Obbligazioni bancarie Banche irlandesi: newsflow, ratings, bonds. Il fronte irlandese dell'Euro. (1 Viewer)

[Imark]

Intanto per quella delle tre banche irlandesi già nazionalizzata (Anglo Irish) il punto della situazione sui Tier 1... mi pare di intendere che l'agenzia nutra remore anche in ordine al recupero del capitale investito, oltre che delle cedole, sebbene non indichi nel commento su quali basi sia ad esprimere una tale opinione.

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Moody's downgrades Tier 1 securities of Anglo Irish Bank to C[/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Action follows tender offer and our classification of this as a "distressed exchange" [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]London, 30 July 2009 -- Moody's Investors Service has today downgraded the Tier 1 securities of Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Ltd (Anglo Irish, rated A3/P-1/E) to C (with the exception of the non-cumulative preference shares with voting rights that are already rated C). The outlook on these securities is now stable. Previously the bank's cumulative Tier 1 securities were rated Caa1 and the bank's non-cumulative Tier 1 securities were rated Caa3, all on review for possible downgrade. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]The downgrade follows the announcement of the tender offer to buyback the Tier 1 securities at a significant discount to the par value (27%). In addition given that the bank has, as detailed below, already announced that coupons will be omitted on both cumulative and non-cumulative Tier 1 securities, the tender offer on these Tier 1 instruments is classed as a "distressed exchange" by Moody's. See "Moody's Approach to Evaluating Distressed Exchanges", published in March 2009, for more details on our approach. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]The C rating for these securities also reflects Moody's view that there is little prospect for recovery of interest and principal for these instruments given the challenges the bank faces and the length of time that the bank may need to return to sustainable profitability. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]On July 9 Anglo Irish announced that as a condition of approving the Irish Government's recapitalisation of the bank the European Commission (EC) requires that no further coupon payments be made on any of the Bank's Tier 1 Securities.

Moody's understands that there has not been any guidance from the EC on when payments will be able to resume, however we expect that this is unlikely to happen until the bank has returned to profitability.

However, given the current situation of the bank and the difficult economic environment Moody's would not expect this to happen in the medium term, although we note that a substantial portion of its loan portfolio will be transferred to the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) and this may speed up this process.

However, depending on the value of the assets which will be transferred, this could also lead to a further capital requirement.

We are also of the opinion that continuing government support is likely to be required to give the bank sufficient flexibility to restructure and establish a viable business model again. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]The dated subordinated and junior subordinated issues that are part of the tender offer are not classed as a "distressed exchange" by Moody's and therefore the ratings are unchanged at Baa1 and B3. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]PREVIOUS RATING ACTION AND PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]The last rating action on Anglo was on July 13, 2009 when the bank's cumulative tier 1 securities (rated Caa1) and non-cumulative tier 1 securities (rated Caa3) were placed on review for possible downgrade. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]....[/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]The detailed ratings and actions are listed below: [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Anglo Irish Asset Finance: [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]• Cumulative Tier 1 securities downgraded to C (stable outlook) from Caa1 (on review for possible downgrade.) [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Anglo Irish Capital UK (2) LP: [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]• Non-cumulative Tier 1 securities downgraded to C (stable outlook) from Caa3 (on review for possible downgrade.) [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Anglo Irish Capital UK (3) LP: [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]• Non-cumulative Tier 1 securities downgraded to C (stable outlook) from Caa3 (on review for possible downgrade.) [/FONT]


[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Anglo Irish Bank had total assets of EUR 88.5 billion at end-March 2009. The bank is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland. [/FONT]

 

[Imark]

E dopo la pubblicazione del disegno di legge irlandese sull'istituzione della NAMA, S&P conferma il creditwatch negativo su BOI, proprio perché la situazione resta incerta (e sarà chiarita dal Parlamento irlandese) sul punto cruciale del quale avevamo parlato qui (vedi post pagina precedente).

In realtà, S&P ventila apertamente l'esigenza che BOI sia sostenuta nella sua capitalizzazione dopo l'esecuzione del trasferimento degli asset tossici a NAMA, che dunque da sola potrebbe non essere sufficiente a consentire alla banca di guadare la crisi in essere.

C'è da capire in quale maniera questo sostegno verrà reso, se attraverso un più elevato prezzo corrisposto per questi asset (che dunque consenta di evitare un eccessivo indebolimento dei livelli di capitalizzazione della banca, ma a fronte di un appesantimento prospettico del debito pubblico irlandese, perché le perdite non realizzate in capo alla banca in termini di svalutazione dei bad asset rispetto al valore di carico dovranno essere un domani essere poste a carico dell'agenzia statale), oppure se con altri meccanismi.

La questione non è priva di rilevanza politica in ambito europeo, IMHO, perché il caricare le potenziali perdite in capo allo Stato in misura eccessiva potrebbe - dipendendo dalla loro consistenza - implicare dei rischi per la stabilità della moneta unica.

Ad ogni buon conto, S&P postula che il sostegno dello Stato non mancherà alla banca irlandese, reso in un modo o nell'altro, e per questo ventila un possibile downgrade del rating corporate (ammesso occorra effettuarlo) di un livello al massimo.

Analoghe considerazioni, con analoga rating action, sono formulate da S&P con riferimento all'altra banca non completamente nazionalizzata, Allied Irish.

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Bank of Ireland 'A' Long-Term Rating Remains On CreditWatch Negative; 'A-1' Short-Term Rating Affirmed[/FONT]

• Draft legislation regarding the Irish National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) has now been published.
• Our 'A' long-term counterparty credit rating on Bank of Ireland (BOI) remains on CreditWatch, where it had been placed with negative implications on May 1, 2009.
• The continued CreditWatch placement reflects our view that the impact of NAMA and any associated measures on BOI's financial profile remains uncertain.
• We currently expect to resolve the CreditWatch placement in the coming three months.

LONDON (Standard & Poor's) Aug. 6, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services today commented on its CreditWatch placement of Bank of Ireland (BOI; the trading name of the Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland). The 'A' long-term counterparty credit rating on BOI remains on CreditWatch, where it had been placed with negative implications on May 1, 2009. At the same time, the 'A-1' short-term counterparty credit rating was affirmed.

The original CreditWatch placement followed an announcement on April 7, 2009, by the Irish government (Republic of Ireland; AA/Negative/A-1+) of its plans to create a National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) (see Related Research section).

"The placement reflected our expectation that the NAMA proposal would proceed, but also the significant uncertainty about BOI's financial profile following the execution of the NAMA plan--especially whether or not it would be sufficiently strengthened to withstand the challenges that we expect it to continue to face from the weak economic environment," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Giles Edwards.

Draft NAMA legislation has now been published. While the draft legislation provides insight into the operational mechanics of how NAMA is intended to work, in our view a number of important questions remain, particularly regarding the strength of the bank's financial position after the loans have been transferred to NAMA.

We understand that the legislation will go before the Irish parliament in mid September, and that around this time the government will provide an indicative figure on the valuation discount.

In our view, the implications for the bank's capitalization and its earnings capacity should subsequently become much clearer. We therefore currently expect to be able to resolve the CreditWatch status within the three-month CreditWatch horizon.

We continue to view BOI as being of high systemic importance and incorporate two notches of support in our long-term rating on BOI beyond its stand-alone credit profile.

In our view, the bank's weakening asset quality will cause a significant reduction in its capital ratios. Without NAMA, this could happen over an extended period if loan impairment charges lead the bank to make losses.

Alternatively, the bank would realize a significant portion of these losses up front, if, as we expect, the loans are transferred to NAMA at a discount to their current book value.

Either way, we expect that further capital support may be needed if the bank is to maintain capitalization at a level that is consistent with the current 'A' rating.

This support could come from a less aggressive NAMA transfer price, or from an injection of capital. When assessing capital adequacy, we will also consider the bank's ability to generate more capital.

In our view, the economic outlook for Ireland remains weak, but the pace of deterioration has slowed. The Irish economy as a whole continues to suffer from a very deep recession.

"The CreditWatch placement of the long-term rating on BOI reflects our expectation that the NAMA proposal will proceed, but also uncertainty about the financial profile of BOI following the execution of the NAMA plan," added Mr. Edwards.

While we expect that the Irish government would continue to support BOI, the level of support provided, particularly regarding capitalization, may not be consistent with the current 'A' rating.

We expect to resolve the CreditWatch status within the coming three months. However, if the economic environment appeared likely to deteriorate materially beyond our base-case expectations, this could prompt a negative rating action sooner.

We do not currently expect the ratings on BOI to be lowered by more than one notch, and it is possible that they may be affirmed

 

[solenoide]

Nama faq

Ciao,
mi permetto di aggiungere le FAQ prese dal sito Nama perche' leggo in giro di bond trasferiti al NAMA con rimborso del 20% + warrant oppure soluzioni tipo GM o Alitalia.
Al momento leggendo il sito NAMA mi pare chiaro che verranno trasferiti unicamente loans a fronte dei quali saranno emessi Government bonds.
Quindi se non ho capito male le banche si ritroverebbero a bilancio bonds garantiti dal governo a fronte di bad loans trasferiti al NAMA.
Che le subordinate siano a rischio e' possibile ed anche probabile , sopratutto per i perpetuals Tier1 , ma non mi pare un fatto direttamente collegato al NAMA

http://www.nama.ie/

http://www.nama.ie/Publications/2009/NAMAFrequentlyAskedQuestions.pdf

1. Loans transfer
1.1 What loans will be transferred?
The eligible land and development loans of each bank involved will be transferred – that is the eligible loans secured on development land and property under development. In addition, the largest property-backed exposures of all the banks in the scheme will be transferred. The number will be decided based on detailed assessment of the loan books concerned. These will all be purchased by NAMA (National Asset Management Agency) at an appropriate price. The loan books will have to be worked out and reviewed in relation to each of the banks to ensure that the appropriate loans are transferred and that the banks are cleared of the identified riskiest loan portfolios. This process is subject to EU State aid approval.


3.5 How will the write off impact on the banks’ capital ratios?

The Banks will be cleansed of risky categories of loans at a price less than their current carrying value on the banks’ balance sheets. This will be financed by the issue of Government bonds. The impact of the difference or write-down on the banks capital ratios will undoubtedly affect individuals bank’s capital positions, but so will the reduction in ‘Risk Weighted Assets’ that will arise for the banks in replacing commercial assets with Government bonds. Moreover, market expectations of capital requirements for the new ‘cleansed’ banks will be different to what would be expected for banks which had not been through the same process, and there may be opportunities for banks to generate core capital through appropriate balance sheet restructuring. Overall, therefore, the capital impacts on individual banks cannot be established in advance of the detailed valuation and pricing process between NAMA and the institutions.
It should be noted that it has already been decided that there is a capital requirement in relation to at least the two institutions in respect of which announcements were made in mid-February – AIB and Bank of Ireland. In the case of Bank of Ireland this recapitalisation process has already been finalised at the end of March and in the AIB case due diligence work is ongoing.
3.6

 

[Imark]

Ciao,
mi permetto di aggiungere le FAQ prese dal sito Nama perche' leggo in giro di bond trasferiti al NAMA con rimborso del 20% + warrant oppure soluzioni tipo GM o Alitalia.
Al momento leggendo il sito NAMA mi pare chiaro che verranno trasferiti unicamente loans a fronte dei quali saranno emessi Government bonds.
Quindi se non ho capito male le banche si ritroverebbero a bilancio bonds garantiti dal governo a fronte di bad loans trasferiti al NAMA.
Che le subordinate siano a rischio e' possibile ed anche probabile , sopratutto per i perpetuals Tier1 , ma non mi pare un fatto direttamente collegato al NAMA

http://www.nama.ie/

http://www.nama.ie/Publications/2009/NAMAFrequentlyAskedQuestions.pdf

1. Loans transfer
1.1 What loans will be transferred?
The eligible land and development loans of each bank involved will be transferred – that is the eligible loans secured on development land and property under development. In addition, the largest property-backed exposures of all the banks in the scheme will be transferred. The number will be decided based on detailed assessment of the loan books concerned. These will all be purchased by NAMA (National Asset Management Agency) at an appropriate price. The loan books will have to be worked out and reviewed in relation to each of the banks to ensure that the appropriate loans are transferred and that the banks are cleared of the identified riskiest loan portfolios. This process is subject to EU State aid approval.


3.5 How will the write off impact on the banks’ capital ratios?

The Banks will be cleansed of risky categories of loans at a price less than their current carrying value on the banks’ balance sheets. This will be financed by the issue of Government bonds. The impact of the difference or write-down on the banks capital ratios will undoubtedly affect individuals bank’s capital positions, but so will the reduction in ‘Risk Weighted Assets’ that will arise for the banks in replacing commercial assets with Government bonds. Moreover, market expectations of capital requirements for the new ‘cleansed’ banks will be different to what would be expected for banks which had not been through the same process, and there may be opportunities for banks to generate core capital through appropriate balance sheet restructuring. Overall, therefore, the capital impacts on individual banks cannot be established in advance of the detailed valuation and pricing process between NAMA and the institutions.
It should be noted that it has already been decided that there is a capital requirement in relation to at least the two institutions in respect of which announcements were made in mid-February – AIB and Bank of Ireland. In the case of Bank of Ireland this recapitalisation process has already been finalised at the end of March and in the AIB case due diligence work is ongoing.
3.6

Hai fatto bene ad intervenire con questa precisazione, in quanto i bond Tier 1 o altri subordinati emessi dalle banche irlandesi non sono coinvolti nel progetto NAMA (chiamiamolo così).

Come chiarito anche nei post precedenti, questo progetto mira a ripulire le banche dei finanziamenti erogati al comparto immobiliare che siano incagliati o a rischio incaglio, secondo i meccanismi che hai ripreso dal sito del NAMA.

I soli problemi che potrebbero venire per bond Tier 1 o subordinati sarebbero generati di sponda dal fatto che non si sa a quale prezzo i loans verranno comprati da NAMA: tale prezzo comporterà l'esigenza da parte delle banche di effettuare delle svalutazioni a fronte delle quali le banche potrebbero dover ricapitalizzare (diciamo che la circostanza è piuttosto probabile a verificarsi).

Può succedere che, a fronte di una nuova ricapitalizzazione da parte dello Stato, la UE dia il via libera a condizione che - faccio per dire - sia sospeso il pagamento delle cedole sui Tier 1 di BOI e di Allied Irish.

Dunque i rischi, per quel che è dato di capire ad oggi, sono di questo tipo, e non è detto che si avverino, ossia può darsi che vengano trovate soluzioni per ricapitalizzare che non coinvolgano i Tier 1 delle due banche non ancora nazionalizzate per intero.

 

[Imark]

A proposito, ho trovato una indicazione interessante: gli asset che NAMA dovrebbe rilevare per un nominale di 90 mld euro, sono pari al 54% del PIL irlandese del 2008, e ad una quota superiore di quello 2009, se si avvereranno le stime dell'Economist per un calo del PIL quest'anno pari al 7,7% su quello dell'anno precedente...

http://www.economist.com/countries/ireland/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Economic Data

 

[Topgun1976]

DUBLIN (Reuters) - The Irish government has issued a tender seeking a derivatives valuer for its "bad bank," following invitations for firms to assess the loans and real estate collateral it will acquire, tender documents have shown.
The publication of the tenders is one of the clearest signs yet that Dublin is moving closer to launching the National Asset Management Agency to cleanse banks of up to 90 billion euros ($127 billion) of risky property development loans.
The latest tender for the appointment of a derivatives service provider to NAMA was published on Wednesday on the public procurement website www.etenders.gov.ie.
"It is envisaged that one firm will be appointed to conduct the valuation of derivative positions transferring from all of the participating institutions," the National Treasury Management Agency, which will oversee NAMA, said in the tender document.
A document published on August 5 indicated the NTMA was seeking to appoint firms to assist in the valuation of other bank assets such as loans and credit facilities to be acquired by NAMA from banks including Allied Irish Banks (ALBK.I) and Bank of Ireland (BKIR.I).
A tender on July 31 was seeking real estate valuers to assist NAMA, including some in Britain and the United States.
The Irish Independent newspaper reported on Thursday that NAMA will control around 3 billion euros worth of land and property in the United States.
It had already been known that around a quarter NAMA's assets would be based in the UK, mainly in London and Northern Ireland.
The government last month published a draft law giving NAMA wide powers to deal with the legacy of a devastating property crash but it will only give clues on costs and its valuation method when parliament starts debating it from September 16.

 

[Imark]

Intanto la questione di quale prezzo debba essere pagato da NAMA per l'acquisto dei 90 mld euro di asset "tossici" in pancia alle banche irlandesi suscita un vivace dibattito politico in vista dell'approdo della vicenda al dibattito parlamentare mirato all'approvazione della legislazione di riferimento.

Un numero piuttosto elevato di economisti ha chiesto al governo di non acquistare gli asset al valore nominale e di chiamare i creditori delle banche a rispondere delle sorti dei propri investimenti. Taluni ipotizzano a questo fine una nazionalizzazione integrale e a tempo delle banche nelle quali lo Stato ha una quota azionaria di minoranza.

Irish economists' opposition to "bad bank" grows

Wed Aug 26, 2009 2:50am EDT

DUBLIN, Aug 26 (Reuters) - The Irish government should pay no more than current market prices for the property loans it plans to transfer into its "bad bank", a group of 46 academic economists said on Wednesday.

Ireland's plans to take risky commercial property loans with a nominal value of 90 billion euros from its banks and transfer them to a state-run National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) have generated much controversy, particularly over the price Dublin will pay for the assets.

Finance Minister Brian Lenihan has said he will value the loans, some of which are still performing, to reflect their "long-term economic value" and has said he will not force banks to accept fire-sale prices.

But the economists, writing in The Irish Times newspaper, disagreed.

"We therefore urge the government to reconsider its approach to payment for loans to be taken into NAMA, to pay no more than current market value ... and to require the investors in the banks to bear some of the cost of restructuring the system."

The opinion piece was signed by 46 economists, more than twice the number that signed a similar article in April.

But Lenihan's economic advisor, Alan Ahearne, told The Irish Times that a number of claims in the article were incorrect, and he said most of the economists in the country had not signed the opinion piece, which was drafted by Professor Brian Lucey of Trinity College Dublin.

Lucey said he had contacted around 250 lecturers and none had disagreed with the views in the article. However, he said a number did not sign because they did not want to get involved in a back-and-forth exchange.

Lenihan will give investors an indication of the cost of NAMA when he opens a parliamentary debate on the plan on Sept. 16.

The 46 academic economists, along with some opposition parties, favour temporary nationalisation of the banks as a way of dealing with the legacy of a property crash that brought the Irish financial system to the brink of collapse. (Reporting by Carmel Crimmins, editing by Will Waterman)

 

[Imark]

E oggi il ministro delle finanze è accreditato di dichiarazioni alla stampa in cui postula, fra le diverse opzioni che saranno sottoposte al parlamento, ipotesi che prevedano che il pagamento dei bad asset rilevati dalle banche non sia effettuato in una unica soluzione, ma in più trance, e sia condizionato almeno in parte all'effettivo ritorno economico generato dalla gestione di questi asset, a protezione degli interessi dei taxpayers.

Le dimensioni dei bad asset (pari al 54% del PIL irlandese del 2008) pare infatti stiano suggerendo misure di contenimento del rischio a carico dello Stato.

Si vedrà poi cosa decideranno i parlamentari.

In sede di presentazione della legislazione, il governo dovrebbe anche indicare che genere di perdita determinerebbe per ciascuna istituzione finanziaria l'approvazione della normativa proposta.

Irish govt to stagger "bad bank" payments -report

Thu Aug 27, 2009 2:25am EDT


DUBLIN, Aug 27 (Reuters) - Ireland is considering holding back some of the payments to be given to banks who transfer property loans to a state-run asset management agency, the Irish Independent newspaper reported on Thursday.

The newspaper, citing government sources, said Finance Minister Brian Lenihan was examining a number of ways to protect the taxpayer, including staggering tens of billions of euros in payments to Bank of Ireland (BKIR.I), Allied Irish Banks (ALBK.I) and other lenders.

Rather than giving a lump sum up front to the banks for their risky property loans, part of the payment would be held back and only paid if the National Asset Management Agency's (NAMA) assets were giving a return, the newspaper reported.

The newspaper quoted Lenihan as saying a two-part pricing schedule was being looked at.

"Yes, that is one of the options. There are a number of options. I'd prefer not to go into them," he told the newspaper.

The Irish Independent also said Lenihan would give more information on the purchases of property loans with a nominal value of 90 billion euros when he introduces legislation setting up NAMA to parliament on Sept. 16.

The newspaper said in addition to the total to be paid for the banks' development loans, Lenihan may also give the amount for each bank separately and the loss this will mean for each institution. (Reporting by Carmel Crimmins, editing by Will Waterman)

 

[troppidebiti]

Addio "Ghiotti" cedoloni

Irish "bad bank" to pay 1.5 pct interest on bonds

 

[Imark]

Irish "bad bank" to pay 1.5 pct interest on bonds

Dal fronte irlandese dell'euro non vengono grandi notizie: si comincia a capire che la coperta è troppo corta per coprire tutti.

Si vorrebbe valutare gli asset ad un prezzo realistico (inferiore al nominale, comunque) e poi pagare in una prima soluzione l'80% del prezzo ed il resto solo in caso gli asset rilevati si rivelino performanti nel tempo.

Per fare fronte alle esigenze di ricapitalizzazione delle banche generate dai writedowns conseguenti agli acquisti dei loans sotto il valore nominale, l'opposizione politica propone la nazionalizzazione delle due banche non ancora del tutto nazionalizzate, ma non si può fare in quanto il rating sovrano irlandese si indebolirebbe e crescerebbero i costi di servizio del debito. Allora si prospetta che lo Stato salga nell'azionariato delle banche ma senza arrivare ad una piena nazionalizzazione.

Resta sullo sfondo il quesito se vi sarà un biglietto da fare pagare agli obbligazionisti subordinati delle banche... per gli azionisti la cosa diventa estremamente probabile...

http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/idUSLV60042320090831

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601102&sid=a9xPPrzQIZWo