Obbligazioni bancarie Obbligazioni CITGROUP (1 Viewer)

[epico696]

mah......"potrebbe"...( could eventually)....non è deve......se , ma, forse......sta diventando un forum della disperazione.
Di str.........S&P, ne ha dette fin troppe ultimamente......tanto quando le cose vanno male, fa comodo a molti buttare benzina sul fuoco.
Io non ci credo.........poi magari avete ragione voi, ma quest'aria da "ritorno al baratto"....mi puzza tanto.
ad maiora

 

[samantaao]

da una parte credo sia inevitabile pensare che ormai tutto è possibile e che si possa finire x scegliere il male minore (o così ce lo venderebbero)

dall'altra è anche vero che in questo momento emettere bond è quasi impossibile per qualunque banca quindi un po' di terrore in più che abbassi le quotazioni permette di ricomprarsi il debito a basso costo...
più esplicitamente: il mercato non si fida di nessuna banca, chi è in difficoltà dovrà accedere ad aiuti, chi non lo è ci mangia sopra sfruttando il "panico" per ricomprarsi i propri bond
(quando facevo i moneybox i primi tempi come sottostante c'erano tds, dopo la prima ondata di panico il sottostante sono obbligazioni della banca stessa... a me questa cosa puzza, coi miei soldi vanno sul mercato e si ricomprano loro bond al 3-4 netto e nel pct mi danno il 2,5 netto... ovvio che ho smesso di farli, però per loro è una situazione molto favorevole)

 

[Jessica.]

.....se e' vero cio che gli economisti piu' illustri dicono ....cioe' che in economia ed in finanza cio che conta davvero e' la fiducia,.......

una volta che tagli il nominale alle obbligazioni senior.......chi mai ...tra privati, istituzionali.....potra' mai fare investimenti se non su titoli statali e poi e poi........

quanto tempo servirebbe per far tornare i capitali nel flusso dei mercati.......

sarebbe un crak assurdo......con notevoli ripercussioni nell'economia reale....artro che '29.....

l'unica e' stampare carta ed aspettare di pagare pegno piu' avanti con l'inflazione a doppia cifra......

 

[Capirex85]

Secondo me vi fate troppi problemi. Inutile fare mille ipotesi su qualcosa che non può essere previsto. I paragoni col 29 non hanno senso, il mondo è cambiato troppo e allora son fallite in America nel solo primo anno migliaia di banche e c'erano le file al di fuori dagli sportelli. Grazie agli interventi dei governi questo pericolo è stato scongiurato a ottobre e quindi la fase più pericolosa è passata, adesso si tratta solo di ristrutturare il sistema bancario il più in fretta possibile per evitare un perido prolungato di ristagnazione economica come è avvenuto in Giappone. Su chi saranno scaricate le perdite è da vedere, sinceramente non ci vedo nulla di così ecclatante se gli obb senior sono chiamati a prendersi in carico la loro quota come gli azionisti e i contribuenti.

Dal punto di vista di investitori sappiate che comprare/detenere bond bancari in questo momento comporta rischi concreti. Il resto ce lo dirà il futuro.

 

[ladiga]

Secondo me vi fate troppi problemi. Inutile fare mille ipotesi su qualcosa che non può essere previsto. I paragoni col 29 non hanno senso, il mondo è cambiato troppo e allora son fallite in America nel solo primo anno migliaia di banche e c'erano le file al di fuori dagli sportelli. Grazie agli interventi dei governi questo pericolo è stato scongiurato a ottobre e quindi la fase più pericolosa è passata, adesso si tratta solo di ristrutturare il sistema bancario il più in fretta possibile per evitare un perido prolungato di ristagnazione economica come è avvenuto in Giappone. Su chi saranno scaricate le perdite è da vedere, sinceramente non ci vedo nulla di così ecclatante se gli obb senior sono chiamati a prendersi in carico la loro quota come gli azionisti e i contribuenti.

Dal punto di vista di investitori sappiate che comprare/detenere bond bancari in questo momento comporta rischi concreti. Il resto ce lo dirà il futuro.

Ciao Capirex,

concordo. Ogni similitudine con le crisi passate rischia di generare una sorta di capacità salvifica empirica.

Secondo me l'unica cosa certa è che se muovono un'altra pedina senza valutare bene le conseguenze (il 15 settembre docet) può succedere di nuovo di tutto, anche l'imponderabile.

Ecco perchè prendono tempo: con Citi, con GM, con AIG, sperando di trovare il consenso almeno sulla metodologia di salvataggio.

Comunque l'haircut per i bondholders è soluzione valida se globale e universale. Faccio un esempio banale: se i Citi o i Bofa venissero tagliati anche solo dell'20%, come possono le altre banche reggere una sana concorrenza? Allora anche le inglesi, le tedesche, le francesi, le spagnole, le italiane, le giapponesi, le russe..........le.........le........devono/possono.

Per non parlare del solo mercato interno USA: non ci sono solo Citi, Bofa, ma altre decine o forse centinaia di realtà importanti.

E' una situazione complicata e non facile.

ladiga

 

[ricpast]

Articolo sull'entrata del Tesoro nel capitale di Citi:

Why Citi Common Shares Crashed, And Why Common Preferred May Be Problematic Too

March 01, 2009

The Volkswagen bandwagon idea du jour was a capital structure arbitrage in Citi (C) preferred paired with shorting Citi common. As the government's term sheet proposed the conversion of Citi preferred stock into common at a price of $3.25, a huge number of accounts thought there was a significant arbitrage to be held here.

The math is roughly as follows: the face value of Citi preferred stock (C AA on Bloomberg) is $25, implying 7.69 shares of common to be received per preferred share (at $3.25). As C common traded at an average price of $1.60/share during the day on Friday, a preferred share holder would effectively arb into an implied value of $12.30 of common stock per preferred share. Citi preferreds traded down to a low price of $4.5 early in the day, after closing at $5.50 Friday, however they quickly inverted and hit a high of $9.25 as people realized the potential arbitrage, before closing for the day at $8.05 on volume of 46.5 million shares. The trade could be boxed by shorting 7.69 shares of common for every share of preferred purchased, thereby "securing" a roughly 50% return. This (probably among other things) explains the persistent drop in Citi common over the day as hedge funds were locking in what they thought was a certain premium.

The problem that most however may have overlooked is a little footnote in the Citi illustrative example of how preferred to common conversion would take place, where Citi noted that the government will provide separate treatment for private and public preferred shareholders: "Ownership assumes conversion of publicly issued preferred stock is done at a significant premium to market, while the U.S. Government's and privately placed preferred are done at par."

Investors are now hoping that the premium for their publicly purchased preferred shares will be lower than the "guaranteed" 50% return they would pocket if they executed the trade at the end of the day, as otherwise they face massive losses on the conversion. As the Volkswagen example has taught us, and as the government has shown in its "white glove" treatment of private investors of all kinds, and couple that with some forced repo pulls by Citi common longs who may eventually realize their stock will skyrocket if they cause a forced squeeze, we wait with baited breath to see the carnage as the "Citi Arb Trade" blows up at some point over the next several weeks.

For people who want to dig through the most recent prospectus supplement to the Citi Series AA Preferred stock, you can do so here.

CreditSights has done an invaluable comparison of the 3 different classes of exchanging securities as part of the transaction, listing out the key terms for each tranche of securities (click on chart to enlarge). One of the relevant findings is that the gov't will exchange the balance of its existing preferreds (not exchanging to common) into 8% Trust Preferreds. The implication is current TruPS and eTruPS holders will be pari with the government, which is good from a security protection point, but risky in case the government decides to waive the dividend on the TruPS as all current TruPS holders will also lose dividend payments. The last is unlikely as it is the last form of dividend-paying security that taxpayers have remaining in Citi.

 

[ricpast]

But what about all those toxic, toxic assets on the left side of the balance sheetreaders ask? Won't they drag the company down anyway regardless of what the government does on the liabilities side? What good is a technical play if the company is an AIG in the making?
The same people at CS put together a good analysis of what the key Stress Test metric of Tangible Common Equity/Risk Weighted Assets will look like in a severe scenario (click on chart to enlarge). And by severe Zero Hedge would use the term realistic. This analysis also presumes that all the potential converters in the preferred to common exchange go along for the ride as demonstrated in Citi's presentation:

 

[ricpast]

The "severe" world is one in which:

• <LI _extended="true">unemployment is 10-12% <LI _extended="true">GDP is negative for more than 18 months <LI _extended="true">credit card receivable portfolios losses reach 15% <LI _extended="true">leverage loan marked down by -45%
• losses on mortgage portfolios are:

1. <LI _extended="true">subprime: -40% <LI _extended="true">optionARM: -50% <LI _extended="true">second liens: -30% <LI _extended="true">Alt-A: -20% <LI _extended="true">first liens: -7% <LI _extended="true">commercial real estate: -15%
2. residential and commercial construction: -40%

Presuming things really hit the skids, the incremental equity generated by the exchange may just be sufficient to not let Citi fail, which itself has stated that based on its own internal stress tests the newly generated TCE "will be enough to let the company pass through this period." TCE/RWA will go from a precariously low 3.0% to 4.9% even in the Draconian scenario. Of course, whether it is pessimistic enough is anyone's call and the government may very well be left with another AIG (AIG), however due to the lack of exponentially devaluing assets such as CDS contracts which become worth less and less with time, Citi's toxic assets may really only go down in value so far.

 

[ricpast]

Update 1: Story is starting to spread... Picked up by Dow Jones at 10:18 PM...

Update 2: More interesting preferred tranches emerge. The spike in Series AA Preferred occurred with Series T 6.5% preferred as well. The stock, whose liquidation preference is $50 and should trade at double the price of AA by implication, closed at $15.75, a slight arbitrage most likely driven by liquidity.

The higher rated Series XV/XVI and other Trust Preferreds (BB-/BB vs CC+), which traded up to a 10% premium over AA/T comparable $25 liquidation parity closing around $8.80 (we are looking at the structural subordination issues regarding regular preferreds vs TruPS).

Update 3: Some legal perspectives on the deal.

Update 4: Some more math on the current equilibrium price for the preferred based on the very crude information provided by Citi in the conversion example slide:

 

[ricpast]

• <LI _extended="true">As the lower right number indicates there would be 21 billion shares of common outstanding pro forma for all participants converting; <LI _extended="true">Current common shares out are about 5.5 billion; <LI _extended="true">The government's conversion of its total $25 billion worth of preferred shares would add another 7.7 billion shares of common (at $3.25) <LI _extended="true">As the slide shows, combined public and private ownership would be 38% of 21 billion or 7.98 billion. As the private preferreds hold 12.5 billion shares, this implies 3.85 billion of common, leaving 4.13 billion shares of common for public preferreds. <LI _extended="true">This allows to calculate what an implicit price for the public preferreds would be: taking 14.9 billion public preferreds translating into the 4.13 billion share of common gives a 3.6 conversion ratio, which is 47% of the unadjusted conversion of 7.69 shares pref/common. Assuming the Friday common closing price of $1.50 is used, we get a value of 3.6 x $1.50 Citi common giving a value of $5.40 for the $25 par value of public preferreds. <LI _extended="true">The Pref's closed at $8.05 on Friday. They are said to convert to significant premium to market. If one takes Thursday's closing price of $2.50 for Citi common, 3.6 share is equal to $9/share, which is a 9/5.5 = 64% premium to market to the Thursday preferred closing price of $5.50
• The question is: Is 64% considered a significant premium to the government? The end number could be much lower (or higher). There is no definitive information yet. A "mere" 20% premium to Thursday's close is a $6.6 implied preferred price, a 20% discount to the Friday closing price, and an explicit 20% incremental value to the common as the arb has to be repriced.

P.S. We will not respond to individual emails requesting additional mathematical elaboration. All you need to come to the presumed conclusion is here.

Update 5: Next, Bank Of America (BAC) picks up on this theme and in a research note focusing on the Citi exchange cautions that the Public Preferred could be in trouble:

An important difference in exchange terms wording

We note that in the term sheet of Citi’s exchange offer, privately placed and government held preferreds are to be exchanged into common stock at “$3.25/share at par”. However, publicly issued preferreds (including the Series T 6.5% convertible preferred) are to be exchanged into common equity at “$3.25/share at premium to market”. We think this is an important difference for investors of those targeted publicly issued preferreds. In our view, “$3.25/share at premium to market” opens up the possibility that those publicly issued preferreds are likely to be exchanged into common equity not based on their original par value, but based on their recently-depressed trading prices.
Implication for the Citi 6.5% convertible preferred
We are looking for Citi to provide additional details on the exact definition of the term “at premium to market” regarding the exchange of those publicly issued preferreds. In our view, “at premium to market” could be interpreted as an “adjusted par value” that is based on past trading price of the preferreds plus a certain premium. Here, we offer our scenario analysis based on certain assumptions. The current trading range of the Citi 6.5% convertible preferred of $15 - $17/share (versus $1.50 C common price) implies an “adjusted par value” of about $33-37/share, which is about 65-74% of the original par value of $50/share and is a premium of 145-178% over the 30-trading price of the series T preferred. Assumptions and detailed scenario analysis are on the second page.
Importantly, investors should note that this is only one of the multiple possible interpretations of the exchange terms, and it could be very different from the more precise exchange terms that Citi may announce later. Investors are strongly recommended to look for Citi’s further clarification regarding this exchange announcement.
Additionally BofA present the following hypothetical conversion analysis on the Citi 6.5% Cvt Pfd (which has a liquidation preferrence of $50, so divide all output numbers by 2 to get comparable values for the Straight Preferred AA, E, and F $25 liquidation pref public preferreds). The question is whether the 45-78% implied premium conversion over recent pref trading prices is what the govt has in mind with its cryptic statement.


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