tommy271
Forumer storico
Dal Financial Times di oggi:
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This would encourage banks to use any additional liquidity to lend to businesses and households. Previous ECB loans, known as long-term refinancing operations, were predominantly used to buy up more government debt rather than extending corporate borrowing.
“Perhaps paradoxically, a rigorous AQR and stress test helps monetary policy [function],” Mr Praet said.
Mr Praet’s comments are the first from a top ECB official to explicitly link the AQR to the governing council’s reluctance to have its liquidity used to fund purchases of sovereign bonds.
In the past, the assumption that sovereigns would always honour their debts meant global regulatory standards such as the Basel II accord allowed governments to set their own risk weights for their bonds.
In practice, this meant regulators seldom asked their banks to hold any capital against their holdings of national sovereign debt. Earlier stress tests, conducted in 2011 by the European Banking Authority, placed only limited risk weights on sovereign exposures after the European Council said that it would not let any eurozone sovereign fail.
However, an EBA exercise conducted later that year required banks to hold a capital buffer against government debt.
Mr Praet said: “Should the procyclical impact of the AQR be significant, then monetary policy would be able to act – without hesitation and being reassured that the side effects of a liquidity injection that we have seen for the 2011-2012 [three-year long-term refinancing operations] would be minimised.”
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This would encourage banks to use any additional liquidity to lend to businesses and households. Previous ECB loans, known as long-term refinancing operations, were predominantly used to buy up more government debt rather than extending corporate borrowing.
“Perhaps paradoxically, a rigorous AQR and stress test helps monetary policy [function],” Mr Praet said.
Mr Praet’s comments are the first from a top ECB official to explicitly link the AQR to the governing council’s reluctance to have its liquidity used to fund purchases of sovereign bonds.
In the past, the assumption that sovereigns would always honour their debts meant global regulatory standards such as the Basel II accord allowed governments to set their own risk weights for their bonds.
In practice, this meant regulators seldom asked their banks to hold any capital against their holdings of national sovereign debt. Earlier stress tests, conducted in 2011 by the European Banking Authority, placed only limited risk weights on sovereign exposures after the European Council said that it would not let any eurozone sovereign fail.
However, an EBA exercise conducted later that year required banks to hold a capital buffer against government debt.
Mr Praet said: “Should the procyclical impact of the AQR be significant, then monetary policy would be able to act – without hesitation and being reassured that the side effects of a liquidity injection that we have seen for the 2011-2012 [three-year long-term refinancing operations] would be minimised.”
(...)