Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 1 (13 lettori)

[negusneg]

FT Alphaville » Blog Archive » Hybrid debt attack hits RBS

Hybrid debt attack hits RBS

Posted by Tracy Alloway on Sep 04 07:54.

Fresh from the LSE — a bombshell for the British bond market, courtesy of the FSA and the European Commission:

Released 4-Sep-2009

In the context of ongoing discussions between the UK Government and European Commission about the RBS restructuring plan and the Commission’s recent communication on restructuring, which states that, where possible, banks subject to restructuring under State aid rules should not use this aid to remunerate their own equity and subordinated debt, the FSA has objected to RBS calling at this time the following four subordinated debt instruments with call-dates in October 2009:

National Westminster Bank plc securities: Upper Tier 2 securities, EUR 400m, callable 5 October

National Westminster Bank plc securities: Upper Tier 2 securities, EUR 100m, callable 5 October

Royal Bank of Scotland plc securities: Lower Tier 2 securities, AUD 590m, callable 28 October

Royal Bank of Scotland plc securities: Lower Tier 2 securities, AUD 410m, callable 28 October

RBS is therefore not calling these subordinated debt instruments, consistent with their terms and conditions. Further, future decisions on whether or not to call capital instruments will be subject to consultation with the same parties, as well as circumstances (economic or other) prevailing at the time, pending the European Commission’s decision on RBS’s restructuring plan.

RBS has become the first British bank to not call some of its subordinated, or hybrid, bonds — in this case upper and lower Tier 2 instruments, which help make up some its regulatory capital. The risk of non-calls and non-payment of coupons (Northern Rock announced a payment deferral last month) has been bandied about for some time — given the EC’’s determination to force bondholders to share some of the cost of state bail-outs of banks.

So much for non-call/non-payment `risk.’

Update: Here’s some comment from Monument Securities’ Marc Ostwald:

The big surprise is that the Lower Tier II were not called.

Initial mark down on the Upper Tier II is 20 points. Clearly impacts all financials where there is govt involvement, most obviously Lloyds, but the fear factor could well leave equivalent Barclays and HSBC suffering a knock-on effect, after all the regulator can easily pose the question: “why are you repaying cheap capital?” to any institution, not just Lloyds & RBS, and if this happens in the UK, then one has to have fears for the rest of the EU banks.

All in all this fits with what we were saying yesterday about the potential for a resurgence of fears about the health of the financial sector.

 

[negusneg]

FT Alphaville » Blog Archive » Hybrid heroes and villains

Hybrid heroes and villains

Posted by Tracy Alloway on Sep 01 10:54.
The market for Tier 1 bonds looks to have re-opened with Deutsche Bank’s €1.25bn and SocGen’s €1bn deals announced last week.
That’s the first issue of ‘normal’ European Tier 1 bonds, also known as subordinated or hybrid debt, since BNP on Sept. 11 last year. The market for the stuff, which helps make up some of banks’ regulatory capital, was pretty much moribund after the financial crisis hit and various issuers declared non-calls and capital writedowns.
In fact, returns for the iBoxx Tier 1 index fell about 66 per cent between August 2008 and March 2009. They’ve since surged 150 per cent from their March low.

The sudden spate of new issues, however, makes for interesting timing.
For a start, you still have lingering questions over banks’ financial health. You also have a giant question mark over the bonds’ ratings given the European Commission’s new-found determinism to force bondholders to share some of the pain of state bailouts of banks — by, in some cases, forcing bailed-out financial institutions to defer coupon payments.
In addition, you still have the non-call issue on callable bonds, which is a type of debt that can be redeemed by the issuer prior to maturity — normally at a premium. Deutsche Bank managed to roil the bond market by not calling one of its Tier 2 bonds earlier this year, saying it was cheaper, at then-Euribor rates, to simply allow the debt to mature.
According to the analysts at Dresdner/Commerzbank, however, the no-call is, at this point, almost an implicit assumption in the market:

Overall, the investment-case for hybrid bonds these days is a lot clearer than it has been in the past: high coupon, but also with the risk of non-payment in the case of negative results. In this, the ‘New’ Tier 1 resembles more the classical German Genusschein — participation capital with high, but profit dependant coupons. Also, it should be clear that call options will be exercised only on economic grounds.

Analytically the situation has become a lot more challenging, as proper valuation now requires stochastic calculus to evaluate the non-payment option and the call option. Bloomberg’s YASN function goes a long way to providing a comprehensive evaluation tool. But in the face of this analytical challenge, and the many unknowns involved, the market appears to have taken a very pragmatic approach and prices most existing Tier 1 issues as truly perpetual. The key number therefore is simple yield, i.e. coupon divided by the price of the bond. Using this metric, it becomes clear that there are four distinct groups of bonds out there right now (see also Chart 2 below)

• The Ugly — running yields above 15% indicate a strong non-payment risk. Currently some issues from British and Irish banks with state help approach this threshold.
  
• The Bad — running yields between 10% and 15%. Mostly banks where governments have taken a major capital stake.
  
• The Good — 8% to 9% appears to be the norm for those banks that only participated in guarantee programmes and have no significant state participation. The vast majority of bank Tier 1 issues fall into this category.
  
• The Unaffected — Less than 8% running yield can be found for non-banks as well as some issues by the banks that have come through the crisis largely unscathed — BNP, HSBC and BBVA.

What seems to be developing then is a rapid division between the heroes and non-heroes of the hybrid world — that is, those banks who were bailed out by their respective governments, and therefore have a high probability of coupon deferral risk, and those that managed to survive mostly without state aid.Combined with the no-call issue, and you may have some interesting bond market developments, according to Dresdner/Commerzbank:

Currently, we see ourselves drawn to the ‘no-call’ camp. Increasing loan provisions, and the fate of many — albeit smaller — US Banks being shut down by the FDIC clearly underline the existing risks for banks. Calling cheap Tier 1 bonds in this environment is a low-likelihood option. This is likely to change by 2011, and at the latest in 2013, when some of the 8%+ bonds issued since 2008 have their first call dates. Some bonds will eventually be called, and appreciation potential depending on market conditions remains significant. The re-opening of the market also increases the chance that trends in primary markets will influence price action for secondary issues. The running yield should thus generally be the lower boundary for expected returns — as long as coupons get paid. This is of course far from certain, and as the vast majority of outstanding hybrid bonds are non-cumulative, scenarios where recently issued bonds do not pay coupons for most of their lives but are eventually called are possible — as well as scenarios where investors end up with worthless irredeemable zero-coupon bonds.

 

[reef]

Bentornato negus!

 

[Zorba]

Bentornato Negus!!
Ci sei mancato molto: riesci sempre a dare una visione imparziale e ponderata di questo complicato mondo dei Perpetuals.
Grazie ancora!!

 

[bosmeld]

Buy Bank Hybrid Securities on Regulatory Pressure, SocGen Says - Bloomberg.com

Buy Bank Hybrid Securities on Regulatory Pressure, SocGen Says


By John Glover

Oct. 6 (Bloomberg) -- Investors should buy bank hybrid bonds because regulatory pressure on lenders to increase capital against losses and sell equity will be positive for this lowest- ranking debt, according to Societe Generale SA.
The so-called Tier 1 bonds of banks with “strong” earnings are recommended because the securities are likely to be redeemed sooner than indicated by their prices, analysts Nathalie Deliens and Matthew Maxwell wrote in a report today.
Regulations “will require banks to raise new equity, creating a layer of protection for holders of subordinated bank debt,” the analysts wrote. Higher earnings as economies recover from the credit crisis “increase the probability that coupons can and will be paid,” they wrote.
Investors should buy UniCredit SpA’s undated 4.028 percent notes callable in 2015 and Credit Logement SA’s 4.604 percent perpetual notes redeemable in March 2011, the analysts wrote.
Milan-based UniCredit’s notes trade at about 65 cents on the euro, which suggests investors don’t expect them to be called until 2022, while the bank has the “money and the will” to repay the bonds in 2015, the analysts wrote. The price of Paris-based Credit Logement’s notes will rise to more than 90 cents on the euro, from 82 cents, as the lender redeems the debt earlier than investors are estimating, SocGen said.

Skipped Payments

Investors should also purchase debt sold by issuers that might miss interest payments where prices compensate them for the risk, according to the analysts.
Dexia SA’s undated 4.892 percent notes callable in 2016 fall into this category, they wrote. The notes are trading at about 50 cents on the euro, according to SocGen, 20 cents less than what the analysts estimate to be a “fair price.”
Bonds from Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc and Natixis SA are also recommended buys because they’re “deeply discounted,” according to the analysts.
Banks’ Tier 1 securities, which mix elements of equity and debt, would be the last debt to be paid in a liquidation. Issuers typically have an option not to pay interest in certain circumstances, and some have come under European Commission pressure to skip coupons and redemption dates after receiving state aid.

To contact the reporter on this story: John Glover in London at [email protected]
Last Updated: October 6, 2009 07:55 EDT

interessantissimo negus

qui da quanto ho capito, consigliano anche di comprare titoli che sono a rischio cedola, come rbs, tu che ne pensi al riguardo????
che ne pensate di questi titoli che rischiano di non pagare la cedola????


io pensavo di prendere dexia e natixis che mi sembrano nel gruppo di quelle a richio le più interessanti....
ancher se sono pure quelle meno a sconto....


oltre al fatto che dexia è anche in attivo

e anche natixis, mi sa proprio che ci butto sopra qualche cosa
si sono pure ricomprati i tier 1 io neanche lo sapevo..

Paris, 06/07/2009 (informazione.it - comunicati stampa) - Following the exchange offers for Natixis Tier 1securities launched today by BPCE (the terms of which are described in a press release issued by BPCE), Natixis announced that it expects to repurchase all of the outstanding securities delivered in the offers in order to cancel them. The price paid for these securities will be the same as the one effectively paid by BPCE in the exchange offers.

As consideration for the repurchase, Natixis expects to issue new Tier 1 deeply subordinated notes to BPCE for the same principal amount as the new securities issued by BPCE in the exchange offers.

These transactions would have the effect of improving the quality of the capital base of Natixis by increasing its Core Tier 1 ratio. The amount of the increase in the Core Tier 1 ratio will depend on the success of the exchange offers, as indicated in the table below:
[FONT=Verdana,] Success rate of exchange offers ([1]) [/FONT][FONT=Verdana,] 50% [/FONT][FONT=Verdana,] 75% [/FONT][FONT=Verdana,] 100% [/FONT][FONT=Verdana,] Increase of Core Tier 1 ratio (²) [/FONT][FONT=Verdana,] 0.2% [/FONT][FONT=Verdana,] 0.3% [/FONT][FONT=Verdana,] 0.4% [/FONT]

Laurent Mignon, Chief Executive Officer of Natixis, said "This transaction increases the financial flexibility of Natixis and shows how Natixis will benefit from belonging to Groupe BPCE."

The Natixis Tier 1 securities for which the offers are being made are the following: (i) E300 million Natixis Undated Deeply Subordinated Floating Rate Notes issued on January 25, 2005 (ISIN FR0010154278, (ii) E200 million NBP Capital Trust I 8.32% Non-cumulative Trust Preferred Securities issued on June 28, 2000 (ISIN XS0113462609) (iii) E750 million Natixis Undated Deeply Subordinated Perpetual Fixed to Floating Rate Notes issued on October 18, 2007 (ISIN FR0010531012), (iv) E150 million Natixis Undated Deeply Subordinated Perpetual Fixed to Floating Rate Notes issued on March 31, 2008 (ISIN FR0010600163), (v) US$200 million NBP Capital Trust III 7.375% Non-cumulative Trust Preferred Securities issued on October 27, 2003 (ISIN XS0176710068), (vi) US$300 million Natixis U.S. Dollar Denominated Fixed Rate Undated Deeply Subordinated Non-Cumulative Notes issued on April 16, 2008 (ISIN FR0010607747), and (vii) US$750 million Natixis Subordinated Fixed to Floating Rate Notes issued on April 30, 2008 (ISIN US63872AAA88 for Rule 144A Notes and ISIN USF6483LHM57 for Regulation S Notes).


BPCE is offering an amount equivalent to up to €1.47 billion of new notes in
four series, two denominated in euros (for up to €129 million and €698.5 million
respectively), and two denominated in U.S. dollars (for up to US$339 million and
US$570 million respectively). These four series will be listed on the Luxembourg
Stock Exchange. The offer prices represent a significant premium relative to the
market prices of the existing securities (with an average premium of 17
percentage points). The new BPCE Tier 1 notes will have a coupon of 12.5% or 13%
depending on the series.


tocca trovare gli isin di questi nuovi titoli dati in scambio e garantiti da BPCE



NATIXIS: I risultati delle offerte di scambio BPCE rafforzano i fondi propri di Natixis

Notizia pubblicata in rete il 04/08/2009 11:47, tempo medio di lettura previsto 1 minuti e 39 secondi

 

[porchetto]

è un grande piacere poterti rivedere in linea
ciao N. in gamba

 

[discipline]

qui da quanto ho capito, consigliano anche di comprare titoli che sono a rischio cedola, come rbs, tu che ne pensi al riguardo????
che ne pensate di questi titoli che rischiano di non pagare la cedola????

magari ne hanno in pancia da vendere e così di certo il rateo loro non lo perdono

 

[bosmeld]

Anglo Irish to sell property portfolio

By Daniel Thomas, Property Correspondent
Published: October 10 2009 03:00 | Last updated: October 10 2009 03:00

Anglo Irish Bank is in talks to sell a €1bn (£925m) real estate portfolio, which includes UK properties such as Liverpool's Metquarter shopping centre, to Stephen Vernon, the British property entrepreneur.
The nationalised Irish lender has agreed the terms of the sale to Green Property, the Dublin-based property company run by Mr Vernon. Should the deal complete, the control of about €1bn of properties held in the UK, Ireland and Germany will be transferred to Green.
All the properties are held in Anglo Irish's Select Geared Property Fund, which was originally destined for syndication to private clients of the bank.
Only some of the equity was distributed and the collapse of the property market meant that the properties remained on the Irish bank's balance sheet.
Green will take over the asset management of the properties, and look to maximise the value of the assets with a view to a medium term exit for the bank. There is also a hotel in Cologne, a shopping centre near Düsseldorf and properties in Dublin.
One source close to the negotiations said: "Banks do not want to own property. This is providing a workout strategy to share the upside and maximise value."
Green has created a vehicle to hold the properties. It would own a majority stake in the non-syndicated equity. It is not known how much equity it will commit to the transaction, but it is expected to assume the debt provided by Anglo. Other minority investors in the fund will not be affected.
The properties, including three office buildings in London, will have fallen significantly in value since their acquisition. It is not known how much Anglo will have to write down the value of the properties if they are transferred to Green.
The properties are not in default of their loans so would not have to be taken by Ireland's National Asset Management Agency, which is to buy distressed real estate debt at a discount from the Irish lenders.
This is the second time that Green has acquired a large portfolio from an Irish bank this year.
In March, it bought a £500m portfolio of properties from Allied Irish Banks, which had taken control of the assets. Allied Irish also provided the debt to fund the transaction.

insisto nella ricerca nuove notizie su anglo irish...
visto che quell'lt 2 mi ispira parecchio, ma sono ancora indeciso...

 

[Topgun1976]

Quindi 8-9% Banche in Salute 10-15% Banche con Aiuti Statali Sopra 15% Danger

 

[negusneg]

Ciao ragazzi, il piacere è tutto mio...

Condivido l'analisi di SocGen, pur sapendo che hanno un grosso conflitto di interessi, essendo uno dei principali collocatori e trader di perpetue in Europa.

Non c'è dubbio che alcune emissioni, anche considerando il rischio che per qualche anno saltino le cedole, a 50 sono tutt'ora a buon mercato.

Personalmente però continuo a preferire quelle che le cedole le pagheranno di sicuro (salvo peggioramenti clamorosi della situazione) o, in seconda battuta, quelle come Bank Austria che dopo l'aumento di capitale non dovrebbero avere problemi.

Tuttora cerco di evitare le banche che hanno ricevuto pesanti aiuti statali, o che addirittura sono state parzialmente nazionalizzate, anche se mi rendo perfettamente conto che, per chi ama il rischio, sono quelle che possono offrire i gain più sostanziosi.

Per usare la terminologia dell'analista di Dresdner, ho in portafoglio alcune "unaffected" (prese in realtà quando erano scese a 70-80, talvolta anche meno), parecchie "good", solo alcune "bad" (quelle che secondo me potrebbero nel tempo rivelarsi "good", cioè non aver bisogno di aiuti statali, come BA o DPB) e di "ugly" solo un po' di Depfa, comprate ahimè prima dello scoppio della crisi.

In ogni caso non c'è dubbio che il riaprirsi della possibilità di aumentare il capitale da parte di un gran numero di banche alla lunga giochi a nostro favore...