Eccolo il downgrade di S&P al rating sovrano irlandese... Per l'agenzia, sarà più elevato del previsto il costo fiscale del salvataggio del sistema bancario ed inoltre il fardello del debito pubblico rischia di accrescersi notevolmente nel medio termine rispetto alle precedenti previsioni di S&P.
Comincia a proporsi anche qui il problema della coperta troppo corta: se alzi le tasse per salvare le banche acuisci e prolunghi la già pesante crisi economica, se non lo fai il debito pubblico rischia di raggiungere vette molto elevate, penalizza il rating sovrano e soprattutto resta sulle spalle delle future generazioni, comprimendo la crescita economica per molti anni a venire.
Qui si parla di 90 mld euro di asset bancari da ricomprare da parte di un'agenzia pubblica (in veste di bad bank) ad uno sconto sul nominale molto forte, ad un costo di 55-75 mld euro da finanziare mediante emissioni di debito pubblico...
Ma il PIL irlandese che valori ha ? Sono pur sempre meno gli irlandesi che gli abitanti della provincia di Roma...
Per S&P l'operazione ha un rischio elevato per le finanze pubbliche in quanto gli asset acquistati (CDO's bonds) potrebbero generare flussi di cassa inadeguati a ripagare il capitale a scadenza, nonostante il beneficio di un prezzo pagato inferiore al valore nominale dei titoli.
A conti fatti, il debito pubblico netto irlandese potrebbe eccedere il 100%del PIL nel medio termine, visto peraltro che le perdite accusate dalla nazionalizzata Anglo Irish Bank negli ultimi sei mesi si sono rivelate molto superiori al previsto e dunque un analogo deterioramento non è da escludere per le altre banche (le quali, finché non nazionalizzate, possono nascondere immondizia sotto il tappeto, alla bisogna, ma una volta che fossero nazionalizzate...
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Insomma, all'orizzonte non é ambiguo dire che si intravedere un rischio di scenari di tipo islandese...
Ireland Rating Lowered To 'AA' On Potential Fiscal Cost Of Weakening Banking Sector Asset Quality; Outlook Negative
-- Standard & Poor's has lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the Republic of Ireland to 'AA' from 'AA+'. The outlook is negative.
-- We have lowered the long-term rating on Ireland because we believe that the fiscal costs to the government of supporting the Irish banking system will be significantly higher than what we had expected when we last lowered the rating in March 2009, and, consequently, that the net general government debt burden will also be significantly higher over the medium term.
LONDON (Standard & Poor's) June 8, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services today said it had lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the Republic of Ireland to 'AA' from 'AA+'. The outlook is negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's has affirmed its 'A-1+' short-term rating on the Republic.
"We have lowered the long-term rating on Ireland because we believe that the fiscal costs to the government of supporting the Irish banking system will be significantly higher than what we had expected when we last lowered the rating in March 2009, and, consequently, that the net general government debt burden will also be significantly higher over the medium term," Standard & Poor's credit analyst David Beers said. "Our revised opinion follows the recent announcement by Anglo Irish Bank of losses at the upper end of Standard & Poor's expectations, as well as the government's announced intentions regarding the scope of the operations of the new National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), which is set to play an important role in bolstering the financial health of the Irish banking system."
Under the government's plans, up to €90 billion of performing and impaired property-related exposures and associated commercial lending will be transferred from Irish banks to NAMA (which we understand will be established under legislation expected to come into effect in September 2009). The government also expects NAMA to acquire the assets at a significant discount to their current face value, with market estimates we have seen of the projected cost, based on average purchase prices, currently in the range of €55–€75 billion. The purchase of these assets, in turn, is to be financed by the issuance of government bonds.
The government has announced that its objective is for NAMA to pay down some or all of this additional debt in future years from the proceeds of maturing loans and from asset disposals and recoveries.
In our view, NAMA's ability to minimize the cost to the government of its financial operations will depend on the prices it pays for the assets and their future performance. We consider that NAMA's ability to meet its
financial objectives is uncertain because of the risk that cash flows from its assets could fall below its funding costs if their underlying performance worsens compared with NAMA's expectations at the time of purchase.
At the same time, we believe the recently announced losses (for the six months to the end of March 2009) at nationalized Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd. (A-/Watch Neg/A-1) highlight both the continued fragility of the Irish banking sector and its reliance on the government for ongoing financial support.
We also maintain our opinion that Irish real and nominal GDP is likely to remain below 2008 levels until 2013.
Taking these factors and NAMA's likely borrowings into account, along with our revised estimate of recapitalization costs to the government of €20-€25 billion (compared with our previous estimate of €15-€20 billion), we now believe that Ireland's net general government debt could exceed 100% of GDP over the medium term-–a level that is higher than for Ireland's 'AA' rated Euro-zone sovereign peers.
"The rating could be lowered again if asset quality in the Irish banking system deteriorates at a faster pace than we expect and if, as a result of its support for the sector or due to an even more pronounced downturn in economic growth, the government's fiscal performance weakens further than we currently assume," Mr. Beers said. "The ratings could also be lowered if the average maturity of the government's debt shortens materially for a sustained period.
Conversely, the outlook could be revised to stable if the Irish banking sector stabilizes more quickly and at a lower fiscal cost to the government than we now think likely."