ECB's first 12-month operation will expire without the chance for banks to 'roll over' the funds automatically.

Another, and potentially more challenging, moment is due at the end of the year, when the ECB intends to restore its old credit rating threshold of single-A-minus for bonds it accepts as collateral.

Market participants are fretting that the government debt of Greece, a member of the 16-country currency zone, may have been downgraded below that level by all the major international ratings agencies by then, which could dramatically restrict the access of Greek banks to ECB funding.

Mr. Trichet warned at a press conference last week that "we will not change our collateral framework for the sake of any single country."
 

stockuccio

Guest
mi piacciono i blog che scavano ... uno dei tanti tyler Durden con la faccia di Brad Pitt :) ... l'esperto di TIC era Brad Setser ma è passato sotto le ali governative ... sarà stato un caso

Indirect Bidders Are Fleeing The Short Bond

picture-5.jpg

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 01/17/2010 20:23 -0500

Treasury International Capital data provides an interesting glimpse into foreigners' bond purchasing habits: since the beginning of Quantitative Easing (April TIC data) through October 31 (the last publicly available data point for TIC), foreigners have bought a total of $236 billion in Treasury securities, which includes Bills, Bonds, Notes, TIPS and Cash Management Bills (from total holdings of $3.262 trillion in April to $3.498 trillion in October). What is known is that in April total marketable debt consisted of $1.988 Trillion in Bills, $3.822 Trillion in Notes and Bonds and $530 Billion in TIPS, for a total of $6.34 trillion. By October, this number had shot up to $4.5 trillion in Notes and Bonds, $567 Billion in TIPS, while Bills had been reduced to $1.85 trillion for a total of $6.925 trillion.
Zero Hedge has gone through every single Bill, Bond and Note TreasuryDirect auction and compiled the data for Indirect Bid auction take down numbers. We observe that the gross take down for Indirect bidders for Bonds and Notes amounts to a substantial $577 billion in the April-October period, and estimating redemptions of $162 billion, implies foreigners purchased a net amount of $414 billion in Bonds and Notes (we exclude TIPS as the number is largely nominal for the purpose of this exercise). Yet as we pointed out, TIC indicates that the total number of UST holdings only went up by $233 billion, implying foreigners (aka Indirect Bidders) were net sellers of $181 Billion in Treasury Bills. And this occurred at a time when there was still some modicum of yield on the short-end of the curve. With Bill yields now at record lows, and a record steep yield curve as a result, will foreigners ever step in to fill a void which apparently has been filled exclusively by Primary Dealers and the Federal Reserve in the attempt to keep the curve at record steepness? If yields continue being so low that only domestic banks, which benefit from the steep curve, are buying the short-end, this leaves a major question mark for the future.
Data analysis
Zero Hedge, using TreasuryDirect data, calculated monthly Indirect take downs beginning in April through the end of October (the last date for which TIC provides total foreign holdings). The monthly auction data for all Bonds and Notes (excl. Bills, CMBs and TIPS) is as follows:

Out of a total $1.215 trillion in Bonds and Notes auctioned off in April-October, Indirects were responsible for taking down $576 billion. The average indirect take down of any given auction is 47.5%, implying that indirect bidders, aka foreigners, are responsible for nearly half of the end demand for any given Bond/Note auction.
Next, using Daily Treasury Statement data for Treasury redemptions, we calculated that in the April thru October period, $342 billion in Notes and Bonds matured/redeemed by the Treasury. We estimate the amount of Indirect redemptions using the same ratio of take down at about 47.5%, to reach a number of $162 billion. Netting out this redemption amount from the total indirect take down of $576 billion, we obtain an estimate for Indirect Purchases net of redemptions in the 7 month period of $414 billion. Net Indirect Bidder activity for April thru October is seen on the following chart:

Using comparable TreasuryDirect data for Bills and Cash Management Bills (CMBs) we obtained the following breakdown of gross purchases for Indirect and Total buying take downs. Notably, the average take down ratio over the 7 month period is noticeably lower at 38.5%. Already, the demand interest is markedly lower by 900 basis points (and this ignores any redemption netting).

Likewise, to estimate Net Indirect take downs, we determined the total amount of Bill redemptions using DTS data, and allocated a portion to indirects using the same process as above: using the take down ratio of 38.5% in reverse. The conclusion: Indirects took down $1.367 trillion in Bills while redeeming $1.523 trillion, for a net negative balance of $156 billion.

Combined, these two data sets yield the following observations for Net Indirect Treasury Activity in the April - October period:

The cumulative sum of all monthly net data results in $257 billion. As a reminder, according to TIC, the total change in all foreign holdings in the comparable time period was $236 billion. We are confident that if we had refined our redemption assumptions, the two data series would overlap.

In summary, while Indirect Bidders have continued to express an interest in US Treasury holdings, the duration profile of their portfolio has shifted dramatically, with a rotation of nearly $260 billion from short bonds into the dated side of the curve. This is how the comparison between the TreasuryDirect primary data and the TIC data looks graphically.

Conclusions
The record steep yield curve is having the desired impact of pushing Indirect Bidders away from the short end of the curve, and, contrary to conventional wisdom, is forcing foreigners to buy further down, or rather, right, the curve. This begs the question: with foreigners so obviously shunning the Bill space, who is it that provides the massive take down interest each and every Bill auction to allow short rates to be in a record tight range? The answer is obviously Primary Dealers, and the broader banker community, which courtesy of Q.E., are the only ones who are able to take advantage of the record curve steepness, and load up on cash at close to zero rates and subsequently lend it out or leverage this new capital via traditional fractional reserve mechanisms.
In very much the same way that near zero money market rates are expected to push retail investors out of safe cash-equivalent investments, so the record steepness is increasingly forcing ever more foreign lenders to go to the right of the curve in order to collect yield.
The question remains: with still a record high ratio of Bills to all other marketable government securities, will the government be able to push enough investors out of the relative safety of the short end into riskiness of "higher" yielding bonds, especially with increasing speculation that inflation may finally be around the corner. If this recent trend of shifting away from Bills into Bonds and Notes by Indirects is any indication, then inflation fears are indeed significantly overdone. Yet if in fact the Fed succeeds in stirring up the money multiplier hornet's nest, and banks finally do turn on the small and middle-business lending spigot, and inflation does intensify, the rush out of Bills will be taken up by everyone, not just Indirect, which would, in our opinion, result in a substantially overall flattening of the curve. This in turn would force all those asset managers who are positioned comfortably in expectation of further record steepening, to rush through the exits and cover their positions, thus create a feedback loop which could potentially cause a near flat curve at some point in the future. In the meantime, the risk of this occurring is minor, and with the 2s30s still at record steepness of around 375, we anticipate that ever more momentum chasers will continue jumping on the most popular trade of the year until such time as the spirit of Volkswagen rears its ugly head once again.
 

tommy271

Forumer storico
Est Europa, no a prestiti valuta straniera prima di euro-Nowotny

lunedì 18 gennaio 2010 19:05

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VIENNA, 18 gennaio (Reuters) - I nuovi stati membri dell'Unione europea non dovrebbero rifare i vecchi errori contando sui prestiti in valuta straniera nella speranza che questi Paesi possano adottare l'euro presto.
Lo ha detto il membro della Bce Ewald Nowotny.
Questi Paesi dovrebbero aiutare a creare mercati per il finanziamento delle banche in valuta locale come alternativa ai presiti in euro o in franchi svizzeri, ha detto Nowotny in un'intervista a Reuters, in cui ha parlato anche della zona euro.
"Credo che questo sia esattamente l'errore commesso in questi Paesi che hanno l'idea di raggiungere l'euro molto presto e per questa ragione non si preoccupano di creare questi mercati", ha spiegato.
La crisi finanziaria ha ritardato i piani di adesione all'euro. L'Estonia sembra essere la prossima ad aderire nel 2012; Polonia, Ungheria e altri Paesi non prima del 2014. Secondo Nowotny dovrebbero avviare alcuni passaggi nel frattempo.
"Poiché nessuno sa quando ci sarà un'occasione per loro di raggiungere l'euro, in ogni caso ha senso sviluppare questi mercati in valuta locale", ha spiegato. "Fa parte del governo creare mercati per il finanziamento in valuta locale".
I privati e le società situate fra il Baltico e il Mar Nero hanno sviluppo l'abitudine a prestiti in valuta forte per qualcunque cosa dall'acquisto della tv all'appartamento. Questo è uno dei motivi che hanno spinto la regione sull'orlo dell'abisso l'anno scorso. L'ungheria introdurrà delle regole per restringere i prestiti in valuta straniera nel corso dell'anno e la Ue ha appoggiato l'estate scorsa l'adozione di una normativa che vada in tal senso.
 

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