FTSE Mib Arriva il QE. Si volaaaaa

COMUNICATO STAMPA
Decisioni di politica monetaria
9 marzo 2017

Nella riunione odierna il Consiglio direttivo della BCE ha deciso che i tassi di interesse sulle operazioni di rifinanziamento principali, sulle operazioni di rifinanziamento marginale e sui depositi presso la banca centrale rimarranno invariati rispettivamente allo 0,00%, allo 0,25% e al -0,40%. Il Consiglio direttivo continua ad attendersi che i tassi di interesse di riferimento della BCE si mantengano su livelli pari o inferiori a quelli attuali per un prolungato periodo di tempo e ben oltre l’orizzonte degli acquisti netti di attività.

Quanto alle misure non convenzionali di politica monetaria, il Consiglio direttivo conferma che continuerà a condurre gli acquisti nell’ambito del programma di acquisto di attività (PAA) all’attuale ritmo mensile di 80 miliardi di euro sino alla fine di questo mese e che da aprile intende proseguire gli acquisti netti a un ritmo mensile di 60 miliardi di euro sino alla fine di dicembre 2017 o anche oltre se necessario, e in ogni caso finché non riscontrerà un aggiustamento durevole dell’evoluzione dei prezzi, coerente con il proprio obiettivo di inflazione. Contestualmente agli acquisti netti sarà reinvestito il capitale rimborsato sui titoli giunti a scadenza acquistati nel quadro del PAA. Se le prospettive diverranno meno favorevoli o se le condizioni finanziarie risulteranno incoerenti con ulteriori progressi verso un aggiustamento durevole del profilo dell’inflazione, il Consiglio direttivo è pronto a incrementare il programma in termini di entità e/o durata.

Il Presidente della BCE illustrerà i motivi di tali decisioni nella conferenza stampa che avrà luogo questo pomeriggio alle ore 14.30 (ora dell’Europa centrale).
 
Conferenza stampa di Draghi

Bce: Draghi, tassi bassi o ancora piu' bassi a lungo

Bce: Draghi, avanti QE finche' non ci sara' rialzo sostenuto inflazione

Bce: Draghi, ripresa ciclica potrebbe stare guadagnando slancio

Bce: Draghi, serve ancora ulteriore grado accomodamento

Bce: Draghi, pronti a estendere o ampliare QE se necessario

Bce: Draghi, andamento inflazione core continua a restare debole

Bce: Draghi, ripresa continuera'

Bce: Draghi, debole implementazione riforme strutturali pesa su crescita

Bce: Draghi, alzata stima crescita Pil 2017 dall'1,7% all'1,8%

Bce: Draghi, alzata stima crescita Pil 2018 dall'1,6% all'1,7%

Bce: Draghi, confermata stima crescita Pil 2019 all'1,6%

Bce: Draghi, no segnali convincenti da inflazione core

Bce: Draghi, alzata stima inflazione 2017 dall'1,3% all'1,7%

Bce: Draghi, alzata stima inflazione 2018 dall'1,5% all'1,6%

Bce: Draghi, serva ancora accomodamento per raggiungere target inflazione

Bce: Draghi, presto per dichiarare vittoria su fronte inflazione

La debole implementazione di riforme strutturali pesa

sulla crescita dell'Eurozona".

Bce: Draghi, no discussioni su altra Tltro

Bce: Draghi, non piu' urgenza in implementazione ulteriori misure

Bce: Draghi, euro e' irrevocabile

Le nostre misure di politica monetaria hanno continuato

a preservare le condizioni di finanziamento molto favorevoli che sono

necessarie per garantire una convergenza duratura dei tassi di inflazione

verso livelli inferiori ma prossimi al 2% nel medio periodo
 
IN SOLDONI


Non ci sono grosse sorprese . tutto invariato. Come previsto dai principali broker


Però:

- inflazione, anche se al momento forse influenzata da fenomeni che possono essere transitori, è in salita (e non di poco) da 1,3 a 1,7 (molto vicina al target del 2% di medio periodo)

- da aprile gli acquisti diminuiranno da 80 a 60 (-25%)

- non sono previste altre azioni (altri bazzouka)


Effetti su BUND?
 
Bund sta scendicchiando su rialzo inflazione maggiore del previsto e confermato ritmo di decrescita acquisti.
Indice italiano che salicchia in parte su parole Draghi(le cose vanno meglio del previsto) e su rialzo tassi USA
 
Petrolio: qualcosa non torna nei numeri su offerta di petrolio. Articolo interessante. Di fatto o nel 2017 aumenta la richiesta oppure il prezzo è destinato a scendere

OPEC’s Misleading Narrative About World Oil Supply
| March 2017
At a time when energy market headlines focus mainly on OPEC cuts, observers may be forgiven for concluding that a supply crunch and higher prices are imminent. On the contrary, there is still too much oil in global markets. In this context, OPEC production cuts (which notably fall short of the original target envisaged by the organization) appear to serve mainly as a psychological support to oil prices.

Analyzing trends from my proprietary database of more than 1,200 global oilfields helped me to make a bold prediction in 2012 regarding a coming oil supply boom. In January, my similar field-by-field analysis indicated that world oil production capacity and actual production were still growing—while prospects for demand growth were not sufficiently high to absorb the excess supply. In particular, actual oil production (which includes crude oil and other liquids such as condensates, NGLs, and more according to the standard definition used by most statistics) was almost 99.5 million barrels per day (mbd)—leaving a voluntary and involuntary spare capacity (the result of local civil wars and other geopolitical factors) of more than 4 mbd.

This surprising level of oil availability is a consequence of the impressive acceleration of world oil production that began between September and October 2016 and culminated in December 2016 and the early weeks of January 2017.

Over that period, oil production increased almost everywhere in the world. Non-OPEC countries such as the United States, Canada, Brazil, and the North Sea Region registered a combined increase of oil output of almost 1 mbd versus their September 2016 production levels. The Russian Federation hit another post-Soviet record of production, reaching 11.2 mbd. Even OPEC countries dramatically increased their production, which ballooned from an October baseline of 30.9 mbd to more than 33 mbd.

These last figures are the key to understanding why OPEC cuts are not sufficient to rebalance the market.

When those cuts were devised in late November 2016, OPEC intended to cut its own total production by 1.166 mbd (effective January 1, 2017) from the October 2016 baseline of 30.9 mbd—which implied targeting a production of 29.8 mbd to be reached in the first six months of 2017. Now several representatives of OPEC are claiming that compliance with the agreed cuts is exceeding expectations—and this may be partially true: according to direct communications between OPEC countries and the OPEC Secretariat, cuts may indeed have reached almost 1.2 mbd, although an official OPEC Report in February (based on secondary sources) stated that cuts were only 890,000 bd.

Focusing on such figures, however, is misleading.

The reason is simple. As we have seen, OPEC production grew dramatically between October 2016 and January 2017: even accounting for a 1.2 mbd cut, in January 2017 the organization was producing almost 31.8 mbd. Thus, in order to meet the original 29.8 mbd target, OPEC should cut 2 mbd more.

And things are even worse for those 12 non-OPEC producers that agreed to make oil output cuts together with OPEC. Their commitment was not overwhelming (as a whole, less than 600,000 barrels per day), yet their level of compliance with that target was less than 60 percent in February.

All of this leads me to suspect that the global oil market remains highly vulnerable to the actual status of oil supplies. There’s a paradox: so far, OPEC’s effort to convey the message of an exceptional level of compliance with cuts has helped sustain oil prices—but in so doing it has also incentivized oil output increases in many countries.

The United States is by far the main beneficiary of such price support. In early February, almost all US shale oil producers have presented plans to strongly increase their shale oil output in the course of 2017. This is a realistic prospect, because all those producers have a massive backlog of already drilled wells that are just waiting to be completed to start production. And it’s plausible to expect that US shale output will accelerate after the winter months, which usually pose major obstacles to shale production. Other countries are still completing investments to develop new productions or re-develop mature oilfields. These investments began in the “golden years” when oil prices exceeded $100 per barrel and cannot be stopped now that the bulk of the original budgets has already been spent.

This scenario of an enduring excess supply could be eased by a robust demand growth. But preliminary data and analyses do not portend such a development, especially because of a significant slowdown in demand growth in China and India—the two major engines of world oil consumption growth.

China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)Research Institute of Economics and Technology forecast that net crude imports would reach 7.92 mbd in 2017—versus 7.5 mbd last year. The forecast pace of growth represents a big slowdown with respect to the 13.1 percent CNPC reported for 2016.

As to India, prime minister Narendra Modi’s decision to ban the use of 86 percent of the cash supply (the so-called demonetization of India’s economy) should have a knock-on effect for oil demand, which could also be dented by the government’s commitment to tackle air pollution by curbing fossil fuel use. All major institutions—from the International Energy Agency (IEA) to OPEC—have so far reduced their estimates of India’s oil demand growth in 2017 versus 2016. Their estimates are probably too conservative. But even assuming a robust net oil import growth of almost 400,000 bd, the combined growth of China and India will not exceed 900,000 bd. Net demand growth in the rest of the world will likely be lower than 400,000 bd. Regardless, given the current oil supply framework, a potential net growth of 1.3 mbd is too meager: all other things being equal, that figure would need to double to remove enough oil from international markets. Unfortunately, such growth is rare: in the past 30 years, it happened only in 2003 and 2004.

To make matters worse, a heavy global refinery maintenance of around 3 mbd—concentrated in March and April—would lower crude demand and could add to temporary crude builds. When it starts to ease, the OPEC and non-OPEC cuts will be close to expiration—June 30, 2017.

Clearly, we still need more data and elements in order to make a sound assessment of what will actually happen on global oil markets in 2017. But it’s not too early to raise a red flag: there is something wrong in the numbers that circulate globally about oil supplies. And one thing is for sure: OPEC and non-OPEC cuts are not enough to re-absorb the world’s excess supply. So, unless oil demand growth rebounds to record levels in 2017, oil prices could head for another substantial fall.
 
Leggere il mercato ex post è molto più facile. I movimenti sembrano veramente chiari e logici.
Prendiamo ad esempio il movimento partito da minimo della Brexit come illustrato nel grafico
FTSE_23mar17.png
 
Ho analizzato il movimento in essere con Elliott e lo sviluppo delle onde mi convince.
(i valori sono evidenziati sul grafico)
onda 2 ritraccia circa 0,618
onda 3 si sviluppa a 1,618 circa
onda 4 ritraccia 0,382
 

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