Bond russi, situazione
We think that the rally in Russian sovereign bonds since the beginning of the year has limited upside from here due to the country’s fundamentals.
The spread of the credit default swap linked to Russian sovereign bonds (the 5-year CDS in USD) declined sharply from a peak of 633 bps on 30 January 2015 to a low 335 bps on 8 April, but has trended up again in recent weeks. The factors behind this rally include, in our view, a stabilization in the price of oil (the price of Brent has rallied from just above USD50/bbl in January to above USD66/bbl in the opening days of May). Russia exports around 4.5 million barrels of oil per day and a rise of USD15/bbl in the price translates into an extra USD 25 billion if sustained for a year. Beyond oil, there were no new triggers for a tightening of sanctions against Russia during this period. Ironically, Russian bonds also benefited temporarily from the sovereign downgrade to sub-investment grade status by S&P and Moody’s in 1Q15. Funds following sub-investment grade benchmarks were required to add Russian sovereign bonds.
Over the next six months though, unless there is a very substantial rally in oil prices and a roll-back of sanctions against Russia, neither of which we expect in our base case, the pressures of a severe recession, a poor growth outlook in 2016, and large repayments from 2017 should weigh on the market’s assessment of the sovereign’s contingent liabilities if access to international capital markets remains challenging. While the sovereign is in a very strong position to service its foreign debt (estimated at USD 39 billion in March 2015), the private sector owes a lot more money to non-residents: The banks owe USD 154 billion (69% denominated in USD, 14% in RUB, 12% in EUR) and the corporates USD 355 billion (63% in USD, 24% in RUB and 12% in EUR). These large amounts exceed Russia’s current level of foreign exchange reserves (USD 353 billion at end-April 2015), which means that the risk premium associated with Russian bonds, both sovereign and corporate, can be impacted by factors affecting the availability of foreign exchange. We believe that sanctions against Russia will be long-lasting, with a low probability of sanctions rolled back before the new US administration takes office in January 2017.
Recommendations: For investors who want to add exposure to Russia despite the asymmetric risks (we see more downside than upside over a six-month horizon), our preference is for selected sovereign bonds under our coverage over corporates. Within the corporate space, we prefer those issuers likely to receive state support if needed (e.g. issuers of systemic relevance).