Debito del Venezuela / GDP (fonte: IMF)
Venezuela
2009 27.6
2010 36.5
2011 50.6
2012 58.1
2013 72.3
2014 63.5
2015 31.9
2016 31.3
2017 34.9
2018 162.0
2019 172.1
2020 168.1
2021 165.5
2022 160.4
2023 157.7
http://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/fiscal-monitor/2018/April/pdf/fm1801.ashx?la=en
Ammetto che i numeri post 2017 mi hanno fortemente stupito...
Ma d'altronde non mi sarei nemmeno aspettato un calo così enorme del PIL (calo certo, ma non questo tracollo che ha dell'incredibile):
GDP 2011 (max) 334 mld$
GDP 2017 210 mld$
GDP 2018 100 mld$
GDP 2023 74 mld$
spero funzioni il link:
Report for Selected Countries and Subjects
secondo questa tabella nel 2017 dovevano avere 464 mld di pil visto che il debito(calcolando tutto ma è una sciocchezza visto che una bella fetta non lo pagheranno mai, chiedere ad Astaldi per es.) sempre quello è(162/0,349).
l'unica grande variabile 2017/2018 è il cambio. anche perché è storicamente accertato che in fasi di crescita del prezzo del petrolio il pil del venezuela cresce.
Venezuela, including assessing past and current
economic developments as the basis for the projections,
is complicated by the lack of discussions with the
authorities (the last Article IV consultation took
place in 2004), long intervals in receiving data with
information gaps, incomplete provision of information,
and difficulties in interpreting certain reported
economic indicators given economic developments.
The fiscal accounts include the budgetary central
government and Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA),
and data for 2016–23 are IMF staff estimates. Revenue
includes the IMF staff’s estimate of foreign exchange
profits transferred from the central bank to the
government (buying US dollars at the most appreciated
rate and selling at more depreciated rates in a multitier
exchange rate system) and excludes IMF staff’s estimate
of revenue from PDVSA’s sale of PetroCaribe assets
to the central bank.
The effects of hyperinflation and
the noted data gaps mean that IMF staff’s projected
macroeconomic indicators need to be interpreted with
caution. For example, nominal GDP is estimated
assuming the GDP deflator rises in line with IMF staff’s
projection of average inflation. Public external debt in
relation to GDP is projected using IMF staff’s estimate
of the average exchange rate for the year. Revenue
includes the IMF staff’s estimated foreign exchange
profits transferred from the central bank to the
government (buying US dollars at the most appreciated
rate and selling at more depreciated rates in a multitier
exchange rate system) and excludes the IMF staff’s
estimated revenue from PDVSA’s sale of PetroCaribe
assets to the central bank. The effects of hyperinflation
and the noted data gaps mean that staff’s projected
macroeconomic indicators need to be interpreted with
caution. For example, nominal GDP is estimated
assuming the GDP deflator rising in line with the staff’s
projection of average inflation. Public external debt in
relation to GDP is projected using the staff’s estimate of
the average exchange rate for the year.
).
