Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 2
- Creatore Discussione tommy271
- Data di Inizio
tommy271
Forumer storico
QUESTIONER: Morning, Gerry. On Venezuela has the IMF had any contact with the interim acting president Guaido? And, also, is the IMF designing or have any design of a program for future assistance to Venezuela in the case it's asked for?
MR. RICE: Look, Venezuela's much in the news. I'm wondering are there any other questions on Venezuela and I'll take them? And, you know, if there's any follow up I'll take that too.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. I was curious if you could talk about what type of pools the IMF has available that it would be able to use in the case of the situation in, like, Venezuela. I mean, I understand there's some procedural things that need to happen before any sort of program could actually begin, but I wondered if you could discuss the options that would be available in a situation like this, and maybe some information about their scale and what types of partnerships would be needed for them to happen.
MR. RICE: Okay. Good morning.
QUESTIONER: Good morning. Thank you very much. and I would like to know whether the IMF already has had talks, conversations with the Central Bank since January 23? I understand those talks stopped last year when they delivered date. Also wanted to know how many IMF member states have already recognized Guaido and whether that's -- that number is what the legal affairs office, department of the IMF needs to make a decision on whether the organization recognizes Guaido or not? Thank you.
MR. RICE: Okay. Let me take that collection of questions, and as I said, if there are follow ups we can do that too.
So maybe just stepping back a bit. Our First Deputy Managing Director David Lipton made some statements a few days ago on Venezuela where he stressed, as we have been stressing in the past the, you know, first and foremost the devastating humanitarian and economic crisis that is facing Venezuela. We see the reports of widespread food and medicine shortages, and worsening health and social conditions. Our director for the Western Hemisphere Department gave a briefing a short time ago where he also pointed to growth projected to contract further this year in 2019, bringing the cumulative decline since 2013 to over 50 percent.
There's hyperinflation and outward migration, and we are anticipating that those will intensify in 2019 as well, unfortunately. We have not had a policy dialogue. By that I mean the annual Article IV surveillance that we conduct with virtually all of our member countries each year. We have not had that with Venezuela or with the Venezuelan authorities for quite some time. In fact, since 2004 we have not had an Article IV. We've not had the opportunity for that kind of policy dialogue.
So, against that bit of background, our work has been focused on following the situation as closely as we can, and again, in light of this lack of dialogue. And more recently, as we have said, our focus has been on the issue of official date provision by the authorities. We've talked about that here in past weeks.
So let me turn more directly to some of your questions. So regarding the issue of official government recognition our position has not changed from what we said a few weeks ago. We're following the situation in Venezuela closely and as in all such cases the international community guides official recognition, and we will be guided by that. So that really is the first step in terms of, you know, the IMF position on Venezuela would be the establishment of the guidance on official recognize where we rely on our membership, on the international community. And before any other action could be taken by the IMF that step would need to be taken. So in terms of the sequencing that's the way it would work. And we're still in that process of consultation with the membership.
There was a question about -- so that kind of answers the question about, you know, possible design of a program or assistance. There are, clearly, a number of tools, financial instruments, technical assistance, analysis, and so on that the IMF uses, can use with our member countries. But it would be premature to, you know, begin to talk about any specifics because again, we are following the guidance of the international community and that would need to be established.
In terms of our -- so I think, you know, that also I hope answers the recognition issue.
In terms of our contacts, our contacts with the Venezuelan authorities have been on recently as I have mentioned here before, have been solely on this issue of data provision which we have talked about before. The IMF has been looking for more updated data from Venezuela over the past several years and the most recent discussions have been focused on that issue.
And in terms of our, you know, discussions with others, you know, in every country we have discussions with various stakeholders, with a broad group of stakeholders and, you know, we have tried as much as we can, given the constraints which I have just described in Venezuela. We have attempted to do that as well over the past years as part of our work to try and better understand the economic situation in the country.
But as I say this is pretty much in line with what we do across our membership. So that’s where we are on Venezuela. Are there any follow ups on that?
QUESTIONER: Yes. But what I want conversations with new government, Guaido's government. We are not talking about a civil society, we are talking about the new government that was confirmed, proclaimed on the 23rd of January. So has there been any conversation with widely when he was here in December or with some of their envoys here like (inaudible)? MR. RICE: You know, I'm not aware of any specific discussions with the IMF. But again, in every country we have -- we try to have a dialogue with a broad array of stakeholders and, you know, we have attempted to do that in the case of Venezuela as well in as much as we were able to. And, I mean, over the past several year is what I'm talking about, you know, we try to have a dialogue with board group of stakeholders. But on you specific question, I'm not aware of the -- any discussion there.
QUESTIONER: And the --
MR. RICE: Let me just take one more on -- are you on Venezuela as well?
QUESTIONER: Yes.
MR. RICE: Let me take one more on Venezuela.
QUESTIONER: You said that contacts with central bank have been solely on the issue of data provision. Has that contacts have taken place after January 23?
MR. RICE: Yes, I don’t have a, you know, I don't have a specific date on it but the -- sorry. The dialogue that we have -- we have been having with the Venezuelans was the Venezuelan authorities was on that issue of data.
QUESTIONER: But that was last year. There was, has there been dialogue this year at all? No contact with the Venezuelan authorities this year?
MR. RICE: I am not, I'm not aware of any contact. I'm not aware.
Transcript of IMF Press Briefing
MR. RICE: Look, Venezuela's much in the news. I'm wondering are there any other questions on Venezuela and I'll take them? And, you know, if there's any follow up I'll take that too.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. I was curious if you could talk about what type of pools the IMF has available that it would be able to use in the case of the situation in, like, Venezuela. I mean, I understand there's some procedural things that need to happen before any sort of program could actually begin, but I wondered if you could discuss the options that would be available in a situation like this, and maybe some information about their scale and what types of partnerships would be needed for them to happen.
MR. RICE: Okay. Good morning.
QUESTIONER: Good morning. Thank you very much. and I would like to know whether the IMF already has had talks, conversations with the Central Bank since January 23? I understand those talks stopped last year when they delivered date. Also wanted to know how many IMF member states have already recognized Guaido and whether that's -- that number is what the legal affairs office, department of the IMF needs to make a decision on whether the organization recognizes Guaido or not? Thank you.
MR. RICE: Okay. Let me take that collection of questions, and as I said, if there are follow ups we can do that too.
So maybe just stepping back a bit. Our First Deputy Managing Director David Lipton made some statements a few days ago on Venezuela where he stressed, as we have been stressing in the past the, you know, first and foremost the devastating humanitarian and economic crisis that is facing Venezuela. We see the reports of widespread food and medicine shortages, and worsening health and social conditions. Our director for the Western Hemisphere Department gave a briefing a short time ago where he also pointed to growth projected to contract further this year in 2019, bringing the cumulative decline since 2013 to over 50 percent.
There's hyperinflation and outward migration, and we are anticipating that those will intensify in 2019 as well, unfortunately. We have not had a policy dialogue. By that I mean the annual Article IV surveillance that we conduct with virtually all of our member countries each year. We have not had that with Venezuela or with the Venezuelan authorities for quite some time. In fact, since 2004 we have not had an Article IV. We've not had the opportunity for that kind of policy dialogue.
So, against that bit of background, our work has been focused on following the situation as closely as we can, and again, in light of this lack of dialogue. And more recently, as we have said, our focus has been on the issue of official date provision by the authorities. We've talked about that here in past weeks.
So let me turn more directly to some of your questions. So regarding the issue of official government recognition our position has not changed from what we said a few weeks ago. We're following the situation in Venezuela closely and as in all such cases the international community guides official recognition, and we will be guided by that. So that really is the first step in terms of, you know, the IMF position on Venezuela would be the establishment of the guidance on official recognize where we rely on our membership, on the international community. And before any other action could be taken by the IMF that step would need to be taken. So in terms of the sequencing that's the way it would work. And we're still in that process of consultation with the membership.
There was a question about -- so that kind of answers the question about, you know, possible design of a program or assistance. There are, clearly, a number of tools, financial instruments, technical assistance, analysis, and so on that the IMF uses, can use with our member countries. But it would be premature to, you know, begin to talk about any specifics because again, we are following the guidance of the international community and that would need to be established.
In terms of our -- so I think, you know, that also I hope answers the recognition issue.
In terms of our contacts, our contacts with the Venezuelan authorities have been on recently as I have mentioned here before, have been solely on this issue of data provision which we have talked about before. The IMF has been looking for more updated data from Venezuela over the past several years and the most recent discussions have been focused on that issue.
And in terms of our, you know, discussions with others, you know, in every country we have discussions with various stakeholders, with a broad group of stakeholders and, you know, we have tried as much as we can, given the constraints which I have just described in Venezuela. We have attempted to do that as well over the past years as part of our work to try and better understand the economic situation in the country.
But as I say this is pretty much in line with what we do across our membership. So that’s where we are on Venezuela. Are there any follow ups on that?
QUESTIONER: Yes. But what I want conversations with new government, Guaido's government. We are not talking about a civil society, we are talking about the new government that was confirmed, proclaimed on the 23rd of January. So has there been any conversation with widely when he was here in December or with some of their envoys here like (inaudible)? MR. RICE: You know, I'm not aware of any specific discussions with the IMF. But again, in every country we have -- we try to have a dialogue with a broad array of stakeholders and, you know, we have attempted to do that in the case of Venezuela as well in as much as we were able to. And, I mean, over the past several year is what I'm talking about, you know, we try to have a dialogue with board group of stakeholders. But on you specific question, I'm not aware of the -- any discussion there.
QUESTIONER: And the --
MR. RICE: Let me just take one more on -- are you on Venezuela as well?
QUESTIONER: Yes.
MR. RICE: Let me take one more on Venezuela.
QUESTIONER: You said that contacts with central bank have been solely on the issue of data provision. Has that contacts have taken place after January 23?
MR. RICE: Yes, I don’t have a, you know, I don't have a specific date on it but the -- sorry. The dialogue that we have -- we have been having with the Venezuelans was the Venezuelan authorities was on that issue of data.
QUESTIONER: But that was last year. There was, has there been dialogue this year at all? No contact with the Venezuelan authorities this year?
MR. RICE: I am not, I'm not aware of any contact. I'm not aware.
Transcript of IMF Press Briefing
tommy271
Forumer storico
AN asegura que gobierno vendió 73 toneladas de oro en 2018
Banca y Negocios @bancaynegocios
El gobierno de Nicolás Maduro vendió 73 toneladas de oro provenientes del arco minero durante 2018 a tres empresas extranjeras, dijo el diputado opositor Carlos Paparoni, quien aseguró que los datos son parte de una investigación que desarrolla la comisión de Finanzas del Parlamento.
El principal comprador fue Noor Capital, una compañía con sede en Dubai, que compró 27,4 toneladas. Sardes Kiymetli Madenler de Turquía compró 23,9 toneladas, y Goetz Gold, también con sede en la capital de Emiratos Árabes Unidos, compró 21,8 toneladas.
Paparoni dijo que la Asamblea Nacional no autorizó estas ventas y trabajaría para asegurar que no se venda más oro. Noor Capital confirmó el viernes pasado que había comprado tres toneladas de oro el 21 de enero de 2019 al Banco Central de Venezuela, pero no compraría más hasta que la situación política de Venezuela estabilizara.
Agregó que trabajan con países europeos con el fin de congelar el movimiento de fondos del Estado venezolano por parte del gobierno de Maduro, quien fue declarado usurpador del cargo por el legislativo.
Banca y Negocios @bancaynegocios
El gobierno de Nicolás Maduro vendió 73 toneladas de oro provenientes del arco minero durante 2018 a tres empresas extranjeras, dijo el diputado opositor Carlos Paparoni, quien aseguró que los datos son parte de una investigación que desarrolla la comisión de Finanzas del Parlamento.
El principal comprador fue Noor Capital, una compañía con sede en Dubai, que compró 27,4 toneladas. Sardes Kiymetli Madenler de Turquía compró 23,9 toneladas, y Goetz Gold, también con sede en la capital de Emiratos Árabes Unidos, compró 21,8 toneladas.
Paparoni dijo que la Asamblea Nacional no autorizó estas ventas y trabajaría para asegurar que no se venda más oro. Noor Capital confirmó el viernes pasado que había comprado tres toneladas de oro el 21 de enero de 2019 al Banco Central de Venezuela, pero no compraría más hasta que la situación política de Venezuela estabilizara.
Agregó que trabajan con países europeos con el fin de congelar el movimiento de fondos del Estado venezolano por parte del gobierno de Maduro, quien fue declarado usurpador del cargo por el legislativo.
tommy271
Forumer storico
CARACAS (Reuters) - La estatal Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) comenzó a mezclar su producción de crudo extrapesado con crudo liviano, debido a la escasez de diluyentes importados que han generado las sanciones impuestas por Estados Unidos la semana pasada, dijeron el jueves dos fuentes con conocimiento de la decisión.
Venezolana PDVSA comienza a mezclar petróleo extra pesado con crudo liviano por escasez de diluyentes: fuentes | Reuters
Venezolana PDVSA comienza a mezclar petróleo extra pesado con crudo liviano por escasez de diluyentes: fuentes | Reuters
tommy271
Forumer storico
Tenedores de bonos venezolanos, entre vender o esperar
Banca y Negocios @bancaynegocios
Los tenedores estadounidenses de bonos de deuda de Venezuela están en una encrucijada clave, luego de que el gobierno de Donald Trump les prohibiera a sus ciudadanos y empresas adquirir estos instrumentos, como parte del conjunto de sanciones que la semana pasada elevaron las presiones sobre el presidente Nicolás Maduro.
Los papeles venezolanos (todos en default excepto el Pdvsa 2020) solo pueden ser vendidos a no estadounidenses, lo que presiona a los tenedores a mantener sus posiciones y esperar una eventual reestructuración de la deuda con un nuevo gobierno o salir de ellos a un precio que no necesariamente garantice ganancias.
El movimiento, que sorprendió a los inversionistas, tiene ahora en el centro a JPMorgan, porque los bonos venezolanos son parte de su índice de mercados emergentes y si pierden liquidez (porque no se están transando) quedan fuera, y a los tenedores “les tocaría vender posiciones colapsando precios”, explica a Banca y Negocios José Gonzáles, director de la consultora GCG Advisors.
Esto cuando justamente ocurre uno de los episodios más claros de cambio de gobierno en Venezuela en los últimos años y el precio de los bonos ha estado subiendo y algunos, como el soberano 2027, se acercan al nivel previo al fallido anuncio de reestructuración hecho por Maduro en noviembre de 2017.
La agencia Redd Latam precisaba esta semana que un cálculo rápido indica que los tenedores de bonos tendrían que liquidar posiciones por $10.000 millones en bonos venezolanos si estos salen del índice de JPMorgan. “Eso significa que incluso los fondos que no están comprometidos con los índices podrían ver grandes pérdidas en el mercado. ¿Y quién estará al otro lado? Personas no estadounidenses, lo que ayudaría a fondos buitres (holdouts) no estadounidenses a construir sus posiciones”, dijo la agencia citando a un inversionista.
El lobby para que no ocurra ese escenario se activó esta semana. La agencia Bloomberg señala que un contingente de acreedores, incluidos Greylock Capital y Goldman Sachs Group, se reunieron con funcionarios del Departamento del Tesoro para expresar su preocupación de que a algunos de ellos se les exigiría vender con grandes descuentos si Venezuela se retiraba del índice.
“Ha habido conversaciones con JPMorgan”, dijo a Bloomberg Carlos Paparoni, diputado opositor y presidente de la comisión de Finanzas de la Asamblea Nacional (AN) y agregó que el interés de un nuevo gobierno será “una reestructuración rápida, confiable y amigable”.
En el Plan País, aprobado en diciembre por la AN y enarbolado la semana pasada por el presidente interino Juan Guaidó como estrategia para la transición, se fija como meta “una reestructuración profunda de la deuda pública externa, (que) ayudará a abrir espacio fiscal para garantizar una trayectoria sostenible de las finanzas públicas”.
Gonzáles afirma que “si es que hay ‘cambio de régimen’… y dependiendo de las condiciones en que se daría, se plantearía una reestructuración. Si no hay cambio de régimen debería precipitarse la aceleración por parte de los acreedores”.
Ambos casos son complicados para los tenedores, porque una deuda como la venezolana no es fácil de reestructurar y con el apoyo recibido por la oposición venezolana para desalojar a Maduro del poder, es previsible que se intente ejecutar una quita de proporciones importantes para dejar espacio fiscal a un nuevo gobierno.
“Incluso en el caso de una transición política, es probable que una reestructuración de la deuda sea un proceso largo. La transición será compleja (…) y la naturaleza de numerosas clases de acreedores, incluidos los tenedores de bonos soberanos y Pdvsa, prestamistas bilaterales (especialmente China y Rusia), los acreedores multilaterales y privados demostrarán ser obstáculos adicionales para una exitosa reestructuración”, apunta la agencia de calificación Fitch, en una nota publicada esta semana sobre el tema.
Banca y Negocios @bancaynegocios
Los tenedores estadounidenses de bonos de deuda de Venezuela están en una encrucijada clave, luego de que el gobierno de Donald Trump les prohibiera a sus ciudadanos y empresas adquirir estos instrumentos, como parte del conjunto de sanciones que la semana pasada elevaron las presiones sobre el presidente Nicolás Maduro.
Los papeles venezolanos (todos en default excepto el Pdvsa 2020) solo pueden ser vendidos a no estadounidenses, lo que presiona a los tenedores a mantener sus posiciones y esperar una eventual reestructuración de la deuda con un nuevo gobierno o salir de ellos a un precio que no necesariamente garantice ganancias.
El movimiento, que sorprendió a los inversionistas, tiene ahora en el centro a JPMorgan, porque los bonos venezolanos son parte de su índice de mercados emergentes y si pierden liquidez (porque no se están transando) quedan fuera, y a los tenedores “les tocaría vender posiciones colapsando precios”, explica a Banca y Negocios José Gonzáles, director de la consultora GCG Advisors.
Esto cuando justamente ocurre uno de los episodios más claros de cambio de gobierno en Venezuela en los últimos años y el precio de los bonos ha estado subiendo y algunos, como el soberano 2027, se acercan al nivel previo al fallido anuncio de reestructuración hecho por Maduro en noviembre de 2017.
La agencia Redd Latam precisaba esta semana que un cálculo rápido indica que los tenedores de bonos tendrían que liquidar posiciones por $10.000 millones en bonos venezolanos si estos salen del índice de JPMorgan. “Eso significa que incluso los fondos que no están comprometidos con los índices podrían ver grandes pérdidas en el mercado. ¿Y quién estará al otro lado? Personas no estadounidenses, lo que ayudaría a fondos buitres (holdouts) no estadounidenses a construir sus posiciones”, dijo la agencia citando a un inversionista.
El lobby para que no ocurra ese escenario se activó esta semana. La agencia Bloomberg señala que un contingente de acreedores, incluidos Greylock Capital y Goldman Sachs Group, se reunieron con funcionarios del Departamento del Tesoro para expresar su preocupación de que a algunos de ellos se les exigiría vender con grandes descuentos si Venezuela se retiraba del índice.
“Ha habido conversaciones con JPMorgan”, dijo a Bloomberg Carlos Paparoni, diputado opositor y presidente de la comisión de Finanzas de la Asamblea Nacional (AN) y agregó que el interés de un nuevo gobierno será “una reestructuración rápida, confiable y amigable”.
En el Plan País, aprobado en diciembre por la AN y enarbolado la semana pasada por el presidente interino Juan Guaidó como estrategia para la transición, se fija como meta “una reestructuración profunda de la deuda pública externa, (que) ayudará a abrir espacio fiscal para garantizar una trayectoria sostenible de las finanzas públicas”.
Gonzáles afirma que “si es que hay ‘cambio de régimen’… y dependiendo de las condiciones en que se daría, se plantearía una reestructuración. Si no hay cambio de régimen debería precipitarse la aceleración por parte de los acreedores”.
Ambos casos son complicados para los tenedores, porque una deuda como la venezolana no es fácil de reestructurar y con el apoyo recibido por la oposición venezolana para desalojar a Maduro del poder, es previsible que se intente ejecutar una quita de proporciones importantes para dejar espacio fiscal a un nuevo gobierno.
“Incluso en el caso de una transición política, es probable que una reestructuración de la deuda sea un proceso largo. La transición será compleja (…) y la naturaleza de numerosas clases de acreedores, incluidos los tenedores de bonos soberanos y Pdvsa, prestamistas bilaterales (especialmente China y Rusia), los acreedores multilaterales y privados demostrarán ser obstáculos adicionales para una exitosa reestructuración”, apunta la agencia de calificación Fitch, en una nota publicada esta semana sobre el tema.
vitoandolini
Forumer attivo
Ammirà, voi siete documentato meglio di me sulla rivoluzione bolivariana e su quella cubana. A Cuba il potere lo conquistarono 4 gatti, roba che qui sul forum siamo di più e la leadership (per lo meno strategica) delle forze venezuelane è cubana. Chavez erano altrettanti 4 gatti e sono per una serie ultrafortunata di situazioni (come successe a Castro) non finirono fucilati o al carcere a vita.
Rilancio a pizza + birra + sfogliata che se c'è un'invasione (ipotesi che ritengo remota, Maduro lo butteranno a mare i russi e i cinesi) rivedremo le scene dell'Iraq, mani alzate e bandiere a stelle a strisce per accogliere i liberatori. Mi voglio spingere oltre, il giorno dopo saranno tutti anti bolivariani (e anche questa è una scena già vista)
gualberto
Charlie don't Surf
si ok...ma non scrivi che fine fa il debito
vitoandolini
Forumer attivo
Ammirà, tra le mie poche qualità, c'è il fatto di non parlare di cose che non conosco ed io il futuro non lo conosco. Se proprio devo fare una previsione, mi rifaccio a quella di Carib, un po' perchè mi sembra la più probabile statisticamente (ma spesso si va fuori dalla statistica) un poco perchè ne sa più di me e io sono della scuola che dai più bravi c'è sempre da imparare. Personalmente sono sempre stato fuori e fuori rimango, ma io sono notoriamente trader fifone.
P.S. Ho confuso due utenti, chiedo venia.
Ventodivino
מגן ולא יראה
Per me
Nel mio piccolo penso che non ci sarà bisogno di invasione
La Machado o Guaidó Saddam o Gheddafi li avrebbero impiccati
Qui sono liberi.
Parlando con vari operatori di borsa, broker e banche
C’è chi dice che dopo il cut rimane tra 35% - 45%, addirittura alcuni più ottimisti si aspettano a 80%. Ma quasi tutti sono d’accordo che non riceveranno più gli interessi accumulati.