Macroeconomia Immobiliare USA (residenziale e commerciale) e finanza strutturata

Stime di perdite sugli Alt -A RMBS in salita, secondo Fitch.

Il calo dei prezzi delle case ha inciso drasticamente sull'home equity, portandolo su valori negativi, anche per il 50% debitori con performing loans (ai quali tuttavia non converrebbe continuare a pagare il mutuo) dei mutui Alt -A accesi nel periodo 2005-7 e del 10% di tutti i debitori solvibili con mutui Alt -A accesi prima del 2005.

Pesa inoltre il fattore disoccupazione.

Fitch: Negative Equity, Jobless Claims Weigh on U.S. Alt-A RMBS; Actions on 767 Deals

06 Aug 2009 9:32 AM (EDT)

Fitch Ratings-New York-06 August 2009: Despite early signs of home price stabilization, rampant negative home equity and continued rising unemployment augur for continued performance pressures on U.S. Alt-A RMBS, according to Fitch Ratings.

In response, Fitch has taken various rating actions on 767 U.S. Alt-A RMBS transactions. A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions on the affected transactions can be found at 'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title search for 'Alt-A RMBS Rating Actions for August 6, 2009.'

'Home price declines have resulted in negative home equity for approximately half of the remaining performing borrowers in the 2005-2007 vintages and approximately 10% of the remaining performing borrowers for all transactions prior to 2005,' said Managing Director Vincent Barberio. 'Unemployment is up significantly since our last Alt-A rating review, particularly in California where the unemployment rate has jumped from 8% to a record-high of 11.6%.'

This will result in increased pressure on Alt-A loans since approximately 36% of the borrowers in Fitch-rated Alt-A pools are in California.

Today's rating actions reflect Fitch's expected collateral loss from the mortgage pools and cash flow analysis of each bond.

The average updated expected collateral losses as a percentage of the original pool balance for the pre-2005, 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintages are as follows:
--Pre-2005: 1%;
--2005: 8%;
--2006: 18%;
--2007: 26%.

As a percentage of the remaining pool balance, average expected losses for the same cohorts are:
--Pre-2005: 4%;
--2005: 14%,
--2006: 24%
--2007: 29%.

In aggregate, Fitch-rated Alt-A transactions consist of 64% fixed-rate loans, 30% hybrid-ARM adjustable-rate loans (ARM) and 6% option ARM loans.

The expected loss for each mortgage pool, the loss coverage ratio for each bond and the average target loss coverage ratios used in the review are provided in a report on Fitch's web site and can be located by performing a title search for 'RMBS Loss Metrics'.

The updated expected collateral losses incorporate performance trends and home price declines since the last rating revisions, which relied on October 2008 remittance data.

The combination of continued home price and employment decline has increased negative pressure on the roll-rates of performing borrowers into a delinquency status despite the increased seasoning of the loans.

Although net roll-rates have improved from the seasonal high in December, the net roll-rates for both the Pre-2005 and 2005-2007 vintage groups in the first half of 2009 were approximately double that experienced during the same period in 2008 when modified loans are excluded.

The deterioration in the market environment appears to be outweighing any expected improvement in performance from seasoning.

The number of completed loan modifications in Alt-A has risen but remains relatively limited to date. Fitch estimates 2% of Alt-A borrowers reported as 'Current' in Fitch-rated pools have had their loan terms modified. The performance to date of modified loans continues to raise concerns about the sustainability of the modifications as Fitch describes in 'U.S. RMBS Servicers' Loss Mitigation and Modification Efforts' published on May 26, 2009.

The performance to date for Alt-A modifications appears to indicate re-default rates after 12 months of above 50%.

In addition to the higher default rates, loss severities on defaulted loan liquidations have also continued to rise and have averaged approximately 47% for Pre-2005 vintages and 57% for 2005-2007 vintages in the second quarter of 2009, up from 38% and 41%, respectively, for the same quarter of 2008.

When determining each collateral pool's projected base-case and rating stressed default and loss severity assumptions, Fitch uses a proprietary loan-level loss model as described in its May 7 report, 'ResiLogic: U.S. Residential Mortgage Loss Model Criteria' also available at 'www.fitchratings.com'.

After determining each pool's projected base-case and stressed scenario loss assumptions, Fitch projects cashflows to determine the amount of collateral loss which would cause each bond to default, also referred to as the bond's break-loss. Fitch's cash flow assumptions are described in the report 'U.S. RMBS Alt-A Surveillance Criteria' published on Dec. 15, 2008.

When performing cash flow analysis, Fitch projects losses and creates cash-flow assumptions for each individual mortgage pool in a transaction, even in transactions where the mortgage pools are cross-collateralized.

For subordinate and non-super senior classes, however, the projected aggregate performance of the cross-collateralized pools is typically the analytical focus for the ratings, since losses across all pools erode the shared credit support for those class types.

For super-senior classes, the analysis focuses on both the aggregate pool and the individual pool which independently collateralizes the super-senior class once all cross-collateralized subordinate classes are written off. It is possible for two super-senior classes in the same transaction to have the same current credit support but different ratings due to a credit distinction in the respective individual pools collateralizing each super-senior class.

It is important to note that Fitch uses the bond's break-loss as determined through the cash flow analysis - not its current credit enhancement percentage - when assessing a bond's credit support. As is the case with most super seniors, a bond's break-loss may be materially lower than its current credit enhancement because the bond is expected to lose credit support due to future principal distribution to support classes.

Many classes in Pre-2005 shifting-interest transactions that are currently passing performance triggers and are distributing principal pro rata across all classes also exhibit this behavior. In other cases, a bond's break-loss may be significantly higher than the current credit enhancement, such as in the case of a senior front-pay sequential class that will pay in full in a short period of time.
 
Attenzione: parla della Cina.

Ma lo posto perchè se rallenta anche in Cina l'immobiliare...

MILANO (MF-DJ)--L'indice Composite della Borsa di Shanghai chiude la
seduta in rosso, lasciando sul terreno lo 0,3% a 3249,76 punti, nonostante
che il premier Wen Jiabao abbia ribadito domenica l'intenzione di
proseguire con le politiche macroeconomiche attuali di sostegno
all'economia.

"Gli investitori non hanno tenuto conto delle parole di Wen perche'
l'aumento di prestiti in yuan nei prossimi mesi non potra' tenere il passo
del totale dei prestiti elargiti nel primo semestre. La crescita avverra'
a ritmo sicuramente ridotto", ha spiegato Zhang Gang di Central China
Securities.

Sul listino terminano in rosso i titoli bancari e immobiliari: China
Construction Bank perde il 2%, China Vanke cede l'1,7%.
red/est/lca
 
Attenzione: parla della Cina.

Ma lo posto perchè se rallenta anche in Cina l'immobiliare...

MILANO (MF-DJ)--L'indice Composite della Borsa di Shanghai chiude la
seduta in rosso, lasciando sul terreno lo 0,3% a 3249,76 punti, nonostante
che il premier Wen Jiabao abbia ribadito domenica l'intenzione di
proseguire con le politiche macroeconomiche attuali di sostegno
all'economia.

"Gli investitori non hanno tenuto conto delle parole di Wen perche'
l'aumento di prestiti in yuan nei prossimi mesi non potra' tenere il passo
del totale dei prestiti elargiti nel primo semestre. La crescita avverra'
a ritmo sicuramente ridotto", ha spiegato Zhang Gang di Central China
Securities.

Sul listino terminano in rosso i titoli bancari e immobiliari: China
Construction Bank perde il 2%, China Vanke cede l'1,7%.
red/est/lca

In Cina, sulla costa, l'immobiliare è a bolla da parecchio tempo: è pieno di edifici destinati ad essere adibiti ad uso ufficio completamente vuoti ed acquistati in vista della possibilità di speculare sulla futura espansione economica della Cina e soprattutto della futura rivalutazione dello yuan.

La bolla è alimentata dalla natura dello yuan: il detenere asset immobiliari finisce per costituire la principale maniera per speculare sull'andamento della valuta... sempre che le cose vadano nella direzione giusta...
 
Il 9,24% di tutti i titolari di mutui USA sono in ritardo sul pagamento delle rate di oltre 30 giorni...


9% of all home loans are delinquent

Mortgage lenders say the flood of foreclosures has not yet crested. Highwater mark should come this fall.

By Les Christie, CNNMoney.com staff writer
Last Updated: August 20, 2009: 12:14 PM ET

NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) -- The number of Americans who have fallen at least 30 days behind on their home loan payments inched up slightly between the first and second quarters of 2009, but jumped 44% compared on an annual basis, according to an industry report.

That puts delinquencies at a record 9.24% of mortgages, according to the National Delinquency Report from the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) That represents more than 4 million of the 45 million borrowers covered by the report.

What the rate does not include, however, are loans already in foreclosure. Some 4.3% of all the mortgages are in that stage, up from 3.85% three months earlier and 1.55 percentage points from one year ago.

The combined percentage of loans past due and those already in foreclosure hit 13.16% during the quarter, the highest ever recorded by the MBA survey

"There was a major drop in foreclosures on subprime ARM loans," said Jay Brinkmann, chief economist for the MBA, in a prepared statement. "The drop, however, was offset by increases in the foreclosure rates on the other types of loans, with prime fixed-rate loans having the biggest increase."

Indeed, the MBA survey reported that prime, fixed-rate mortgages accounted for nearly one in every three foreclosure starts. That's way up from a year ago, when only one of every five foreclosure start involved a prime loan.

That bodes ill for the future health of the mortgage market. Prime loans make up two-thirds of the mortgage market, and if delinquencies among these mortgages continue to proliferate, the number of foreclosures will soar.

Brinkmann forecasts continued delinquency and foreclosure increases until the economy starts to recover. He predicts that job losses will peak by mid-2010, as will delinquencies, and foreclosures will start to fall about six months later.

Problem areas

The so-called "sand states" continue to contribute disproportionately to the mortgage meltdown. Four states -- California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada -- accounted for 44% of all foreclosure starts during the quarter.
"Issues related to the deteriorating economy and deteriorating home prices in those states have driven their delinquency problems]," said Brinkmann.

In Florida, 12% of mortgages were somewhere in the process of foreclosure, the highest in the nation; another 5% were at least 90 days past due as of the end of June.

Adding in 30 days and 60 days past due and Florida's total delinquency rate comes to 22.8% -- almost twice the national percentage.

The next highest states are Nevada at 21.3%, Arizona at 16.3% and Michigan at 15.3%. California stood at 15.2%, but because it is such a large state, that represents nearly 900,000 mortgage borrowers.

"It's hard to look at a national recovery," Brinkmann said. "We could have multiple bottoms with some markets recovering much faster than others."
 
Sul CRE USA, potremmo non essere troppo lontani da un bottom: la caduta dei prezzi a gigno 2009 va rallentando ed alcuni settori cominciano a mostrare segnali di ripresa. E siamo ad oltre - 35% dal picco dei prezzi toccato ad ottobre 2007.

Resta più di una incognita: fra le altre, il fatto che giugno facesse seguito a due mesi di forte calo dei prezzi ed una certa ciclicità del loro andamento che porta ad un appiattimento nei mesi estivi. Senza contare, aggiungerei, il possibile impatto in futuro di un costo del denaro in risalita.

Moody's: U.S. commercial real estate prices experience mild decline in June

New York, August 19, 2009 -- Commercial real estate prices as measured by Moody's/REAL Commercial Property Price Indices (CPPI) decreased 1% in June, leaving the index at 26.9% below its level a year ago.

Coming on the heels of two consecutive large monthly value drops, the index now stands 35.5% below the peak measured in October 2007. The number of repeat sales showed a small uptick in June over the May transaction volume.

The 1% drop is the smallest monthly decline since February, when the index fell by 0.63%. The index also flattened slightly during the summer of 2008 when a 0.4% increase in July was followed by a 0.1% dip in August.

June price changes by property type varied widely, with the industrial sector experiencing a 20.4% decline and prices for office properties nationally rising by 4.1%

The report also looks at several measures on a quarter to quarter basis. Notable among them are the values in the Top Ten Metropolitan Statistical Areas, which while declining by 5.1% to 16.3% in the quarter depending on property type, continued to perform better than the nation as a whole

The CPPI

Moody's/REAL Commercial Property Prices Indices are based on the repeat sales of the same properties across the US at different points in time. Analyzing price changes measured in this way provides maximum transparency and methodological rigor. This approach also circumvents the distortions that can occur with other commercial property value measurements such as appraisals or average prices, says Moody's.

The title of this report is "Moody's/REAL Commercial Property Price Indices, August 2009" and is available at Moody.com
 
Federal Reserve and Treasury officials are scrambling to prevent the commercial-real-estate sector from delivering a roundhouse punch to the U.S. economy just as it struggles to get up off the mat.
Their efforts could be undermined by a surge in foreclosures of commercial property carrying mortgages that were packaged and sold by Wall Street as bonds. Similar mortgage-backed securities created out of home loans played a big role in undoing that sector and triggering the global economic recession. Now the $700 billion of commercial-mortgage-backed securities outstanding are being tested for the first time by a massive downturn, and the outcome so far hasn't been pretty.
The CMBS sector is suffering two kinds of pain, which, according to credit rater Realpoint LLC, sent its delinquency rate to 3.14% in July, more than six times the level a year earlier. One is simply the result of bad underwriting. In the era of looser credit, Wall Street's CMBS machine lent owners money on the assumption that occupancy and rents of their office buildings, hotels, stores or other commercial property would keep rising. In fact, the opposite has happened. The result is that a growing number of properties aren't generating enough cash to make principal and interest payments.
The other kind of hurt is coming from the inability of property owners to refinance loans bundled into CMBS when these loans mature. By the end of 2012, some $153 billion in loans that make up CMBS are coming due, and close to $100 billion of that will face difficulty getting refinanced, according to Deutsche Bank. Even though the cash flows of these properties are enough to pay interest and principal on the debt, their values have fallen so far that borrowers won't be able to extend existing mortgages or replace them with new debt. That means losses not only to the property owners but also to those who bought CMBS -- including hedge funds, pension funds, mutual funds and other financial institutions -- thus exacerbating the economic downturn.
A typical CMBS is stuffed with mortgages on a diverse group of properties, often fewer than 100, with loans ranging from a couple of million dollars to more than $100 million. A CMBS servicer, usually a big financial institution like Wachovia and Wells Fargo, collects monthly payments from the borrowers and passes the money on to the institutional investors that buy the securities.
CMBS, of course, aren't the only kind of commercial-real-estate debt suffering higher defaults. Banks hold $1.7 trillion of commercial mortgages and construction loans, and delinquencies on this debt already have played a role in the increase in bank failures this year.
But banks' losses from commercial mortgages have the potential to mount sharply, and the high foreclosure rate in the CMBS market could play a role in this. Until now, banks have been able to keep a lid on commercial-real-estate losses by extending debt when it has matured as long as the underlying properties are generating enough cash to pay debt service. Banks have had a strong incentive to refinance because relaxed accounting standards have enabled them to avoid marking the value of the loans down.
"There is no incentive for banks to realize losses" on their commercial-real-estate loans, says Jack Foster, head of real estate at Franklin Templeton Real Estate Advisors.
CMBS are held by scores of investors, and the servicers of CMBS loans have limited flexibility to extend or restructure troubled loans like banks do. Earlier this month, it was no coincidence that CMBS mortgages accounted for the debt on six of the seven Southern California office buildings that Maguire Properties Inc. said it was giving up. "During most of the evolution [of CMBS] no one ever thought all these loans would go into default," says Nelson Rising, Maguire's chief executive.
Indeed, many property developers and investors complain there is no way to identify the investors that hold their debt and that it is difficult to negotiate with CMBS servicers. In light of the complaints, the Treasury is considering guidance that would allow servicers to start talking about ways to avoid defaults and foreclosures sooner, according to people familiar with the matter. But investors in CMBS bonds argue that the servicers are ultimately bound contractually to the bondholders.
So Maguire will soon have a lot of company. In a study for The Wall Street Journal, Realpoint found that 281 CMBS loans valued at $6.3 billion weren't able to refinance when they matured in the past three month, even though 173 such loans worth $5.1 billion were throwing off more than enough cash to service their debt.
Mounting foreclosures in the CMBS sector would likely depress values even further as property is dumped on the market. And this would put pressure on banks to write down loans. "What's going on in the CMBS world is a precursor for what might be seen in banks' books," predicts Frank Innaurato, managing director at Realpoint.
The commercial-real-estate market could yet be salvaged by an improving economy and bailout programs coming out of Washington. In addition, capital markets are starting to ease for publicly traded real-estate investment trusts. Since March, more than two dozen REITs have managed to raise more than $13 billion by selling shares.
Still, most of the $6.7 trillion in commercial real estate is privately owned. Also, it is unlikely commercial real estate will benefit much from an early stage of an economic recovery. What landlords need is occupancy and rents to rise, and that means employers have to start hiring and consumers need to shop more. So far, there are few signs this is happening.


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http://sbk.online.wsj.com/article/SB125167422962070925.html
 
Una domanda sorge spontanea: ma se l'immobiliare residenziale USA ha fatto il bottom e dunque le cose vanno a migliorare, perché Toll Brothers - leader di mercato nella costruzione di case di lusso e solo homebuilder ad aver conservato un rating IG - si indebita per poter riacquistare sopra la pari, a prezzi fra 103 e 107, bond a scadenza 2012 e 2014 così da allungare la durata del debito ?

Il segmento delle case di lusso è quello difensivo nell'homebuilding, e le cose, se è vero che ci avviamo verso la ripresa, dovrebbero solo poter migliorare per Toll Brothers, che invece preferisce perdere dei soldi comprando sopra la pari pur di sostituire scadenze 2012 e 2014 con una scadenza 2019...

Toll Brothers Finance Corp.'s $250M 6.75% Senior Unsecured Notes Rated 'BBB-'

-Horsham, Penn.-based Toll Brothers Finance Corp. intends to issue $250 million of 6.75% senior unsecured notes, due Nov. 1, 2019. The notes will be guaranteed by Toll Brothers Inc.

-The homebuilder will use proceeds to tender up to $150 million of its $300 million 6.875% senior notes due 2012 and/or its $250 million 5.95% senior notes due 2014, and for general corporate purposes.

-We assigned our 'BBB-' issue rating to the new notes.

NEW YORK (Standard & Poor's) Sept. 16, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services today assigned its 'BBB-' issue rating to Toll Brothers Finance Corp.’s $250 million 6.75% senior unsecured notes due Nov. 1, 2019. The notes will be guaranteed by parent Toll Brothers Inc. and will rank pari passu with the company's existing senior unsecured notes.

Toll Brothers will use proceeds from the issuance to fund a tender offer for up to $150 million of its $300 million 6.875% senior notes due 2012 and/or its $250 million 5.95% senior notes due 2014, and for general corporate purposes.

Total consideration for the tender offer will range from 103%-to-107% of par.


Horsham, Pa.-based Toll Brothers is one of the nation's largest homebuilders, having delivered 3,184 homes during the 12 months ended July 31, 2009. The company's focus on the luxury segment (with an average price of roughly $616,000) is unique among its large public peers.

Toll Brothers' closings and revenues have fallen sharply in recent years and the company posted a large ($472 million) GAAP loss in the most recent quarter (including a $417 million valuation allowance against its deferred tax assets and other noncash charges).

However, the company's order trends were positive (up 3%), as cancellations (9% of gross orders) fell closer to historical averages. The improved orders originated from 22% fewer communities and indicate higher absorption.

The operating loss modestly reduced shareholders equity and contributed to a slight increase in adjusted leverage (to 45% of capital on July 31, 2009). Toll Brothers held $1.7 billion of cash
at quarter end and leverage was less than 11% on a net-debt basis.
 
SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWatch) -- In another sign that the commercial real-estate market may be struggling as much as the residential side, Capmark Financial Group Inc., one of the nation's largest commercial lenders, likely will file for bankruptcy this weekend, according to a media report Saturday.
Capmark, formerly GMAC LLC's commercial real-estate arm, recently reported a second-quarter loss of $1.6 billion and signaled it may seek bankruptcy protection. The company will file this weekend, The Wall Street Journal reported in its online edition, citing an unnamed source.
An investor group comprised of KKR & Co., Goldman Sachs Capital Partners and Five Mile Capital Partners bought the company from GMAC in 2006. The group owned about 75% of the company, while GMAC and its employees owned the rest, according to the report, citing data through March 31.
Horsham, Pa.-based Capmark is selling its bank operation to Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and Leucadia National Corp. , but the bank would not be part of the bankruptcy filing, according to the report.

Capmark Financial to file bankruptcy: WSJ - MarketWatch
 

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