tommy271
Forumer storico
Los #BonosSoberanos de Venezuela cerraron la jornada con pocos cambios, a pesar de la fuerte caída en los precios del petróleo
Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 2
- Creatore Discussione tommy271
- Data di Inizio
tommy271
Forumer storico
tommy271
Forumer storico
Rússia descarta ajudas adicionais à Venezuela
António Freitas de Sousa
09:00
Ao contrário da China, a Rússia poderá não estar interessada em auxiliar a recuperação da economia venezuelana. O problema é o de sempre: a constitucionalidade das decisões de Nicolas Maduro.
Depois da China, a Rússia: Nicolás Maduro, presidente da Venezuela, continua a procurar junto dos parceiros internacionais o auxílio de que precisa para relançar a economia – depauperada pela queda dos preços do petróleo nos mercados mundiais e pela crise interna, que elevou a inflação à condição de problema fulcral e praticamente acabou com as exportações.
Mas, se no caso da China, as intenções da Venezuela parecem ter tido acolhimento – nomeadamente pelo alargamento dos programas de cooperação para o aumento da extração de petróleo e condições especiais para a sua colocação no mercado chinês – na Rússia as coisas parecem estar bem mais difíceis.
É essa, pelo menos, a leitura de Emilio Figueredo, ex-embaixador da Venezuela junto das Nações Unidas e analista político, que, citado pelo jornal ‘El Impulse’, afirma que Maduto pouco conseguirá junto de Vladimir Putin, presidente da federação russa. O ex-diplomata afirma que Maduro procura na Rússia ajuda solidária – mas traduz essa solidariedade em algo bem diferente: a reforma (ou seja, o refinanciamento) da enorme dívida externa que a Venezuela colocou junto do Estado russo.
Para Emilio Figueredo, esse tipo de ajuda ‘solidária’ nunca chegará à Venezuela. Por uma razão: os acordos anteriormente assinados entre os dois países e entre empresas dos dois países há muito que deixaram de ser cumpridos, pela parte venezuelana. O ex-diplomata dá exemplos: as empresas russas Rosneft e Azot, que há vários anos assinaram acordos com a empresa petrolífera estatal venezuelana (a PDVSA), têm queixas muito graves sobre a imensa corrupção que grassa no interior desta última.
Na sua opinião, os russos não aceitarão avançar com novos créditos ao governo venezuelano porque conhecem a situação real do país. E essa situação real passa pelo facto de o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça e a muito polémica Assembleia Nacional Constituinte assumirem funções que antes estavam constitucionalmente nas mãos da Assembleia Nacional, que é o poder público que deve autorizar os compromissos a assumir entre a Venezuela e os outros Estados.
Ou seja, a Rússia não está interessada em deixar-se ‘cair’ num imbróglio jurídico que poderia transformar-se num problema interno para Putin: ‘atirar’ dinheiro para o país sul-americano, sem que em troca tivesse umagreement válido para poder reaver essa dívida.
Se a frente russa fechar as portas à Venezuela e ao governo de Maduro, o país terá que tentar compensar com o reforço do envolvimento da China no país. Mas isso será sempre um risco: o excesso de exposição de uma economia a outra – em detrimento das outras todas – é sempre um plano que pode surtir efeitos imediatos, mas hipoteca o futuro. Mas esta é apenas mais uma das muitas encruzilhadas em que a Venezuela está envolvida.
http://www.jornaleconomico.sapo.pt/noticias/russia-descarta-ajudas-adicionais-a-venezuela-217678
António Freitas de Sousa
09:00
Ao contrário da China, a Rússia poderá não estar interessada em auxiliar a recuperação da economia venezuelana. O problema é o de sempre: a constitucionalidade das decisões de Nicolas Maduro.
Depois da China, a Rússia: Nicolás Maduro, presidente da Venezuela, continua a procurar junto dos parceiros internacionais o auxílio de que precisa para relançar a economia – depauperada pela queda dos preços do petróleo nos mercados mundiais e pela crise interna, que elevou a inflação à condição de problema fulcral e praticamente acabou com as exportações.
Mas, se no caso da China, as intenções da Venezuela parecem ter tido acolhimento – nomeadamente pelo alargamento dos programas de cooperação para o aumento da extração de petróleo e condições especiais para a sua colocação no mercado chinês – na Rússia as coisas parecem estar bem mais difíceis.
É essa, pelo menos, a leitura de Emilio Figueredo, ex-embaixador da Venezuela junto das Nações Unidas e analista político, que, citado pelo jornal ‘El Impulse’, afirma que Maduto pouco conseguirá junto de Vladimir Putin, presidente da federação russa. O ex-diplomata afirma que Maduro procura na Rússia ajuda solidária – mas traduz essa solidariedade em algo bem diferente: a reforma (ou seja, o refinanciamento) da enorme dívida externa que a Venezuela colocou junto do Estado russo.
Para Emilio Figueredo, esse tipo de ajuda ‘solidária’ nunca chegará à Venezuela. Por uma razão: os acordos anteriormente assinados entre os dois países e entre empresas dos dois países há muito que deixaram de ser cumpridos, pela parte venezuelana. O ex-diplomata dá exemplos: as empresas russas Rosneft e Azot, que há vários anos assinaram acordos com a empresa petrolífera estatal venezuelana (a PDVSA), têm queixas muito graves sobre a imensa corrupção que grassa no interior desta última.
Na sua opinião, os russos não aceitarão avançar com novos créditos ao governo venezuelano porque conhecem a situação real do país. E essa situação real passa pelo facto de o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça e a muito polémica Assembleia Nacional Constituinte assumirem funções que antes estavam constitucionalmente nas mãos da Assembleia Nacional, que é o poder público que deve autorizar os compromissos a assumir entre a Venezuela e os outros Estados.
Ou seja, a Rússia não está interessada em deixar-se ‘cair’ num imbróglio jurídico que poderia transformar-se num problema interno para Putin: ‘atirar’ dinheiro para o país sul-americano, sem que em troca tivesse umagreement válido para poder reaver essa dívida.
Se a frente russa fechar as portas à Venezuela e ao governo de Maduro, o país terá que tentar compensar com o reforço do envolvimento da China no país. Mas isso será sempre um risco: o excesso de exposição de uma economia a outra – em detrimento das outras todas – é sempre um plano que pode surtir efeitos imediatos, mas hipoteca o futuro. Mas esta é apenas mais uma das muitas encruzilhadas em que a Venezuela está envolvida.
http://www.jornaleconomico.sapo.pt/noticias/russia-descarta-ajudas-adicionais-a-venezuela-217678
freddi
Forumer attivo
tommy271
Forumer storico
La Russia non è generosa come la Cina, al massimo si limiterà a rinnovare (non può fare altro) il prestino non onorato... in ballo le questioni sulle garanzie di Citgo a Rosneft che, forse, verranno tolte (vedi questione sanzioni) e girate sulla raffineria di Amuay.
Maduro in Bielorussia ha poi raccolto sorrisi (non c'è altro).
In Turchia qualche buona stretta di mano, ma niente di più.
Ventodivino
מגן ולא יראה
Bielorussia . 9 milioni di abitanti, modestissimo PIL pro capite. Economia "satellite" della Russia (un po' come la Bulgaria nel 1964).
Cosa ci si poteva attendere ?
Su chi deve aiutare il Venezuela.
Una volta leggo : no la Cina che è pragmatica, sì la Russia, avendo ancora velleità di grande potenza mondiale, per far arrabbiare Trump.
Altre volte : no la Russia, ha il PIL come l'Italia, un 'economia da terzo mondo (ormai rinchiusa nell'esportazione del petrolio, altrimenti sarebbe una piccola Polonia : i dati sono quelli); sì la Cina ha tutto l'interesse a diversificare i paesi da cui prendere le materie prime.
Da un po' ho iniziato a leggere che potrebbe esserci l'India.
In allegato un report uscito pochi giorni fa.
Copioincollo la parte sulle relazioni Venezuela-Cina (non vedo molte speranze per interventi "a fondo perduto"; dopo aver ristrutturato con l'Angola, i cinesi paiono non aver voglia di scucire " a caso")
China’s Role
China has been the primary provider of financing to the Venezuelan government in recent years, and while there is little transparency to these deals, it is thought that China has lent the country more than $50 billion since 2007.21 Net claims are on the order of $20 billion. Many of the contracts require payment in oil, and currently Venezuela sends around one-quarter of its daily crude oil export to China to repay the debt.22 Even this involves continuing forbearance by China. Full payment of the Chinese claims on original terms could consume 80 percent of the country’s daily oil exports, and terms have been modified on several occasions since October 2014. There is little doubt that China will be central to any resolution of the crisis, through a restructuring of Venezuela’s debt and the possible provision of new money. On the surface, China’s support does not seem to be waning, even as Venezuela’s crisis has been deepening. In addition to forbearance on oil-related debt, in November 2016, China committed $2.2 billion to support new investment in oil production (Shi 2016). Nonetheless, the overall sense is that China is pulling back, wary of the legitimacy of new debt accumulated by the current government. Within Beijing there is increasing frustration about the poor
returns from the lending programs23 and
concerns about the longer-term implications
of supporting the current government.24
Venezuela is not the only country that owes
substantial debt to China. Since the early 2000s,
China has been lending hundreds of billions of
dollars to many resource-rich countries, most
of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America, and many of which are struggling
following the collapse of commodity prices.
Similar to the Venezuela loans, these financing
packages are secured by commodities such as oil,
cocoa and copper. Any agreement with Venezuela
consequently could be precedential and affect
China’s relations globally. As Venezuela’s default
risk escalates, it is imperative that Chinese
lenders become more active in the discussion
and potential working of debt restructuring. The
role that China plays in resolving the country’s
debt crisis will be precedential, as there are
many other at-risk borrowing countries that may
develop crises similar to the one in Venezuela.
China is one of the largest lenders to developing
countries, yet its official position on how
to deal with sovereign debt crisis is largely
muted. Restructuring the Chinese debt owed
by Venezuela is best done by China joining the
Paris Club of official creditors, and agreeing to
restructure on comparable terms to other official
creditors. But short of such a decision, China
could still participate in a financing package
in parallel to other creditors, and in line with
new IMF rules on arrears to official creditors
introduced in 2016 following Ukraine’s default
on its Russia Eurobond. Whatever China decides
in Venezuela will likely set a precedent for other
countries that owe China much debt and have
been battered by low commodity prices and
slow global growth — countries that will seek
restructurings in coming years. The decisions
made in this case will be consequential.
carib
rerum cognoscere causas
esatto.
Ventodivino
מגן ולא יראה
Pazientissimo Carib,
forse l'estensore dell'articolo non sa che la Cina sta già ristrutturando con l'Angola (di là si offendono , ma l'Angola è un benchmarck da tener presente ).
Qui un mio post del primo settembre
Ventodivino
מגן ולא יראה
JPM sul Venezuela (poi cancello) disseminato il 6/10/2017
Still somewhat far from the end game
The Constituent Assembly has further deinstitutionalized Venezuela and prompted sanctions Amid a political stalemate, October regional elections set the stage for possible 4Q18 presidential elections The economy can take an even sharper turn into negative territory but no default seen yet Politics heading into unchartered territory. Venezuela’s government installed a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) following a highly questioned end-July election that was boycotted by the opposition after its informal plebiscite drew more than 7mn voters, and condemned by much of the international community. The body is in theory in charge of rewriting the 1999 constitution as the Maduro administration’s answer to the extended economic and political crisis. In practice, the ANC has declared itself superior to all other public entities, and it intends to take two years to draft the new magna carta—in other words beyond the January 2019 end of the current presidential term. Among its first acts, the ANC removed the rebel attorney general Ortega Diaz and installed a “truth commission” that threatened to try opposition legislators. In turn, most of the Western Hemisphere and Europe have openly labeled Venezuela a “dictatorship” and a number of countries led by the US have subjected regime officials to sanctions. As for economic sanctions, the US has shut the door to new financing for state entities, including PDVSA and Republic bond issuance— although it has refrained for now from imposing commercial sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry. Looking for legitimacy. One of the first acts of the new ANC was to bring forward long-overdue state gubernatorial elections to October 15. The opposition, after much deliberation, agreed to participate based on the idea that if the elections were remotely fair, their candidates could capture a strong majority of Venezuela’s 23 states. Taken together with
new “dialogue talks” in the Dominican Republic, for the government, the move seems like a relatively-low-cost gambit to try to buy time and stave off more sanctions and bolster its legitimacy. If the opposition does in fact do well, pressure from the international community could ease even as state governors’ powers could be constrained by the ANC. Moreover, if election conditions on October 15 are sufficiently slanted, and opposition voters sufficiently demotivated and disenchanted, Chavismo could actually eke out a tie in the vote, allowing it to portray a “divided” Venezuela before the world, rather than a country which polls suggest is strongly in the anti-government camp. Regional elections, if the opposition participates, would also make Maduro’s promise to hold presidential elections at the end of 2018 somewhat more credible—again, buying time against additional international pressure. 2018 presidential elections as the end game? Regardless of the October 15 result, at this juncture there seems to be few if any signals that Maduro will agree to depart before his term ends, and the main focus will be on whether 2018 elections occur under conditions acceptable to the opposition/ international community. The crux of whether these elections will take place centers on several key questions: whether the opposition will agree to go united to elections with secondary candidates, assuming Lopez and Capriles remain banned; whether Chavismo will accept Maduro if he intends to run again; and whether Chavismo and the opposition can agree on a future roadmap that would allow alternation of power, or rather will Chavista officials feel excessive costs (both personal and political) to abandoning power. A key logistical question that could be part of any negotiation could be the fate of ANC and the constitution of 1999. The impact from financial sanctions on the local economy is being felt. Directly, PDVSA’s JV partners and service providers must explore if and how they can maintain their financial relationships, and the uncertainty is adding to output woes. Indirectly, the local banking system is impacted by caution from correspondent banks in dealing with any Venezuelan entity. This is weighing on private sector activity, especially as FX disbursements on the DICOM platform have been halted. With monetary financing increasing, DICOM stalled, and the parallel FX rate soaring towards 30,000 (+66% m/m; 2,600% y/y) inflation seems to be bursting higher to another range. There are shortages of banknotes, putting a strain on the informal economy. While Venezuela has already withstood a historically profound economic downturn, it is possible that an even more acute and unmanageable period could be forthcoming. This would appear to be an unpredictable factor that could destabilize the aforementioned more-drawn-out political calendar.
And what of default? Public sector cash-flow management is even more non-transparent than ever, with liquid assets now apparently being managed out of development bank BANDES by the (sanctioned) CFO of PDVSA, Simon Zerpa. 4Q bond payments total 3.8bn. Given previous delayed coupons and ongoing revisions to banking relationships, accident risk around the almost $2bn of maturities (PDVSA 17N and 20s) at end-October seems relatively high. Nonetheless, the base case remains current for now, with help on the margin from China and Russia. The next maturity after 4Q17 is $1.1bn Republic 18Os next August. Restructuring scenarios are cryogenic in nature until sanctions are lifted. In other words, the end game for both bonds and politics may not be all that close.
Notare il disclaimer di JPM :
Notice to investors: The Government of Venezuela is targeted by US sanctions which prohibit dealing in new debt or equity issued by it, or any entity owned or controlled by it, after the effective date of the sanctions program (together “Sanctioned Securities”). Nothing in this report is intended to be read and construed as relating to, encouraging or otherwise approving or promoting investment or dealing in such Sanctioned Securities. Clients should be aware of their own obligations and those of JPMorgan Chase & Co, its affiliates and/or subsidiaries under applicable US sanctions when making investment decisions.
Still somewhat far from the end game
The Constituent Assembly has further deinstitutionalized Venezuela and prompted sanctions Amid a political stalemate, October regional elections set the stage for possible 4Q18 presidential elections The economy can take an even sharper turn into negative territory but no default seen yet Politics heading into unchartered territory. Venezuela’s government installed a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) following a highly questioned end-July election that was boycotted by the opposition after its informal plebiscite drew more than 7mn voters, and condemned by much of the international community. The body is in theory in charge of rewriting the 1999 constitution as the Maduro administration’s answer to the extended economic and political crisis. In practice, the ANC has declared itself superior to all other public entities, and it intends to take two years to draft the new magna carta—in other words beyond the January 2019 end of the current presidential term. Among its first acts, the ANC removed the rebel attorney general Ortega Diaz and installed a “truth commission” that threatened to try opposition legislators. In turn, most of the Western Hemisphere and Europe have openly labeled Venezuela a “dictatorship” and a number of countries led by the US have subjected regime officials to sanctions. As for economic sanctions, the US has shut the door to new financing for state entities, including PDVSA and Republic bond issuance— although it has refrained for now from imposing commercial sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry. Looking for legitimacy. One of the first acts of the new ANC was to bring forward long-overdue state gubernatorial elections to October 15. The opposition, after much deliberation, agreed to participate based on the idea that if the elections were remotely fair, their candidates could capture a strong majority of Venezuela’s 23 states. Taken together with
new “dialogue talks” in the Dominican Republic, for the government, the move seems like a relatively-low-cost gambit to try to buy time and stave off more sanctions and bolster its legitimacy. If the opposition does in fact do well, pressure from the international community could ease even as state governors’ powers could be constrained by the ANC. Moreover, if election conditions on October 15 are sufficiently slanted, and opposition voters sufficiently demotivated and disenchanted, Chavismo could actually eke out a tie in the vote, allowing it to portray a “divided” Venezuela before the world, rather than a country which polls suggest is strongly in the anti-government camp. Regional elections, if the opposition participates, would also make Maduro’s promise to hold presidential elections at the end of 2018 somewhat more credible—again, buying time against additional international pressure. 2018 presidential elections as the end game? Regardless of the October 15 result, at this juncture there seems to be few if any signals that Maduro will agree to depart before his term ends, and the main focus will be on whether 2018 elections occur under conditions acceptable to the opposition/ international community. The crux of whether these elections will take place centers on several key questions: whether the opposition will agree to go united to elections with secondary candidates, assuming Lopez and Capriles remain banned; whether Chavismo will accept Maduro if he intends to run again; and whether Chavismo and the opposition can agree on a future roadmap that would allow alternation of power, or rather will Chavista officials feel excessive costs (both personal and political) to abandoning power. A key logistical question that could be part of any negotiation could be the fate of ANC and the constitution of 1999. The impact from financial sanctions on the local economy is being felt. Directly, PDVSA’s JV partners and service providers must explore if and how they can maintain their financial relationships, and the uncertainty is adding to output woes. Indirectly, the local banking system is impacted by caution from correspondent banks in dealing with any Venezuelan entity. This is weighing on private sector activity, especially as FX disbursements on the DICOM platform have been halted. With monetary financing increasing, DICOM stalled, and the parallel FX rate soaring towards 30,000 (+66% m/m; 2,600% y/y) inflation seems to be bursting higher to another range. There are shortages of banknotes, putting a strain on the informal economy. While Venezuela has already withstood a historically profound economic downturn, it is possible that an even more acute and unmanageable period could be forthcoming. This would appear to be an unpredictable factor that could destabilize the aforementioned more-drawn-out political calendar.
And what of default? Public sector cash-flow management is even more non-transparent than ever, with liquid assets now apparently being managed out of development bank BANDES by the (sanctioned) CFO of PDVSA, Simon Zerpa. 4Q bond payments total 3.8bn. Given previous delayed coupons and ongoing revisions to banking relationships, accident risk around the almost $2bn of maturities (PDVSA 17N and 20s) at end-October seems relatively high. Nonetheless, the base case remains current for now, with help on the margin from China and Russia. The next maturity after 4Q17 is $1.1bn Republic 18Os next August. Restructuring scenarios are cryogenic in nature until sanctions are lifted. In other words, the end game for both bonds and politics may not be all that close.
Notare il disclaimer di JPM :
Notice to investors: The Government of Venezuela is targeted by US sanctions which prohibit dealing in new debt or equity issued by it, or any entity owned or controlled by it, after the effective date of the sanctions program (together “Sanctioned Securities”). Nothing in this report is intended to be read and construed as relating to, encouraging or otherwise approving or promoting investment or dealing in such Sanctioned Securities. Clients should be aware of their own obligations and those of JPMorgan Chase & Co, its affiliates and/or subsidiaries under applicable US sanctions when making investment decisions.
carib
rerum cognoscere causas
leggendo i tuoi post..
si legge che l'angola deve 25 miliardi ai cinesi..
e che i cinesi gli hanno condonato debiti.. per 13 milioni.
differenza.. di tre zeri-