Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 1 (3 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione Imark
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
tommy271
Forumer storico
Bene, ricordalo anche tra qualche giorno altrimenti ci dimentichiamo.
tommy271
Forumer storico
Athens Stocks Firmer Ahead Of Earnings Reports
ATHEX advances on Thursday ahead of the kick off of earnings reports by banks.
“In such an international environment, the ability of the Greek market (despite its already relative underperformance year to date compared to US and European major indices due to Greece’s sovereign worries) to decouple from international sentiment is limited. In any case, Greek major bank H1 2010 results announcements commencing today have the potential for some influence on market sentiments for the domestic market,” ATESecurities says in its morning report.
Given recent heavy losses and an improved performance in the US yesterday, the ASE is likely to stage a rebound today, Eurobank Securities says.
“With the Athens market closing once again on its daily lows, following 15 trading sessions with cummulative losses of 14.7%, we expect the GI to provide investors with a technical ascending reaction, at least at the start of the session, also assisted by yesterday΄s US markets comeback. To consider, however, that this upward move will continue mainly depends on whether bidside interest will remain strong following the opening 60 min of the session, as an increase of trading activity is considered vital in order for the GI to react. In this context, we expect the Athens market to open towards the 1,535 (pivot point) or even the 1,550 (1st resistance level) units should demand remain strong, with the Index΄s intraday support level standing at 1,500 units,” Pegasus Securities notes.
Across the board, the General Index rises 0.89% at 1,529.53 on a total turnover of 20.21 mil. euro.
(Capital.gr)
ATHEX advances on Thursday ahead of the kick off of earnings reports by banks.
“In such an international environment, the ability of the Greek market (despite its already relative underperformance year to date compared to US and European major indices due to Greece’s sovereign worries) to decouple from international sentiment is limited. In any case, Greek major bank H1 2010 results announcements commencing today have the potential for some influence on market sentiments for the domestic market,” ATESecurities says in its morning report.
Given recent heavy losses and an improved performance in the US yesterday, the ASE is likely to stage a rebound today, Eurobank Securities says.
“With the Athens market closing once again on its daily lows, following 15 trading sessions with cummulative losses of 14.7%, we expect the GI to provide investors with a technical ascending reaction, at least at the start of the session, also assisted by yesterday΄s US markets comeback. To consider, however, that this upward move will continue mainly depends on whether bidside interest will remain strong following the opening 60 min of the session, as an increase of trading activity is considered vital in order for the GI to react. In this context, we expect the Athens market to open towards the 1,535 (pivot point) or even the 1,550 (1st resistance level) units should demand remain strong, with the Index΄s intraday support level standing at 1,500 units,” Pegasus Securities notes.
Across the board, the General Index rises 0.89% at 1,529.53 on a total turnover of 20.21 mil. euro.
(Capital.gr)
tommy271
Forumer storico
Grecia/ Milioni di euro di pensioni pagati a persone decedute
11:06 - ESTERI- 26 AGO 2010
In alcuni casi pensionati morti da dieci anni
Atene, 26 ago. (Apcom) - Il Tesoro greco - portato sull'orlo del fallimento dalla crisi economica - ha versato milioni di euro di pensioni a persone decedute da anni: lo hanno reso noto fonti del Ministero del lavoro di Atene. Secondo i dati diffusi dal Ministero, sulle 500 persone registrate all'anagrafe di età superiore ai 110 anni, 300 risultavano morte in alcuni casi anche da dieci anni: sebbene in alcuni casi si configuri il reato di truffa da parte delle famiglie, che avrebbero omesso di informare le autorità del decesso del proprio congiunto, in altri il denaro è stato versato regolarmente sul conto ma mai ritirato. Il governo ha intenzione di aggiornare la lista delle pensioni, in particolare per quel che riguarda i falsi invalidi: la stima prevista dal Ministero è quella di risparmiare dagli 80 ai 100 milioni di euro l'anno di versamenti non dovuti. (fonte Afp)
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11:06 - ESTERI- 26 AGO 2010
In alcuni casi pensionati morti da dieci anni
Atene, 26 ago. (Apcom) - Il Tesoro greco - portato sull'orlo del fallimento dalla crisi economica - ha versato milioni di euro di pensioni a persone decedute da anni: lo hanno reso noto fonti del Ministero del lavoro di Atene. Secondo i dati diffusi dal Ministero, sulle 500 persone registrate all'anagrafe di età superiore ai 110 anni, 300 risultavano morte in alcuni casi anche da dieci anni: sebbene in alcuni casi si configuri il reato di truffa da parte delle famiglie, che avrebbero omesso di informare le autorità del decesso del proprio congiunto, in altri il denaro è stato versato regolarmente sul conto ma mai ritirato. Il governo ha intenzione di aggiornare la lista delle pensioni, in particolare per quel che riguarda i falsi invalidi: la stima prevista dal Ministero è quella di risparmiare dagli 80 ai 100 milioni di euro l'anno di versamenti non dovuti. (fonte Afp)
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tommy271
Forumer storico
Grecia: 9000 pensionatio ultracentenari
Ministro Lavoro, l'autorita' giudiziaria ha aperto inchiesta
26 agosto, 10:45
(ANSA) - ATENE, 26 AGO - In Grecia fra coloro che percepiscono una pensione figurano 8.500 persone con piu' di 100 anni e 500 che hanno superato i 110 anni. 'La Grecia e' un paese di centenari...''ha annunciato ironicamente il ministro del lavoro Andreas Loverdos precisando che l'autorita' giudiziaria ha aperto un'inchiesta ed ha gia' individuato 321 casi di persone defunte da diversi anni nel cui nome si continuava a percepire illegittimamente la pensione.
Ministro Lavoro, l'autorita' giudiziaria ha aperto inchiesta
26 agosto, 10:45
(ANSA) - ATENE, 26 AGO - In Grecia fra coloro che percepiscono una pensione figurano 8.500 persone con piu' di 100 anni e 500 che hanno superato i 110 anni. 'La Grecia e' un paese di centenari...''ha annunciato ironicamente il ministro del lavoro Andreas Loverdos precisando che l'autorita' giudiziaria ha aperto un'inchiesta ed ha gia' individuato 321 casi di persone defunte da diversi anni nel cui nome si continuava a percepire illegittimamente la pensione.
tommy271
Forumer storico
Recensioni: "Un libro accusa Goldman Sachs"
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/fina...iornalista-cinese-accusa-goldman-170842.shtml
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/fina...iornalista-cinese-accusa-goldman-170842.shtml
tommy271
Forumer storico
KKE on updated memorandum
The Communist Party of Greece's (KKE) Parliamentary group on Thursday demanded that the government unveil the updated memorandum - agreed to with the Commission, ECB and IMF -- in parliament.
KKE said the updated memorandum is not a simple elaboration of the already known memorandum but adds new reforms, an even more decisive step towards creating a cheaper work force.
"The struggle must continue even if growth materialises, because such will be frail. What is needed is a 'popular, decisive organisation and counterattack'," KKE opined
(Ana.gr)
The Communist Party of Greece's (KKE) Parliamentary group on Thursday demanded that the government unveil the updated memorandum - agreed to with the Commission, ECB and IMF -- in parliament.
KKE said the updated memorandum is not a simple elaboration of the already known memorandum but adds new reforms, an even more decisive step towards creating a cheaper work force.
"The struggle must continue even if growth materialises, because such will be frail. What is needed is a 'popular, decisive organisation and counterattack'," KKE opined
(Ana.gr)
Grisù
Forumer attivo
Per chi avesse voglia di leggere le considerazioni della BcE sulle relazioni tra debito e PIL.....
The euro area government deficit ratio is projected to increase rapidly from 0.6% of GDP in 2007 to 6.6% of GDP in 2011, while the gross government debt ratio is expected to surge from 66.0% to 88.5% of GDP during the same period. Overall, long-term fiscal sustainability in the euro area has deteriorated markedly and many expect that such effects would linger on in the medium and longer term. According
to the latest European Commission’s Sustainability Report, many euro area and EU countries (8 in the euro area and 13 EU countries) are now at high risk with regard to fiscal sustainability. This reflects large current fiscal deficits, high debt levels, an outlook of possibly subdued GDP growth, as well as the projected fiscal implications of population ageing which are considerable in some countries.
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1237.pdf
The euro area government deficit ratio is projected to increase rapidly from 0.6% of GDP in 2007 to 6.6% of GDP in 2011, while the gross government debt ratio is expected to surge from 66.0% to 88.5% of GDP during the same period. Overall, long-term fiscal sustainability in the euro area has deteriorated markedly and many expect that such effects would linger on in the medium and longer term. According
to the latest European Commission’s Sustainability Report, many euro area and EU countries (8 in the euro area and 13 EU countries) are now at high risk with regard to fiscal sustainability. This reflects large current fiscal deficits, high debt levels, an outlook of possibly subdued GDP growth, as well as the projected fiscal implications of population ageing which are considerable in some countries.
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1237.pdf
Grisù
Forumer attivo
Un poco datato ma espone la visione della BcE su quelli che sono i due scenari per la Grecia, il piano concordato nel memo (A) e quello eventuale di ristrutturazione (B).
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There is widespread scepticism among academics, financial market participants and observers about whether Plan A will work, particularly in the case of Greece, because it is too harsh, it imposes too many restrictions and would ultimately be politically unsustainable. Plan A is for countries with liquidity problems, while Greece – they argue – has solvency problems. If Plan A is not viable, there is only one alternative – Plan B.
It’s not very clear what Plan B is. Some regard it as an ‘orderly’ debt restructuring by Greece, with a substantial haircut for bondholders which would alleviate the country’s debt burden. A further elaboration of Plan B also entails a return to the national currency – the drachma – with a devaluation which would allow competitiveness to be restored. The consequences of Plan B have not been considered in detail by its proponents, but this is considered as a secondary issue, to be assessed at a later stage.
That’s the main reason for the difference of view. Those who have seriously studied Plan B, in all its details, know that it is not only much harsher for the people of Greece, and for the other European countries. What’s more, it doesn’t work. And because Plan B doesn’t work Plan A is the only viable solution. Let me elaborate on this.
First, experience has shown clearly that within an economically integrated area like the euro area a currency devaluation does not allow a growth stimulus that would support faster fiscal consolidation. The countries which devalued their currencies - as Italy did after leaving the ERM in September 1992 - suffered large interest rate spreads for a protracted period, because of renewed uncertainty about the monetary regime after the devaluation as well as about the fiscal system. After each devaluation, inflationary risks rapidly appeared, which required more monetary tightening than would be the case within the euro. In fact, several countries, like Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands, implemented their fiscal consolidation programmes while maintaining a stable exchange rate and a high primary budget surplus (i.e. net of debt interest). Another aspect that is often ignored is that the return to a national currency is not an event comparable to a change in parity in a pegged exchange rate regime. It would involve a renegotiation of all contracts, especially financial ones, within individual countries and between residents of different countries, with conflicting interests between debtors and creditors. In the event of legal disputes the international courts would be inclined to rule against the country which had decided to change its currency of denomination. This means that residents of that country would be severely affected by a change in the denomination of their contracts. A debtor country which imports capital from the rest of the euro area and devalues its currency would immediately suffer from an increase in its debt burden, which would exacerbate its difficulties. The country would probably suffer from an attempt by the population to maintain the euro as a unit of account and means of exchange, leading to parallel circulation.
To sum up, given the financial and economic integration achieved over recent years in the euro area, the possibilities voiced by some about a country abandoning the euro or about reconstituting the euro area in a reduced form would have highly detrimental effects on everyone, be they net creditors or debtors. It would be in nobody’s interest.
Even without leaving the euro area, a debt restructuring which would entail a substantial haircut for bondholders would hammer the domestic financial system and have serious repercussions on the real economy. As many countries which have undergone a restructuring in the past know well, access to capital markets would be impaired for many years, affecting not only the government but the whole country, with severe effects on the private sector. Finally, a restructuring would also have major political consequences if the loans made by the other euro area countries were not repaid in full. Greece’s access to the Cohesion Funds would most probably be called into question.
To sum up, Plan B would not put Greece in a sustainable position for the long term and would have a lasting economic impact on society. Greece would end up being politically marginalised in the European Union. The Greeks authorities know this.
Plan B would also have strong contagion effects on the other countries, starting from those with weaker fiscal positions, inside and outside the euro area. Such contagion effects have already materialised to some extent.
Plan A is preferable. All parties involved, both in Greece and in the euro area, have a strong incentive to ensure that it works.
ECB: The financial and fiscal crisis: a euro area perspective
-------------------------------------------------------
There is widespread scepticism among academics, financial market participants and observers about whether Plan A will work, particularly in the case of Greece, because it is too harsh, it imposes too many restrictions and would ultimately be politically unsustainable. Plan A is for countries with liquidity problems, while Greece – they argue – has solvency problems. If Plan A is not viable, there is only one alternative – Plan B.
It’s not very clear what Plan B is. Some regard it as an ‘orderly’ debt restructuring by Greece, with a substantial haircut for bondholders which would alleviate the country’s debt burden. A further elaboration of Plan B also entails a return to the national currency – the drachma – with a devaluation which would allow competitiveness to be restored. The consequences of Plan B have not been considered in detail by its proponents, but this is considered as a secondary issue, to be assessed at a later stage.
That’s the main reason for the difference of view. Those who have seriously studied Plan B, in all its details, know that it is not only much harsher for the people of Greece, and for the other European countries. What’s more, it doesn’t work. And because Plan B doesn’t work Plan A is the only viable solution. Let me elaborate on this.
First, experience has shown clearly that within an economically integrated area like the euro area a currency devaluation does not allow a growth stimulus that would support faster fiscal consolidation. The countries which devalued their currencies - as Italy did after leaving the ERM in September 1992 - suffered large interest rate spreads for a protracted period, because of renewed uncertainty about the monetary regime after the devaluation as well as about the fiscal system. After each devaluation, inflationary risks rapidly appeared, which required more monetary tightening than would be the case within the euro. In fact, several countries, like Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands, implemented their fiscal consolidation programmes while maintaining a stable exchange rate and a high primary budget surplus (i.e. net of debt interest). Another aspect that is often ignored is that the return to a national currency is not an event comparable to a change in parity in a pegged exchange rate regime. It would involve a renegotiation of all contracts, especially financial ones, within individual countries and between residents of different countries, with conflicting interests between debtors and creditors. In the event of legal disputes the international courts would be inclined to rule against the country which had decided to change its currency of denomination. This means that residents of that country would be severely affected by a change in the denomination of their contracts. A debtor country which imports capital from the rest of the euro area and devalues its currency would immediately suffer from an increase in its debt burden, which would exacerbate its difficulties. The country would probably suffer from an attempt by the population to maintain the euro as a unit of account and means of exchange, leading to parallel circulation.
To sum up, given the financial and economic integration achieved over recent years in the euro area, the possibilities voiced by some about a country abandoning the euro or about reconstituting the euro area in a reduced form would have highly detrimental effects on everyone, be they net creditors or debtors. It would be in nobody’s interest.
Even without leaving the euro area, a debt restructuring which would entail a substantial haircut for bondholders would hammer the domestic financial system and have serious repercussions on the real economy. As many countries which have undergone a restructuring in the past know well, access to capital markets would be impaired for many years, affecting not only the government but the whole country, with severe effects on the private sector. Finally, a restructuring would also have major political consequences if the loans made by the other euro area countries were not repaid in full. Greece’s access to the Cohesion Funds would most probably be called into question.
To sum up, Plan B would not put Greece in a sustainable position for the long term and would have a lasting economic impact on society. Greece would end up being politically marginalised in the European Union. The Greeks authorities know this.
Plan B would also have strong contagion effects on the other countries, starting from those with weaker fiscal positions, inside and outside the euro area. Such contagion effects have already materialised to some extent.
Plan A is preferable. All parties involved, both in Greece and in the euro area, have a strong incentive to ensure that it works.
ECB: The financial and fiscal crisis: a euro area perspective
- Stato