Titoli di Stato (Volume VIII) - mag 2023 (2 lettori)

valgri

valgri

Valter : Born in 1965
daniele26 ha scritto:
G. SAX

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Cedole fissenti signorie1 pagate al Rimborso:

Anno 1 : 5,10% ? Anno 2: 5,10%

Anno 3: 5,40% ? Anno 4: 5,60%

Anno 5: 5,80% ? Anno 6: 6,00%

Anno 7: 6,20% Anno 8: 6,40%

Anno 9: 6,60% Anno 10: 6,80%

Anno 11: 7,00%

Le cedole fisse sono corrisposte in un’unica soluzione al Rimborso delle Obbligazioni, annualmente discrezione a prevista dell’Emittente o a Scadenza. Il rendimento delle Obbligazioni dipenderàrà anche dal di acquisto dal prezzo di vendita dal prezzo di vendita (se effettuata prima della Scadenza) delle persone che si prestano sul mercato.
Clicca per allargare...
Nuova emissione , isin ?
 
ang41

ang41

belindo
Per me non siamo ancora fuori da onda 5 ma il superamento della verde mi farebbe cambiare idea.
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samantaao

samantaao

Forumer storico

Italy 'BBB/A-2' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable​


Overview​

  • Economic growth will decelerate in 2023 and 2024 on the back of rising private sector savings, tightening credit conditions, slowing manufacturing, and weakening global trade.
  • By 2025, we project that Italy's real GDP growth will recover to above 1%, helped by accelerated deployment of the Next Generation EU funds, which we believe will likely extend beyond 2026.
  • Budgetary consolidation will be more gradual than previously expected due to the economic slowdown and rising interest payments as a percent of GDP reaching 4.2% next year versus 3.6% in 2021.
  • We affirmed our unsolicited 'BBB/A-2' long- and short-term ratings on Italy and maintained the stable outlook.

Rating Action​

On Oct. 20, 2023, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its unsolicited 'BBB/A-2' long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Italy. The outlook is stable.

Outlook​

The stable outlook balances our view of a slower budgetary consolidation than we previously expected, including due to increasing interest payments on large government debt, against the significant economic stimulus EU funds should provide.

Downside scenario​

We could lower the ratings should the government's budgetary trajectory deviate significantly from its targets. An only partial implementation of structural economic and budgetary reforms, especially those attached to the disbursement of EU funds, would also pose risks to economic growth and public finances, and consequently put downward pressure on the rating.

Upside scenario​

We could raise the ratings if budgetary performance improves, for example due to implementation of deficit-reducing policies or stronger-than-expected economic growth, leading to a decline in government debt as a share of GDP.

Rationale​

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By 2025, we project that Italian real GDP growth will recover to above 1%, after a deceleration in 2023-2024. The temporary softening will mostly result from tighter financing conditions; high, albeit declining, inflation; rising private savings; and a decline in external demand.

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Critical to this outcome is the full deployment of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) funds. Given relatively low execution rates of the NGEU funds supporting Italy's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) so far, we believe the funds' deployment will accelerate in the coming years. Italy, however, is not an outlier in the context of other EU sovereigns that benefit the most from these funds. We believe that if the funds are not fully absorbed by 2026, Italy and other sovereigns concerned will be granted an extension. Although the impact on economic growth will probably come through with a lag, it will remain a net positive, given the sheer size of the program and the structurally transformative nature of the projects involved.

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At the same time, budget deficits will be higher than previously expected this year and over 2024-2026. This is mainly due to bleaker economic growth and rising interest payments expected to absorb around 4.2% of GDP or 9% of government revenue in 2024 (versus 3.4% of GDP or 7% of revenue before the COVID-19 pandemic). In our view, the execution of the 2024 budget will be important in assessing the government's commitment to fiscal prudence and the direction of policy, especially in view of the recent increase in the 2024 budget target to 4.3% of GDP compared with 3.7%, previously.

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Government debt and sensitivity to market conditions will remain high. Under our base case, net government debt in relation to GDP will decline by 1% of GDP by 2026, reaching 132% of GDP, still above the pre-pandemic levels of 126%. Given the high government debt level, Italy remains particularly sensitive to a deterioration in funding conditions, which could weigh further on its budgetary performance.

Institutional and economic profile: Economic growth will recover in 2025 after a temporary slowdown, dependent on the EU funds' full deployment​

  • Economic growth will decelerate in 2023 and 2024 due to tighter monetary conditions, rising private savings, and weaker global trade.
  • By 2025, we project that Italian real GDP growth will recover to above 1%.
  • The full deployment of the NGEU funds will likely extend beyond 2026 and continue to provide a strong boost to the economy, albeit with a lag.

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With a GDP of $2.2 trillion at current prices, Italy's economy is the eighth largest in the world. It is highly industrialized and makes up 19% of the EU total value of sold industrial production, according to Eurostat data, with over one-third of this consisting of basic metals and fabricated metal products. This is just behind Germany (26%). Therefore, the large recent swings in global manufacturing, down during 2020, the first year of the pandemic, and then sharply up in 2021 and 2022, have created significant volatility in Italian national accounts. The more recent softening of world trade has been more impactful on Germany and Italy than on other services-intensive European economies.

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Italy is open, with exports of GDP of about 36% in 2023, and wealthy, with net household wealth estimated by Istat at €10.4 trillion. But, it is also experiencing both declining and aging demographic trends, which have significant implications for public finances and economic growth. While government debt is high, private non-financial sector debt (household plus corporate) is among the lowest in the G7 at 106% of GDP as of the end of the first quarter of 2023. Taking advantage of deepening private sector savings, the Italian Treasury has increasingly turned to retail markets.

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The impact of the inflationary shock and tightening credit conditions will linger in 2024, before economic growth picks up above 1% in 2025. We forecast growth will decelerate to 0.9% in 2023, slightly above the government's target of 0.8%. The government's support package (1.2% of GDP) will only partially offset the inflation-driven dent to private consumption. Meanwhile new restrictions to the "Superbonus" tax incentive on house renovation will affect the construction sector. Tighter financing conditions, rising private savings, and the bleaker growth outlook in Europe contributing to a decline in net exports will lead to further deceleration of economic activity to 0.7% in 2024. By 2025, we project that Italian GDP will recover to above 1%, driven by higher consumption due to disinflation, the NGEU-financed projects, the benefits from our expectation that the impact of monetary policy will become neutral, and assuming a resilient labor market performance.

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Critical to this outcome is the accelerated deployment of the NGEU funds, which we believe will likely extend beyond 2026. After months of negotiations, the EU disbursed the quasi-totality of the long-due third tranche (€18.5 billion), leaving the milestones tied to the remaining €500 million for the next review. The process is likely to be swifter for the next installment, as the EU has already approved Italy's amended targets. But project implementation is slow, with only 22% of the available funds executed by end-2022 according to our estimates (see "EU RRF At Half-Time: Italy And Spain Will Likely Need Extra Time To Spend Their Funds," published July 19, 2023, on RatingsDirect). This is not specific to Italy, and stems from strained administrative capacity, the economic downturn, and the complexity of these projects, aiming to address climate, digital, and social cohesion objectives. In our view, these low absorption rates may prompt a deadline extension for Italy and other countries, and the EU may be inclined to a certain degree of flexibility as long as the countries fall in line with the program's targets.

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The NGEU impact on economic growth will come with a lag but is a net positive. The NGEU funds, totaling €191.5 billion (9% of GDP), including 36% of grants, support around 80% of Italy's PNRR, the rest being covered by national resources and smaller EU funds. Investments and execution are likely to accelerate later than initially anticipated, over 2024-2025. In conjunction with structural reforms, including of the judiciary, they will boost the country's growth prospects. Given the sheer size of the recovery plan, we calculate that even half the funds available under the NGEU facility would boost growth by 2 percentage points by 2027.

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The labor market will remain resilient with unemployment ticking up slightly in 2023 and 2024. A more severe economic slowdown or hastier monetary tightening could weaken the forecast. Unemployment will remain at 7.8% on average during 2023-2026, which is well below the 2014 peak of 12.8% in the aftermath of that global financial crisis. Support measures during the pandemic and the energy crisis have helped to protect employment, while flexibility measures introduced as part of the Jobs Act in 2014 continue to bear fruit. Wage pressures are likely to remain moderate, perhaps slightly higher than the 3%-4% level seen in 2022. The lower wage pressure compared with that of European peers is mostly due to the nature of the Italian benchmark for wage indexation, which excludes energy prices, and the variations in the timing and size of wage increases due to multiyear contracts, especially given that several collective agreements were reached in 2021.

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Italy's energy resilience should strengthen. The country has managed to diversify away from Russian gas, which now constitutes 10% of its gas imports instead of 40% prior to the Russia-Ukraine war, thanks to new sources, particularly in North Africa. Still, around 80% of energy supply is imported and 19% is derived from renewables. This is a vulnerability that the NGEU funds earmarked for the green transition (37% of the total envelope) will help to reduce. In addition, Europe is moving ahead with plans to buy gas jointly in a bid to leverage the bloc's purchasing power and secure lower prices from international suppliers.

Flexibility and performance profile: Slowing government debt reduction amid tightening monetary policy​

  • Budgetary consolidation will be slower than previously planned after the government's revision of budget deficit targets.
  • The European Central Bank (ECB) is set to continue its tight monetary policy but we don't forecast inflation will hit the target before 2025.
  • Given the high government debt level, a sharp deterioration in the cost of financing will result in higher interest payments.

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We revised our budget deficit forecast for 2023 to 5.5% of GDP. This reflects in part an additional 0.8% of GDP expense stemming from the accounting of the Superbonus tax incentive. In September, the government diluted its original proposal to impose a windfall tax on banks' net income. Despite this, government revenue continued to perform relatively well, reflecting not just elevated inflation but continued success on narrowing the value-added tax collection gap.

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Budgetary consolidation will be slower than anticipated. Bleaker growth prospects in 2024, pressures to provide countercyclical measures, and rising interest and pension spending will lead to a deficit of 4.7% of GDP in 2024, compared with the government's target of 4.3% of GDP. In our view, the execution of the 2024 budget will be important in assessing the government's commitment to fiscal prudence and the direction of policy. This is especially relevant in view of the recent increase in the 2024 budget target to 4.3% of GDP versus 3.7% previously. Importantly, despite the widening of the 2024 deficit target, Italy's primary balance is expected to be almost balanced.

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It appears unlikely the government will implement revenue-negative modifications to the tax code. The government's tax reform measures aim to simplify the tax system by introducing a targeted flat tax on personal income for low- and middle-income employees, limiting the number of tax brackets, or cutting taxes for companies hiring new employees. They are not likely to have an impact in the near term, especially given that their contours remain uncertain at this stage. Nevertheless, taxes on wealth (including Italy's property tax, which is based on property values dating back four decades) are considerably lower than those of the Northern European wealth tax regimes.

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The pace of government debt reduction will slow. We project Italy's net government debt, excluding the European Financial Stability Facility guarantee, will slightly decline to 132% of GDP in 2026 from 133% in 2023, still above pre-pandemic levels of 126% of GDP. Nevertheless, the government expects to reduce general government debt through a partial privatization of public company shareholdings for a total of €20 billion (1% of GDP) over 2024-2026. In this regard, the government is already counting on the inflow from the sale of the bank Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, and reached a deal concerning the airline ITA. Contingent liabilities stem from the government guarantees, representing 15% of GDP, including 8% of GDP related to the general scheme, and 7% of GDP of one-off pandemic-related guarantees.

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A deterioration in market conditions could weigh further on interest payments.Interest payments as a share of government revenue are set to rise to 8.4% of revenue in 2023 and to above 9.7% in 2026, a hike from the 7% average in 2019-2021. This is due mostly to rising yields on bonds following the steep monetary tightening in the eurozone. Given high government debt levels, Italian bond prices can be volatile, as illustrated after the snap elections in 2022 and the announcement of the windfall tax on banks in August. They pose a risk to budgetary performance and the debt trajectory as gross financing needs remain elevated at 24% of GDP, and just under 17% of Italian government debt is floating rate. But the relatively long tenure of the Italian government debt, of 7.7 years average maturity estimated in 2023, contributes to limiting the pass through of market volatility on interest expenditure.

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Italy's external position is a relative credit strength. The current account will swing back to surplus in 2023 owing to lower oil imports and a rebound in tourism. Higher imports from the acceleration of projects under NGEU will weigh on imports over 2023-2026 and reduce the current account surplus in the next few years in comparison with pre-pandemic levels. Italy is a net external creditor vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and we expect its net external asset position to average 28% of current account receipts during 2023-2026. Half of gross external liabilities correspond to the government of Italy and the Bank of Italy.

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We believe the ECB could be done hiking interest rates but is not finished with monetary tightening. The ECB increased the deposit facility rate again by 25 basis points (bps), bringing it to 4.0%, a 450-bps rise since it started tightening monetary policy in July 2022. The increase comes as inflation remains stubbornly high in the eurozone and the recent oil price surge could put further pressure on prices. Interest rates may have reached their peak (4.0% for the deposit rate), although the ECB did not rule out further hikes. The ECB is likely to continue its quantitative tightening. If inflation does exceed the target for another two years, the current form of quantitative tightening--extinguishing bank reserves by letting bonds held by the ECB mature-–could give way to a more active form, with the ECB selling bonds on the market.

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Domestic banks in Italy have sharply reduced the high stock of problem assets accumulated in the previous downturn, and significantly reduced imbalances on their balance sheets. We also believe banks have made structural progress in managing the elevated credit risk they are exposed to in comparison with peer banking systems, including high exposures to weaker small and midsize enterprises. This progress can be summarized in better underwriting standards, more proactive management of riskier loans, and more prudent provisioning, all under the supervision and guidance of the ECB. Furthermore, the weakest banks that suffered the most in past recessions are no longer operating after being either liquidated or merged into stronger banks. These factors are likely to make Italian banks' asset quality more resilient to future downturns than in the past.
 
leosoier

leosoier

Forumer storico
B giorno, stanno comprimendo e media-volumi in calo, c'è il rischio di un onda a triangolo.

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Aggiorna una chicca e guardate che Rating:
Moody's quando non era rompi@@, visto che noi anche negli anni 90 (con Amato + Dini + ICI + extrabollo sulla patente), i debiti li abbiamo sempre pagati puntuali, certo con la lira era piu facile!! Ma adesso i paesi Visegrad che hanno la loro ex-moneta e sono dentro all Euro-sistema, fanno tanto i furbi, io vorrei vederli con l' Euro e senza possibilita di svalutare...

NB: sotto c'è il Giappone...


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E due:

www.ilsole24ore.com

Dbrs conferma il rating dell’Italia, trend stabile

L’agenzia Dbrs Morningstar conferma il rating BBB (high) per l’Italia con trend stabile. E’ quanto si legge in una nota, nella quale si spiega che i “fondamentali...
www.ilsole24ore.com www.ilsole24ore.com
 
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buttozzo

buttozzo

Forumer storico
buongiorno per quest'anno la data per non pagare i dossier titoli cade il 27 o il 28 dicembre perche' ho una bella cifra sul btp e non lo vorrei pagare grazie
 
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