Chris Watling: Debt and its dynamics may yet leave Greece's economy  in ruins
       Economic View
                  
                       Sunday, 18 April 2010
                               
Is Greece a liquidity problem or a solvency  problem? If that question sounds familiar, it should – the same  questions were asked of Western banks in the summer of 2007 and into  early 2008 when, initially, policy makers diagnosed the problems of the  Western banking system as a liquidity not a solvency issue – now we know  that many of those banks were bust.
          Policymakers are now making similar noises and  suggesting that the next looming crisis – that of Greece's fiscal  deficit and government indebtedness – is liquidity not solvency. Last  weekend, in response to heightened concerns in the market over the debt  (as highlighted by a further widening of Greece's 10-year government  bond yields relative to Germany's – that is the risk premium over German  debt. Chart 2) the EU, in conjunction with the IMF, announced more  details on its lending programme for Greece. EU member states have  offered to lend the country €30bn (£26bn) in the first year, at around 5  per cent interest rate, and more money in later years. The IMF has  offered a further€€15bn. Given that Greece's funding needs are  approximately €45bn to€€50bn in 2010 (and similar in the following four  years), this provides it with the near-term liquidity it needs. So far,  Greece is yet to take the EU and the IMF up on the offer – but comments  from EU finance ministers last week suggest that is likely to change  soon.
  Perhaps surprisingly, the market reception to this  deal has been pretty muted. The premium on Greek 10-year debt over  Germany's initially tightened on Monday by 0.5 per cent (suggesting  market confidence in the deal, or perhaps just short covering). By the  end of Thursday, though, those spreads had given back almost all of  Monday's tightening. So despite the EU-IMF backstopping all Greece's  financing needs for 2010, and implying that they are likely to do the  same for the coming years, bond investors still seem to have little  interest in the sovereign debt. The question we have to ask ourselves  is, why? And who's right: policymakers or the market?
On one level, given such unprecedented levels of  Western government debt issuance in 2010 to 2011 and beyond, it's little  wonder that appetite for Greek debt seems severely curtailed. On our  calculations, OECD economies are looking to raise $2.6trn (£1.7trn) from  investors this year to fund government deficits (that is, 9 per cent of  OECD GDP), and a similar amount next year, with that slowly falling in  following years. As a share of GDP this is meaningfully higher than at  any other time in recent history – the previous record peak (since the  end of Bretton Woods in 1971) was just below 5 per cent of GDP in 1983. 
Since last September, as central banks have slowed  and then stopped their quantitative-easing programmes (and as we have  therefore lost the biggest buyers in the market), spreads have started  to widen – investors have started to demand higher compensation  (interest) for buying so much government paper. 
On  one level, this is a classic problem of oversupply. On another, though,  and more importantly, it also reflects the real risk (probably greater  than 50 per cent) that Greece will default. 
Under  market pressure, Greece is attempting to cut its fiscal deficit  quickly. Greek plans incorporate a fiscal tightening from 12.7 per cent  deficit in 2009 to 8.7 per cent in 2010, 5.6 per cent in 2011 and 2.8  per cent in 2012. That equates to a fiscal tightening of  3-4 per cent  of GDP in each of the next three years. Yet, despite that tightening,  the Greek Finance Ministry expects its economy to contract by only 0.3  per cent of GDP in 2010 and then return to a reasonable growth path of  1.5 per cent and 1.9 per cent in 2011 and 2012.
If  correct, Greece will stabilise and start bringing down its debt-to-GDP  ratio, thereby creating long-term sustainable debt dynamics.
The growth (and inflation) assumption within that  calculation, though, is critical. Ireland's economy, the only recent  example of a country within the eurozone which has undertaken a  draconian fiscal austerity plan, has contracted by 17 per cent in real  terms since the beginning of 2008. In nominal terms, that contraction is  22 per cent, as the economy has also suffered deflation. Given that  government debt is nominal, not real, the 22 per cent contraction is the  relevant one when thinking about debt dynamics. If Greece were to  suffer a similar contraction, its debt dynamics would worsen  considerably. 
While that degree of economic  contraction is unlikely (especially as the world economy is growing  again), even a more modest contraction would be likely to lead to a  vicious circle – whereby refinancing rates rise as debt dynamics  deteriorate. Any economy with debt over 100 per cent of nominal GDP  (Greece's debt is 115 per cent, says the IMF) faces deteriorating debt  dynamics if the interest rate on its debt is greater than nominal GDP  growth and it runs a primary fiscal deficit of any size. In 2009,  Greece's primary deficit was 8 per cent of GDP.
A  loan from the EU and the IMF is essential in order to halt the  deterioration of debt dynamics due to rising interest rates. But it  doesn't ensure that nominal GDP growth is greater than the weighted  interest rate. 
With the government contracting  by 3 to 4 per cent of GDP each year, a huge question mark exists over  the Finance Ministry's growth assumptions. Greece, like Ireland, does  not have currency weakness as an option to boost growth (and inflation).  In most fiscal crises, the exchange rate serves as a release valve –  falling sharply, so boosting exports and supporting growth (or  offsetting weakness). As Greece has the euro, this is not an option. 
And Greece, with its low productivity levels, is not  competitive within the eurozone, while its growth model of the past 10  years has been heavily dependent on house-price appreciation and rapid  household credit growth. House prices in Athens and the rest of the  country have risen over three-fold since eurozone entry, pumped up by  rapid credit growth. Household credit has increased by almost 50 per  cent of GDP this past decade. With Greece's cost of borrowing from the  rest of the world rising, and unemployment set to rise further as a  result of this austerity plan, there's a risk that debt deflation will  take hold. This has also been the experience of Ireland these past two  to three years. Irish house prices have fallen by 30 per cent from their  peak. Private-sector credit has contracted.
So  while an EU-IMF loan will help tide Greece over, it doesn't disguise the  reality that the levels of debt in Greece, because of its debt  dynamics, are probably too high for the economy to handle. So, even if  the money is forthcoming from the EU, this farce is likely to turn into a  Greek tragedy.
It's the dawning of the age  of austerity as populations shrink and get older
Greece's problems are the tip of the iceberg. Many  European countries, including Portugal, Spain, Italy and the UK, also  have marked fiscal challenges. The IMF estimates that Britain, for  example, needs a structural fiscal tightening of 11 per cent of GDP over  the next decade to put its government debt to GDP ratio back on to a  sustainable path by 2030. 
But Europe has  demographic problems which dramatically increase the fiscal challenges.  Most of its populations are expected to shrink by 10 to 15 per cent over  coming decades (starting about now), while all its major countries have  ageing populations which means an increasingly expensive welfare state.  Old-age dependency ratios (Chart 2) are rising sharply. There are, for  example, 27 over-65-year-olds for every 100 working-age adults in  Greece. By 2050 it will be 57. Trends are similar in Spain, Portugal,  Italy and other countries.
Retirees not only  incur greater health costs but also need pensions (out of the taxes of  the working-age population). The National Center for Policy Analysis  published a study last year which concluded that in order to fund all  future, mostly age-related, policy commitments, EU governments, on  average, needed to save an extra 8.3 per cent of GDP a year (increasing  for every year its implementation is delayed). In the UK, the savings  required are 6.5 per cent of GDP, while Greece is at 10.9 per cent. Last  month, the Bank for International Settlements published The Future of  Public Debt. The paper highlights how even after addressing short-term  fiscal deficits, government debt to GDP will stay on an upward  trajectory to 2050 for most Western economies. In Britain, government  debt to GDP is set to rise from current levels, just below 100 per cent,  to almost 400 per cent by 2040. 
These problems  are easily fixed, by upping retirement age, but that requires political  will and public understanding. Without it, today's Greek problem seems  destined to be a European one.
(The Independent)