PASTELLETTO
Guest
+1,5% No non è possibile.
Poi mi abituo male.
Poi mi abituo male.
Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 1
- Creatore Discussione Imark
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
tommy271
Forumer storico
PASTELLETTO
Guest
Non dirlo, altrimenti chiedo anche a te l'obolo per la Grecia ...
Se mi travesto da PIIG e presento un bilancio con qualche miliardo in obbligazioni Greche pensi che me le concambiano.
A quel punto sarei disposto ad accettare un loss anche superiore al 21%.
Topgun1976
Guest
+1% ad ora
Nobody's
Γένοιο οἷος εἷ
tommy271
Forumer storico
tommy271
Forumer storico
Greece to issue 625 mln eur of 6-month T-bills Aug 9
ATHENS | Fri Aug 5, 2011 8:17am EDT
ATHENS Aug 5 (Reuters) - Greece will auction 625 million euros ($880.4 million) of 26-week T-bills on August 9, continuing its plan of monthly short-term debt sales, the country's debt agency (PDMA) said on Friday.
The settlement date will be August 12. Only primary dealers will be allowed to participate and no commission will be paid.
***
Audaci ...
ATHENS | Fri Aug 5, 2011 8:17am EDT
ATHENS Aug 5 (Reuters) - Greece will auction 625 million euros ($880.4 million) of 26-week T-bills on August 9, continuing its plan of monthly short-term debt sales, the country's debt agency (PDMA) said on Friday.
The settlement date will be August 12. Only primary dealers will be allowed to participate and no commission will be paid.
***
Audaci ...
tommy271
Forumer storico
EU Commissioner Rehn's comments on debt crisis
BRUSSELS | Fri Aug 5, 2011 7:53am EDT
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn made the following remarks at a briefing for reporters on Friday:
"I will start by stating the obvious: markets have not reacted as we expected or hoped for to the measures agreed by euro-area Heads of State and Government on 21 July.
The spread of bond-market tensions across the euro area is, however, not justified by economic and budgetary fundamentals.
Economic recovery is proceeding in most parts of the euro area, while important steps in budgetary consolidation and structural reform are underway across Europe and in particular in those Member States most exposed to market tensions.
Some of the reasons for market tensions relate to developments outside of the euro area. Investor sentiment has been negatively affected by the impact of the debt ceiling negotiations in the United States and recent data suggesting a soft patch in the global economy.
But other sources of tension can be found closer to home. While the 21 July agreement is a milestone in our management of the sovereign-debt crisis, we have had difficulties in communicating the agreement to the markets.
Such a comprehensive, detailed and technically complex agreement requires time to implement. But there were expectations in financial markets that all elements could be implemented immediately. While these expectations were clearly unrealistic, markets have nevertheless been disappointed.
Two weeks ago, the euro area leaders re-affirmed their commitment "to do whatever is needed to ensure the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and its Member States.
The political will to defend the euro should not be underestimated. Since the onset of the crisis, euro area leaders have always proven that they could take the necessary decisions and a continuously evolving situation.
Let me recall what The French and German finance ministers, Francois Baroin and Wolfgang Schauble, said only a few days ago: "Rebuilding confidence in the eurozone will require patience, considerable stamina and vision.
Our path is demanding We have embarked on a way to ever closer co-ordination and co-operation of our national fiscal policies.
Yesterday, President Barroso wrote to the Heads of State and Government urging them to ensure full and rapid implementation of the 21st July agreement.
The reason for me being here today is to do a follow-up on that letter, explaining how the various measures agreed to are being implemented, and how we are addressing market concerns about the management of the sovereign debt crisis.
I am of course focusing on the work-streams and policy actions where the Commission has relevant responsibilities and policy competences.
First we are doing what is necessary to implement the 21st July agreement fully and as rapidly as possible.
It would have been fantastic if the agreement had been fully operational on the 22 July, but this was of course impossible. The very technical details of the agreement must be fleshed out and then accepted and ratified in each Member State.
This is the necessary and legitimate a price to pay for living in democracies.
Experts from Member States, supported by my services of DG ECFIN, as well as by the ECB and the EFSF , are working night and day to put flesh on the bones of the 21st July agreement. And we are progressing quickly.
Meetings and conference calls are being organised very frequently and will take place as often as necessary in coming days. The technical work will be completed as a matter of urgency.
We are talking here of a matter of weeks, not months. In order to end the uncertainty, the technical and political processes should be finalised by early September. But the technical and the political processes are mutually dependent.
There are different procedures for ratification across Europe and we expect all euro area Member States to do what is expected of them to meet that timeline. That is what President Barroso called for in his letter yesterday, stressing that there could be no delay in ratification.
I am confident that, once investors understand that all this work is underway behind the scenes, they will be reassured about implementation of 21st July agreement.
Yesterday, President Barroso wrote to Heads of State and Government of the Eurozone urging rapid implementation of the measures agreed.
It is the Commission's long-standing position that the effective lending capacity of the EFSF should be reinforced and the scope of its activity widened. We said this already in our Annual Growth Survey on 12 January this year.
That is why the European Commission was and remains satisfied with the 21st July agreement, which achieved most of these objectives with regard to the EFSF.
The new EFSF instruments, now always linked with appropriate conditionality, include the possibility to act on the basis of a precautionary programme, to intervene in the secondary markets in the basis of an ECB analysis, and to finance recapitalisation of financial institutions through loans to governments.
But, as experience over the last few years has shown, we need to stand ready to adapt our crisis management tools to be credible and effective.
Of course, this goes for the EFSF as well. To be effective, the EFSF needs to be credible and respected by the markets. Thus it will need to be continuously assessed, once up and running in its updated form, with those objectives in mind.
This is in line with the conclusions of the euro-area summit in July, which called for improvements of working methods and enhancements of crisis management in the euro-area.
As President Barroso underlined in his letter to heads of state, the Commission stands ready to contribute to this task which is of paramount importance.
Second heightened concerns around Greece are not warranted.
Investors seem unconvinced that Greece's debt will be put on a sustainable track. I think this is not the right conclusion. The 21st July agreement did deliver major improvements in the terms and conditions for financing Greek public debt. There will be a significant extension in the average maturity of all loans and a lowering of interest rates on official loans.
A reduction of interest rates to about 4 percent should reduce cumulative interest payments by some 25 bn between 2011 and 2020. This implies a reduction in the debt ratio in 2020 (without private sector involvement) of around 10% of GDP.
Meanwhile, the offer of private sector involvement (PSI) implies further important benefits for Greek public debt sustainability.
PSI considerably stretches the average maturity of Greek government debt even further and reduces substantially the amounts that Greece will have to raise in the markets by the end of the programme in 2014. PSI and the accompanying debt buy-back entail a further estimated net debt reduction by some 26bn or 12% of GDP by 2020.
It is correct that PSI entails certain costs, but these costs impact more on gross debt than on net debt. The costs relating to PSI include the recapitalisation of Greek banks (20 billion euros) and credit enhancements (35 billion euros), in the form of AAA rated bonds paid on an escrow account, for the new government bonds that are exchanged for existing bonds maturing during the period 2011-20.
This escrow account is an asset for the Greek government and has a positive impact on net debt.
And the Greek authorities are doing what is necessary to implement their various commitments. They are developing the proposals for the PSI along the lines of the IIF proposal. Preparatory work is continuing for the new support programme for Greece, in liaison with the ECB and together with the IMF.
The Commission's Task Force set up at the end of July is starting to coordinate technical assistance to Greece. Importantly, it will help ensure measures are taken to accelerate take-up of EU funds which make a visible impact on competitiveness, growth and employment.
Let me conclude on Greece by recalling that the situation of Greece is exceptional, and that's why it requires a special and unique solution with regard to PSI.
I can therefore only reiterate what the Heads of State and Government said on 21st July PSI will be restricted only to Greece, and will thus not be a feature of crisis management in other Member States.
BRUSSELS | Fri Aug 5, 2011 7:53am EDT
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn made the following remarks at a briefing for reporters on Friday:
"I will start by stating the obvious: markets have not reacted as we expected or hoped for to the measures agreed by euro-area Heads of State and Government on 21 July.
The spread of bond-market tensions across the euro area is, however, not justified by economic and budgetary fundamentals.
Economic recovery is proceeding in most parts of the euro area, while important steps in budgetary consolidation and structural reform are underway across Europe and in particular in those Member States most exposed to market tensions.
Some of the reasons for market tensions relate to developments outside of the euro area. Investor sentiment has been negatively affected by the impact of the debt ceiling negotiations in the United States and recent data suggesting a soft patch in the global economy.
But other sources of tension can be found closer to home. While the 21 July agreement is a milestone in our management of the sovereign-debt crisis, we have had difficulties in communicating the agreement to the markets.
Such a comprehensive, detailed and technically complex agreement requires time to implement. But there were expectations in financial markets that all elements could be implemented immediately. While these expectations were clearly unrealistic, markets have nevertheless been disappointed.
Two weeks ago, the euro area leaders re-affirmed their commitment "to do whatever is needed to ensure the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and its Member States.
The political will to defend the euro should not be underestimated. Since the onset of the crisis, euro area leaders have always proven that they could take the necessary decisions and a continuously evolving situation.
Let me recall what The French and German finance ministers, Francois Baroin and Wolfgang Schauble, said only a few days ago: "Rebuilding confidence in the eurozone will require patience, considerable stamina and vision.
Our path is demanding We have embarked on a way to ever closer co-ordination and co-operation of our national fiscal policies.
Yesterday, President Barroso wrote to the Heads of State and Government urging them to ensure full and rapid implementation of the 21st July agreement.
The reason for me being here today is to do a follow-up on that letter, explaining how the various measures agreed to are being implemented, and how we are addressing market concerns about the management of the sovereign debt crisis.
I am of course focusing on the work-streams and policy actions where the Commission has relevant responsibilities and policy competences.
First we are doing what is necessary to implement the 21st July agreement fully and as rapidly as possible.
It would have been fantastic if the agreement had been fully operational on the 22 July, but this was of course impossible. The very technical details of the agreement must be fleshed out and then accepted and ratified in each Member State.
This is the necessary and legitimate a price to pay for living in democracies.
Experts from Member States, supported by my services of DG ECFIN, as well as by the ECB and the EFSF , are working night and day to put flesh on the bones of the 21st July agreement. And we are progressing quickly.
Meetings and conference calls are being organised very frequently and will take place as often as necessary in coming days. The technical work will be completed as a matter of urgency.
We are talking here of a matter of weeks, not months. In order to end the uncertainty, the technical and political processes should be finalised by early September. But the technical and the political processes are mutually dependent.
There are different procedures for ratification across Europe and we expect all euro area Member States to do what is expected of them to meet that timeline. That is what President Barroso called for in his letter yesterday, stressing that there could be no delay in ratification.
I am confident that, once investors understand that all this work is underway behind the scenes, they will be reassured about implementation of 21st July agreement.
Yesterday, President Barroso wrote to Heads of State and Government of the Eurozone urging rapid implementation of the measures agreed.
It is the Commission's long-standing position that the effective lending capacity of the EFSF should be reinforced and the scope of its activity widened. We said this already in our Annual Growth Survey on 12 January this year.
That is why the European Commission was and remains satisfied with the 21st July agreement, which achieved most of these objectives with regard to the EFSF.
The new EFSF instruments, now always linked with appropriate conditionality, include the possibility to act on the basis of a precautionary programme, to intervene in the secondary markets in the basis of an ECB analysis, and to finance recapitalisation of financial institutions through loans to governments.
But, as experience over the last few years has shown, we need to stand ready to adapt our crisis management tools to be credible and effective.
Of course, this goes for the EFSF as well. To be effective, the EFSF needs to be credible and respected by the markets. Thus it will need to be continuously assessed, once up and running in its updated form, with those objectives in mind.
This is in line with the conclusions of the euro-area summit in July, which called for improvements of working methods and enhancements of crisis management in the euro-area.
As President Barroso underlined in his letter to heads of state, the Commission stands ready to contribute to this task which is of paramount importance.
Second heightened concerns around Greece are not warranted.
Investors seem unconvinced that Greece's debt will be put on a sustainable track. I think this is not the right conclusion. The 21st July agreement did deliver major improvements in the terms and conditions for financing Greek public debt. There will be a significant extension in the average maturity of all loans and a lowering of interest rates on official loans.
A reduction of interest rates to about 4 percent should reduce cumulative interest payments by some 25 bn between 2011 and 2020. This implies a reduction in the debt ratio in 2020 (without private sector involvement) of around 10% of GDP.
Meanwhile, the offer of private sector involvement (PSI) implies further important benefits for Greek public debt sustainability.
PSI considerably stretches the average maturity of Greek government debt even further and reduces substantially the amounts that Greece will have to raise in the markets by the end of the programme in 2014. PSI and the accompanying debt buy-back entail a further estimated net debt reduction by some 26bn or 12% of GDP by 2020.
It is correct that PSI entails certain costs, but these costs impact more on gross debt than on net debt. The costs relating to PSI include the recapitalisation of Greek banks (20 billion euros) and credit enhancements (35 billion euros), in the form of AAA rated bonds paid on an escrow account, for the new government bonds that are exchanged for existing bonds maturing during the period 2011-20.
This escrow account is an asset for the Greek government and has a positive impact on net debt.
And the Greek authorities are doing what is necessary to implement their various commitments. They are developing the proposals for the PSI along the lines of the IIF proposal. Preparatory work is continuing for the new support programme for Greece, in liaison with the ECB and together with the IMF.
The Commission's Task Force set up at the end of July is starting to coordinate technical assistance to Greece. Importantly, it will help ensure measures are taken to accelerate take-up of EU funds which make a visible impact on competitiveness, growth and employment.
Let me conclude on Greece by recalling that the situation of Greece is exceptional, and that's why it requires a special and unique solution with regard to PSI.
I can therefore only reiterate what the Heads of State and Government said on 21st July PSI will be restricted only to Greece, and will thus not be a feature of crisis management in other Member States.
- Stato
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